A BRIEF HISTORY OF EUROPE 

From 1789 to 1815 



THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

From 1862 to 1914 

By LUCIUS HUDSON HOLT and 
ALEXANDER WHEELER CHILTON 



AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
STUDY OF GOVERNMENT 

By LUCIUS HUDSON HOLT 



A BRIEF 

HISTORY OF EUROPE 

From 1789 to 1815 



BY 



LUCIUS HUDSON HOLT, Ph.D. (Yale) 

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL, UNITED STATES ARMY 

PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH AND HISTORY 

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY 

AND 

ALEXANDER WHEELER CHILTON 

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL, INFANTRY, UNITED STATES ARMY 

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF HISTORY 

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY 



WITH MAPS OF MILITARY CAMPAIGNS DRAWN BY 

WILLIAM KELLY HARRISON, Jr. 

CAPTAIN, CAVALRY, UNITED STATES ARMY 

INSTRUCTOR IN HISTORY 

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY 



Neto gorfe 

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

1919 

All rights reserved 



s& 






COPYEIGHT, 1919, 

By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. 



Set up and electrotyped. Published Au 



AlJli 2u !9!3 



NorfoooD $rtss 

J. S. Cushing Co. —Berwick & Smith Co. 

Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. 



©C1.A52062G 



PREFACE 

This history has been written in the endeavor to present 
in brief compass the story of the French Revolution and the 
Napoleonic period in proper perspective against the back- 
ground of general European conditions. 

In the account of the Revolution, the authors have 
attempted to give a fair and impartial estimate of causes and 
incidents, and to show the reaction of the other states of 
Europe against events in France. In the account of the 
Napoleonic period, they have tried, so far as space per- 
mitted, to keep before the reader the general European 
conditions as these affected, and as they were affected by, 
the policies of the great Emperor. 

A feature of special importance is the unusually complete 
presentation of the more important military operations of 
the period. Without going into technical details the authors 
have striven to give an accurate and readable account of 
the strategy and maneuvers by which the campaigns were 
won or lost. 

In the division of work, the authors have followed respec- 
tively the lines laid down in their previous book, European 
History, 1862-191^ The Professor of English and His- 
tory has undertaken the outline of the political history : 
the Assistant Professor that of the military campaigns. 

The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance ren- 
dered by Captain William Kelly Harrison, Jr., in drawing 
the maps for use in the study of the campaigns, and by 
Major Charles A. King, Jr., in reading the book in manu- 
script and offering many valuable suggestions. The polit- 



vi PREFACE 

ical maps have been reprinted from A Political and Social 
History of Modern Europe with the kind permission of the 
author, Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes. 

L. H. H. 

A. W. C. 

West Point, New York, 
July, 1919. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

CHAPTER I 

PAGES 

Eighteenth Century Europe 1-S7 

A. Social Conditions 2-1 1 

i. Central and Eastern Europe 
ii. Western Europe 

B. Economic Conditions 11-15 

C. Political Conditions • . . 15-37 

i. Russia 

ii. Austria 
iii. Prussia 
iv. The Holy Roman Empire 

v. England 

CHAPTER n 

France : The Beginnings of Revolution .... 38-67 

A. The Peasantry, the Bourgeoisie, the Nobility, and the 

Clergy 38-47 

B. Political Philosophy and its Authors .... 47-50 

C. The Government in France 50-55 

D. The Financial Crisis in France 55-60 

E. The Estates General and the Formation of the National 

Assembly 60-67 

CHAPTER III 

The National Assembly and the Revolution, 1789-1791 68-88 

A. Chief Figures in the Factions in France . . . 68-71 

B. The King and Nobility vs. the People .... 71-74 

C. Work of the National Assembly 74-76 

D. Removal of the King and the National Assembly to 

Paris 76-78 

E. Continuation of the Work of the National Assembly 

in Paris . ' 78-85 

i. Flight to Varennes 
ii. Massacre of the Champ de Mars 

F. The New Constitution, and the Dissolution of the 

National Assembly 85-88 

vii 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



CHAPTER IV 



Europe and the Revolution 

A. The Legislative Assembly . 

B. The Beginning of the War . 

C. Insurrection of the Paris Coirimune 

D. The War — To the Close of 1792 

E. The Convention .... 



PAGES 

89-111 
90-95 

95-100 
100-105 
105-108 
108-111 



CHAPTER V 

Foreign War: The Terror and the Reaction in France 112-136 

A. Military Operations, February, 1793-August, 1793 . 113-116 

B. The Convention, March-September, 1793 . . . 116-119 

C. Military Operations, August, 1793, to the End of the 

Year 119-124 

D. The Reign of Terror 124-127 

E. Military Operations, 1794 127-131 

F. The End of the Terror 131-136 

CHAPTER VI 

Contemporary Europe, 1789-1795 137-157 

A. Austria 137-144 

B. Prussia 144-148 

C. Spain 148-151 

D. England 151-157 

CHAPTER Vn 

The Rise of Napoleon 158-183 

A. The Directory — to the Coup d'Etat of September, 

1797 162-174 

i. Military Operations, Germany, 1796 
ii. Napoleon's Campaign in Italy, 1796-1797 

(a) Political Reconstruction in Italy 
iii. Government in France 

B. The Directory, 1797-1799 174-180 

i. The Campaign in Egypt and Syria, 1798-1799 

C. The Fall of the Directory 180-183 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



IX 



CHAPTER VIII 

The Consulate, November, 1799-December, 1804 

A. The Consulate and its Problems . 

B. Marengo and Hohenlinden .... 

C. Napoleon in International Diplomacy . 
i. Austria 

ii. Great Britain 

iii. Holland, Italy, and Switzerland 
iv. Germany 

D. Napoleon's Domestic Policies 



184-208 
187-189 
189-194 
194-201 



201-218 



CHAPTER IX 

Napoleon Versus the Third Coalition 

A. Formation of the Third Coalition 

B. Ulm and Austerlitz 

C. The Treaty of Pressburg 

D. Changes in Italy and Central Europe 



209-227 
213-217 
217-223 

223 
223-227 



CHAPTER X 

Napoleon Versus Prussia 228-249 

A. The Campaign in Prussia 230-235 

B. The Winter of 1806-1807 235-246 

i. The Polish Campaign 

ii. Diplomacy 

iii. Campaign in East Prussia 
iv. Diplomatic Manoeuvres 

v. The Campaign in East Prussia (Cont.) Friedland 

C. The Treaty of Tilsit 246-249 



CHAPTER XI 

The Duel with Great Britain 250-268 

A. The Continental Blockade 250-254 

B. Effect of Napoleon's Political and Economic Measures 254-258 

C. The Peninsular War 258-262 

D. The War with Austria 262-267 

E. The Peace of Schonbrunn 267-268 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



CHAPTER XII 

Napoleon at the Height ov His Power . 

A. Consolidation of Power 

i. Portugal and Spain 
ii. Sweden 
iii. Holland 
iv. Annexations 

B. Conditions in France .... 

C. International Situation 

i. Russia 

ii. Portugal and Spain 

D. Preparations for tlu> War against Russia 



PAOE3 

269-287 
269-274 



274-279 
279-285 



285-287 



CHAPTER XIH 

Tin: Campaign in Russia, \m> the Campaign of Leipzig 

A. The Russian Campaign .... 

B. The Aftermath of the Russian Campaign . 

C. The Leipzig Campaign, to the Armistice 

D. The Armistice 

E. The Leipzig Campaign, to the Battle of Leipzig 



288-308 
288-293 
298 298 
298-301 
301 303 
303-308 



CI I WTER XIV 



The First Abdication . 

A. The Frankfort Negotiations 

B. The Peninsular War . 

C. The Defense of France 

D. The First Abdication . 



309-323 
309-311 
311-314 
314-321 
321-323 



CHAPTER W 



The Last Phase . 

A. The First Restoration . 

B. The Government of France . 
('. Tin- Congress of Vienna 

1). The Hundred Days . 

i. The Waterloo Campaign 

E. The Final Surrender . 

F. The Second Restoration 



324-348 
324-326 
326-328 
328-33.'» 
886-844 

344 346 
346-348 



LIST OF MAPS 



Europe, 1775 .... 

Russian Expansion to 1796 

Rise of Prussia to 1786 . 

Revolutionary France, 1789-1795 

Campaign of 1792-1793 . 

Campaign of 1794-179.5 . 

Partitions of Poland, 1772-1795 

Italian Campaign, 1796-1797 (1) 

Italian Campaign, 1796-1797 (2) 

Egyptian Campaign . 

Campaign of Marengo and Ilohcnlindcn 

Battle of Marengo 

Campaign of Austerlitz and Wagram 

Battle of Austerlitz . 

The Italian States and the Germanies 

Jena and Leipzig 

Poland and East Prussia Campaign 

Battle of Friedland . 

Peninsular Campaign 

Campaign of Austerlitz and Wagram 

Battle of Wagram 

Europe under Napoleon, 1810 . 

Russian Campaign 

Jena and Leipzig 

Peninsular Campaign 

Campaign of 181 1-1815 

The Germanies .... 

Battle of Waterloo . 

Europe, 1815 .... 



Frontispiece 

BETWEEN PAGES 

24-25 
32-33 
52-53 
106-107 
128-129 
142-143 
166 L67 
168-169 
178-179 
100 I!) I 
192-193 
218-219 
222-223 
224-225 
232-233 
240-241 
244-245 
260-281 
264-265 
266-267 
272-273 
290-291 
304-305 
312-313 
316-317 
334-335 
342-343 
346-347 



THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

FROM 1789 TO 1815 

CHAPTER I 

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE 

To visualize life in the Europe of the latter half of the 
eighteenth century requires a vigorous and sustained effort 
of the imagination. So accustomed have we become to 
steam transportation by railways and ocean liners, to electric 
communication by telephone and telegraph, to machinery 
contrived for manufacture on a large scale, to huge centers 
of population with their complicated economic, social, and 
governmental problems, and to liberal and democratic 
ideas of the rights of the individual and the nature and 
purpose of political organization, that the consideration of 
conditions in Europe during the eighteenth century plunges 
us suddenly into a strange world. Though we all realize 
vaguely that there was a time when these modern marvels 
of communication, transportation, and manufacture, and 
these present-day conceptions of economic, social, and 
political issues, did not exist, we commonly fail to appreciate 
the nature and extent of the resulting differences in the 
conditions of individual, community, and national and 
international life. Yet in order to gain any adequate idea 
of the truly revolutionary nature of the events which con- 
vulsed Europe in the years between 1789 and 1815, and 
which were the birth-throes of a new epoch in modern his- 
tory, we must have in our minds the background of the 

B l 



2 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

social, economic, and political conditions in which these 
events found their origin and development. 

A. SOCIAL CONDITIONS 

Looking broadly at social conditions in Europe of the later 
eighteenth century, we distinguish at once a difference 
between life in eastern Europe and life in western Europe. 
We may draw a rough dividing line along the river Elbe 
and say that the countries to the east were more primitive, 
nearer to the feudal conditions, than those to the west. 
In their progress toward our modern form of civilized 
community life, Prussia, Austria, Poland, and Russia were 
distinctly behind the Rhine countries, the Netherlands, 
France, and Great Britain. The power of the nobles in the 
east exacted from the peasantry the utmost endurable 
burdens in labor and time : in the west this power had waned 
until it survived only in a number of petty traditional rights 
and privileges. The chasm between noble and serf in the 
east had become so wide through generations of oppression 
on the one hand and acquiescent suffering on the other 
that it seemed impossible to bridge : this chasm had been 
so nearly filled in the west by the growth of the bourgeoisie, 
the middle class of society, that passage from one stratum 
to another was easily possible. 

i. Central and Eastern Europe 

In the feudal ages, it will be remembered, human society 
in Europe consisted of the lords, or seigniors, on the one 
hand, and of the serfs on the other. The sole industry 
was agriculture : the sole profession war. The serfs tilled 
the land for the seignior : the seignior protected his serfs 
from attacks or depredations from their neighbors. Social 
conditions in the eighteenth century in central and eastern 
Europe had changed little from these conditions of the feudal 
ages. The sole industry was still agriculture : the only 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE 3 

classes of society were the nobles (including the clergy) and 
the peasant. The middle classes, the bourgeoisie, the small 
traders, business men, skilled and intelligent artisans, me- 
chanics, and the like, who have had a determining in- 
fluence in modern liberal and democratic states, constituted 
then an insignificant element in the population : they were 
the growth of a later period in these sections of Europe, a 
development subsequent to the French Revolution. In 
gaining our idea of the social conditions of the time we are 
treating, we may focus our attention upon the peasantry and 
the nobility, and give but a passing glance at others. 

The vast mass of the people were, of course, of the peasant 
class. These lived, not in nominal serfdom as a rule (except 
in Russia), but in an equivalent state of subjection to their 
respective lords. They were not free to leave their land 
without their lord's consent. They were required to spend 
from three to six days a week in the cultivation of their 
lord's land. Though in most countries they had technical 
ownership of their own small plots, they were not free to 
sell or mortgage their land and could work upon it only 
in such spare time as remained after they had satisfied the 
requirements of their lord. They could not marry without 
their lord's consent. Their children were at an early age 
pressed into their lord's service at a nominal wage and kept 
there until their maturity. They were housed in miserable 
hovels grouped in small villages. Indeed, it is difficult to 
exaggerate the misery and wretchedness in which the 
ordinary peasant beyond the Elbe passed his life. So many 
were the demands of his masters that often the only time 
he had to work upon his own small allotment of land was 
in the evening by the rays of the moon. At any instant 
he might be called from his plow and torn from his family 
to be plunged into a war whose cause he knew not and whose 
issue meant nothing to him. To be left in peace and to have 
time to exact a bare livelihood by unremitting toil upon his 
land were his highest expectations. The African slave in 



4 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

America had as many privileges and lived actually under 
better conditions than the peasant of a Prussian, Austrian, 
Polish, or Russian proprietor. 

The comfort, grandeur, and occupation of the nobles 
showed in startling contrast to the squalor of the peasantry. 
Though the absolute independence of the separate nobles in 
the feudal ages had very generally given way to the political 
overlordship of the Czar, Emperor, King, Prince, Archduke, 
or the like in large states, the lord continued to be in his own 
local lands an autocrat of unquestioned authority and power. 
He profited by the labors of his peasants. His household 
was provisioned by them. His armies were recruited from 
the able-bodied among them. His retinue of servants and 
attendants was drawn from their children. He maintained 
complete control over the administration of the villages 
within his domain. He was the court by whom cases might 
be decided, a court in which lie himself could not be sued 
without his own consent. He was at once executive, legis- 
lative, and judiciary in the affairs of his district. In the 
wider field of the state, he was a member of the only class 
which might influence the decisions of the monarch. He 
and his colleagues were the prop of the monarch, the body 
from which the sovereign chose advisers. If he so desired, 
and if his sovereign appreciated his qualities of mind and 
character, he might rise to high administrative and execu- 
tive positions in the state and wield an influence which 
would be felt beyond its borders. By right of his noble 
birth, all avenues of advancement were open to him. He 
naturally signalized his superior station in life by the size 
of his castle, the splendor of its appointments, and the re- 
finements of his social life. He regarded himself, and was 
regarded by others, as a privileged being living on a plane 
above that of the mass of men, subject to no will but his 
own and bound by no conventions save those which he 
might care to observe. An Austrian nobleman is reported 
to have said that no one below the rank of count deserved 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE 5 

the name of human being: though the statement may 
seem extreme, it not inaccurately represents the general 
opinion the nobility held of themselves and of others. 

Among the privileged classes we have included the clergy. 
It is difficult, however, to make such sweeping generaliza- 
tions concerning the clergy as we have concerning the 
peasantry and the nobility, for no such uniformity in re- 
ligion and in the position of the clergy existed. Many of 
the north German states, including Prussia, were pre- 
ponderatingly Protestant in religion. Austria, Poland, and 
the states of Italy were almost solidly Roman Catholic. 
The great Slav power, Russia, had become the chief repre- 
sentative of the Greek Catholic (the eastern branch of the 
Roman Catholic, which had developed along radically 
different lines from the Roman Catholic). In all the 
countries, however, the clergy were recognized as a priv- 
ileged order, ranking with the nobility. They were exempt 
from taxation and from forced labor, were able to own 
property, and were free to move from place to place with- 
out restriction. Many of the higher clergy had immense 
incomes, dwelt in great palaces with retinues of servants, 
and in every way adopted the mode of life of the lay nobility. 
The lower clergy, though often as poor as the mass of their 
flock, yet gained certain peculiar rights from the dignity of 
their calling. In states like Austria and Russia, where the 
government officially acknowledged and supported the re- 
ligion of the mass of the people, the hierarchy of the clergy 
were hand in glove with the administrative nobility. In 
Prussia, where nominal religious freedom was the official 
attitude, the clergy existed and worked more independently. 

The simplicity of the social system of the rural districts, 
divided as it was into nobility (including clergy) and peas- 
antry, was developed into complexity in the few towns and 
cities. We must keep in mind, however, that the towns 
and cities were few in number and relatively small in popu- 
lation. It was not until after the middle of the century 



(J THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

thai Berlin numbered over 100,000 inhabitants. Thecondi- 
tions we have outlined concerning the peasantry and no- 
bility, therefore, obtained mosl generally throughout the 
countries indicated. The extremes of the social scale in 
llit' towns and cities were similar to the two classes of the 
country, the nobles a I the top, and a large mass of ignorant 
ami wretched unskilled workers al the bottom. Tn between, 
however, were oilier classes practically unknown in the rural 

Communities. Above the unskilled workers were the arti- 
sans, commonly apprenticed to some master and looking 
forward to the time when they themselves in turn would 
be masters in their craft. Above the artisans were the 
masters, members of the "guild," or association of master 
workmen, each industry having a "^,'iiild" of its own. 
Above the masters, or guildmen, were the greal merchants 
and men of industry, often themselves graduates from the 
guilds into the wider opportunities of trade. Above the 
merchants were the professional men of all kinds, doctors, 
lawyers, scholars, and the like. And at the lop wore the 
nobility, controlling here as in the country the legislative, 
judicial, ami administrative details of the government, and 
regarding themselves as on a plane above thai of the re- 
mainder of society. 

Such, in broad general outlines, were the chief features 
of society as it existed in states to the (Nisi of the Elbe 
during the later eighteenth century. Though individual 
exceptions may be noted in different localities to each 
point mentioned, these outlines present a substantially 
accurate statement of the typical conditions in these terri- 
tories. We may, then, turn to the countries to the west. 

ii. Western Europe 
In western Europe as in eastern, agriculture was the chief 
industry of the mass of the people, but social conditions 
were different. Although the two classes in the rural dis- 
tricts, the nobility and the peasantry, still remained from 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE 7 

the feudal ages, I lie nobles retained merely shreds of their 
ancient power in the form of some special privileges, and 
the peasants suffered only a few humiliating reminders of 
l heir Conner serfdom. Ii has been customary to emphasize 
I lie misery and wrel chedness of I lie peasantry in France, yel 
in comparison with conditions to llie east of the Elbe, the 
French peasanl was well oil". 

Perhaps the mosl marked differences between the lot of 
the peasanl in I lie west and that of his brother in I lie east 
lay in his individual freedom and his ownership of land. 
The peasant of the west, excepl in the very lew eases where 
actual serfdom survived, was free to change his abode, his 
occupation, or both. More important, he could own land, 
and could sell, lease, bequeath, or mortgage his property. 
The thrifty peasants had taken advantage of their oppor- 
tunities. Ft is estimated thai more than one hall" of the 
arable land in France, for example, was owned by peasants. 
Many prosperous farmers rented large areas which they 
worked for their own advantage. Other peasants worked 
proprietor's lands on a share basis, being furnished with 
house, a part of the slock, and seeds, and being given one 
half of the annual produce. Though methods of cultiva- 
tion were primitive, and yields therefore relatively small, 
the pride of ownership, the individual independence, and 
the expectation of material gain made the western peas- 
ant's lot far brighter than that of his neighbors in the east. 

Such was the brighter side of the peasant's condition. 
Free though he was, the burdens laid upon him were ex- 
ceedingly heavy. He had in the first place humiliating 
reminders of his ancestors' position under the feudal system 
in I he nature of "seigniorial" charges or dues and of a 
certain amount of forced labor upon public works. The 
seigniorial charges wen' animal payments legally exacted by 
the lord from the peasanl proprietor for the use of I he land, 
or were dues paid to the lord in case the land were sold. 
These payments were not large, were, in fact, irritating 



8 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

rather than burdensome. The forced labor, called in 
France the corvee, consisted of from eight to forty days of 
work annually upon the roads. Here, again, this labor was 
not exorbitant, but it often' was imposed at a time when 
the peasant's work upon his crops was most necessary. In 
addition to these direct reminders of serfdom, heavy taxes 
were laid upon the peasants to provide income for the state 
and its ally, the church. Again using France as an ex- 
ample, we find the peasant called upon to pay the church 
tithes, amounting to about one twelfth of his annual prod- 
uce, the state taille, levied upon the supposed net income 
of the individual, the poll tax, and a tax called the vingtieme 
(the twentieth), which was expected to take five per cent of 
the income. It has been estimated that through these 
various taxes the government collected over fifty per cent 
of the peasant's net income — truly, a burdensome levy. 
Travelers in western Europe at this period bear testimony 
to the appearance of poverty of the peasantry, a poverty 
produced by the extortions of the tax collectors. And yet, 
knowing human nature and taking into account the crude 
and unscientific methods of levying taxes at that time, we 
may well believe that much of the appearance of poverty 
and wretchedness was external only. This was due to the 
efforts of the peasants themselves to deceive the govern- 
ment agents with respect to their actual material wealth 
and thus to escape heavy taxation. 

The superior station of the nobles in the west was attested, 
as has been said, by certain special rights and privileges. 
Important among these privileges was their exemption from 
most of the forms of taxation. They were, of course, by 
right of their inheritance from the feudal seigniors, exempt 
from any manner of labor upon public works, such as the 
corvee in France. Again, by the same right, they were 
exempt from taxes of the nature of the French taille, it 
being held in theory that they rendered direct military 
service to the monarch in the place of this tax. Further, 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE 9 

the prestige of their position enabled them to escape then- 
proper share of any income taxes. In short, their contri- 
butions to the finances of the state were ordinarily far less 
than their proportionate wealth warranted. The income of 
the nobles was derived from various sources. Many of 
them were landowners, and had an income from leasing 
their farms. Many others had a large and steady annual 
income from the feudal charges or dues. Many sought 
and gained lucrative sinecures in the service of their mon- 
arch. In western Europe, as in eastern, all avenues of 
advancement were open to those of noble birth. From 
the nobility the sovereigns chose their advisers and their 
administrators. A nobleman, if he so desired and if he 
basked in the favor of his ruler, might play a leading part 
in affairs of state and wield an influence not only in national 
but also in international affairs. Though genius might oc- 
casionally raise a man of mean birth to high position — a 
miracle unknown in the states of central and eastern Europe 
— the noble always had the inner track on the road to 
preferment. Naturally, in western as in eastern Europe, 
the nobleman's scale of living was consistent with his 
opinion of his own position. As western Europe had pro- 
gressed more rapidly in modern civilization than had eastern, 
the nobleman's life was graced with greater refinement and 
comfort. Paris had, since the time of Louis XIV, set the 
standard of fashion for all of Europe. The French noble- 
men were, therefore, always a step in advance of their 
neighbors in the art of living, and their influence was com- 
municated more directly to their immediate vicinity. The 
nobility of the west, then, constituted a privileged class as 
in the east. Their opportunities in the life of the nation 
were equally great. Their standard of living was well 
raised above that of the peasantry. But their power and 
authority (except where they entered administrative or 
executive positions under the sovereign) in their local dis- 
tricts had degenerated. 



10 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

The social status of the clergy was much the same in 
western Europe as in the states beyond the Elbe. They 
formed a privileged class, ranking with the nobility. The 
tithes, exacted under the authority of the state, went for 
their support. The higher clergy often enjoyed a princely 
income from this source, and followed the life of the fashion- 
able nobility in the towns and cities, even to participation 
in political affairs. The lower clergy, as the parish priests, 
were often underpaid and lived under conditions similar to 
those of the peasantry, but even these occupied a unique 
social position because of their calling. 

In the life of the towns and cities we find the most marked 
difference between social conditions in western Europe and 
those in eastern. Not only were these centers more nu- 
merous and more populous, but their activities were more 
varied and flourishing. Manufacturing had been arti- 
ficially stimulated in France by the economist Colbert in 
the reign of Louis XIV and had ever since had the special 
favor of the French government : consequently, in France 
and in the neighboring countries to which the inspiration 
passed, a large and increasing class of skilled and intelligent 
artisans formed an important element in the town popula- 
tion. Through the numerous ports on the North Sea, the 
English Channel, and the Atlantic seaboard, a constantly 
growing commerce passed, giving occupation to numerous 
keen, active, and prospering merchants. The increase in 
wealth and the rise in the general standard of living in the 
towns and cities made opportunity for the small trader, 
shopkeeper, and business man. The number of such multi- 
plied rapidly. Professional men, especially lawyers, flour- 
ished as the place, need, and opportunity presented them- 
selves. A vigorous intellectual life sprung up, involving 
not merely the nobility and the scholars, but all ranks of 
society. Thus developed a healthy and prosperous bour- 
geoisie, or middle class, in society, alert, intelligent, and 
interested in issues of the day. This class filled the gap 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE 11 

which existed in rural communities between the nobility 
and the peasantry. This class it was which, a few years 
later, in various countries of western Europe, supported 
and carried through the revolutionary movement initiated 
in France. 

B. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 

The first, and perhaps the most striking, general difference 
between economic conditions of today and of the later 
eighteenth century lies in the speed and volume of business. 
We work today at a pace and in a volume which would 
have astounded our forefathers. Lacking steam transpor- 
tation, facility for communication by telephone and tele- 
graph, and mechanical marvels for rapid production, the 
men of the eighteenth century conducted their mutual 
affairs in a more leisurely way. Economic methods in 
those days were by no means as complex and as highly 
specialized as they are today. 

The chief industry in Europe, as has been emphasized, 
was agriculture. At least ninety per cent of the people 
spent the major portion of their time in the cultivation of 
the land. Methods and implements, however, had im- 
proved little over those of primitive times. Although 
agricultural societies existed in which theorists propounded 
their ideas, and though a few notable inventions in tools 
had been made, neither the ideas of the theorists nor the 
improved tools of the inventors had been put to any gen- 
eral use. In a population so entirely dependent upon 
agriculture, thinkers realized, of course, the advisability of 
improving methods, but stood aghast at the inert weight 
of ignorance, stupidity, and tradition they would have to 
raise. To let matters go on as they had in the inherited 
inefficient way was easy : to force improvements and new 
methods upon a dull and unwilling peasantry was very 
difficult. Hence, no care was taken to select seed for the 
production of better and more prolific varieties. No use 



12 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

was made of what practical improvements in the imple- 
ments of cultivation had been invented. Little effort was 
exerted to breed better stock. Scientific knowledge of the 
proper use and the advantages of fertilizers was extremely 
limited. The peasant plowed and reaped with methods 
and tools not far different from those of ancient Egypt. 
His stock was commonly small and weak. The common 
method of restoring the yielding power of worked-out land 
was to leave it fallow, running to grass and weeds, for a 
year or more. Added to these inefficient methods was the 
natural apathy of a degraded and oppressed peasantry in 
the greater part of Europe. The peasant east of the Elbe, 
especially, had no incentive to do good work, for his labor 
was largely spent upon his lord's lands and the profits 
accrued to the proprietor. Slave labor has never proved 
efficient, and the labor of the peasantry in central and 
eastern Europe, under conditions so nearly those of slaves, 
gave most unsatisfactory results. Thus the art or science 
of agriculture was backward, the yields relatively small, 
and in a country given over to farming a large proportion 
of the population lived constantly on the verge of famine. 

When we turn from the vast agricultural lands to condi- 
tions in the towns and cities, we find industry still in the 
grip of the descendants of the medieval guilds, or corpora- 
tions of craftsmen. Although these guilds had declined 
materially from the power and influence they had wielded 
during the thirteenth and fourteenth century, they still 
remained the most conspicuous feature of industrial life. 
They were, in essence, close associations of the master 
workmen — one association for each craft — intended to 
preserve to their members a monopoly in the specific in- 
dustries. Thus the weavers' guild included all the master 
weavers and had the power to prevent others from engaging 
independently in the weaving industry ; the shoemakers' 
guild included all the master shoemakers and prevented 
others from engaging in this trade ; etc. Inasmuch as the 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE 13 

masters in the guild profited more as their numbers were 
less, they commonly put many obstacles in the way of the 
apprentices and journeymen who were ambitious them- 
selves to gain membership in the association. In this way, 
of course, the power of the masters of the guilds was being 
continually exerted to retard the natural expansion and 
development of industry. Free competition among skilled 
workmen was rendered impossible. No workman could 
learn a trade except through apprenticeship to a master in 
a guild ; and then, after years of work in this capacity, he 
might find himself barred from further progress by the 
selfishly conservative policy of the guild. 

Both in the trade in grain and in the management of 
industry, unwise and unscientific governmental interference 
tended to hinder natural expansion and development. This 
interference took two forms : first, taxation, and second, 
direct regulation. Owing to their great extravagance, and 
to the lack of any system in their finances, the various 
governments were always in dire need of more money. 
The obvious and easy way to get such money was by the 
levy of taxes upon production. Hence, increased industry 
in the fields or at the loom was met by increased tax burdens 
laid upon the producer. Ambition and enterprise were 
curbed ; trade lagged ; individual initiative was discouraged. 
Governments persisted in their short-sighted policy of kill- 
ing the geese that laid the golden eggs. Again, by govern- 
mental decrees the governments endeavored to regulate 
economic conditions. Though the intention was often 
laudable, the means adopted were usually the opposite. 
Thus in the effort to keep the price of grain low to con- 
sumers within a country, the government, ignoring the 
inexorable laws of supply and demand, would regulate the 
place and method of its sale and establish maximum and 
minimum prices. In an effort to standardize craft prod- 
ucts, the government, disregarding the possibilities of in- 
ventions which might materially change conditions of 



14 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

manufacture, would regulate the amount of raw material 
and the quality of the production. Thus both in the vast 
grain industry of the rural districts and in the limited 
manufacturing industry in the urban districts, we find 
progress checked at every turn by conditions within the 
individual industries and by governmental interference 
from without. 

When we pass from industry to commerce, that is, to a 
consideration of trade and exchange in the articles of pro- 
duction, we find similar handicaps to flourishing develop- 
ment. The selfishness of the separate states, and within 
the states the jealousy of their traditional rights on the 
part of the provinces, and within the provinces the inherited 
privileges of the seigniors, led to the imposition of tariffs 
at every boundary line and at most rivers and roads. Though 
the amount in question was in each instance relatively small, 
the total was considerable, not to mention the annoyance of 
having commodities held up from fifteen to thirty times 
between the producer and his market for payment of the 
tariffs. As examples of the amount and annoyance of the 
tariffs, the following will suffice : cloth exported from Car- 
cassonne in southern France to a market in northern France 
paid fifteen per cent of its value in tariffs on the way; 
goods going via the Rhine River from Strasbourg to Rotter- 
dam were stopped thirty times for the collection of tolls. 

The channels of international trade were clogged from 
similar causes. To be sure, British cloths of superior weave 
and texture found their way to the French, Prussian, and 
Russian markets, French silks and wines were exported, the 
Russians sent their furs, the Far East yielded its spices, 
and the colonies each its indigenous products. Govern- 
ments, however, watched commerce with a jealous eye, ever 
anxious to have the balance of trade in their own favor, yet 
constantly by unwise measures thwarting the natural growth 
and progress of international business. On one occasion a 
government, fearing the depletion of its food supply, would 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE 15 

forbid the exportation of grain, thus barring its citizens 
from the advantages of the higher price obtainable in a 
foreign market. Again, a government, desiring to force the 
use of home-made products, would impose a prohibitive 
tax upon certain grades of imported goods, thus arbitrarily 
shutting off the supply. Especially did each country jeal- 
ously regard its colonial markets as a commercial invest- 
ment, demanding an absolute monopoly of the colonies' 
trade in return for the military protection it afforded its 
distant subjects. Freedom of trade was the dream of un- 
regarded theorists. National selfishness, misdirected, forged 
the shackles which bound commerce. 

With the vast and easy current of international commerce 
in peaceful days of modern times in our mind, it is difficult 
to realize the narrow and sluggish flow of such commerce 
in the eighteenth century. We must keep in mind the 
increase in raw materials caused by improved scientific 
methods of cultivation, the increase of commodities manu- 
factured from such raw materials by modern machinery, 
the additional demand due to the added population, the 
opening and settling of new lands, the general rise in stand- 
ards of living, the modern speed of transportation by rail- 
road and steamship, and the wisdom of modern governments 
in breaking down customs barriers and adopting the prin- 
ciples of economists in their attitude toward industry and 
commerce. In the eighteenth century, economically, we are 
still in the dark ages. 

C. POLITICAL CONDITIONS 

When we speak of the politics of the later eighteenth 
century in Europe, we are dealing with a game which, 
before the French Revolution, only princes played. The 
ignorant peasant, in the greater part of Europe bound to 
the soil which he cultivated, was under the conditions in- 
capable of speculation either upon local, national, or inter- 
national politics. The bourgeoisie, distributed in the few 



K; THE IIISTOUY OF EUROPE 

towns and cities in general, servilely followed the lead *»r 
the nobles. The modem newspapers and periodicals, with 
their vast influence in the formation and guidance of an 
independenl and intelligent public opinion, were practically 
unknown. When we speak ;is we shall, following a 
natural method of the policy i>( Prussia, or of Austria. 
or of Russia, ii must be remembered thai we do not refer 
ii> I he policy of all, or even ot any considerable pari of the 
people of these countries, l>m to the policy arbitrarily 
adopted by the reigning prince and his small circle of noble 
advisers. The peasant had no policy : his only desire 

was to l>e allowed to gain his livelihood from his land. 
When he warred, il was in accordance with tin- demand 
of his lord, not because he had any Conception of the 
issues :il slake, or because, indeed, he had any special 
sense ^)( nationality or patriotism. The prince with his 
nobles played the game: I he mass of I he people blindly 
and unknowingly responded to his call and accepted the 
results. 

Not that princes we're unaware of the responsibilities of 
their position. The besl political theory of the lime de- 
manded thai the prince should exert himself for the good 
of his people. It was generally understood throughout the 

classes which spent any thought on the mailer al all that 
government existed for the furtherance of the safely, wel- 
fare, and prosperity of the governed. It was Frederick the 
Great of Prussia, one i)( the most arbitrary despots of the 
age, who proclaimed himself the first servant of his people. 

'The later eighteenth century was the period of what lias he- 
come known in history as the age of tin- Benevolenl or En- 
lightened Despots, i.e., of autocratic rulers who according 
to their lights administered I heir respective countries with 
an eye to the general good. Frederick the Great, King of 
Prussia from 1740 to 1786, Catherine II, commonly called 
Catherine the Great, who ruled Russia from 1762 to 1796, 
Joseph II, Holy Roman Emperor from !?(>.*> to L 790 and ruler 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE 17 

of Austria from L780 to 1790, Charles III, King of Spain 
from L759 to L788, Gustavus III of Sweden, and the Arch- 
duke Leopold of Tuscany, were all monarchs who were 
familiar with the advanced political philosophy of the day. 
They associated with themselves men of learning and judg- 
ment, and labored long and unceasingly along whal they 
believed to be the right lines for the improvement of gen- 
eral conditions within their respective countries. 

These monarchs did not, however, because of their ad- 
vanced and enlightened ideas of the responsibilities and 

duties of 1 1 1 < - i f- positions, ;il>;ilc one jot of their belief in the 

principle of autocracy. The modern theory that govern 

menl should be more or less direct ly under I he control of 

the governed grew from the ashes of the institutions de- 
stroyed in the fires of the great revolutionary period of 
1789 L815. This theory formed no part of the political 
philosophy of the period of the Benevolenl Despots. The 
autocrats of the earlier period still retained the conception 
of the divine origin of their power and of their superior 
ability for its exercise. 

From the conditions we have out lined above, it followed 
thai international polities consisted of intrigue among the 
various princes, each striving to add to his dominions re- 
gardless of the method of acquisition or the homogeneity 
of the resulting population. The principle of nationality, 

i.e., thai people of the same race had an inherent right lo 

a government of their own, was unrecognized before the 
French Revolution, was, indeed, an outgrowth of that 
Revolution. Racial boundaries were regarded as unim- 
portant. Princes intrigued to add to the number of "souls" 
in their territories irrespective of blood, language, or re- 
ligious affiliations. Austrian and Spanish princes ruled 
Italian stales; the Austrian house governed what is now 

Belgium; the unfeeling disruption of Poland in the latter 
half of the eighteenth century offered opportunities to 
Russia, Prussia, and Austria lo aggrandize themselves. 



18 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

No sympathy was extended to subjects thus living under, 
or brought under, the dominion of foreign princes. 

To summarize : In the later eighteenth century the great 
mass of the people were still unenlightened in a political 
sense and incapable of exerting pressure upon national 
policy by an intelligent public opinion. Personal liberty 
of thought, expression, movement for the people at large 
was unknown. States were thought of, named, directed, 
and typified by the persons of their sovereigns. Although 
monarchs in the leading states followed the dictates of 
advanced political philosophy in their performance of their 
duties, they still upheld the principle of autocracy and 
regarded themselves as divinely authorized and gifted for 
absolute government. And international politics consisted 
of the intrigues of princes to add to their dominions, irre- 
spective of ties of race, language, or religion. 

With these general ideas of political conditions in Europe 
of the later eighteenth century, we may now consider in 
more detail the governments of the leading separate states. 
These are of special importance in our study for, although 
as we have noted the princes had no body of intelligent 
public opinion upon which to rely, their governments con- 
trolled and directed the destinies of the millions of men 
in Europe. Historians are not without justification, there- 
fore, in devoting their space to the domestic and inter- 
national politics of the governments of the European states. 

We should first get an accurate notion of what the political 
subdivisions of Europe were in the latter half of the eight- 
eenth century. We may use the map of modern Europe as 
the basis of our description in order to gain at the same 
time an idea of the vast changes which have taken place. 
Beginning with the east, we find Russia then as in 1914 
the greatest state territorially in Europe. The Russia of 
that period, however, had not thrust herself so far into 
the heart of Europe as she has since done, for Finland was 
a part of Sweden, and Poland was a great independent 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE 19 

kingdom stretching from Posen to the Dnieper River, and 
from the Gulf of Riga to within about one hundred miles 
of Odessa on the Black Sea. To the southeast, the Turkish 
empire than embraced all of modern Rumania, Bulgaria, 
Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece, and stretched across the 
Bosphorus, as today, into Asia Minor. Central Europe 
was cut up into a large number of independent units, loosely 
bound politically into the so-called Holy Roman Empire. 
Of these independent units the most important were Prussia, 
stretching along the Baltic in the north, with scattered 
dependencies up to the Rhine, and Austria, including Hun- 
gary, to the south. The remaining units, ranging from 
insignificant states with a few thousand inhabitants to 
kingdoms of the size of Bavaria and Saxony, reached through 
central Europe from the Baltic and North seas to Switzer- 
land. In the south, the Italian peninsula was cut up into 
a number of independent states, the most important of 
which were the Kingdom of Naples, which reached from 
Naples south, and included the island of Sicily, the States 
of the Church, which extended in a broad belt from Rome 
northeastward to the head of the Adriatic Sea, and Venice, 
Lombardy (or Milan), and Piedmont (including the island 
of Sardinia) in the north. Denmark at this time possessed 
what is now Norway ; and Sweden, still retaining some 
remnants of its former greatness, had dominion over Fin- 
land. Tucked away in the northwest was independent 
Holland, and, south of it, the Austrian Netherlands. 
France, Spain, Portugal, and Great Britain had substan- 
tially the same boundaries as in modern times. 

Of the units we have mentioned, the most important 
actors in the drama we are about to follow were Russia, 
Prussia, Austria, France, and Great Britain. These states 
featured in events from beginning to end : the other states 
either furnished merely the battleground for the opposing 
forces, or injected themselves only occasionally into the 
action. Leaving France for extended treatment in the 



20 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

next chapter, we shall consider here political conditions 
in Russia, Austria, Prussia, and England, and outline the 
nature and government of the Holy Roman Empire. 

i. Russia 

Catherine II of Russia, Catherine the Great, succeeded 
to the throne in 1762 at the age of thirty-three, after a 
palace revolution engineered by her favorites had dethroned 
and assassinated her husband, Peter III. She was a Ger- 
man princess by birth, married to the Grand-duke Peter of 
Russia by the influence of Frederick the Great of Prussia 
with the idea of cementing friendship between Russia and 
Prussia. Her education, as was customary at the time in 
German princely families, was largely in the hands of French 
governesses and tutors. With great good sense, Catherine, 
once her future was determined for her, set out to fit her- 
self for her assured position of Empress of Russia. She 
learned thoroughly the Russian language, adopted the 
orthodox religion of the Greek church, accustomed herself 
to the conventions of Russian society, and tried to under- 
stand and appreciate the nature and needs of the Russian 
people. A woman of strong and determined character, she 
found herself wedded to a degraded degenerate without 
ambition, taste, or decency. She could not but despise 
him, and he in turn both hated and feared her. A few 
months after Peter's accession to the throne in January, 
1762, a group of her favorites, realizing his utter inefficiency 
and willing to advance their own fortunes by placing Cather- 
ine in sole power, proclaimed his deposition and Catherine's 
elevation to the throne as empress. A few days later 
Peter's death by "apoplexy" was announced. He was 
probably murdered. Though Catherine was not directly 
guilty of this murder, she connived at it. The assassins, 
though generally suspected, were never punished. 

Once empress, this German-born and French-eduoated 
woman showed a force of character and talent for govern- 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE 21 

merit which marked her as an unusual genius. Though 
her private life was immoral and the story of her amours 
was common gossip throughout the court society of Europe, 
though she had no innate love of the arts, she exhibited a 
practical sense and judgment in affairs of state and a passion 
for her adopted country which firmly secured her position 
in the opinions of her contemporaries and have won the 
admiration of succeeding generations. In internal affairs, 
Catherine was responsible for the organization of local 
administration in provincial governorships which persisted 
until the Russian Revolution in 1917. By this innovation 
the centralized administration, which had proved inefficient 
because of the vast extent and varied interests in the great 
empire, was replaced by a system under which the country 
was divided and subdivided for local government into 
areas which local governors and provincial governors-gen- 
eral could manage. The ultimate direction and control, 
of course, was to remain in the hands of the sovereign ; but 
the administration of purely local interests was under this 
system left in the hands of those who could best appreciate 
the needs and interests of the people concerned. The 
complete working out and installation of this system, thus 
so briefly stated, occupied twenty years of Catherine's 
reign. The system marked an immense advance in effi- 
ciency over the previous chaotic conditions. That it did 
not accomplish more perfect results in following genera- 
tions was due not so much to the faults of the theory as to 
the corruption and inefficiency of the officials. 

In her policy toward serfdom, Catherine theoretically 
advocated the uplift of the serf socially, economically, and 
politically, but in practice was forced by conditions to sup- 
port and continue the existing status. Government in 
Russia was to all intents and purposes carried on by a 
well-understood alliance between the sovereign and the 
nobility : anything which Catherine might do to antagonize 
the nobility would create an intense opposition. The no- 



•22 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

bility, naturally, since it lived upon serfdom, considered 
serfdom as a necessary institution in the empire. Hence, 
though Catherine endeavored to give an opportunity for 
improvement in the status of serfs, and actually appointed 
a Legislative Commission to deliberate upon ways and 
means for admitting serfs to limited rights in local affairs, 
the dead weight of the nobility thwarted all her efforts. 
It is to the credit of her reputation for liberalism, however, 
that she had the interests of the serfs so much at heart 
and actually projected schemes for their gradual emanci- 
pation. 

Again in the matter of the laws and the courts, Catherine 
showed advanced ideas. She felt the need of a thorough 
revision and codification of the body of existing law, and 
even went to the length of drawing up herself a draft of the 
general principles to be followed by the appointed commis- 
sion. Here, however, as in the case of serfdom, we have 
to credit Catherine with good intentions rather than with 
practical results, for the magnitude of the task prevented 
the commission from ever recommending radical changes. 

In her policy toward the economic life of the country, 
Catherine achieved more. She favored freedom of trade 
and manufacture, and, inasmuch as these interests were 
slight and did not materially affect the nobility, was able 
to promulgate decrees to bring about these conditions. 
She removed export duties, abolished monopolies, per- 
mitted without special authority the establishment of fac- 
tories by private enterprise, and appointed a Trade Com- 
mission to handle matters connected with commerce. 
Especially notable were her interest in the waterways 
throughout the country and her efforts for their improve- 
ment. Thus her policy in general stimulated the growth 
of industry and trade in the empire. Here, as in adminis- 
trative reforms, failure to achieve more was due to the 
incapacity and corruption of many of her agents and to 
the ignorance and stupidity of the masses of the population. 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE 23 

Catherine appreciated keenly the need for general edu- 
cational reforms throughout the country, but she was 
thwarted by the social and political conditions. Education 
on a scale involving the serfs was, in the opinion of the 
great landed nobility, impracticable and undesirable. She 
provided, however, special schools in St. Petersburg for 
the children of the privileged classes, cadet corps for the 
boys and boarding schools for the girls, and planned that 
the capital of each governmental district should have a 
national school. But in the latter project, as in so many 
others, she encountered obstacles of ignorance, super- 
stition, incapacity, indolence, and corruption, — obstacles 
which one sovereign in a single generation could not hope 
to overcome. The few schools she founded remain to her 
credit. The new universities and the system of national 
schools in the provinces never materialized. 

We have indicated in the above paragraphs a few of the 
interests which occupied the time of this notable sovereign. 
They give but a partial view of the diversity and activity 
of Catherine's mind and character. She journeyed con- 
stantly through her empire, striving to see in person the 
effects of her reforms. She created an Imperial Medical 
Commission and founded hospitals. Entirely irreligious by 
nature, she carried through a scheme for the secularization 
of the church lands and made the clergy the paid servants 
of the state, at the same time affirming her allegiance to 
the orthodox faith of the Russian people. She consistently 
endeavored to further the complete Russification of her 
non-Russian subjects. She wrote voluminously, not only 
official reports and instructions, but memoirs, columns in a 
fashionable periodical, plays (which were actually per- 
formed), and letters to a number of correspondents, of 
whom Frederick the Great and Voltaire were the most 
conspicuous. Force, brilliance, genius, vigor were apparent 
in all that Catherine did : she deserved the title of Catherine 
the Great. 



24 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

More notable than her internal reforms were her successes 
in her foreign policy. Russia's chief contemporaries were 
Turkey to the south and Prussia and Austria to the west. 
Hostility to Turkey was traditional in Russian circles : 
hostility to Prussia or Austria was spasmodic. It fell to 
Catherine's lot to carry through two wars against Turkey, 
and to intrigue successfully to keep the peace with Austria 
and Prussia, yet to continue clear of any alliance which 
would impede the independence of Russia. 

As a result of her first Turkish war (1768-1774), she 
separated considerable territory in the neighborhood of the 
Black Sea from her enemy. The most important parcel 
was the Crimea, which she definitely annexed in 1783. In 
1787 war with Turkey again broke out, and the great 
Russian victory at OchakofT (1788) insured Catherine in 
all the gains she had made before. Early in 1792 the treaty 
of peace was signed. 

The most important single event in the relations between 
Russia and her western contemporaries during Catherine's 
reign was the first partition of Poland. This once powerful 
country had fallen into a sad state of decay. Its govern- 
ment consisted of a sovereign elected by the nobility, and 
deliberative and legislative Diets composed of members of 
the nobility. Public political life consisted in the rivalries 
between the noble families in the struggle for power. These 
rivalries paralyzed government and kept the entire country 
in a state of continual anarchy. With the development of 
powerful and unified neighbors all around her, Poland was 
marked for extinction : only the jealousies of the great 
powers had saved her for generations past. For two cen- 
turies before Catherine came to the throne, the emissaries 
of European powers had intrigued in Polish politics. Cath- 
erine, therefore, was doing nothing new when she entered 
the arena. Her vigor and unscrupulous aggressiveness, 
however, gave Russian intrigue a new character. In 1764, 
by agreement with Frederick the Great, she secured the 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE 25 

election of her favorite, Stanislas Poniatowski, as King of 
Poland. She is credited with having suggested to Fred- 
erick's ambassador at St. Petersburg a few years later the 
advisability of dividing up Poland to their mutual profit. 
Austria, of course, had interests which could not be dis- 
regarded, so Maria Theresa was invited to join the agree- 
ment. In 1772, the first partition took place, Poland losing 
approximately one third of its land and population. Russia 
gained a rather more important section than either of the 
other countries. Catherine's policy justified itself in her 
eyes and in the eyes of Russian political circles by its 
success. 

Catherine's foreign policy thus consisted in the assertion 
of Russia's power for what she conceived to be Russian 
interests. She kept herself consistently free from alliances 
unless such alliances tended to yield national gain for 
Russia. Particularly in the case of Prussia and Austria, 
who individually were continually bidding for her friend- 
ship, did she stand aloof, preferring to render Russia's 
position stronger by the possibility of casting her weight 
on one side or the other at any critical moment. There 
was nothing altruistic in such policy, to be sure, but no 
governments at that time were altruistic. In the game of 
princes, Catherine played her hand exceedingly well. Her 
reign resulted not only in large and important territorial 
additions, but in an increase of prestige for Russian diplo- 
mats in the councils of central European statesmen. As 
Peter the Great is credited with having introduced Russia 
to western Europe, Catherine may not unjustly be credited 
with having established Russia's position among the great 
powers of Europe and having made Russia a factor hence- 
forth to be reckoned with in diplomacy. Catherine II was 
still Empress of Russia at the time the French Revolution 
broke out, not dying until 1796. 



26 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

ii. Austria 

The reins of government in the Austrian dominions at 
the time of the beginning of the French Revolution were in 
the hands of Joseph II, one of the most remarkable and 
thorough-going reformers among the Enlightened Despots. 
Born in 1741, instructed from his early boyhood in the 
mechanical details of governmental administration, thor- 
oughly acquainted and wholly in sympathy with the lib- 
eral and progressive political theories of his age, Joseph suc- 
ceeded to the throne upon the death of his mother, Maria 
Theresa, in 1780. He was then a man of thirty-nine, 
equipped, apparently, as few monarchs of his time were, 
with the mental qualities, the education, and the training 
suitable for success. lie was serious-minded, taking a 
noble view of the responsibilities of his position, and set 
out at once to make his reign notable for its reforms. Thor- 
oughly masterful and despotic in nature, he eagerly seized 
the opportunities of his position. Unfortunately for him 
and for conditions within Austria, lie lacked judgment, 
that judgment which saved Catherine of Russia so many 
times from attempting innovations which social and political 
conditions were too backward to permit. He failed to ap- 
preciate the nature and extent of the inertia and opposition 
his attempts to raise Austria from medievalism to modern- 
ism would face. Thus the record of his reign becomes a 
statement of noble failures, of well-intentioned decrees nulli- 
fied by sullen opposition and open rebellion. He died in 
1790, just after the outbreak of the French Revolution, a 
sad and embittered man. 

With all the enthusiasm of a heaven-sent reformer, Joseph, 
immediately he inherited the throne in 1780, initiated his 
measures to cure Austrian society of all its evils. In 1781, 
he issued a Patent of Tolerance, giving freedom of religious 
worship within his dominions. Along the same lines, he 
later decreed the suppression of the contemplative religious 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE 27 

orders, characterizing them as useless, and thus decreased 
largely the number of monasteries and convents. Further, 
he interested himself in the education of the secular clergy 
in his domains. In order to broaden such education, he 
replaced the regular diocesan seminaries by general semi- 
naries having a curriculum including secular as well as 
theological studies. By these changes, the education of 
the clergy was actually directed by the government. As 
was to be expected, these reforms incurred serious opposi- 
tion from the Catholic church. The Pope, departing from 
his custom, visited Vienna in person at one time to plead 
against Joseph's decrees. 

The sovereign endeavored to replace the old and outworn 
judicial system with one more suited to contemporary 
conditions. He therefore swept away the former courts 
and substituted an admirable uniform judicial hierarchy, 
ranging from numerous local courts in small areas to the 
High Court sitting in Vienna, with provisions for appeal 
from one rank of court to another. At the same time he 
decreed a radical revision of the penal code along enlight- 
ened lines, abolishing torture and the methods of the in- 
quisition and restricting materially I lie list of crimes punish- 
able by death. In no field was the wisdom of the monarch 
more clearly displayed than in these reforms, but he met 
the utmost difficulty in finding the men to carry through 
details of the new system. Its partial failure was due, 
not to faults in the Emperor's plan, but to the incapacity 
and lack of sympathy of his agents. 

The energetic reformer had been struck by the misery of 
the peasantry in his travels through Austria before he 
ascended the throne. The feudal system had held out 
longer therein than in other parts of Europe, except Russia. 
In large sections, as in Moravia and Bohemia, actual serf- 
dom still existed, with crushing burdens laid upon the 
peasantry by the overlords. Joseph undertook as Emperor 
to rectify and improve conditions. He abolished serfdom 



28 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

throughout the Slav provinces, .and secured to the peasants 
the right to own land, to marry according to their own 
choice, and to move freely from place to place. This re- 
form, so admirable in theory, turned an important body of 
the nobility, which he sorely needed for his political support, 
against him. We cannot but compare Catherine's action 
under similar circumstances : though theoretically favor- 
ing the emancipation of the serfs as whole-heartedly as 
Joseph did, her superior judgment warned her that emanci- 
pation was not a politically wise step under the conditions. 
Joseph, headstrong and confident of the correctness of his 
ideas, issued his decrees and suffered the consequences. 

The opposition to Joseph's government flamed forth in 
rebellion during the latter years of his reign. Between 
1787 and 1789 the Austrian Netherlands revolted, the 
leaders rising to defend their ancient institutions. The 
revolutionists were, indeed, the conservative element, led 
by clerical influence and aroused by the successive decrees 
for religious freedom and toleration and for the decrease of 
monastic Orders. These conservative elements were sup- 
ported by the administrative circles when Joseph's later 
decrees disrupted the existing judicial and civil system in 
the provinces. At the same time, serious trouble had 
arisen in Hungary. There, as in other parts of his dominion, 
Joseph's religious reforms had been badly received. Also, 
indications that he favored a more liberal treatment of the 
peasantry, and his innovations in the judicial and adminis- 
trative systems alarmed the privileged classes of Hungary, 
who had so long profited from the old conditions. He faced 
formidable disorders in this great and supremely important 
part of his empire. Though he was finally able, by pouring 
troops into the disaffected regions, to prevent disaster, the 
extent and force of the opposition broke his spirit. He 
finally awoke to the universal discontent which his well- 
intentioned reforms had created throughout his dominions. 
In bitterness of spirit he decreed at the end of January, 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE 29 

1790, the annulment of his reform measures (with the ex- 
ception of the abolition of serfdom) and the restoration of 
conditions in the empire to those existing at the time of 
his succession to the throne. A few weeks later he died, 
and was succeeded by his brother Leopold II. 

Austria as left by Joseph at the beginning of the French 
Revolution was internally in a dangerous state. The lack 
of tact and judgment on the part of the sovereign in carry- 
ing through his well-intentioned reforms had alienated the 
most powerful elements in the country. At a period when 
the government was shortly to need all its united resources 
to meet the inroads of a new and determined invader, 
Joseph's policies had actually tended toward national dis- 
organization. Austria was politically and militarily weaker 
at the close of his reign than she was at its beginning, less 
capable of resisting the forces set in motion by the French 
Revolution. 

iii. Prussia 

Frederick II, Frederick the Great, of Prussia, after a 
notable reign of forty-six years, died August 17, 1786. 
He was succeeded by his nephew, Frederick William II, a 
man then in his forty-second year. Frederick William II 
remained King of Prussia during the beginning and early 
years of the French Revolution. 

Frederick the Great had during his long reign raised 
Prussia from a small unregarded state in Europe to the 
position of one of the great continental powers. As a 
youth, he had greatly offended his martinet of a father, 
Frederick William, by his frivolous tastes, his apparent 
lack of interest in the army (so dear to the old King's 
heart), and his stubborn opposition to the royal plans for 
his education. As he grew to manhood, however, he yielded 
himself, after some terrible experiences of the results of his 
opposition, more fully to his father's will. From the time 
he was twenty years old (1732) until he ascended the throne 



30 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

(1740), he performed the duties set for him by Frederick 
William so thoroughly that he regained in a great degree 
the esteem of the King. At the same time, he continued 
to be a diligent student of philosophy, history, and 
poetry. 

At his accession to the throne upon the death of old 
Frederick William (May 31, 1740), all traces of the frivolity 
which had marked his youth were effaced. He took his 
position and his duties most seriously. Considering himself 
as the "first servant of his people," and believing it to be 
his duty to raise Prussia's prestige and place in Europe, he 
clearly discerned that the two foundations of his policy 
must be a sound financial system and a powerful army. 
He had inherited from his father a goodly state treasure 
and a strong army : these he undertook to increase in every 
practicable way. 

A few months after his accession, he plunged his country 
into war with the new Queen of Austria, Maria Theresa, in 
an attempt to enforce Prussia's traditional claims to Silesia. 
His victories in this First Silesia n War (1740-1742) and in 
the Second Silesian War which followed (1744-1745) gained 
him the territory he desired and focused the attention 
of European chancelleries upon him. He became the most 
famous sovereign of his time. 

His great military reputation was gained, however, in 
the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), brought on by Maria 
Theresa's attempt to regain Silesia. Emerging finally suc- 
cessful from this war, he had twenty-three years of peace 
at the close of his reign. 

His greatest qualities as a sovereign were displayed by 
his policies during this period of peace. His "enlighten- 
ment" in no way encouraged liberalism in government: 
he was absolute monarch in his dominions. Indeed, his 
success as absolute monarch increased the prestige of the 
institution in Prussia and rendered the people of that 
country less likely to appreciate the liberalism loosed by 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE 31 

the forces of the French Revolution. By Frederick's orders, 
all kinds of public questions, important and unimportant, 
were submitted to him for decision. H<- was a keen and 
accurate judge of character, and appointed to public offices 

a group of clear-thinking, hard-working, efficieni men, who 
were stimulated to do their besl by the knowledge that 
Frederick himself was always in touch with what they were 
doing. He personally took the mosl intense interest in 
the finances of his kingdom, gaining a reputation for nig- 
gardliness by his care for trifle- : yet his interest and care 
were responsible for the rapid recovery of Prussia after 
the disorganization and virtual bankruptcy of the country 
following the Seven Year-' War. He instituted plan- for 
the encouragement of agriculture throughout his land.-, 
going so far as to lend the army horses and to furnish seed 
to many landowners whose property had been devastated 
by war. and arranging for the draining and cultivation of 
huge areas of swamp land. He began measures for the 
codification of laws in his kingdom, a huge task not finished 
until eight year- after hi- death. Above all, he exerted 
himself continually to keep his army in the mosl perfect 
condition and training. 

His success as u sovereign was proverb according to the 
standards accepted at the time, by the changed conditions 
in Pru.v-ia at the time he died. He had found Prussia a 
state of four and a half million people, regarded as of the 
second rank politically in the councils of Europe: he left 
Prussia increased twofold in territory with a population of 
seven and oik- half million, recognized as one of the great 
continental powers. At his accession, Austria was the 
single great German power: at his death. Prussia -hared 
German power with Austria, beginning a rivalry which was 
not settled until the field of Koniggratz in 1866. He had 
waged the most devastating of war-, draining his country 
of both money and men : yet at his death hi- policies had 
so recouped Prussian resources that he left seventy million 



32 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

thalers in the state treasury (c. $40,000,000) and a per- 
fectly equipped and drilled army of 200,000. 

Frederick William II, whose task in carrying on Frederick 
the Great's policies was clearly outlined for him at his ac- 
cession, failed miserably. His reign marks the beginning 
of the descent of Prussia into the Valley of Humiliation, 
whose nadir was reached in Napoleon's time. Personally, 
he was a gentle, well-meaning man, but lacked force of 
character, aggressiveness, and a grasp of the principles of 
wise government and administration. A vein of mysticism 
in his nature made him a prey to the quacks who abounded 
at a period so famous for its spiritualists, alchemists, and 
pretended wise men. He became a member of one of the 
well-known secret "Orders" of the age, and allowed himself 
to be influenced in his policies by some of the charlatans in 
his "Order." Frederick the Great must have turned in 
his grave did he know the weakness and incapacity which 
his successor showed in governing the magnificent heritage 
he had bequeathed. 

Frederick William II's narrow religious views were in- 
dicated when he reversed the policy of tolerance followed 
by his predecessor and established a censorship to forbid 
discussion of all questions of religion or dogma. Candidates 
for the ministry had to submit to the most rigid tests of 
orthodoxy, and the famous philosopher Kant was repri- 
manded for the tone of one of his works. 

The immense fortune of over seventy million thalers 
accumulated by Frederick the Great in years of scrimping 
and sacrifice, Frederick William II dissolved in less than 
nine years. To gain a temporary popularity, he remitted 
many of the taxes his uncle had levied and replaced them 
by none other, so that the income of the government steadily 
decreased. Whereas the Prussia of Frederick the Great's 
time was financially independent, Prussia under Frederick 
William II descended to the financial status of her great 
rival, Austria, and became unable to carry on an aggressive 
policy without liberal subsidies from without. 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE 33 

Frederick the Great had taken the keenest interest in his 
army and had welded the interests of the officer class to 
those of the monarchy by his own leadership and by his 
grants of special privileges. Frederick William II took no 
interest in his army, turned its management over to a 
specially constituted board, made no effort to replace in- 
competent and superannuated officers, and allowed this 
great prop of the monarchy and insurance of Prussia's 
position in Europe to degenerate sadly in efficiency. 

Frederick the Great had shown especially by his brilliance 
in his foreign policy : his successor failed here as elsewhere. 
His vacillation and indecision cost Prussia advantages in 
the rivalry with Austria for prestige in the Holy Roman 
Empire. His futile expedition into Holland to maintain 
the part of his sister, the wife of the Prince of Orange, had 
no result for Prussia but to dissipate its resources. His 
neglect of the opportunities offered by the French Revolu- 
tion lowered Prussian prestige and lost him the chance to 
become practical arbiter in central Europe. 

Thus in every department of political affairs Frederick 
William II broke with the policies of his predecessor. The 
decay, or.ce begun, proceeded rapidly. By the time the 
French Revolution had been accomplished and Napoleon 
had assumed leadership, Prussia had become but an empty 
shell of the splendid state Frederick the Great had left. 
Frederick William II died November 16, 1797, leaving it 
to his son and successor, Frederick William III, to see the 
full fruition of his weak and incapable policies. 

iv. The Holy Roman Empire 

No account of political conditions on the continent would 
be sufficient which did not indicate the nature and govern- 
ment of the Holy Roman Empire. The title, it was once 
wittily said, was a misnomer, for this central European 
agglomeration of states was neither Holy, nor Roman, 
nor an empire. The territories nominally part of this 

D 



S4 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

"Empire," however, stretched through central Europe and 
played an important part in the events of the Revolutionary 

and Napoleonic period. 

Historically, the Holy Roman Empire came into being in 
962 A.i)., when Pope John XII crowned Otto I as Emperor, 
intending to renew under the auspices of the Catholic 
church an empire as broad and as great as that of ancient 
Rome. Actually, however, the Holy Roman Empire never 
fulfilled the Pope's intentions, for it lacked the organization, 
unity, and centralized power which characterized Rome at 
its height. The Holy Roman Emperor had but shadowy 
authority over the mighty feudal lords whose territories 
formed a part of the Empire. The tendency toward the 
development of individual political states was far greater 
than the tendency toward unity. If we were to trace in 
detail the history of the Holy Roman Empire from its 
foundation in !)(> c 2 to its condition at the outbreak of the 
French Revolution more than eight centuries later, we 
should record the various stages marking the decrease of 
central authority and the crystallization of state lines. 

By the end of the eighteenth century the disintegration 
of the Empire had proceeded far. Italy and Burgundy, 
which had originally been important components, had been 
detached, and only "The ( Jermanies," that is, the lands in 
central Europe peopled by Germans, remained. More than 
three hundred separate units could be counted, ranging 
from Austria and Prussia down to petty dukedoms or 
counties comprising a single castle with a miserable peasants' 
village at its base. Indeed, if we should include all the 
imperial baronies, the number of units would be over twelve 
hundred. 

The Empire, however, still maintained a kind of political 
organization. The central Diet was composed of three 
colleges, the college of the Electors, the college of Princes, 
and the college of Free Cities. In these colleges the sepa- 
rate units of the Empire had their representatives. When 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE 35 

all these colleges agreed upon anything — a most rare 
occasion — their decision was presented to the Emperor 
for his approval as a conclusum of the Empire. The P2m- 
peror himself was elected, not hereditary. The election 
for generations past, however, had fallen to the head of the 
Austrian Hapshurg house. 

Theoretically this organization might have been efficient : 
practically it was the reverse. The intense rivalry of Austria 
and Prussia, the selfish aims of each individual unit, the lack 
of any genuine national feeling orpal riotism, combined 
to defeat efficiency. The Holy Roman Emperor, though 
crowned with all the traditional ceremony, wielded in- 
fluence, not because he was head of I lie Holy Roman Empire, 
but because he was head of Austria. Any attempt of an 
Emperor to exert more than a nominal authority aroused 
instant opposition among the other states. Each individ- 
ual unit, instead of considering itself bound to further the 
interests of the Empire as a whole, sought only to secure 
its own independence and safety and to aggrandize itself 
if possible at the expense of its neighbors. Mutual jealousy 
and suspicion took the place of patriotism. "The Ger- 
manics" of 1789 revealed nothing of that solidarity which 
has marked the national life of the German Empire since 
1870-1871. 

v. England 

Across the English Channel, social, economic, and political 
life had developed along lines markedly different from those 
on the continent. The early abolition in the seventeenth 
century of the relics of feudalism had favored the develop- 
ment of the independent and self-relianl peasant-farmer. 
Though nobles retained their titles, they preserved none of 
those irritating and often burdensome privileges which on 
the continent distinguished the nobility as a class from the 
peasantry. Taxes were levied alike against noble and 
farmer, rich and poor. Forced and humiliating labor was 
unknown. Further, the successes in the Seven Years' War 



36 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

(1756-1763), under the inspiring leadership of William Pitt 
(Earl of Chatham), had stimulated national patriotism and 
had won for Great Britain vast colonial possessions in 
Canada and India. In industrial development, England 
was decidedly in advance of her neighbors across the channel. 
The forerunners of modern machinery, calculated to increase 
marvelously the speed and quantity of production, were just 
being introduced. The number and the prosperity of the 
bourgeoisie, the middle class, which formed the bulwark of 
liberal institutions in England, were increasing by leaps and 
bounds. Isolated as she was geographically from the conti- 
nent, England in her internal social and economic conditions 
had progressed much more rapidly than her contemporaries 
toward modern standards. 

The differences were even more notable, however, in the 
English political institutions. Whereas on the continent 
the sovereigns ruled in their respective states, in England 
Parliament ruled. England had already become a Limited 
Monarchy, as distinguished from the absolute monarchies 
which prevailed elsewhere throughout Europe. The unique 
features in the English system were the Parliament, the 
Cabinet, and the position and powers of the King. 

Although parliaments were not unknown in states upon 
the continent, they had played but an unimportant part in 
political life. In England, however, the Parliament had at 
the beginning of the eighteenth century signalized its con- 
trol over the government by passing over the legitimate 
claimant to the throne because he was a Catholic, and sum- 
moning George, Duke of Hanover, member of a collateral 
branch in the English line, because he was a Protestant. 
The ascendancy which the Parliament thus established 
over the person of the sovereign it never lost in succeeding 
years. An inner council of Parliament, called the Cabinet, 
composed of the leaders of the dominant political party 
and headed by the Prime Minister, determined the policies 
of the government, and presented them to the King for 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE 37 

confirmation. Although in theory the King retained the 
power of veto, in practice he was forced to accept the pro- 
posals of the Cabinet, supported as they were by a majority 
in Parliament. He could, of course, by his personal in- 
fluence and by the wisdom of his advice, wield an enormous 
influence with his Cabinet, but in the last analysis he could 
not resist its decision without running the risk of losing 
both his crown and his head. Thus where upon the conti- 
nent we have emphasized the character and policies of the 
sovereigns, in England we must consider both the sovereign 
and the Prime Minister — perhaps we should reverse the 
order and say, the Prime Minister and the sovereign. 

George III, the third in direct line from that Duke of 
Hanover who was summoned to the throne in 1714, began 
his reign in 1760 and was King through the entire revolu- 
tionary and Napoleonic period. Resenting the limitations 
upon his power, he endeavored under the existing forms to 
dictate himself the national policy. Ten years after his 
accession to the throne (1770) he obtained a subservient 
Prime Minister, Lord North, through whom he accomplished 
his purpose for a time. The tragic result of his policy for 
England was the loss of the American colonies by revolution 
in the years from 1775 to 1783. Before the final treaty was 
signed, the strength of parliamentary and public opposition 
forced Lord North from his office (1782). There then en- 
sued a bitter conflict in which the obstinate King endeavored 
again to obtain a ministry of his own choice, a conflict ended 
by practical victory for Parliament in 1784 when William 
Pitt, son of the Pitt who had been Prime Minister during 
the Seven Years' War, was appointed to head the govern- 
ment. The younger Pitt continued Prime Minister, with 
one break between 1801 and 1804, until his death in 1806. 
At his elevation he was a man of but twenty-four years of 
age. It was he, and not George III, who carried England 
through the strain occasioned by the French Revolution 
and the early years of the Napoleonic wars. 



CHAPTER u 
PRANCE mi' BEGINNINGS OF REVQL1 no\ 
Wjirn revolt flames up m .1 country, the spark th.it sets 

the tiiv i- USUall^ lost U> \ u-w in tlu- general ronll.i:;! .it u>u 
riuiN it WftS in Ki.unv Tlu- immediate CaUSC v .| [\\c revolu 

lion was tlu- vicious financial system (or lack of system) 
which had brought (he count rj face to race with national 
insolvency, but when the spirit oi rebellion was once aroused, 
.ill persons with real cur fancied grievances of .m\ kind 
pressed their demands for reforms Along .til lines ro ap 
preciate the causes ol the universality ot this revolution in 
Prance, then, we roust gam .1 clear understanding ut general 
conditions in the country .is well rs trace the successive 
incidents wlm-h brought on the financial crisis 



i mi i'i \s\\nn. nit novnoKoiais, ran 

NQBJ1 ITY, v \t» I'll t * t t m,\ 

1 /■■•.. /• ■ 

Hie Prance of the last quarter of the eighteenth century 
li.nl .i population of approximately M,000»0Q0, of whom 
ninety per cent were peasant farmers Serfdom had prac 
tu-.illv disappeared, not more than n million and r half of 
serfs remaining in the countrj . and the peasants had liberty 
of prison, freedom to roove from place to place, the right to 
in.uiN according to their choice, tit*' legal power to roake 
contracts a iu 1 u> own. mortgage, lease, and bequeath land. 
Indeed, .is .i class the peasantry had prospered in Prance, 
compared with the conditions of theii neighbors in other 
continental countries IPhough their lives seem pinched and 
barren Recording u> our modern standards, their natural 



PRANCE THE BEGINN] GS 0] REVOLUTION :)U 

industry and thrift yielded them ••« living and enabled large 
numbers to become landed proprietors on a small scale. Ji 
he been estimated thai one half the arable land in Prance 
belonged to the peasants, and records show that from year 
to year members of Mm- pea lanl cla w< re adding to their 
holdings by purcha i 

At the ame time the peasanl was subjecl to many irrital 
in," and humiliating reminders of the previous condition of 
servitude of his class. He alone bore the burden of the tax 
called the taille, levied directly in accordance with the up 
posed wealth of the individual. The nobility were exempl 
from paymenl of this tax on Ui<- theory thai they rendered 
dired military service to the King in il place; and the 
corporations of the towns u uallj paid ;i lump sum for ex 
emption. Liability for the taille had thus become, not 
in* rely a financial burden, bul ;i mark of social inferiority. 
The tax, and the conditions under which il was assessed and 
collected, were importanl among the "abuses" of which the 
l>< .1 .-mi s complained. 

A dired survival of the feudal condition wa the y i< m 
of charges or dues which descendants of the former eigniors 
were legally able to colled from the land of the pea anl .. 
Thus, although ;i peasanl tnighl own his land, and mort- 
gage, lease, or sell it, thai land was always subjecl to an 
annual paymenl to the lord. Often, too, in case of the ale 
of land, ;i definite proportion of the sale price wenl to tin- 
lord. Further, the peasanl was required to have In grain 
ground ;tt the lord's mill, his grapes pressed in the lord's 
winepress, his flour baked in the lord's oven. Foi each < r 
vic<- he had to pay ;i fee which went to the lord. And till 
further, ;it the importanl road and river crossings he had 
to pay toll which likewise swelled the lord' income. The 
actual financial burdens imposed upon the peasantry by 
these vestiges of feudalism were not for any single individual 
heavy, hut they were constanl and exa perating reminders 

of .in outlived system, whieh arOUSed the keenest l< <nl 



40 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

ment among the people. Throughout most of France, too, 
the lords themselves seldom exiled themselves from the 
pleasures of Paris to the vicinity of their ancestral estates. 
Hence, the collection of these dues and tolls lay in the 
hands of bailiffs whose efficiency was measured by the 
amounts they turned in. Constant trouble resulted. The 
disputes between the peasants and the lords' bailiffs over 
questions of seigniorial dues, charges, and tolls filled the 
rural courts and furnished a living for a host of petty lawyers. 

The peasant also resented the inherited privileges of the 
nobility in regard to hunting. This sport was legally re- 
served to the noble class, and game could not be harmed 
by the peasant. Each seignior, too, had the right to keep 
pigeons to an unlimited number, pigeons who found their 
food in the peasant's grain fields. Any peasant who killed 
one of these birds was liable to imprisonment. Such privi- 
leges were no slight matter to the peasant. Large tracts of 
arable land in the neighborhood of hunting preserves were 
left untitled. 

The peasants, again, were the only class of the population 
subject to the royal corvie, consisting of labor for from eight 
to forty days annually upon the highways. This labor was 
exacted often when the peasant's attention to his crops 
was most necessary. Exemption from the corvSe was a 
privilege of the nobility, and a natural right of the towns- 
people. This labor added one more grievance to the long 
list of complaints of the peasantry. 

Added to the burdens imposed upon the peasant by the 
survivals of feudalism were the taxes levied directly or in- 
directly upon him by the government. The capitation, or 
poll tax, was one, to be sure, levied upon all heads of house- 
holds in France, but its weight was proportionately heavier 
upon the peasant than upon the wealthy nobleman. The 
nobles were rated for this tax according to their personal 
declaration, and commonly escaped the greatest part of 
their legitimate share. The whole body of the clergy had 



FRANCE: THE BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION 41 

for years compounded with the government for its portion 
of the tax by a free gift (don gratuit) to the King at five- 
year intervals, such gift, however, amounting to much less 
than the tax would have yielded. The townspeople were 
more directly taxed, and paid more nearly their propor- 
tionate quota. But the peasant at the bottom of the scale, 
helpless individually to resist injustice, paid, it is estimated, 
eight times his just share of the burden. 

The indirect taxes, collected through duties laid upon 
such articles as tobacco, powder, saltpeter, were commonly 
farmed out by the government. By this system, the gov- 
ernment leased to the Farmers-General (as the leasees were 
called) for a lump sum paid in advance the right to assess 
and collect these duties, the Farmers-General profiting by 
the amount yielded by the duties over and above the sum 
paid to the government for the concession. The system 
gave enormous profits to the Farmers-General, who used 
all means to exact every possible payment from the people. 
The agents were intensely hated throughout all of France. 
Voltaire, in a circle where stories of famous robbers were 
being told, when himself pressed for a tale, started : "Once 
upon a time there was a Farmer-General;" then stopped, 
waited a moment, and added : "That is all." 

Such were some of the most noteworthy grievances, or 
"abuses, " under which the peasant suffered. By one writer 
he is termed "the beast of burden of the old regime." The 
brand of social and political inferiority and the greatest part 
of the weight of the direct and indirect taxation fell to his 
lot. He is estimated to have paid in excess of fifty per cent 
of his income in dues, charges, or imposts of one kind or an- 
other. That he thrived at all under such a burden is to be 
marveled at; that he was bitterly discontented is natural. 
He was ready for revolution so long as it offered the promise 
of lifting some of the burdens from him. He had no al- 
truist ie ideals. He held no high theories of government. 
His lack of education, inexperience in political affairs, and 



42 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

long unremitting toil in subordinate positions barred him 
from taking the initiative or leadership. Hut he had come 
to such a pass thai he was willing to throw himself whole- 
heartedly into any movement which might better the hard 
conditions of his ordinary life. Selfish as his motives must 
be acknowledged to have been, they were yet the keenest 
spur to his action, an all-sufficient reason which kept him 
true to the revolution, once started, from its beginning to 
its end. 

ii. The Bourgeoisie 

The peasantry, as we have said, were the most numerous 
and, on the whole, the most important element in the popu- 
lation of France: next in numbers and importance were 
the bourgeoisie. Bourgeoisie, derived from a word for 
town, originally was applied to the class of people living in 
towns as distinguished from those living in the country. 
By extension of meaning the word came to be used as a 
general term for persons o^i the middle class of society, i.e., 
belonging neither to the peasant or laboring classes nor 
to the nobility. In the bourgeoisie would be included 
merchants, shopkeepers, master craftsmen, and professional 
men of all kinds. In France in the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century this element contained some two mil- 
lion persons, concentrated almost wholly in about SO towns 
or cities containing 10, 000 or more inhabitants. 

What the bourgeoisie as compared with the peasantry 
lacked in numbers, it made up in intelligence, vigor, and 
prosperity. The average man of this class had need of 
sharp wits to keep his place in the keen competition with 
his fellows in business. He was well educated in the en- 
dowed schools of his town. lie was widely read in the 
social and political philosophy of the day. lie had a part, 
though small, in the local administration. lie had property 
and capital. From his class came the brightest lawyers, 
judges, doctors, professors, financiers, and civil adminis- 



FRANCE: THE BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION 43 

trators. A common class interest and property interest 
bound the individuals together. The bourgeoisie was the 
most recent, indeed the only new, development in French 
society since the feudal ages. Il was unfortunate for the 
monarchy thai il did not recognize and appreciate the 
qualities ol* I his new class. 

The very intelligence, vigor, and prosperity of the 
bourgeoisie made its members the most damning critics of 
the incapacity of the government. The bourgeois had no 
inherited awe or Tear of the nobility. He fell no special 
reverence for the members of the Catholic hierarchy. He 
had, indeed, come to feel that the person of the monarch 
himself did not have the peculiar sanctity which the Middle 
Ages had ascribed to him as vice-regent of God. He resented 
the arrogance and insolence of the nobles. lie was indig- 
nant at the narrow class distinction which barred him from 
commissions in the army and navy and from service in the 
diplomatic corps. He objected to the continual official in- 
terference with the normal course and development of in- 
dustry and commerce. He understood I lie waste in high 
places that was so largely responsible for the financial 
stringency of I lie country. lie sought for himself the wider 
opportunities that would come with the breaking of the 
traditional political and social barriers. lie wanted a 
greater share in the local and national government, a place 
proportionate to his wealth, ability, and education. 

So he, as well as the peasant, was ripe for a revolution 
which promised reforms. lie, however, had political 
theories, untested though they were by practical experi- 
ence, and was willing to assume the leadership. He had 
had his imagination fired by the success of the Americans 
in their revolt from 1775 to I7<S:> and was proud of France's 
part in helping them. The peasantry constituted the body 
of the French Revolution : the bourgeoisie, the brains. 

In all the towns and cities there existed a class, usually 
disregarded, known later as the proletariat. These people 



44 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

corresponded roughly to what we often call in modern days 
the submerged tenth of society, thai portion whoso normal 
life is passed in poverty and misery. They furnished the 
common laborers, the drivers, the hod carriers, the brick- 
layers, and the considerable multitude of mere scavengers 
and hangers-on of society. Withoul education or fixed 
occupation, they had no chance to rise in life, and lived 
on the verge of starvation most of tin* time. They were 
the first to suffer from any lessening of the food supply, 
and, with unscrupulous leadership, the most daring and 
unprincipled of all classes. Although as a factor in social 
conditions they are always important, they merit treat- 
ment here solely because of the significant part they played 
later in the darker and more terrible part of the Revolution. 

iii. The Nobility 

The nobility, the class which profited by the survivals of 
the feudal system, and which stood intrenched in its privi- 
leges, was certain to resist with all its power any measures 
of reform. The nobility, indeed, formed a select group in 
French social life, into which every child of noble parentage 
was born, and into which a few not of noble birth might 
enter by virtue of their official position. Although bitter 
animosity existed in many cases between the old nobility, 
tracing its lineage from former seigniors, and the new 
nobility, raised from the wealthy bourgeoisie by appoint- 
ment to, or by open purchase of, an official position, the 
nobles as a whole stood together in their opposition to any 
change in the political and social structure of the Kingdom. 
In numbers, however, they were unimportant compared 
with the peasantry and the bourgeoisie. There were prob- 
ably less than 150,001) of them in the Kingdom. 

The noble, however, had all the prestige of tradition and 
position. He alone was eligible for commissions in the 
army and navy and for diplomatic service. Since he was 
freely admitted to the presence of his sovereign, with whom 



FRANCE: THE BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION 45 

so many lucrative and importanl official appointments 
originated, he had unusual opportunities to secure good 
positions in the government. He profiled without labor on 
his part from the numerous seigniorial dues, charges, tolls, 
and the like, inherited from an obsolete system. Though 
he might not be rich, his social position was assured, and he 
often exhibited a careless arrogance and insolence before 

those whom lie considered his inferiors. lie had every 

motive in the existing conditions and in prospecl of future 
opportunities to uphold the old regime. 

And yet, the position of the noble in the country at large 
was not strong. Where his ancestors, the feudal lords, had 
lived in the country and identified themselves with their 
local districts, were known to and often beloved by their 
peasantry, the noble of Louis XVTs time found his sole 
pleasure in the towns, especially in Paris. He spoke of 
residence upon his ancestral estates as "exile.*' He was 
commonly represented there by his agent, or bailiff. Any 
personal consideration the peasantry might have felt in 
former times for their lords, they had long since ceased to 
have for the noble whom they rarely saw and whose power 
was exercised through the hands of the hated bailiff. Again, 
the noble was often not wealthy, thus lacking the power 
which comes from the ownership of considerable property. 
He was, however, prohibited by the narrow prejudices of 
his class from engaging in any lucrative calling. In many 
instances he presented to the prosperous bourgeoisie a 
pitiable if not contemptible figure, living on a miserable 
income, refusing to engage in any business or profession 
which might benefit him materially, yet arrogantly main- 
taining his social superiority. Another prejudice of his 
class forbade him to marry a woman not of noble birth. 
He could not, therefore, recruit his failing fortunes and 
extend his influence in other classes of society by marriage 
with a scion of one of the wealthy families of the bourgeoisie. 
Indeed, the noble was himself a useless survival of an obso- 



46 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

lete and, on the whole, discredited system. He was an 
isolated figure, clinging proudly to the frail glory of a title 
and an inherited social distinction, in the midst of the new 
and vigorous life surging around him. 

iv. The Clergy 

The interest of the Catholic church and its clergy were, 
like those of the noble class, bound up closely with the 
existing regime. The Catholic clergy were the sole author- 
ized spiritual teachers of the people. The Catholic religion 
was the only religion officially recognized by law. The 
clergy formed the highest of the three "estates," or political 
Orders, in the country. The church was vastly rich. 
Their wealth and their privileges made the clergy an ex- 
ceedingly import an I element in French life. They and 
their property were exempt from all manner of obligations 
or taxes, though they gave at five-year periods a free gift 
(don (j rat ii it) to the King which may be considered as a 
substitute for the taxes they might justly be expected to 
pay. They were said to own about one fifth of the soil of 
France, and to have revenue from the tithes (i.e., church 
taxes legally collected, amounting to approximately one 
twelfth of a man's income) and from their lands of almost 
200,000,000 livres a year (about $40,000,000). The mem- 
bers of the clergy numbered about one hundred and fifty 
thousand. 

The clergy, however, were not so united in their class 
consciousness as were the nobility and the bourgeoisie. A 
sharp line of demarcation existed between the higher clergy 
and the lower clergy. The latter, drawn mainly from 
people of the middle class or from the peasantry, worked 
hard in their parishes for miserable salaries. Though their 
education was not usually broad and liberal, they were 
ordinarily men of godly lives, sincerely devoted to their 
labors. As their time was spent wholly with the peas- 
antry and bourgeoisie of their parishes, they appreciated the 



FRANCE: THE BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION 47 

grievances people of these classes felt against the existing 
regime, and sympathized with them. 

The higher clergy, on the other hand, were appointed 
from the ranks of the nobility. Many of them enjoyed 
immense incomes from the tithes of parishes they seldom 
visited, and lived the life of the wealthy lay noble. They 
were more commonly courtiers and men of the world than 
pious and godly priests. Conspicuous as I hey were be- 
cause of their position and profession, they too often cast 
discredit upon the church and their religion by their worldly 
lives. 

Thus the division of interests within the clergy paved the 
way for division when the critical days of revolution came. 
The lower clergy, with little to lose and everything to gain, 
were influenced by a sympathy with their parishioners, and 
a natural long-standing human jealousy of their superiors, 
to side with the peasantry and the bourgeoisie. The higher 
clergy, drawing their great incomes from sinecures in the gift 
of the sovereign, and allied by birth and association with 
the nobility, threw themselves enthusiastically into the 
cause of the King and the maintenance of the existing 
regime. 

B. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND ITS AUTHORS 

We have upon several occasions in the preceding pages 
referred to the political philosophy of the day. It is worth 
our time to outline briefly the nature of this philosophy and 
say something of the authors, for literature of this class 
furnished to leaders of the Revolution their ideas of what 
government and society should be. 

The marvelous achievements of scientists during the 
eighteenth century, including such work as that of Sir 
Isaac Newton, von Leibnitz, Joseph Priestley, Lavoisier, and 
Cavendish, aroused thinking men everywhere to the pos- 
sibility of new and theretofore unsuspected facts, not only 
in the world of matter, but in the world of politics and 



48 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

society. The logical reasoning by which the scientists ob- 
tained their results suggested that a similar reasoning ap- 
plied to social and political conditions might reveal flaws 
in the existing system and open the way to constructive 
theories of a better order of things. Hence, the writers in 
the field of what would now be called sociology, political 
economy, and political science attempted to apply the rule 
of reason to existing institutions, to measure everything by 
logical and rational standards. 

Nowhere did these rationalistic critics flourish more 
abundantly than in France — and hardly anywhere could 
they have found more to criticize. The most famous and 
most influential among them was Frangois Arouet, or, as 
he called himself, Francois Voltaire (1694-1778). En- 
dowed with a keen and active mind, boundless courage, 
and a ready pen, he attacked in poetry and prose the out- 
worn system in his own country. He resided for a time 
in England and conceived great enthusiasm for English 
methods and institutions, publishing Letters on the English 
in which he exalted the English at the expense of French 
conditions. He directed his attacks especially against the 
Catholic church and all the "abuses" that had grown up 
around it. In 1764 he published the Handy Philosophic 
Dictionary/, a collection of witty essays which brought upon 
him the condemnation of the Parlement of Paris for his 
attack upon "all that was sacred in religious teachings, 
mysteries, and authority." A voluminous writer, Voltaire 
returned again and again to the attack in his epics, dramas, 
essays, romances, and histories. Though often in danger 
of his life, he attained the greatest popularity among the 
bourgeoisie and the more liberal section of the nobility. 

Voltaire was magnificently supported in his crusade 
against ignorance, superstition, and injustice by his con- 
temporary, Denis Diderot (1713-1784). Diderot planned 
to produce an encyclopedia which should contain the latest 
advances men had made in the various branches of human 



FRANCE: THE BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION 49 

knowledge. He associated with himself in the enterprise 
the most noted scientists of the age. The completed work, 
in seventeen volumes and eleven additional volumes of 
engravings, proved to be a forceful rationalistic argument. 
Over four thousand copies were subscribed for at the time 
of its appearance. Thousands of readers were converted 
by its text to the principles of the liberal authors. 

Most radical among the writers in these fields, and most 
direct in his influence upon the theories which flourished 
during the Revolution, was Jean Jacques Rousseau (1713- 
1778). Rousseau presented in brilliant style arguments to 
support the theory that men were over-civilized, that all 
the evils of society developed from the fact that man had 
grown away from his natural environment and methods of 
life. He preached a return to nature, and his theme struck 
a responsive chord in many of his contemporaries wearied 
by the constant round of artificial duties and amusements. 
He clung to the same thesis when he attacked the consti- 
tution of society in his most famous book, The Social Con- 
tract (1761). He maintained that government, law, con- 
ventions were the result of a mutual compact in which all 
members of society had agreed at the dawn of history. He 
begins his book with the famous sentence: "Man is born 
free and yet is now everywhere in chains;" and endeavors 
to prove that the real sovereign should be the people, and 
that a republic is the best form of government for a state. 
We shall recognize the results of his teachings later in the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man, and in the promulgation 
of a Republic after the overthrow of the monarchy. 

Such were among the most notable writers who were 
stimulating thought and influencing public opinion among 
the bourgeoisie in the later eighteenth century. Along 
many other lines, too, the rule of reason, when applied to 
existing life, brought forth scathing criticism and con- 
structive suggestions. An Italian, Beccaria (1738-1794), 
in a famous volume entitled Crimes and Punishment, an- 



50 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

alyzed the judicial and penal codes and proposed reforms. 
In England, Adam Smith (1723-1790) published in 1770 
his Wealth of X at ions, from which the science of political 
economy dates. Montesquieu (1689-1755) in France dis- 
sected the legal and political constitution of France, and 
advocated the strict separation of the agencies for the 
executive, legislative, and judicial duties of government as 
the best guarantee against tyranny of the sovereign. These 
various writers had a wide audience among the bourgeoisie, 
and. too, among the most liberal elements in the nobility. 
It was the fashion tor the wealthier citizens of the bour- 
geoisie to keep abreast of the literature of the times. They 
thus kepi themselves alert, critical, and ready as a class 
with constructive theories of reform. 

('. THE GOVERNMENT IX FRANCE 

Unsatisfactory social or economic conditions invariably 
lead men in modern democratic states to blame the govern- 
ment. A financial panic, crop failure, military or diplo- 
matic reverse, or general industrial depression will change 
enough voles today to oust the representatives of a party 
from their control. Although politics as we know it did 
not exist in the absolute monarchy e>( France, the same 
tendency to Maine the government was rife among the dis- 
contented classes. It is well, therefore, to gain an idea of 
the main features of the system of government as it existed 
under Louis XVT. 

Under the ministries of Richelieu and Mazarin, the Kings 
ol France had contrived during the seventeenth century to 
break the power of the last of the feudal nobles and to 
centralize administration in the hands of the monarch. 
Louis XIV, after the death o( Mazarin in 1661, with un- 
usual ability personally governed the state, and by his 
success strengthened the influences making for centraliza- 
tion. In the years following his death in 1715. the system 
he had established remained essentially the same, though 



FRANCE: THE HKGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION 51 

his successors showed none of his capacity for the business 
of government. France was, therefore, a highly central- 
ized monarchy, the ultimate executive, legislative, and 
judicial power resting in the hands of the King alone. 

As behooved so high ;< personage, the King surrounded 
himself with the pomp and luxury of a brillianl court. 
Louis XIV had built for this purpose an enormous palace 
at Versailles, a sleepy little I own a dozen miles from Paris, 
and I here his successors commonly lived. The cost of 
maintenance of the royal household and courl was a heavy 
drain upon the resources of the country. "Tlie military 
and civil households of the King and of the royal family," 
writes E. J. Lowell, "are said lo have consisted of about 
fifteen thousand souls, and to have cosl forty-five million 
francs per annum." And the King added to this expense 
enormously by his generous distribution of gifts, appoint- 
ments, and pensions to his favorites. For he was the first 
gentleman of France, and il was his duly, as he conceived 
it, lo support liis position in befitting style and lo show 
prodigal liberality lo those of his own caste. In the fifteen 
years between the succession of Louis XVI to the throne 
and the outbreak of I he Revolution, years when France was 
in the grip of I he worst financial crisis in its history, the 
King is said lo have presented to his favorites more Ihau 
one hundred million dollars in gifts. 

Since no one man, however able, could handle the num- 
berless administrative details involved in the governmenl 
of a stale of twenty-five million people, a great complex 
bureaucracy of officials had developed for the King's assist- 
ance. The existence of this bureaucracy, however, in no 
manner limited the powers of the sovereign lo assume 
authority in any particular case. Al the head of the 
bureaucracy, and hence, ;il the head of actual government 
in France, was the King's Council. This Council, contain- 
ing about forty members including the several ministers of 
state and a number of persons without other official posi- 



52 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

tion, was divided for practical operation into four com- 
mittees, known respectively as the Council of State, the 
Council of Dispatches, the Council of Finance and Com- 
merce, and the Committee on War. The King was, of 
course, head of the Council, and actually presided at many 
of the sessions of the committees. The Council was the 
supreme executive, legislative, and judicial authority of 
the Kingdom, exercising its power always in the name of 
the King. All ma Iters of foreign policy or domestic con- 
cern were ultimately decided by the Council. Not only the 
important affairs of state, decisions of war or peace or taxes, 
but such petty matters as the building of a bridge or the 
repairing of a church in some small town, came up to the 
Council. 

The agents of the Council, directly appointed by and 
responsible to it, were known as Intendants. These num- 
bered thirty-two, each governing a district known as a 
Generalite, and assisted by a number of sub-delegates. As 
personal representatives of the royal power, the Intendant 
conducted the entire administration of his Generalite. He 
supervised the collection of the direct taxes, apportioning 
the share of his Generalite in the tattle among the several 
parishes, and named the individual dues in the capitation 
and the vingtieme; he had authority over the rural police 
and the militia; he had charge of public works and public 
charity ; and he was empowered to oversee all acts of local 
bodies in administration. He was not ordinarily one of 
the noble class, but rather a lawyer, trained in the admin- 
istrative service. As centralization of power in the hands 
of the King had proceeded in France, the authority, duties, 
and responsibilities of this royal agent had necessarily in- 
creased, until he and his colleagues had become regarded 
in their several Genera lites as the actual government of 
France. 

Between the Generalites, the largest administrative unit 
sometimes containing as many as two million people, and 



FRANCE: THE BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION 53 

the rural village, or commune, the smallest administrative 
unit, no subdivision existed. Outwardly the commune 
possessed some powers of self-government. The general 
assembly of all inhabitants paying the faille constituted 
nominally the supreme authority. This assembly had the 
management of the communal property ; was charged with 
providing repairs for bridges and churches ; and chose the 
communal officers. Actually, however, the assembly was 
a feeble body. The Intendant controlled its every act. He 
had power to summon it. He confirmed or disapproved its 
nominees to office. His sanction was necessary before any 
of its decisions or recommendations could be put into effect. 

Though the towns and cities had won powers more free 
from the control and interference of the Intendant of their 
Generalite, they had abuses peculiar to the conditions of 
their development. Each town had gained its own charter, 
giving it certain rights to self-government. These charters, 
however, were by no means uniform, so that some towns of 
importance had been able to obtain greater privileges than 
others. Ordinarily the two administrative bodies in town 
government were the General Assembly and the Town 
Council. Whereas originally the General Assembly had 
comprised most of the citizens of the town, its member- 
ship had gradually become extremely limited, often in- 
cluding not more than sixty or a hundred persons. In 
most cases, the great craft guilds formed the most important 
element in the membership. This small General Assembly 
elected the Town Council, which constituted the real execu- 
tive of the unit, with powers in local affairs, such as the 
purchase or sale of property, the making of loans, the di- 
rection of the town police, and the like. 

Thus, to summarize, the most notable feature of the ad- 
ministrative system in France was the existence of a great 
bureaucracy, with the King and the King's Council as its 
head and the thirty-two Intendants as its direct agents. 
Local self-government was not known or encouraged, ex- 



54 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

cept in the few towns where its exercise had fallen into the 
hands of a small number of citizens. The officials of this 
bureaucracy, though often hard-working and capable men, 
were overwhelmed by the mass of details of administration. 
Their government was inefficient. Public business was de- 
layed. Though they often realized their inability to do 
well all the tasks that fell to their lot. they were part of the 
system and were jealous of their position and powers, un- 
willing to intrust to others what they had to leave undone. 
The reputation of the government as a whole therefore 
suffered because of the faults inherent in the bureaucratic 
system. 

If we turn from the administrative branch to the equally 
important judicial branch we find a still worse state of 
affairs. Though the increase of royal power had naturally 
been accompanied by the creation of a system of royal 
courts, the previous courts had never been suppressed. No 
thoroughgoing reform and reconstitution of the judicial 
system had been attempted. Thus in addition to the royal 
courts were the ecclesiastical courts, administrating ecclesi- 
astical law; the numberless feudal courts, over which the 
descendants of the seigniors had jurisdiction; and the 
municipal courts of the towns and cities, guaranteed by 
their respective charters. The confusion of jurisdiction un- 
der such circumstances was great, and formed one of the 
grievances of the people at the time of the Revolution. 

We need notice for our purpose only the royal courts. 
These were of three degrees: (1) the Parlements; (2) the 
Presidium-; and (3) the Bailliages and SenechaussSes. The 
two lower grades handled civil and criminal cases of lesser 
importance. The highest grade, the Parlcmcnt, was not only 
the supreme court of the country but also had the tradi- 
tional function of registering the edicts of the King. This 
latter function was interpreted by the Parlements as giving 
them an implied right to criticize a new law before regis- 
tering it. With them it was a question, indeed, whether 



FRANCE: THE BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION 55 

they might not actually nullify a law by refusing to register 
it. Their beliefs with regard to their prerogatives in this 
connection, and their attempt to exercise these prerogatives, 
played an important part at one stage in the development 
of the Revolution. 

The most glaring fault in the judicial system, in addition 
to the multiplicity of courts of different authorities, was the 
lack of guarantees of personal freedom and of individual 
equality before the law. Many of the judgeships in the 
lower courts were openly bought and sold. The judges 
were venal. Wealthy suitors were thus able to influence 
decisions. The King and his Council had the right at any 
stage of proceedings to remove any case from the court in 
which it was being tried and have it tried before himself. 
The King also exercised the power of arbitrary imprison- 
ment by means of what was known as a lettre do cachet, 
that is, an order under the privy seal. Such conditions 
inspired among the people a thorough distrust of, and hatred 
for, the judicial system of the country. 

D. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN FRANCE 

Sharp as their grievances were, the people of France as a 
whole were dumb until a general financial crisis brought 
about conditions whereby their King afforded them oppor- 
tunity to speak. And when once they had formulated their 
grievances in accordance with the King's invitation, they 
were encouraged in the hope of reform. The actual prepa- 
ration of a statement of the "abuses" brought full conscious- 
ness of their nature and their magnitude, and inspired a 
resentment which brooked no opposition to projected re- 
forms. 

The general financial crisis which precipitated the move- 
ment for reform and the Revolution had its ultimate source 
in the extravagance of Louis XIV, who wasted the resources 
of the richest country on the continent in futile wars and 
personal luxury. His incapable successors, Louis XV and 



56 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

Louis XVI, failed to remedy the disorganized finances either 
by a reform in the system or by personal economy. The 

situation was serious at the accession of the well-inten- 
tioned but weak-willed Louis XVI in 1774. It became 
more acute as the years passed without decisive reform. It 
came to a climax in August of 178G, when the controller- 
genera] of the finance's was forced to inform the King that 
France was at the point of bankruptcy, and that nothing 
would save the slate hut a radical reform of the "whole 
public order." It was not, apparently, until August of 
178G that the King really began to appreciate the gravity 
of conditions. During the do/en years of his reign pre- 
ceding this date, Louis XVI's ministers had been able to 
keep the state going only by constant borrowing. A suc- 
cession of finance ministers had, with full knowledge of the 
deficits running between sixty and eighty million livres 
($12,000,000 and $10,000,000) a year, feared to disclose to 
the King and his Council the true state of affairs, and had 
covered up the deficits by floating loans. But the process 
could not keep on indefinitely. The credit of the govern- 
ment became so impaired that further loans could not be 
obtained. New measures had to be considered. 

When Calonne, the finance minister (Controller-general 
of Finance), revealed to Louis XVI the desperate condition 
of the treasury, he urged the assembly of a Council of 
Notables, composed of members of the three estates, or 
orders, of the Kingdom (the clergy, the nobility, the Third 
Estate or the commoners) appointed by the sovereign, to 
advise with the King concerning the levy of new taxes to 
meet the expenses of the government. There were pre- 
cedents for the summoning of such a Council, but these 
precedents were few and remote. The very act of assem- 
bling an advisory Council, however, constituted a confession 
of incapacity on the part of the King, and was not in accord 
with the theory of absolute power which Louis XIV had 
bequeathed. Louis XVI hesitated four months before act- 



FRANCE: THE BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION 57 

ing upon his finance minister's advice, allowing Calonne to 
struggle along in the interval as best he could. The fol- 
lowing December he yielded, appointed the members, and 
made preliminary arrangements for the meeting. 

The opening session of the Council of Notables was held 
February 22, 1787. Its membership in no wise represented 
proportionately the interests of the Kingdom, for out of a 
total of one hundred and forty-four, forty-six were nobles, 
eleven were of the clergy, twelve were members of tin- 
King's Council, and thirty-eight were magistrates of the 
higher courts, making altogether one hundred and seven 
whose interests were bound up with the existing system. 
Yet the meeting of this Council, unrepresentative though 
it was, marked so distinct a departure from previous 
methods that the entire country throbbed with interest and 
anticipation. 

Before this Council Calonne stated frankly the financial 
condition of the country and his projects for reform. He 
slated that one and a quarter billion of livrcs ($250,000,000) 
had been borrowed during the last decade and thai many 
sums were at the moment, when the treasury was empty, 
due to creditors. He announced that the existing taxes 
could not be increased, so that the only practical reform 
lay in the suppression of the privileges of the clergy and 
nobility, thus rendering persons of these classes liable to 
their proportionate share in the financial burden, and light- 
ening the load upon the bourgeoisie and peasantry. He 
proposed the suppression of the corvee and the vingtieme, 
the reduction of the faille and of some of the indirect taxes, 
the creation of provincial assemblies, freedom of grain trade 
from governmental regulation, and numerous economies in 
administration. All of these were measures to conciliate 
the people. At the same time he explained a scheme for 
new taxes, — a land-tax, payable by all landowners upon the 
assessed value of their lands, and a stamp-tax. 

The Council was aghast at Calonne's statements and 



58 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

proposals. Intense opposition at once developed. The 
abolition of their time-honored privileges was too bitter a 
pill for the clergy and nobility to swallow. Members ol' the 
Council called for a financial statement giving accurate 
figures and revenue and expenses, showed the insufficiency 
of Calonne's proposals to meet the immediate needs of the 
government, and argued the practicability of strict economy 
to overcome the deficits. Precious weeks passed away with 
nothing accomplished. 

In the meanwhile the nobility outside of the Council, in- 
censed at the proposals to suppress their privileges, intrigued 
to undermine Calonne's position with the King. The Queen, 
Marie Antoinette, was most active in these intrigues, and 
because of her influence over Louis XVI was responsible for 
their success. April S, 1787, the Controller-General was 
dismissed and at the end of the following month the Council 
of Notables was dissolved. Under a new minister, Lomenie 
de Brienne, appointed not Controller-General but Chief of 
the Committee of Finance in the King's Council, the King 
once more attempted government along the old familiar lines. 

The policy of Lomenie de Brienne precipitated a bitter 
conflict between the government and the Parlements. 
Lomenie 1 de Brienne was forced by the immediate neces- 
sities of the government to advise the King to order by 
edict some of the reforms and some of the taxes which the 
Council of Notables had refused. The Parlements, es- 
pecially the Parlement of Paris, registered the reforms, such 
as free grain trade 1 and the replacement of the corvee by a 
payment in money, without comment or criticism, but im- 
mediately opposed the levy of a stamp-tax, the first of the 
new taxes proposed. In the discussions the Parlement of 
Paris prepared an address to the King, declaring that only 
the nation as represented in the Estates General could 
authorize a new permanent, tax. The King and Lomenie 
de Brienne, before the question of the stamp-tax could be 
decided, forwarded to the Parlement for registration an edict 



FRANCE: THE BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION 50 

imposing a general land-tax, such as Calonne had presented 
to the Council of Notables. Again the Parlement refused 
to act, and demanded llie summoning of the Estates (Jen- 
oral. Thereupon I lie King, in accordance with ancient 
custom, held what was known as a lit de justice at Versailles, 
August 6, 1787, and declared by virtue of his supreme power 
that the edicts were registered. The Parlement of Paris 
protested, and formally declared the registration null and 
void, following up this declaration by renewed demands 
for a meeting of the Estates General. 

This conflict of authority between the Bang and the 
Parlements, especially the Parlement of Paris, aroused the 
bourgeoisie as no previous incident in the political situation 
had done. The bourgeoisie was composed of men of affairs, 
as we have seen, and they had during the past few troubled 
years analyzed the situation from a practical standpoint. 
They believed that the cause of the financial difficulty 
lay in the exemptions of the privileged classes and the ex- 
travagances of the government. They wauled reforms, 
and not new taxes. They welcomed the resistance of the 
Parlements as a step in the right direction, and applauded 
their stubbornness. h\ Paris, especially, where the most 
numerous, most prosperous, and most intelligent of the 
bourgeoisie dwelt, the Parlemenfs action was immensely 
popular. When the Parlement was temporarily banished 
from the capital, riots broke out in the streets. When the 
Parlement returned to Paris, September 24, 1787, and the 
King consented to suppress the edicts for a stamp-tax and a 
land-tax, the people welcomed it with the enthusiasm en- 
gendered by a sense of victory over the sovereign. 

The demand of the Parlement for a meeting of the Estates 
General had in particular struck a responsive chord in the 
hearts of the people. As popular respect for the authority 
and person of the King had declined during the demon- 
si rat ion of his incapacity in the preceding moid lis, popular 
hopes of the advantages to be gained by a meeting of the 



60 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

Estates General steadily rose. People knew little of what 
i In- Estates General were it had not been in session for 
a hundred and seventy-five years but looked forward to a 
body of representatives of the various classes of the people 
as better qualified than the King and his advisers to appre- 
ciate the popular grievances and formulate measures of re 
form. Before the continued pressure of opinion in influ- 
ential bourgeois circles! accompanied by increasing disorder 
amounting to actual rebellion in sections of the country, 
the King yielded. He seemed, indeed, to have no other 
recourse. His treasury was empty, the nation's creditors 
were pressing for payment, important elements of the people 
were demanding the convocation of the Estates Genera] l>e- 
fore they consented to new taxation, and his ministers had 
failed to find any way out of his difficulties. With some 
trepidation and regret, therefore, the King by royal decree 
of August 8, L788, announced the meeting of the Estates 
Genera] for May I, L789. 
In the interval between his decree and the meeting of t he 

Estates General, the King made a bid for popularity l>y 

dismissing Lomenie de Brienne. He replaced him with 
Jacques Necker, a wealthy Swiss-horn Protestant banker 
who as Director of the Treasury and Director-General of 
Finances in France from !??(> to 1 7 S 1 had gained the con- 
fidence of t he people by his practical reforms. This time, 
upon Lomenie de Brienne's retirement (August 25, 1788), 
Necker was made Minister of Finance and became a member 
of the King's Council. The bourgeoisie were enthusiastic 
over the appointment. Necker, however, made no attempt 
to do more than tide the government over until the meeting 
of the Estates General. By his personal influence he man- 
aged to scrape together small amounts of money from time 
to time in order io pay the most pressing demands upon the 
treasury, He in common with all the ministers and all the 
people could see no salvation except in the action of the 
Estates General, 



FRANCE: THE BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION 61 

E. THE ESTATES GENERAL AND THE FORMATION 
OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 

The elections to the Estates General wen- held during 
;i period of great distress throughout France. The harvest 
of I7KH was exceptionally poor. In the autumn the govern- 
inciil look measures in its mistaken efforts to alleviate 
conditions to restrict the grain trade. These regulations 
increased the panic, and, by causing the individual hoard- 
ing of grain in the rural districts, intensified the distress of 
the poorer urban population. In addition, all of western 
Europe experienced the most severe winter weather. The 
rivers were frozen, hindering the natural means of transport, 
.■Hid even the harbor of Marseilles in southern France was 
covered with ice. Many of the poor died of starvation and 
cold. Serious disturbances were common, not only among 
the proletariat in the cities, l>nl among the peasantry. Un- 
der the conditions the government hesitated to use ex- 
treme measures to suppress the disorders, !>ui its clemency 
was interpreted as weakness and actually resulted in the 
spread of disorder. Rumors of the speculation in food- 
si nfl's by members of I he minisl ry helped furl her to discredil 
the administration. The people were, therefore, in an ex- 
ceedingly dangerous frame of mind as the lime for the 
meeting of ilie Estates General drew near. 

Anxiously ;is I lie people of all classes had looked forward 
to the meeting of the Estates General, none could know the 
view its members would hike regarding their powers and 
duties. The last meeting had been in 1614, one hundred 
and seventy-five years before. Il had then been literally 
an assembly of the Estates, or Orders or ('kisses, of the 
Kingdom. The clergy, I'"' nobility, and the Third Estate, 
or Commonalty, each wilh its own interests and traditions, 
had acted separately. The assembly as ;i whole had no 
powers of legislation: il had merely the power to petition 
the King. On his side, the King was not hound to observe 



62 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

this petition. His absolute authority was subject to no 
restrictions from the Estates. Undoubtedly when Louis 
XVI summoned a meeting of the ancient Estates General 
for 1789 he expected a body of the same obsequious kind as 
that of 1614. In his summons he ordered in general terms 
that the deputies be instructed and empowered to propose, 
advise, and agree to measures concerning the needs of the 
state, the redress of grievances, and the general and in- 
dividual welfare, and he pledged himself to execute what 
should be agreed upon between him and the Estates. 
Firmly believing in his own unlimited authority, Louis XVI 
certainly did not intend in any way to surrender his own 
legislative or executive rights to the Estates. But he 
failed utterly to comprehend the changed conditions in 
France during the hundred and seventy-five years that had 
elapsed since the previous assembly. lie failed to estimate 
the different relative importance of the Estates, especially 
to realize the growth of the Third Estate, or Commonalty, 
in numbers, wealth, and intelligence. And he failed es- 
pecially to appreciate the discredit which had attached to 
him and his government as a result of the incapacity shown 
during the recent decade. The important elements among 
the people had no idea that the Estates General was to be 
merely a petitionary body, without authority or legislative 
power. Pamphlets appeared by the thousand, spreading 
in popular form the liberal theories of the political phi- 
losophers. The Estates General was to be a real parliament 
of the people, charged with the task of reforming all abuses, 
reconstructing the administration and the government, and 
reconstituting society. Their very inexperience in practical 
politics made the difficulties in such a great program seem 
trifling to these pamphleteering theorists. They succeeded 
in awakening among the people at large the highest expec- 
tations of what the Estates General should accomplish. 

Elections began in January, 1789, and dragged on through 
the following months. The royal decrees had made the suf- 



FRANCE: THE BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION 63 

frage in the various classes very liberal. In the clergy, all 
members had the vote, from the Archbishops and Bishops 
down to the parish priests. Every noble twenty-five years of 
age or above had the vole. In the Third Estate, every 
Frenchman twenty-five years of age or above, whose name 
was inscribed on the tax register, had the vote. Thus only 
the very poorest laborers and the actual paupers were ex- 
cluded from the franchise. 

At the same time thai the elections were held, voters were 
invited to draw up a list of grievances, known as the cahier 
(from its full title, cahier des plaintes et doUances). It is 
from the contents of these cahiers that the modern historian 
gains much of his informal ion concerning the social, po- 
litical, and economic abuses of the late eighteenth century 
France. The representatives of the people, responding to 
the King's invitation, presented in each district an aston- 
ishingly frank and direct statement of their grievances and 
of the reforms advocated. It was, perhaps, in the formula- 
tion of the cahiers that the people first became fully con- 
scious of the nature, number, and extent of the abuses of 
the old regime. The deputies were pledged to present these 
cahiers before the Estates General. 

Monday, May 5, 1789, the eleven hundred and eighteen 
deputies met in a great hall of the palace at Versailles for 
their first business session. In numbers, the members of 
the Third Estate were equal to the combined membership 
of the clergy and nobility. By decree of the King, the 
deputies had followed the traditions of 1614 in the matter 
of dress, so that the clergy and nobility appeared in all 
the splendor of their official garb, whereas the representa- 
tives of the Third Estate were in plain black. The ancient 
formalities, too, were carefully observed, the clergy and 
nobility being allowed to enter and take their seats while 
the Third Estate were kept standing in the entrance way. 
The King in person opened the session. He was followed 
by the Keeper of the Seals who in a long address outlined a 



64 THE HISTORY OF EITROPE 

large number of reforms for the consideration of the depu- 
ties. Then Necker, the Minister of Finance, submit tod a 
lengthy report on the condition of the treasury. These 
preliminaries took up t ho whole of the first day's session. 

The next morning the real nature of the immediate prob- 
lem before the Estates General became apparent, for when 
the deputies of the Third Estate reported at the hall, they 
found themselves alone. The nobility and clergy, having 
resolved to organize and deliberate after the ancient fashion 
in separate bodies, had met in different halls. The deputies 
of the Third Estate were determined that all three Orders 
should be organized, and should meet, deliberate, and vote 
as a single body. They sent committees to the other Orders 
to invite them to join the representatives of the people; 
and they held conferences with the leaders of the other 
Orders; but these were without practical result. The 
weeks dragged by with nothing done, the deputies of the 
Third Estate refusing even to organize except temporarily, 
for fear such organization might be accepted as agreeing 
to deliberation by separate Orders. Finally, June 10, 1789, 
it was moved and carried that for the last time the represent- 
atives of the Third Estate should invite the clergy and 
nobles to joint organization. When no answer was received 
to this invitation, the deputies organized themselves (June 
12-14) and adopted the name (June 17) of National As- 
sembly. 

The act of the deputies was in defiance of precedent and 
of the power of the King -- it was, indeed, the first step 
in revolution. Their new National Assembly usurped its 
position and, though allowing admission to members of the 
clergy and nobility as individuals, refused to recognize 
these Orders as Estates of the Kingdom. Their only de- 
fense for their revolutionary decision was one based on 
reason, namely, that the representatives of twenty-four 
millions should prevail over the representatives of a few 
hundred thousand. 



FRANCE: THE BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION 05 

Three days later, June 20, 17H0, the King's agents, with- 
out previous warning to the deputies of the Third Estate, 
barred them from their hall on the excuse that arrange- 
ments had to be made Tor a royal session a few days later. 
The discourtesy of this acl done in the King's name incensed 
the deputies. Adjourning to a neighboring hall used often 
as a tennis court, the nearest room large enough to accom- 
modate them, they look a solemn oath never to separate' 
until a constitution had been established. Every deputy 
but one subscribed solemnly to this oath. The "Tennis- 
Court Oath," as it is commonly called, was evidence of the 
sincerity and earnestness of the Third Estate. 

In the meanwhile, the King and the nobility failed to 
take seriously the acts of the Third Estate. They were 
blind to the true significance of what had been done. The 
clergy, on the other hand, swayed by the large representa- 
tion of the lower ranks, the cures, parish priests, and the 
like, were more influenced by the stand the Third Estate 
had taken. Individual members of the clergy began to join 
the Third Estate June 13, and on June If) the whole body 
decided by a vote of 128 to 127 to yield. June 22 the bulk 
of them took their seats with the members of the Com- 
monalty. The strength of the position of the Third Estate 
during these weeks had, indeed, been strong. The other 
Orders could do nothing without it. Its passive refusal to 
organize separately had prevented all action by the Estates 
General. Encouraged by their success in winning over 
most of the clergy, the Third Estate awaited with keen 
anticipation the royal session announced for June 23. All 
Orders recognized that the action of the King and his gov- 
ernment on that day would be decisive. 

Enormous crowds lined the streets of Versailles to watch 
the assembling of the deputies for the royal session. Spon- 
taneous demonstrations of enthusiasm for the Third Estate 
broke out, but none was evident for the nobility or for the 
King himself. The deputies of the Commonalty were again 



66 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

humiliated by being forced to wait at the entrance until 
clergy and nobility were sealed. In the meeting the 
King's secretaries announced that it was I lie King's will 
that the distinction between the separate Estates should be 
observed. The acts of the Third Estate were declared null 
and void, and a long list of reforms was read. The King 
in person then spoke, saying that if the Estates General 
failed to help him, he alone would take measures to insure 
the happiness of his people, and directing that the three 
Estates meet the following day each in its separate chamber. 
The King's speech ended the session. Upon his withdrawal, 
the bulk of the nobility and a number of the clergy also 
withdrew. The remainder of the deputies kept their seals. 
When summoned to withdraw, their most prominent spokes- 
man, Mirabeau, replied that they would not leave except at 
the point of the bayonet. Before such contumacy the 
King took no effective measures, still failing to appreciate, 
apparently, the significance of their opposition. The depu- 
ties proceeded to declare that their previous decrees were in 
force, contrary to the expressed statement of the King, and 
that the persons of members of the assembly were inviolable. 
The meeting thereupon adjourned. 

The uobility now showed signs of yielding to the com- 
mons. June 25, forty-seven of them left their own hall and 
joined the commons. The final signal of surrender was 
given when the King himself receded from his position and 
urged personally (June l 27, ITS!)) the remainder of the 
nobility and of the clergy to join the assembly. 'Flic Na- 
tional Assembly was now complete, all three Orders being 
fully represented, meeting together, and voting together. 
The Estates General had in these weeks of trial and conflict 
become transformed by the act of the representatives of 
the Third Estate into the National Assembly. 

This transformation marks the completion of the first 
definite stage of the French Revolution. The representa- 
tives of the Third Estate had won a notable victory. Over- 



FRANCE: THE BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION 07 

throwing precedent and defying tradition, they had con- 
stituted themselves a National Assembly and had forced 
the submission of the other orders. The body summoned 
according to ancienl style had proved itself most modern 
in its ideas, had refused to be merely petitionary, and was 
on its way to becoming a regular legislative, if not an execu- 
tive, assembly. The King and his Council had foreseen 
nothing of these results : they were too blind to interpret 
their significance for the future. 



CHAPTER III 

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY VXD THE REVOLUTION 
1789-1791 

The representatives of the people had won the first battle 
in their campaign for reform. The task still ahead of them, 
however, was far more difficult than the inexperienced depu- 
ties realized. The adherents of the old regime were not 
to give up after the loss of a single fight. The financial 
pressure was to force itself upon the assembly at moments 
when the deputies sorely needed time for other matters. 
The disorders throughout the country were to east almost 
unbearable executive and administrative burdens upon men 
already engaged to the uttermost with a legislative program 
of reforms. And the formulation of a constitution was to 
develop differences of opinion among the deputies which on 
several occasions threatened disaster. The National As- 
sembly expected to finish its work and dissolve within a few 
months: it was actually in session more than two years, 
from June ^>7. ITS'), to September 30, 1701. 

A. CHIEF FIGURES IN THE FACTIONS IN FRANCE 

The natural leader of the court and the nobility was, 
of course, the King. A poorer figure for such a leader in 
so critical a period can scarcely be imagined. When he 
ascended the throne in 1774 upon the death of his grand- 
father, the ill-famed Louis XV, Louis XVI was a youth of 
twenty, large, ungainly, shy, sluggish, and indolent. He 
was ill-fitted to shine in a court of the kind Louis XIV had 
established. He had interested himself, curiously enough, 
in the trade of a locksmith, and whiled away hours in his 



THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 69 

little workroom practicing this occupation. He enjoyed, 
too, the pleasures of the chase. He was morally admirable, 
a devoted husband and a fond father. He was naturally 
well-meaning, generous, and kind-hearted, bul his very 
mercy proved a weakness with his rebellious people. Above 
all, lie was unready and vacillating at limes when steadi- 
ness, constancy, and decision were essential for the safely 
of his crown and the welfare of his kingdom. As a private 
citizen he might have been a commonplace mechanic: as a 
King of France in a critical period, he ruined himself and 
brought untold suffering upon his country. The fall of the 
monarchy was due to the weakness and incapacity of the 
monarch. 

Louis had been married at sixteen, while he was heir- 
apparent, to Marie Antoinette, daughter of Maria Theresa 
of Austria. This marriage had been arranged by Maria 
Theresa to cement the political alliance then existing be- 
tween France and Austria. Marie Antoinette was but 
nineteen when she became Queen of France. Her position 
was extraordinarily difficult, for the Auslro-French alliance 
was not popular. Especially after the revolution began this 
"Austrian woman," as she was called, became the focus of 
general suspicion. In ordinary times Marie Antoinette 
would have adorned the throne. She was beautiful in per- 
son, equipped with all the social graces, and possessed of an 
indescribable charm of manner. She proved herself, how- 
ever, unable to appreciate the character, extent, and force 
of the revolutionary movement. Extravagant by nature, 
she failed to check her expenses even when France was on 
the verge of bankruptcy. Incapable by birth, environment, 
and education of sympathy with the mass of the people, 
she never understood the necessities and passions which 
were the driving power behind the revolution. When her 
more lively personality had gained its influence over the 
phlegmatic King, she used her advantage to spur him to 
spasmodic and dangerous acts of opposition. We may feel 



70 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

greal sympathy for Marie Antoinette, thus cast unwittingly 
into the maelstrom of politics of the revolution, but her 
ignorance and her misguided interference played a great 
part in hastening the ruin of the monarchy. 

In the National Assembly one figure soon topped the rest 
on the popular side — the Count de Mirabeau. Mirabeau, 
scion of a noble family of Provence, was born in 1741). H's 
youth and early manhood were marked by constant quarrels 
with his irascible father and by a series of more or less dis- 
graceful love intrigues. His father obtained lettres de cachet 
from the King time and time again to imprison this unruly 
youth in punishment for excesses. Mirabeau spent part of 
these years in practical exile in Switzerland, Holland, and 
England. He studied assiduously the government of these 
countries, made comparisons with French institutions, and 
wrote scathing criticisms of the latter. Before the revolu- 
tion he was conspicuous for his defense of the cause of popu- 
lar liberties. When the King convoked the Estates General, 
Mirabeau ottered himself to the nobility of his native dis- 
trict, but his writings had discredited him with them. He 
then appealed to the Third Estate. The fact that the nobil- 
ity had rejected him was a strong argument in his favor with 
the Third Estate, and he was chosen deputy both from 
Marseilles and from Aix. As deputy from Aix, he was 
present at the opening session of the Estates General May 5, 
1789. That he won a commanding place was due solely to 
his superior ability, for neither faction had confidence in 
him. The nobles looked upon him as a renegade : the 
people distrusted the possible influence upon him of his 
noble birth and traditions. He emerged from the crowd 
because of his vision, his enthusiasm, and his practical 
sense. At every crisis in the deliberations his voice was 
heard. He had indomitable courage, clear logic, passionate 
fervor, and a definite policy. He never was able to gather 
around him a party. The great influence he had upon the 
course of events was wholly the result of his courage, his 



THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 71 

reasoning, and his vigor. As we gain a clearer perspective 
of the French Revolution, Mirabeau appears as one man, 
indeed as the only man, in public affairs who had the neces- 
sary vision to comprehend the drift events were taking, and 
the judgment to advise measures of relief. 

B. THE KING AND NOBILITY VS. THE PEOPLE 

We cannot wonder that the King and the nobility failed 
to appreciate the crumbling of the edifice in which they and 
their predecessors occupied such privileged positions — few 
people living in the tumult of events which mark the fall of 
one order of human society and the rise of another are able 
to estimate justly the situation. It is not surprising that, 
after the first success of the Third Estate in the formation 
of the National Assembly, the King and the nobles prepared 
a counterstroke which was intended to restore the status quo 
in France. 

Louis XVI himself had been temporarily aroused from his 
customary apathy by the defiance of the Third Estate. 
The Queen and the indignant nobles at the court prodded 
him to action. Under their guidance he planned to dismiss 
Necker, reorganize his ministry, and resume his former 
powers aggressively. To meet any popular disturbances, 
he ordered a concentration of troops, especially of foreign 
mercenaries free from revolutionary contamination, near 
Paris and Versailles. 

It was, of course, impossible to conceal the troop move- 
ments from the National Assembly. The deputies of the 
Third Estate, distrusting the King, spread the news and 
imparted their fears to the people. July 8, 1789, the Na- 
tional Assembly took official cognizance of the military 
preparations and on motion by Mirabeau voted to request 
the King that the troops be withdrawn. Two days later 
the King, feeling secure in his preparations, refused the 
Assembly's request, stating, however, that he had no de- 
signs against the deputies. He and his agents secretly hur- 



72 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

ried their plans. The following clay, July 11th, the King 
dismissed Necker and his supporters in the ministry, and 
directed him to leave the Kingdom secretly and immediately. 
Obedient to his sovereign's request, Necker started toward 
Switzerland that same evening. 

At this critical moment, Paris came to the rescue of the 
assembly and set an example of revolt which in the follow- 
ing weeks was imitated throughout France. Radical politi- 
cal discussion had flourished in the capital. The harvest 
failure in 1788 and the severe winter of 1788-1789 had 
caused tens of thousands of half-starved wretches to flock 
to Paris to live upon the municipal charity. The prole- 
tariat was thus swollen in numbers in the city. A keen 
.sense of their wrongs filled the minds of these poor people. 
Their only salvation lay, they thought, in the success of the 
National Assembly. A rallying place was furnished in the 
square before the Palais-Royal, home of the profligate and 
unprincipled Due d'Orleans, cousin of the King. There they 
assembled day and night, stirred by the harangues of revolu- 
tionary demagogues. Through the crowds during July 12th 
the rumor passed that Necker had been dismissed. An 
impassioned young scribbler, Camille Desmoulins, gave the 
throng purpose and activity. He leapt upon a table, shout- 
ing that Necker had been dismissed, that his departure was 
the signal bell for a St. Bartholomew's massacre of the 
patriots, that the Swiss and German mercenaries were to 
march against them. The crowd took fire at his words 
and surged away to find arms. 

The next two days were days of uncontrolled riot in Paris. 
The mob looted the gunshops, took the guns and ammuni- 
tion in the Hotel de Ville (City Hall) and the Hotel des 
Invalides, and sacked stores and houses. The police dis- 
appeared and the royal troops, decimated by desertion and 
left without orders, were withdrawn beyond the city bar- 
riers. On the 14th, the mob concentrated in front of the 
Pastille, the last remaining position in the capital held by 
the King's soldier- . 



THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 73 

The Bastille had once been a fortress but in recenl years 
had been used as a state prison. Stories were abroad of 
unlit subterranean dungeons and of instruments of torture 
therein. To the maddened mob the frowning walls seemed 
the embodiment of the evils of despotism. Yet its ten-foot 
thick masonry could defy any artillery the crowd could bring 
against it. Though manned by but a handful of Swiss 
mercenaries, it could have stood a siege. The governor, 
however, chose to parley with the crowd. In an unguarded 
moment he let the massive drawbridge down for a deputa- 
tion. Masses of men swarmed across it into the court, and 
the governor, upon promise of safety for himself and his 
men, surrendered the fortress. The unruly crowd disre- 
garded the promise of its leaders and in a most brutal 
fashion murdered the governor and most of his soldiers. 

The anniversary of the fall of I lie Bastille, July 14, 1789, 
is still celebrated as a national holiday in France. Though 
the event in itself was unimportant, for the place had little 
or no strategical value and no unlit dungeons or instruments 
of torture were found, the people regarded it as marking 
the surrender of the most striking symbol of the old regime. 
As such, its fall meant to the people the end of autocracy, 
the beginning of a new era. 

The disorders quickly communicated themselves to the 
provinces. Throughout the length and breadth of France 
an unreasoning panic seized the people, especially the 
peasants. Rumors that brigands were coming led the peo- 
ple to band themselves together for protection. The agen- 
cies of the government everywhere abdicated. Authority 
was unknown. When the first fear passed, the peasant 
leaders began to attack the chateaux of the nobles, each 
chateau being to the district a symbol of the old regime as 
the Bastille was to Paris. Sacking and burning, seeking 
especially for destruction the old manorial records contain- 
ing the list of seigniorial charges and dues, the peasant 
bands ravaged the country. France descended to anarchy. 



74 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

Yet not all the work of these tumultuous weeks was 
destructive. The bourgeoisie in Paris had, at the height of 
the disorders, recognized the need for the establishment of a 
municipal authority to take the place of the wreck of the 
royal power in Paris. Their representatives, therefore, had 
organized a local government, chosen a mayor, and made 
plans for a municipal council to be elected by the voters in 
the several districts of the city. At the same time, they 
provided for the organization of an armed civic soldiery to 
be known as the National Guard, and appointed the Marquis 
de Lafayette its commandant. Other communes quickly 
followed the example of the capital. The form of municipal 
government thus organized survived in its main outlines the 
Revolution. The National Guard became in the trying 
years of foreign warfare the chief dependence of the gov- 
ernment. 

The insurrection in Paris and the disturbances through- 
out the country defeated the King's intended coup d'etat. 
July 15, Louis XVI appeared before the National Assembly 
and stated that the troops would be withdrawn. A week 
later, July 21, Necker was recalled amid the rejoicing of the 
people. The nobility, however, realizing now the wreck of 
the royal authority, began to leave France, deserting their 
homes and their property. During the summer and autumn 
of 1789 about seventy thousand of these "emigres" fled 
across the borders. The success of the popular uprising of 
July was so great that these emigres saw no hope in the im- 
mediate future except from intervention on the part of a 
foreign power. 

C. WORK OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 

The National Assembly in the meanwhile proceeded in its 
efforts to reorganize France. Its various committees were 
hard at work upon the material for a constitution. Its 
efficiency was seriously handicapped by the inexperience of 
many of its members, the constant succession of deputa- 



THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 75 

tions from all parts of France, the long set speeches, the 
lack of rules governing debate, and the failure to keep order 
among the spectators. It was, indeed, remarkable that it 
was able to produce results at all. 

One important part of its labors was achieved in a peculiar 
way. A committee, appointed in July to investigate the 
disorder in the Provinces, presented its report to the As- 
sembly in the session of August 3. It proved to be a grue- 
some recital of pillage and outrage, perpetrated by a peas- 
antry in their reaction against the system so long responsible 
for their oppression. The following evening (August 4-5) 
members of the nobility, stung by implications that they 
were selfishly clinging to their traditional rights, began to 
offer motions for the suppression of privileges. The fmt 
motion was to proclaim equality of taxation. This was 
followed by one to make all men equal before the courts ; 
by another to admit all men to offices in the public service ; 
by another to abolish the rights of the chase. The con- 
tagion of self-sacrifice rapidly spread. A madness of liber- 
alism seized the deputies of the privileged orders. In a few 
hours successive motions carried by acclamation swept away 
the whole body of special rights. The slate was wiped 
clean for the National Assembly to write out a new social 
order. Never has the impulsive generosity of the best 
elements of the French people shone forth so brilliantly. 
The wisdom of such hasty legislation on matters of such 
great import may be questioned : the motives cannot but 
be praised. 

With the way thus cleared, the Assembly set to work 
upon the constitution, debating it provision by provision. 
After long discussion it agreed that the body of the docu- 
ment should be preceded by a Declaration of Rights. Many 
days were spent in framing this Declaration. As read to 
the Assembly August 26, 1789, this Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and of the Citizen was a noble statement of princi- 
ples to guide the Assembly in its endeavor to reorganize 



76 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

France. It proclaimed the liberty and safety of the in- 
dividual, security of property, and freedom of speech, pub- 
lication, and religious belief. Its paragraphs reflected the 
reaction from the abuses of the old regime. In its pream- 
ble it acknowledged the force of the American example : 
"Our soil should by right be the first to which this grand 
idea, conceived in another hemisphere, should be trans- 
planted. We cooperated in the events which gave North 
America her liberty, and now she shows us on what prin- 
ciples we ought to base the preservation of our own." 
The Declaration of the Rights of Man stands with the Dec- 
laration of Independence as one of the notable documents 
in the history of democracy. 

After the report on the Declaration of Rights had been 
submitted, the National Assembly began discussion of the 
important articles in the proposed constitution bearing on 
the executive power and the organization of the legislative 
body. This discussion occupied most of the following 
month (September, 1789). 

D. REMOVAL OF THE KING AND THE NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY 

The position of the King, following the revolt of July, 
had been pitiable. He was but a passive spectator of 
events. His nobles had fled the country in great numbers, 
led by his own younger brother, the Comte d'Artois. His 
royal administration had broken down. His authority had 
ceased. His advice was not asked. He had become in a 
few months a puppet King. Though the country was dis- 
organized, local authority not obeyed and taxes not paid, 
people were looking, not to the King, but to the National 
Assembly for their orders. And the National Assembly, 
without his royal sanction, was framing a constitution which 
would forever limit him in his authority. 

A more pressing danger existed in the conditions within 
Paris. The proletariat had tasted power in the tumults of 



THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 77 

July 12-14, and were stirring uneasily in anticipation of 
another outbreak. Economic conditions in the city were 
bad. Food was scarce and prices high. The prevailing 
disorders in the country were adding crowds of poverty- 
stricken refugees to the capital. The flight of many of the 
wealthy classes, and the disorganization of industry, threw 
thousands out of employment. Agitators were ever pres- 
ent in the Palais-Royal to harangue the crowds. Any in- 
cident or rumor was enough to start serious trouble. 

The King, appreciating the danger of the situation, 
ordered for protection a regiment from Flanders to rein- 
force the guard du corps and the National Guard at Ver- 
sailles. Upon the arrival of the Flanders regiment, the cus- 
tomary banquet was given, October 1, 1789, to its officers. 
The arrival of the Flanders regiment and news of the ban- 
quet proved the signal for an outbreak in Paris. Rumors 
flew about of another attempt to reinstate the old regime by 
force. Lurid stories of the banquet were circulated. The 
red, white, and blue cockade, adopted by the National 
Guard and already a symbol of liberation, had been tram- 
pled under foot, it was said, by the officers pledging loyalty 
to the King and Queen. Versailles had been banqueting 
while Paris was starving. 

Riot started in Paris the morning of October 5, 1789. 
A crowd gathered around the Hotel de Ville clamoring for 
bread. Members forced their way into the building and 
distributed a quantity of arms and ammunition stored there. 
Lafayette at the head of the National Guard hesitated to 
use force, hoping to persuade the people to disperse. His 
hesitation gave the mob time to increase. Some one seized 
a drum, and led the way to Versailles. The crowd in a 
disorderly march all day long streamed out toward the King. 
Lafayette with the National Guard followed. In the even- 
ing during a drizzling rain, weary and bedraggled, the crowd 
reached the vicinity of the royal palace. Later Lafayette 
bivouacked his troops in the squares and posted guards 



7S THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

around the building. The crowd built great bonfires and 
camped around them for the night. 

Early the next morning, October 6, 1789, a few prowlers 
found an unguarded door, gave a signal which brought 
others to their aid, broke into the palace, and began to 
search for the Queen. Marie Antoinette was forced to flee 
from her rooms. Tin' mass of the crowd surged into the 
courtyard of the palace. To appease them. Lafayette per- 
suaded the King and Queen to show themselves on the 
balcony. While there, the King placed a red, white, and 
blue cockade in his hat, and Lafayette harangued the people, 
saying that Louis XVI had resolved to confirm the Decla- 
ration of Rights and to go with his people to Paris. At 
noon the King, Queen, ami the Dauphin, — the baker, the 
baker's wile, ami the little cook-boy, as the crowd called 
them, — surrounded by the triumphant mob. were driven to 
Paris. The National Assembly, declaring itself inseparable 
from the King, resolved to accompany him to the capital. 
Louis XVI went to the Tuileries : the National Assembly 
a few days later resumed its sessions in a riding-school 
near by. 

The removal of the King and the National Assembly to 
Paris marked the beginning of a new stage in the Revolu- 
tion. Both were henceforth subject more directly to mob 
pressure in the capital. The King was virtually a prisoner 
in the Tuileries. The most radical elements in the National 
Assembly had a weapon close at hand in the violence of the 
proletariat to enforce their policies upon the Assembly. 

E. CONTINUATION OF THE WORK OF THE NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY IX PARIS 

After the rioting of October o-(>, the National Assembly 
again took up its consideration of the constitution and the 
reorganization of government in France. As a preliminary 
measure it reconstructed by decree the administrative areas 
of the country. 



THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 79 

France under the old regime retained in the number and 
character of its areas for administration many historical and 
traditional distinctions. The generalitcs, previously men- 
tioned, had been recently created, but the dioceses dated 
back to the break-up of the Roman Empire, and certain of 
the Provinces represented duchies formerly independent. 
It was the desire of the National Assembly to destroy these 
distinctions between the various areas, which often gave rise 
to consideration of local rather than national interests, and 
to establish in their stead a new and uniform administrative 
division. Thus they hoped to inculcate national rather 
than local feeling, as well as to simplify the operation of 
government. 

They therefore divided France into eighty-three Departe- 
ments (including Corsica as one) ; subdivided each Departe- 
ment into six or seven Districts; further subdivided each 
District into eight or nine Cantons. Each Canton contained 
eight or nine of the former Communes. The Dcpartements, 
Districts, and Cantons were wholly new; the Communes, 
altogether about 40,000 in number, were the only historical 
divisions retained in the system. For each of these areas 
the National Assembly provided a government and a judi- 
ciary. For both Dcpartements and Districts were created 
an executive council of five and an administrative council 
of thirty-six members, and criminal and civil courts. For 
the towns were provided a mayor and council and local 
courts. The Cantons, being merely electoral areas, i.e., areas 
serving as units for election purposes, needed no govern- 
ment. In all the areas, the officers were elected by the 
people, the suffrage being given to all men over twenty- 
five who paid in taxes the equivalent of three days' labor. 

A more radical readjustment of administration could 
scarcely be imagined. In a country where previously 
autocracy had existed, a simple decree revolutionized con- 
ditions. The people had the whole power. Where such a 
change has taken place in other states, it has been brought 



80 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

by gradual stages during which the people gained experience 
little by little. The theorists in the National Assembly, 
however, were anxious to create in a moment the structure 
of a democratic government. Hence they erased ancient 
and familiar local divisions to establish a new and uniform 
system, whereby they might be free to devise what govern- 
ment they desired. Their work is one of the most impor- 
tant and constructive acts of the Revolution, yet under 
the circumstances it can scarcely be judged wholly wise. 

A second preliminary measure was an adjustment of the 
relations between the state and the Catholic church. The 
""abuses" which followed from the privileged position of the 
clergy, and the immunity both of the clergy and of church 
property from taxation, constituted an important grievance 
under the old regime. The deputies, therefore, especially 
those of the original Third Estate, were prepared when they 
arrived at Versailles to take radical measures to insure state 
control of the church revenues. Many of them were, if not 
atheistic, at least irreligious. The rationalism of Voltaire 
and his attacks upon the evils of the church system had 
influenced them greatly. 

In their consideration of the church problem, the leaders 
were also influenced by the financial situation. The country 
had been practically bankrupt in May, 1789. The confu- 
sion of the succeeding months had prevented any effective 
measures for relieving the financial stringency. Money had 
to be obtained. At the moment, vast properties of the 
church were the asset most ready at hand. 

Debate on the project for taking over the church land 
began October 10, 1789, and the decisive vote was cast 
November L 2. Thus in less than a month the National 
Assembly introduced, debated, and passed a measure radi- 
cally altering the age-long rights and privileges of the church 
in France. Such haste was due, first, to the need of money, 
and, second, to the radicalism of the deputies. As finally 
shaped by Mirabeau, the motion consisted of a declaration 



THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 81 

that the property of the church in France was at the dis- 
posal of the nation on condition thai the expenses of wor- 
ship, the support of the clergy, and the care of the poor 
were adequately provided for. At the same time, it was 
moved and passed that cures (the lowest rank of the clergy) 
should be paid a minimum salary of 1200 livres (c. $250) 
per annum with lodging. A little over a month later, De- 
cember 11), 1789, the sale of a part of the church lands was 
authorized to meet the needs of the government. 

The value of the property thus taken over by the nation 
was estimated at between two or three thousand million 
livres (c. $400,000,000 and $000,000,000). To make the 
property immediately available in cash, the Assembly 
planned to use it as security for the issue of paper notes, 
called assignats. This plan was sound, providing that the 
issue of assignats was limited and that the value of the 
property was not depreciated by the sale of its most desir- 
able sections or by poor management. At the same time, 
therefore, that the Assembly authorized the sale of part of 
the church lands (December If), 1789), it authorized the 
issue of the first lot of assignats; four months later (April 
17, 1790) the assignats to the amount of 400,000,000 livres 
were voted and began to be put into circulation. This 
issue met with dangerous success — success because it re- 
lieved the government of its pressing money difficulties ; 
dangerous because it suggested to the inexperienced depu- 
ties a reservoir from which issues of money could be author- 
ized whenever the treasury was low. The dangers became 
evident later, when the deputies voted successive issues — 
800,000,000 livres additional September 29, 1790, and 
600,000,000 more June 19, 1791 — with the result that the 
assignats depreciated rapidly in value. 

In the meantime, the taking over of the church lands on 
the proviso that the clergy should be provided for made it 
necessary for the Assembly to draw up a plan for further 
relations between the government and the clergy. The 



82 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

way was cleared for a sweeping measure by a preliminary 
law (February, 1700) whereby monastic orders were sup- 
pressed and their properties taken over by the state. In 
May, 1700, came the general plan in a report from the 
Ecclesiastical Committee of the Assembly upon a proposed 
law for "The Civil Constitution of the Clergy." By the 
provisions of this proposed law, the ancient ecclesiastical 
divisions were wiped out. Henceforth there were to be 
eighty-three Bishops, one Bishop in each DSpartement. All 
intermediate ranks between the Bishops and the parish 
priests and cures were to be destroyed. The salary of each 
ecclesiastic was fixed. The clergy were to be elected, the 
Bishops by the electors in their DS piirtcmcnts, and the parish 
priests and cures by the assemblies of their districts. French 
citizens were prohibited from recognizing the authority of 
any Bishop whose see was outside the Kingdom — a pro- 
vision designed against the authority of the Pope. And 
each member of the clergy was required to maintain his 
residence in his parish, district, or DSpartement. 

Debates upon this proposed "Civil Constitution of the 
Clergy" began immediately after the submission of the 
report in May, 1790, and continued for six weeks. The 
most bitter opposition to its features developed among the 
clergy. The National Assembly was planning changes in a 
domain heretofore regarded as wholly under ecclesiastical 
authority. The Pope was naturally wholly out of sympathy 
with the law, and the clergy both of their own accord and 
by inspiration from Home fought its adoption. The will of 
the radical element in the Assembly, however, was unyield- 
ing. The plan was adopted July 12, 1790, and received 
the reluctant assent of the helpless King, August 27, 1700. 

The "Civil Constitution of the Clergy" was, from the 
point of view of practical statesmanship, a most unwise 
measure. The Assembly, anticipating trouble, voted No- 
vember 27, 1700, to require the clergy to subscribe publicly 
to an oath "to swear to watch with care over the faithful 



THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 83 

of the diocese or parish intrusted to them, to be faithful to 
the nation, the law, and the King, and to maintain with 
all their power the constitution decreed by the National 
Assembly and accepted by the King." Any cleric who 
refused to lake the oath would be regarded as having re- 
signed his position. January 4, 1 7!) I, the roll of the clergy 
in the National Assembly was called, and one after another 
the Bishops and priests declined to subscribe. Only four 
of the higher clergy and less llian half of the priests arid 
curates yielded. Under the law the non-juring priests were 
regarded as having resigned. Many parishes were thus left 
without priests or religions services. Though elections were 
at once held to determine successors, the people in the 
parishes were divided in their allegiance, some holding 
stubbornly to the old and others accepting the new priests. 
Disorders broke on I ill many sections, so serious as to cause 
troops to be dispatched for their suppression. 

i. The Flight to Varennes 

Humiliated as he had Keen by the successive assumptions 
of power by the National Assembly, the King was aroused 
by the "Civil Constitution of the Clergy" as he had been 
by nothing else. He had ever been a devout Catholic, and 
the provisions of the law had outraged his deepest instincts. 
Though he realized that his acceptance was forced, and 
that the Pope recognized this fact, he fell the abiding sense 
of guilt. lie believed, not only that he had done wrong 
himself, bul that his own acceptance might imperil the 
spiritual welfare of millions of his people. 

Stung by remorse, the King again determined to make an 
effort to resume what he considered his legitimate functions. 
He still failed to appreciate the universality of the Revolu- 
tion, thinking that it was the work of a small faction and 
that, if he himself were \'rv(\ the greater part of the nation 
would rally to him. Miraheau, who had for months past 
endeavored to assist him by counsel, died April C Z, 171)1. 



84 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

Louis decided as a preliminary step to flee from Paris, 
establish himself among loyal troops at the northern border, 
and with the help of friendly Powers regain his power. 

His plans were carried out with the utmost secrecy. He 
selected Montmedy, where was stationed a considerable 
body of dependable troops, as his objective, and intrusted 
arrangements to a Swedish nobleman resident at the court. 
No intimation of his purpose was allowed to escape. On 
the night of June 20, 1791, the royal family in disguise 
entered a traveling coach and were driven rapidly toward 
the frontier. 

All went well until the carriage reached the town of 
Varennes, twenty-five miles from Montmedy. There, June 
21, 1791, during a delay in obtaining a fresh relay of horses, 
the King carelessly showed himself at the door of the coach 
and was recognized. The National Guard of the town was 
assembled and formally detained him until orders came 
from the capital. Four days later he was ignominiously 
conducted back through the streets of Paris to the Tuileries. 

The flight of the King revealed to France at large how in- 
alterably opposed he was, in spite of his public declarations 
to the contrary, to all the principles underlying the Revolu- 
tion. Though the National Assembly created the fiction 
that he had been abducted, and passed motions to punish 
his abductors, the people were not deceived. The King 
himself was now a prisoner under guard, and groups of 
radicals were openly discussing his punishment. Some ad- 
vocated his deposition for treason. A small group, known 
as Republicans, began agitation for the abolition of the 
monarchy and the establishment of a democracy. 

ii. The Massacre of the Champ de Mars 

The Republicans, especially, were determined to influence 
the National Assembly. For this purpose they prepared a 
petition to be presented to the Assembly, calling for the 
deposition and trial of the King, and placarded Paris with 



THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 85 

summonses to "patriots" to assemble in the Champ de 
Mars July 17, 1791, for the ceremony of signing. 

On the morning of the 17th, in answer to the summons, 
an immense crowd streamed out of Paris to the Champ de 
Mars. The baser elements of the city predominated, seeing 
the possibility of using this demonstration for a new insur- 
rection. The National Assembly, fearing the temper of the 
mob and out of sympathy with its purposes, directed the 
Mayor of Paris to take the necessary measures for the safety 
of the capital. The National Guard was assembled, 
marched to the Champ de Mars, and stationed around the 
speaker's stand. The Mayor read a proclamation order- 
ing the crowd to disperse, but was answered with shouts of 
derision and a volley of stones. The National Guard then 
fired, killing and wounding a dozen or more and so frightened 
the rest that they fled in confusion. 

Such was the "massacre of the Champ de Mars." Its 
effect was twofold, to embitter still further the proletariat 
against the King, and to create intense hostility between the 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie in Paris. The bourgeoisie 
had accepted gladly the cooperation of the proletariat in 
the insurrection of July 12-14, 1789, and had connived at 
the mob acts which had brought the royal family to Paris 
October 4-5, 1789. But the bourgeoisie had established and 
kept control of a stable municipal government, and was 
chiefly interested in maintaining order. Its interests were 
at bottom incompatible with those of the proletariat. Dur- 
ing later days, when the proletariat gained the ascendancy, 
they took bloody revenge upon the leader of the bourgeoisie 
for this "massacre of the Champ de Mars." 

F. THE NEW CONSTITUTION, AND THE DISSOLUTION 
OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 

The constitution upon which the National Assembly had 
been working more or less steadily was now near com- 
pletion. Certain of its provisions, such as the adminis- 



86 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

trative division of the Kingdom and the relation of the 
government to the church and clergy, had actually been 
put into effect during the Assembly's deliberations. To 
exhibit their own purity of motives, the deputies finally 
incorporated a 'self-denying' clause, providing that no dep- 
uty who sat in the National Assembly should be regarded 
as eligible for the succeeding assembly — a mischievous 
article, iu that it insured a new assembly of members prac- 
tically as inexperienced as the deputies of the Estates Gen- 
eral had been in IN [ay of 17SJ). The draft of the Constitu- 
tional Act was voted on and carried September 3, 1791. 
Eleven days later the King publicly took the oath to sup- 
port it. 

The new constitution provided for government by a King 
and a unicameral legislature. Royalty was to be hereditary 
in the male line of the Bourbon house according to the rule 
of primogeniture. At his accession, the sovereign was to 
take an oath of allegiance to the nation, the law, and the 
constitution. His person was inviolable and sacred, but 
he was to be regarded as having abdicated if he failed to 
take or observe his oath of allegiance, if he took part in any 
military enterprise against the state, or if he quitted the 
Kingdom. He was under the constitution the nominal 
supreme executive, and as such was head of the adminis- 
tration, and had extensive powers of appointment in the 
higher grades of army, navy, and diplomatic service. He 
had a suspensive veto upon legislation, operative through 
two assemblies, but any bill passed in spite of his veto in 
three successive assemblies, became law without his con- 
sent being required. Though it might seem from the above 
statement that the King had retained important powers in 
the new government, we must not lose sight of the vast 
differences between his position under this constitution and 
his position previously. He now had no control over the 
duration of the legislative body. He had no initiative in 
making laws, being empowered merely to suggest to the 



THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 87 

Assembly subjects for its consideration. He was unable 
to declare or to wage war without the consent of the legis- 
lature. He had no judicial power. He had no control 
over the agencies of local government in his Kingdom. And 
he had no direct or final control of the army and navy. He 
had, indeed, descended far from the absolute sovereignty of 
a Louis XIV. 

The legislature was to consist of a single Chamber of 
seven hundred and forty-five members, apportioned among 
the eighty-three Depart ements according to area, popula- 
tion, and amount paid in taxes. The deputies were elected 
by a system of indirect elections. The duration of a legis- 
lature was two years and it could not be prorogued or dis- 
solved by the King. The legislative body had full power 
over legislation, except as qualified by the King's sus- 
pensive veto. 

With the completion of the new constitution, and its 
acceptance by the King, the labors of the National Assembly 
came to an end. At its final formal session, September 29, 
1791, the King attended in person as he had at the opening 
of the Estates General May 5, 1789. He made the retiring 
deputies a short speech, concluding with the words: "In 
returning to your constituents you have still an important 
duty to discharge ; you have to make known to the citizens 
the real meaning of the laws you have enacted, and to ex- 
plain my sentiments to the people. Tell them that the 
King will alw 7 ays be their first and best friend ; that he has 
need of their affection ; that he knows no enjoyment but in 
them, and with them ; that the hope of contributing to 
their happiness will sustain his courage, as the satisfaction 
of having done so will constitute his reward." In the 
evening magnificent fetes were ordered by the King to 
celebrate the beginning of a new order, and as the royal 
family drove through the Champs-Elysee, they were greeted 
with demonstrations of enthusiasm. The people believed 
that the Revolution was completed. 



SS THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

The dissolution of the National Assembly marks the 
definite end of the first part, the relatively peaceful period, 
of the French Revolution. Confronted by the gigantic 
problems involved in the reconstruction of the entire polit- 
ical and soeial life o( a Kingdom of twenty-five million souls, 
the deputies had accomplished much. They had swept 
away completely the system of privileges which had been 
the chief characteristic of the old regime. They had se- 
cured freedom of religious worship. They had abolished 
torture and punishment by breaking on the wheel. They 
had established a uniform judicial system. They had put 
into effect a complete new administrative system. They 
had opened careers in the military and diplomatic service 
to all who proved their capacity for advancement. They 
had brought about the distribution of land among the 
laboring classes. They had framed guarantees of civil 
liberty for the individual. No similar body under analogous 
conditions has ever in so short a time accomplished as much. 
That their work should have been perfect is too much to 
expect. Their errors were serious, were, indeed, the direct 
cause of the later ami more terrible phases of the Revo- 
lution. They created schism in the Catholic church of 
France by the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. They gave 
full exercise of the suffrage to great classes of men wholly 
unaccustomed to the right uses of such power. They gave 
supreme legislative power to a legislature of a single cham- 
ber, in spite of the fact that every contemporary example 
emphasized the value of two chambers. And, most impor- 
tant of all, in their anxiety to destroy the autocracy of the 
old regime, they so curbed and weakened the executive 
authority as to render it unable, even if well disposed, to 
maintain order and security within the Kingdom. 

With all oi its virtues, a constitution which had such 
fundamental errors was doomed to failure. As a matter 
of fact, it survived less than a year. 



CHAPTER IV 

EUROPE AND THE REVOLUTION 

During the two preceding chapters, we have confined 
our attention exclusively to the course of events in France 
from May, 17S9, to the dissolution of the National Assembly 
September, 1791. The other governments of Europe, 
though not indifferent to the Revolution, preferred to re- 
gard it as an issue in the internal politics of France. Even 
the appeal of the emigres failed to move these governments 
to intervene. Guided solely by motives of self-interest, 
Austria, Russia, and Prussia saw no objects to be gained 
by a war with France comparable with those to be easily 
won in other quarters. Austria was at the time engaged 
in war against Turkey (1788-1791), from which she hoped 
to absorb what is now northern Serbia and western Ru- 
mania. Russia was at war both with Turkey (1788-1792) 
and with Sweden (1788-1700), and was at the same time 
intriguing against the new government in Poland (estab- 
lished May 3, 1791) to bring about ultimately a second 
partition for her territorial advantage. Prussia, tradi- 
tionally hostile to Austria, was holding herself in readiness 
to intervene for her own advantage in the Austro-Turkish 
War, and was following with jealous anxiety the Russian 
intrigue in Poland. The small German states of the Holy 
Roman Empire could make no move against France without 
the leadership of Austria or Prussia. Across the English 
Channel, public opinion was divided with regard to the 
merits of the Revolution. Strong voices were raised in 
its defense. Not until the news of the excesses of the radi- 
cal elements reached England did the government lean to 

S9 



90 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

the opposition, ami even then, no hostile move was proposed 
unless English rights should be infringed upon. 

Considerations of internal polities, however, led the 
French factions to provoke foreign war, war that lasted 
with few intermissions for over two deeades. We have 
to trace from now on, therefore, both the course of politics 
m France and the resulting crises in international politics 
in Europe. 

A. THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, 

oer. 1, 1791-sept. 20, 1792 

Since the convocation of the Estates General in ITS!). 

political life in France had rapidly developed. Though 
"parties' in the modern sense of the term with their com- 
plex machinery and their platform oi policies were un- 
known, men oi like opinions naturally tended to coalesce 
into well-defined groups. These groups centered about 
"Clubs," successors in many eases to the informal 'salons' 
in which the bourgeoisie under the old regime had met for 
social pleasure and for discussion of economic and political 
conditions. Ajs these new "Clubs" became important factors 
in directing the policies of their members in the Legislative 
Assembly, the most important deserve mention here. 

In the early days oi the Estates General and the National 
Assembly, a group of deputies entitling themselves "Friends 
of the Constitution" met in a hall oi an abandoned Jacobin 
convent. At first composed only of deputies, this group 
soon admitted many prominent Paris revolutionaries, and 
established branches in prominent towns of France. By 
the fall of 1791, the "Jacobins" had over 400 affiliated 
branches, each in correspondence with the central "Club" 
at Paris. Through their large membership they exerted 
a wide influence upon public opinion and upon the decisions 
of the National Assembly. In the elections to the Legis- 
lative Assembly they carried ISO seats, their deputies sitting 
together on the left of the hall. As the Revolution had pro- 



EUROPE AND THE REVOLUTION 91 

gressed, the Jacobins had become more radical, and had 
drawn into their membership sections of the restless prole- 
tariat as well as the most daring of the bourgeoisie. Their 
power in the Legislative Assembly lay in their compact and 
disciplined organization and their willingness to use the 
spirit of insurrection in the Paris mob to overawe other 
deputies. 

A second radical Club was the Cordeliers, organized in 
May, 1790, as the "Society of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen," and holding its early meetings in the church 
of the monastery of the Cordeliers. From the beginning 
it was ultra-revolutionary, encouraging measures against 
the monarchy and rallying to its support the baser elements 
of the Paris populace. Its members worked with the 
Jacobins in promoting insurrectionary movements in Paris 
in 1792, but later attacked the leaders of the other party 
for their 'moderation.' It gained importance by the 
vehemence of its attacks and the radicalism of its policies. 

The chief of the more moderate "Clubs" was the Feuil- 
lants, an offshoot of the Jacobins. The Feuillants Club was 
organized in July, 1791, by Jacobins who refused to advo- 
cate the extreme measures against the King adopted by 
the majority of the "Club." Their early meetings were held 
in the buildings of a former religious order called The 
Feuillants. They supported the constitution framed by 
the National Assembly, granting, however, the advisability 
of some amendment. In the Legislative Assembly they 
were numerically the strongest group, comprising ^G-l mem- 
bers on the right of the Chamber, and the King chose his 
first ministry from them. They did not have, however, 
the compact organization of the Jacobins, and their modera- 
tion found no sympathy with the radical Paris populace. 

The absence of national party organization is revealed 
by the fact that more than 300 deputies in the Legislative 
Assembly sat in the center, professing no fixed political 
policies. Elected because of local prominence, they arrived 



i>2 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

at Paris, presented their credentials, and awaited develop- 
ments, ready to throw their votes as expediency might 
demand. This drifting mass held the balance of power : 
whichever group could influence it. could rule the Assembly, 
and with the Assembly. France. 

Outside of Paris, the people were drifting politically as 
were many oi their representatives in the Legislative As- 
sembly. All hoped that the Revolution was finished, yet 
the sporadic disorders and uprisings of the peasantry 
against their former lords, the continued fall in the value 
of the assignats, and the general stagnation of trade were 
preparing the ground for further revolutionary excesses. 
The French people were restless and unhappy : they were 
expecting from the Legislative Assembly more than that 
body could possibly accomplish. Within the capital, the 
forces oi Radicalism — the Jacobins. Cordeliers, and their 
allies — though not numerically in the majority, had the 
power that results from organization and daring. Since 
Lafayette had resigned the command of the Paris National 
Guard, the sansculottes had rilled its ranks and undermined 
its discipline. The newly elected mayor of Paris, Petion, 
was an avowed Republican and willing to go to great lengths 
to aid the radicals. The "(Tubs" were functioning per- 
fectly, keeping their representatives worked up to a high 
pitch o( enthusiasm and binding them together with com- 
mon political interests. Thus the Jacobins and their allies 
wielded a power out of proportion to their actual number 
in the one place from which they might hope to dominate 
France. 

The Legislative Assembly believed that, before under- 
taking internal reforms, it should endeavor to insure the 
permanence of the Revolution. Two prominent groups 
still defied this Revolution, the emigres on the border, and 
the non-juring priests in France. The first acts of the 
Assembly, therefore, were directed against the emigres 
and the non-juring priests. November 9, 1791, it decreed 



EUROPE AND THE REVOLUTION 93 

that those emigres who did not return by January 1, 1792, 
should be condemned to death. November l 29, 1791, it 
decreed that the non-juring clergy should take the oath to 
the constitution within one week on penalty of expulsion 
from their living and confiscation of their pay. By these 
decrees the Legislative Assembly made known its purpose 
to defend and perpetuate the Revolution. 

These decrees placed the King in an embarrassing posi- 
tion. He had, apparently, accepted his constitutional 
position, but he was unwilling from loyalty to his nobility 
and his church to approve measures against them. He 
was not lacking in personal courage. At the sacrifice 
of much of what was left of his popularity, he used his 
royal prerogative and vetoed both decrees (November 12 
and December 15). 1791V 

During these months the factions in the French assembly 
took advantage of the troubled international relations to 
force a foreign war. In their initial efforts they were aided 
by the threats and the ill-judged actions of the Austrian 
and Prussian sovereigns. After the arrest of the royal 
family at Varennes, Leopold of Austria, urged by the 
emigres, persuaded Frederick William of Prussia to join 
him in a "declaration" {The Declaration of Pillnitz, August 
27, 1791) addressed to the emigre princes, stating that the 
restoration of the monarchy in France was a matter of 
common interest. The emigres hailed this "declaration" 
with joy, publishing it broadcast, and falsely adding that 
not only Austria and Prussia but England and the other 
powers were preparing for intervention. 

Naturally the Declaration of Pillnitz served the purposes 
of the French factions who desired to inflame the passions 
of the people for foreign war. Even though Leopold after 
Louis XVFs acceptance of the new constitution in Septem- 
ber, 1791, showed that he had no real desire for war with 
France by withdrawing the Declaration of Pillnitz, certain 
radical factions continued their agitation. In the Legisla- 



94 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

tive Assembly, they passed measures requiring the French 
King to demand that the Elector oi Troves disperse the 
emigres in his electorate, and to question insolently Leopold 
on his support oi the German princes in their protection 
of the emigres. Again Leopold yielded, and advised the 
Elector of Treves to accede to the French demands. Shortly 
afterward Leopold died March 1. 1792), and Austrian affairs 
passed into the hands of his less competent son and successor, 
Francis. 

Neither the withdrawal oi the Declaration of Pillnitz 
nor the dispersion of the emigres allayed the sentiment 
for war. In March, the Fenillant ministry was replaced 
by a Girondin ministry a ministry whose members were 
from a Jacobin group hailing from the Gironde district of 
southern France. The Girondins ardently desired war, 
believing that the French people would be united by war 
in the defense oi the Revolution, anil that the King would 
bo forced to show his true colors. The King himself de- 
sired, not war, but intervention by the foreign powers in 
his favor. He was still deluded by the belief that the 
Revolution was the work of but a small group of radicals 
in France. He and the Queen at this time began their 
secret communications with their fellow sovereigns. Friends 
of the King, however, actually connived at the maneuvers 
of the Girondins in the belief that war would rally the 
nation, not to the Revolution, but to the King, and would 
thus be a step toward the restoration of the former con- 
ditions. 

Before the forces plotting to engulf France in foreign 
war. the King was too weak to stand. April 20, 1792, he 
appeared before the Legislative Assembly. His minister 
read the grounds oi complaint against Austria. Louis 
then added: "You have heard, gentlemen, the result of 
my negotiations with the court of Vienna : they are con- 
formable to the sentiments more than once expressed to 
me by the Assembly, and continued by the great majority 



EUROPE AND THE REVOLUTION 95 

of the Kingdom. All prefer a war to the continuance of 
outrages to the national honor, or menaces to the national 
safety. I have exhausted all the means of pacification in 

my power; I now come, under the terms of the constitu- 
tion, to propose to the Assembly, that we should declare 
war against the King of Hungary and Bohemia." In the 

vote on the declaration, all hut seven voted in favor. It 
had been hoped that Prussia might he detached from 
Austria, hut Frederick William took the ground that an 
alliance he had formed with Leopold in February com- 
pelled him to consider the declaration of war to he directed 
against him also. By the vote o( April 00, 1792, therefore, 
France was committed to war against both Austria and 
Prussia. 

/). THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR 

It was fortunate for France that the volatile Assembly 
which plunged her into conflict with all Europe did not 
have control of the war. Although the Revolutionary 
principles which were spread rapidly throughout the country 
had not left the army untouched, that fiery ardor for and 
contagious faith in the new order which marked the armies 
of a year later, and made them a glorious instrument on 
which the impulsive leaders might play, were yet to be 
developed. The soldier on the frontier was still the product 
of the old regime, trained in its systems, obeying and re- 
specting the officers it supplied him, and. as yet, living and 
moving in a world apart from the Revolutionaries in Paris. 
Discipline instead of enthusiasm, a sense of duty rather than 
patriotism actuated this army in the beginning and carried 
it on to victory when success seemed impossible. Behind 
the bulwark o( this remnant of the Bourbon Army. France 
called out and prepared those levies which formed the 
great armies of the Revolution, but the honor and glory of 
holding the gate against the united attacks belongs to the 
old army, 



96 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

It must not be supposed that the army of France was 
without flaw. To begin with, it was far below the 170,000 
troops which were its peace quota. Three months before 
war was declared, Narbonne, the Minister of War, reported 
to the Assembly that it was 5 1,000 under strength. In 
addition to the regulars, it contained a militia element of 
55,000 which was but little better than useless. It was 
recruited entirely by voluntary enlistment; and because 
the pay was poor, barracks bad, and food worse, its re- 
cruits were often of a low type. Its officers, scions of noble 
houses, and, hence, faithful to the King, had deserted in 
great numbers at the time of the flight to Varennes, and 
had left the army sadly lacking in experienced leaders. 
And finally, although the years following the Seven Years' 
War had witnessed spasmodic attempts to better the 
organization of the army and improve the condition of the 
soldier, these attempts were made in the usual torpid 
fashion of the Bourbons, and the outbreak of the war had 
found an army with no adequate system of supply or 
transport, with an ephemeral general staff, directed by a 
war office whose chief changed with every new political 
wind. 

To make a clumsy organization still more unwieldy, 
the Assembly, in August, 1791, passed a decree authorizing 
169 new volunteer battalions — 101,000 men — of which 
60 plundering, turbulent battalions were actually formed. 
Six months later, a new decree disabled this force most 
effectively : all volunteers were permitted to return home 
at the end of a campaign (supposedly December 1) ; and 
they were privileged to choose their own officers. 

Yet several things combined to make this army a tool 
sufficiently effective to save the country. Disorderly and 
drunken as the individual soldier often was, he had in im- 
mediate command a non-commissioned officer who was 
intelligent and zealous. A system of examinations in- 
sured certain literary and practical qualities in this part 



EUROPE AND THE REVOLUTION 97 

of the personnel, and gave the army at least one focus. 
The non-commissioned officers kept alive an esprit de corps 
in the various regiments throughout the unquiet months 
which preceded the war, and upon the dereliction of their 
officers, furnished the substitutes for the junior ranks. 
Under their guidance, the privates soon settled down into 
ways of discipline, once the forces were actually in the field. 
Further, the artillery and engineers had escaped the de- 
moralization which had attacked the infantry and cavalry. 
The volunteers called by the Assembly were brigaded with 
the regular troops, and soon showed signs of worth. 

But the greatest factor in enabling this army to safe- 
guard France until new armies could be formed and trained, 
was the fact that the canker which had eaten so deeply into 
the French army had been equally destructive in its effect 
upon the forces of Prussia and Austria. Even before the 
close of the Seven Years' War, the splendid infantry of 
Frederick the Great had begun to degenerate, and though 
at the death of the great captain, Prussia was left with the 
finest army in Europe, with the passing of the old King the 
fire died, and those evils which culminated in the disaster 
of 1806 began to show themselves. It was still imposing 
in appearance, and its well-advertised self-esteem gave it 
an apparent formidability unjustified by its actual strength 
and efficiency. Moreover, the suspicion with which the 
King of Prussia regarded his Austrian ally, and his insist- 
ence upon independent commands, gave to his army the 
finishing touch of impotency. 

It is, perhaps, harder to justify the statement that Aus- 
tria's army was on the decline. In 1763, she had been at 
war continuously for a hundred years, and since that date 
she had twice fought Turkey. Her force was unquestion- 
ably the most powerful in Europe, but her commanding 
generals were always subject to the orders of the Aulic 
Council in Vienna, and in proof that decay had set in, we 
have at least one authority who says that her army "was 



98 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

disgraced by the frequent occurrence of large bodies' laying 
down their arms." At any rate, we know that her greed 
for Polish territory kept her attention divided until France, 
thoroughly aroused, had become an armed nation, against 
which the numbers and organization of Austria proved 
wholly inadequate. 

When war was declared, France found herself in possession 
of 82,000 effectives, stationed along her frontiers, and divided 
into three armies. The names of two of the commanders — 
Rochambeau and Lafayette — are very familiar to American 
ears, but the former resigned before activities began. Du- 
mouriez, secretary for foreign affairs of the Girondin min- 
istry, and the real driving power of the war, intended to 
begin with an invasion of the Austrian Netherlands by 
Lafayette's army. Nothing could have been more dismal 
than the attempt. Of the three columns which advanced 
on Namur, Mons, and Tournai, in late April, 1792, only 
the one commanded by Lafayette made a creditable show- 
ing, the other two fleeing in most shameful fashion. Lafay- 
ette was forced to withdraw after having accomplished 
nothing except to arouse Austria to a realization that war 
was actually upon her. Immediately, Prussia was asked 
for assistance under terms of the treaty, and armies were 
started toward France, with the Duke of Brunswick in 
command. However, the mutual jealousies of Prussia 
and Austria kepi them from adopting the active policy 
which would have defeated France, and gave her a little 
respite in which to improve her defense. 

The only movement in this direction was a decree on the 
part of the Assembly to establish a camp of jederes near 
Paris. At the same time it decreed the deportation of the 
non-juring priests and the sacrifice of the King's guard. 
Louis accepted the last named decree but vetoed the other 
two, thereby arousing an opposition which resulted in the 
dismissal of the Girondin ministry (June, 1792). Only 
Dumouriez was retained in the new position of Minister of 



EUROPE AND THE REVOLUTION 99 

War. The latter, always with the war before his eyes, 
urged upon Louis the acceptance of the decrees, but without 
success. Convinced now that he could no longer serve 
the war in Paris, he resigned and joined Lafayette's army 
of the North. The storm aroused by Louis' stubbornness 
waxed, and finally found expression through a mob which 
invaded the Tuileries on June 20th, and imperiled the 
life of both the King and Queen. Still Louis remained 
obdurate, and meanwhile the armies of Prussia were slowly 
approaching. 

Expressions of sympathy for the King began to be heard 
from all over France, among them being one which had a 
direct bearing on the war. Lafayette, liberal though he 
was, still had hope of reconciling the monarchy and the 
Revolution. Accordingly, he came to Paris, thinking to 
make use of the enormous popularity which had been his 
in the early days of the Revolution. His time had passed, 
however, and he returned to his command under sus- 
picion from both parties — from one for having tried to 
control the Revolution, from the other for having failed. 
This suspicion grew, and his trial as a traitor was discussed 
in the Assembly, so that upon receipt of the news of the 
Insurrection of August 10 (see below), Lafayette saw that 
his usefulness was past. On August 19, he crossed the 
frontier and surrendered himself to the Austrians, choosing 
imprisonment rather than an abandonment of his prin- 
ciples. He was succeeded in command of the Army of the 
North by Dumouriez. 

On July 25th, the Duke of Brunswick started his march 
from Coblentz, and the same day he issued his famous 
manifesto to the people of France. In it he declared that 
the allied sovereigns, without hope or intention of terri- 
torial aggrandizement, had taken up arms for the purpose 
of putting down the anarchy which now prevailed in France, 
and restoring to the throne its rightful occupant. He 
ended by warning the Assembly and the people of Paris that 



100 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

if they did not liberate the King, and "return to their 
allegiance, they should answer with their heads for their 
disobedience; and thai if the palace were forced, or the 
slightest insult offered to the royal family, an exemplary 
and memorable punishment should be inflicted, by the total 
destruction of the city of Paris." 

In justice to tin- Duke oi Brunswick it must be said 
that he was far-seeing enough to consider the manifesto 
ill-timed. The allied sovereigns, however, insisted upon 
its publication. Curiously enough, the document is largely 
the work of Calonne, former Minister of Finance for Louis 
XVI. Its effect upon France was electric. Immediate 
indignation was aroused at the arrogance of the foreign 
king's, and everywhere were seen signs that France now 
appreciated the task before her and was earnestly prepar- 
ing for it. 

C. tNSURRECTION OV THE PARIS COMMUNE 

The threat oi' invasion had produced the greatest tumult 
in France, centering, naturally, at the seat of government. 
The Legislative Assembly decreed La Patric en danger 
July It, and on July 22 and 23 the tocsin was sounded, re- 
cruiting bureaux were established at the chief corners in 
the towns, and the people called to arms. The general 
fear led to an outburst of indignation against the King. 
He was believed to be as indeed he was in correspond- 
ence with the allied governments; and the Queen was 
suspected o( furnishing the French plan o^i campaign to the 
commander o'i the hostile army. From Marseilles came a 
deputation July 12 demanding the deposition of the King, 
and from the same city inarched into Paris July 30 a force 1 
of volunteers singing Etouget de Lisle's new stirring revolu- 
tionary anthem, now universally known as I. a Marseillaise. 
In Paris, the Jacobins favored deposition, and plotted 
insurrection to accomplish this result. Under cover of the 
ferment in Paris, they planned to gain control of the gov- 



EUROPE AND THE REVOLUTION 101 

crnmcnt of the commune (i.e., the regular municipal gov- 
ernmenl of the capital) and with the support of the mob to 
coerce the Assembly. The presence of the Marseillaise 
troops, the constant marching and counter-marching in 
I lie streets, and finally I lie publication on Augusl 3d of the 
ill-advised proclamation of I lie Duke of Brunswick worked 
I he people up lo a fever of excitement and prepared the way 
for the success of I lie plans of I he conspirators. 

The royal family were aware of the danger of insurrec- 
tion. Although they look measures to strengthen the guard 
al the Tuileries, I heir hope lay in I he advance of I he allied 
armies. The King was in correspondence with his brother 
sovereigns. The Queen was furnishing copies of l he French 
plans lo the allied generals. Bolh hoped for relief if they 
could hold out for a monl h. 

[nsurrection broke ou1 in the early morning of August 10, 
\7 ( .H. A council of commissioners elected in primaries 
at the dictation of the conspirators deposed the regular 
communal assembly and established itself in the Hotel 
de Yille as the Provisional Commune of Paris. At the 
Tuileries, the Swiss guard al first repelled the mob, bul 
the King and the royal family, little understanding the 
true situation, decided lo throw themselves on the mercy 
of I lie Legislative Assembly. They therefore made their 
way to the hall of the Assembly, where they presented 
themselves, the King saying simply: "I am come here to 
,s;ive the nation from the commission of a great crime; 
1 shall always consider myself, with my family, safe in 
your hands." He then sent written orders to his guard 
to withdraw — orders which resulted in the extermination 
of the guard by the mob. He and his family were given 
seats in a gallery of the Assembly, where they remained 
from 10 a.m., Augusl 1 0th, until 3 a.m., August 11th, passive 
witnesses of the debate which determined their late. 

The Provisional Commune, or the Revolutionary Com- 
mune, as it is often called, assumed direction of the revolt. 



102 rHE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

It preferred to have the Legislative Assembly remain in 
session, thus keeping in existence a body which was nominally 
representative of all France, and which retained the alle- 
giance oi the provinces. The Assembly, however, was 
helpless before the Commune, supported by the Paris mob 
— indeed, only 284 of the 745 deputies dared to appear in 
their seats August 10. Before this subservient Assembly 
deputations from the Commune just after the fall of the 
Tuileries on the morning of the 10th urged the deposition 
of the King anil the dismissal of the ministry. The As- 
sembly obediently followed the dictates of its masters. 
decreed the deposition of the King, the dismissal of the 
ministry, and the convocation of a "Convention" to frame 
a new constitution. Three days later, the Commune de- 
manded the custody o( the King and the royal family: 
again the Assembly perforce yielded. 

Between the success o( the insurrection ami the meeting 
of the Convention. August 10 to September 20, 1790. the 
Provisional Commune of Paris governed Prance. Robes- 
pierre. Danton, and Marat then first became conspicuous 
as leaders of the radicals. Maximilien Robespierre, born 
17. 58, was a successful lawyer in Arras when the Revolution 
began. Elected to the Estates General, he became an im- 
portant figure there and a leading member of the Jacobin 
club. Fanatically sincere in his belief in the principles 
of the Revolution, he found an audience in the bourgeoisie 
and the proletariat of the Club, and was soon idolized by 
these elements as their natural and inspired leader. The 
power he exercised over the Jacobins is difficult to explain, 
for he had no gift of eloquence, no commanding presence, 
and no breadth of vision. He was. however, strictly honest 
and moral, gaining the surname of "The ' Incorruptible,' " 
and preached the popular doctrines of Rousseau time with- 
out end. He knew the Jacobin plans for the insurrection 
of August 10, but took no active part in their execution. 
He sat in the Provisional Commune and. as the most in- 



EUROPE AND THE REVOLUTION 103 

fluential man of the Jacobin organization, wielded an im- 
mense power. 

A more direct, practical, and forceful leader was George 
Jacques Danton. Horn 1759, Danton was practicing law 
in Paris in 1789. Although President of the Cordeliers 
Club in the early days of I he Revolution, Danton did not 
emerge from political obscurity until the August 10, 1792, 
insurrection. lie is given credit today for the success of 
that revolt. In the rcconstitution of government follow- 
ing it, he was appointed to tin* prominent post of minister 
of justice. Huge in body, endowed with a loud and vibrant 
voice and great natural eloquence, brave, honest, and 
practical, Danton from this time until his execution less 
than two years later had an important part in shaping events 
in France. History today, however much it condemns 
certain errors in judgment, gives him unreserved praise 
for the sincere patriotic motives which underlay his every 
act . 

We can admire much in Robespierre and Danton, but 
almost nothing in Marat. Yet Marat's character is one 
of the enigmas of history. Jean Paul Marat, born 1743* 
was a Paris physician of great reputation when the Revolu- 
tion began. He had published a dozen notable books, had 
been honored by election to learned societies, had been a 
favored doctor among the autocracy, holding a privileged 
position in the household of the King's younger brother, 
the Comte d'Artois, and was a recognized leader in scientific 
circles. At the Revolution, he laid aside completely his 
professional life and threw himself into the popular cause. 
During the first years he edited a paper (L'Ami (lit Pen pic. 
Friend of the People), notable for its scurrilous violence. 
His attacks on persons in power placed him in jeopardy 
again and again, so that he was forced to hide or flee from 
time to time. He won, however, the confidence of the 
basest elements of the Paris proletariat. In the insurrection 
of August 10, 1792, he took a seat in the Provisional Com- 



104 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

mune, where he was in a position to give full scope to his 
suspicious zeal. 

The Provisional.. or Revolutionary. Commune undertook 
energetically the task of carrying on the governmeni (under 

the shadow oi the Legislative Assembly) until the Con- 
vention should be elected. They dictated the appoint- 
ment of a ministry. Pant on being the most prominent figure. 
They approved the Assembly's decree ordering the con- 
fiscation and sale of the land of the emigre nobles, hoping 
thus to holster up the depreciated assignats. They ordered 
the non-juring clergy to leave the country under penalty 
of transportation to Guiana. They were especially inter- 
ested, however, in measures to discover and punish traitors 
to the Revolution, those suspected of desiring the restora- 
tion o( monarchy and the old regime. For such purpose 
they demanded from the Assembly the creation of an ex- 
traordinary tribunal, with judges and jurors chosen by the 
people, empowered to try conspirators: and the cowed 
Assembly consented August 07. 1792. Thus began the 
Revolutionary Tribunal, later so conspicuous during The 
Terror. 

The Provisional Commune felt the Deed of a demon- 
stration to terrorize the disloyal. Lafayette had deserted 
August 10: the fortress of Longwy had fallen August 07; 
the enemy were before Verdun August 30. On the pretext 
of a search for concealed weapons, agents of the ministry 
conducted a house to house canvas of Paris the last days 
of August. 1790. tilling the prisons with suspected reaction- 
aries. With the fall of Verdun momentarily expected and 
the allied armies then within a few weeks* march of Paris, 
the Commune saw no opportunity of trying judicially all 
the eases. To some desperate minds the remedy sug- 
gested itself. In the afternoon of September -J. 1792, while 
crowds in the Champs de Mars were being roused by speeches 
to patriotic fervor, assassins started the round of the prisons. 
During the next few days more than 1400 of the suspected 



EUROPE AM) THE REVOLUTION 105 

reactionaries wore murdered. The authorities, indifferent 
or helpless, took no measures to check the slaughter. The 
excuse for the massacre was the oft-repeated question: 
"How can we go to war and leave three thousand prisoners 
who may break out and slay our wives and children?" 

The remaining fortnight after the massacre was chiefly 
taken up with the elections to the Convention. In Paris, 
the acts of terrorism contributed directly, as was partly 
intended, to the success of the most radical of the Jacobin 
elements. Robespierre led the list ; Danton and Marat 
were colleagues. Throughout France as a whole, the radical 
Jacobins had a strong representation. At the meeting of 
the Convention September 21, 1792, they formed the most 
important group. 

D. THE WAR TO THE CLOSE OF 1792 

With the advance of Brunswick's forces, 42,000 strong, 
the French army on the frontier underwent all the terror 
and panic which marked the restless days in Paris. Follow- 
ing the flight of Lafayette, Dumouriez had succeeded to 
the command of the Army of the North, and a few days 
later. Kellermann became commander of the Army of the 
Center. Both changes were for the betterment of the 
army, but the latter change, at least, came late. Keller- 
mann's inert predecessor had, either stupidly or willfully, 
neglected to keep the border fortresses in a state of prepa- 
ration to resist attack. When Brunswick appeared before 
Longwy, August 27. that important fortification was so 
ill-armed and ill-garrisoned that it surrendered without 
making even a show of resistance. It was the same at 
Verdun. What should have been France's sturdiest strong- 
hold on her eastern frontier went through only a mockery 
of defense, and then, both her military garrison and her 
civilian population, terrified by the shells of the allies, de- 
manded that the fort be surrendered. Against their frenzied 
clamor, the Commandant was helpless, and in despair he 



106 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

committed suicide. The gates of the town were opened to 
the invader, September -2. Brunswick was free to march 
on Paris. 

Had the Prussian commander taken advantage of the 
situation which stupidity and inertia had created for him, 
a few days more would have made him master of the French 
capital. But the lethargy of the French seems to have 
been contagious, for now the same inertness marked their 
opponent as had previously characterized French move- 
ments. Day after day of allied inaction gave Dumouriez 
one last chance to save France. By a rapid and daring 
tiank march he moved his forces along the front of Bruns- 
wick's army, part of the time in contact with the enemy 
outposts, and took up a strong position in the Argonne 
hills which lay across the road to Paris. At the same time, 
he gave orders for Kellermann to move north from Metz 
with his troops, and join the main army at once. In position 
in the hills he awaited the attack which he knew was certain. 

The Puke was halted eleven days by the detachments 
holding the passes of the Argonne Hills. Then, he pushed 
through the northern pass and forced Dumouriez to fall 
back to the southern end of the hills, with the Prussians 
on the direct road to Paris, between the French and their 
base. Chalons. Once more a vigorous move would have 
brought success to the Duke, but he delayed until the 
tardy Kellermann had joined Dumouriez and brought the 
French strength to 50,000. 

Chi September CO was fought the battle of Valmy. It 
was insignificant as a battle between large armies, but it 
was of the greatest moment to France. Against an accurate 
and vigorous artillery tire. Brunswick was unable to force 
forward his infantry columns, and at nightfall abandoned 
the attack. His losses in numbers were trifling, as were 
also those of the French, but the influence on the morale 
of the two armies was remarkable. The allies, already 
weakened by hardships, hunger, and disease, were ready 



Necrwinden 

LIEGE 




EUROPE AND THE REVOLUTION 107 

to retire, whereas the French were inspirited out of all 
proportion to the size of the engagement. 

Dumouriez, who had long been intriguing to detach 
Prussia from the alliance, continued his secret negotiations 

with Brunswick, and failed to harass his beaten enemies 
until their retreat was well organized. Thereupon, a half- 
hearted pursuit drove across the frontier the 10,000 effectives 
which remained of the allied army. October 22. 

Meanwhile, in late September and early October, 1792, 
the French Army of the Vosges, under General Custine, 
had captured Speier, Worms, Mainz, and Frankfort in 
Brunswick's rear. The expedition, as carried out, had 
neither strategical nor permanent political value hut the 
occupation o( the cities proved a thorn in the flesh which 
the allies were unable to remove for months. At least 
three attacks were launched against Custine before he 
abandoned all his gains and fell back once more to the 
line of the Vosges (April 1, 17J>SV 

In November, l?J) k 2, Dumouriez found leisure to carry 
out his interrupted plan of the invasion of the Netherlands. 
Against an opponent who had seriously weakened his 
strength by extending his lines, the French commander 
led superior forces which struck the Austrians at the little 
town of Jemappes, near Mons. lie discovered his enemy 
in a strong position on the hills near Jemappes. Making 
use of his superior numbers. Dumouriez launched an envelop- 
ing attack against the Austrian left flank. He was at first 
successful on the right but was forced to halt because of 
disastrous cavalry attacks against his center. When this 
danger had been averted, another became imminent on the 
right flank, which hail halted. The situation was relieved 
by the extreme right column of the French. These troops 
found boats wherewith to cross the Haine, and thus were 
enabled to get completely around the Austrian left. When 
they appeared, in rear of the enemy lines, the Austrians 
broke and tied. 



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EUROPE AND THE REVOLUTION 109 

Belgian liberals, who expressed desire to be forever freed 
from Austrian tyranny. In accordance with these desires, 
the Convention in a paroxysm of fervor for the principles 
of the new-found liberty, decreed November \9, 1700. its 
protection of all nations struggling for freedom. Appeals 
from another direction two days later determined the depu- 
ties to extern! their decree. Delegations from the people 
of Savoy requested annexation to France. A committee 
qniekly reported that the Convention would not "repulse 
from their bosom men brought near to them by an identity 
of principles and interests." and November 0? the deputies 
voted the annexation. The next month. December 15, 
1792, the Convention, under the leadership of Danton, 
decreed a definite policy of revolutionary propaganda in 
neighboring countries, providing that the institutions of 
the new Republic should be transplanted to them, and 
declaring that any people which should refuse the offered 
liberty would be treated as enemies and considered as slaves. 

These decrees oi November 10 and December 15, 179-2. 
mark a definite phase in the passage of the Revolution from 
an issue of French internal politics to a question of inter- 
national relations. The French were justified in carrying 
through a Revolution in France, ami few governments in 
Europe eared to intervene. They were not justified, 
however, under any of the conventions of international 
relations in attempting to spread their revolutionary propa- 
ganda and system beyond their borders, especially when 
annexation of territory belonging to other governments 
followed. The Republic was creating against itself an 
implacable league of European governments. 

In the meanwhile a bitter factional tight developed in 
the Convention between the extreme Jacobins and the 
Gironde Jacobins — i.e.. the Jacobins from the Gironde 
district in southern France. Up to the meeting of the 
Convention the Gironde Jacobins had been in power. They 
had furnished the ministry of Louis XVI following the fall 



110 THE HISTORY OF EUROTE 

of the Feuillants (March, 1792), and wore indeed the minis- 
ters of the government at the opening of the Convention. 
They had been instrumental in forcing France into foreign 

war. Their leaders, gathering frequently in the salon of 
the brilliant Mine. Roland in Paris, had become the most 
conspicuous persons in France. After the suspension of 
the King, however, their policy differed sharply from that 
advocated by the extremists the enrages, as they came to 
be catted). They were not whole-heartedly in favor of a 
Republic. They did not sincerely desire the trial and 
punishment of the King. They leaned toward modera- 
tion, involving the retention of their own position as the 
head of the government. 

The opposing group, headed by Robespierre, was com- 
pactly organised and could rely upon the support of the 
Paris proletariat. The proletariat had so terrorized the 
bourgeoisie of the capital that in the municipal elections 
for the new commune to replace the Provisional, or Revolu- 
tionary. Commune, only about ten per cent of the voters 
dared to appear at the polls. This proletariat was ready at 
Robespierre's call to overawe the Convention. In contrast 
to the enragSs, the Gironde Jacobins were not well organized 
and had no popular support in Paris, and relatively little 
throughout the country. The leaders. Brissot. Roland 
(husband of Mine. Roland), Yergniaud. were not men of 
force and political vision, and were not unjustly suspected 
of personal ambition. They had no direct common policy 
to suggest, but wasted critical hours in rhetorical fulmina- 
tions against the opposing group. The Girondins lacked 
the capacity for leadership and the definite policy which 
might have carried a majority of the independent deputies 
with them. 

As the Robespierre group, the enragts, or the Mountain 
died from their seats in the top benches of the Con- 
vention), saw that the disposition of the King was the key to 
the situation, they pressed the issue to a decision. Nbvem- 



EUROPE AND THE REVOLUTION 111 

ber 3, L792, ;i committee brought in its report on the charges 

against Louis, recommending that he be tried before the 
Convention for treason. Late in the same month the 
discovery in a secret safe of the Tuileries of the correspond- 
ence Louis had carried on with his brother sovereigns 
revealed how he had intrigued against the Revolution. 
December 3, 1792, the Convention formally decreed that 
the recommendation of its committee be followed and that 
"Louis Capet" be tried for treason. December 26, 1792, 
Louis appeared for trial at the bar of the Convention. 
The Girondists were placed in a difficult dilemma. To 
vote guilty was to betray their convictions : to vote not guilty 
was to arouse the populace, invite accusations of disloyalty, 
and endanger their lives. They had not the courage to take 
the second course and to attempt to carry the independent 
deputies of the Center, or the Plain, with them. On the de- 
cisive vote, they yielded before danger and voted the King's 
guilt. January 19, 179.'}, the Convention, with the Girondins 
still fearing the dangers of opposition, decreed the immediate 
execution of the King. Two days later, January 21, 1793, 
Louis bravely mounted the scaffold and was guillotined. 

The execution of the King, together with the Convention's 
decrees of November 19 and December 15, 1792, was a 
gauntlet thrown down by republican France to the gov- 
ernments of Europe, and the challenge was straightway 
accepted. The English government expelled the French 
diplomatic agent from its country, and cemented its alliance 
with the United Provinces of Holland. The Convention 
thereupon waited no longer, but declared war against Eng- 
land and Holland February 1, 1793. War against Spain, 
whose ambassador had vainly attempted to save the life 
of Louis XVI, and with the Holy Roman Empire, followed 
a month later. By early spring, 1793, France was at war 
with the First Coalition, comprising Austria, Prussia, 
Sardinia, England, Holland, Spain, Portugal, Tuscany, 
Naples, and the Holy Roman Empire. 



CHAPTER V 

FOREIGN WAR: THE TERROR, AND THE REACTION IN 
FRANCE. MARCH, 1793-OCTOBER, 1795 > 

Had the coalition energetically pressed the war, its troops 
would soon have forced their way to Paris and there dictated 
the terms of peace. The governments, however, were either 
impotent or interested in other enterprises. Prussia con- 
sidered the dissolution of Poland more important than war 
against France, and had, by treaty with Russia in January, 
1793, gained liberally in the Second Partition. Spain, 
Holland, and Sardinia had not sufficient forces to attempt 
invasion. England had no foothold from which to launch 
an army, and was reduced to the exercise of her sea power 
and to the offer of subsidies to the continental governments. 
The burden of the land offensive, therefore, fell upon 
Austria — and even Austria did not contemplate a decisive 
invasion of France. 

To the French, however, the war was of vital interest. 
The decree of La Patrie en danger awakened every loyal 
instinct. From their government they asked measures, 
organization, and leaders to insure success. Hence, every 
military movement found its direct reflection in internal 
politics ; and every faction argued for its policies on the 
ground that they were best fitted to save the country. 

In the confused events of the next few years, therefore, 
we shall gain a proper perspective by making the ebb and 
flow of the military campaigns the background of our 
narrative of the course of politics in France. 

1 The Convention had introduced a new republican calendar, with months named 
from the seasons. It has been thought simpler, however, to date events by the 
commonly known method. 

112 



FOREIGN WAR 113 

A. MILITARY OPERATIONS 
FEBRUARY 16, 1793-AUGUST 14, 1793 

The success of the fall and winter of 1792 — the advances 
of Dumouriez in the Netherlands, and those of Custine on 
the Rhine — had given the French an estimate of their 
military prowess which was not upheld by their actual 
condition. Their political ambitions knew no bounds and 
they determined to make their army the handmaid of their 
ambitions. England and Holland, protesting against the 
destruction of a treaty which had closed the Scheldt River 
to commerce, were offered their 'freedom' at the hands of 
the Revolutionists, who proposed an invasion to assist 
Republicans in the two countries. On February 1, 1793, 
France declared war on England and Holland, and a few 
weeks later, served a similar declaration on Spain. Before 
the close of the year, the gauntlet flung down by France 
had been taken up by the Kings of Portugal and Naples, 
by the Duke of Tuscany, and by the Holy Roman Empire. 
Against this First Coalition, France light-heartedly sent 
an army, unorganized, undisciplined, and untrained, with 
only the record of two chance-won battles, Valmy and 
Jemappes, to justify its existence. 

Undaunted by the news that large allied armies were 
concentrating against him, Dumouriez boldly started his 
advance into Holland. A few cities fell to his arms, but he 
soon found himself compelled to lay siege to a Prussian 
force which had occupied Maestricht. As he was making 
his preparations, news came that the Austrian army under 
Coburg was beginning to advance into Belgium coincident 
with a similar movement by Brunswick directed against 
Custine's forces on the Rhine. The French commander 
ordered a retreat, and himself hastened back to Belgium 
to forestall disaster. He found his troops in a panic, and 
all his efforts toward reorganization enabled him only to 
make a reasonably well-ordered retreat before his adversary. 



114 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

At the end of ten days, he determined to risk battle. On 
March 18th, he drew up his line in front of Neerwinden. 
The favorable position of Valmy, the overwhelming num- 
bers of Jemappes were absent. On the level ground be- 
fore Neerwinden, the well-handled Austrian battalions 
were everywhere successful and created havoc among the 
disordered Republicans. It was not a great battle, but it 
appeared to flu- French in the light of an overwhelming 
disaster. Dumouriez withdrew his disheartened troops 
to the border fortresses. 

The Prussian advance on the Rhine had met with similar 
success, and ended with Custine forced back to the fortified 
town of Landau, his left resting on the Vosges Mountains, 
his right on the Rhine. There was this difference with 
Custine's army, however, — it had been forced to retire 
but it had not been shaken by any such reverse as Neer- 
winden. 

It would look, then, as though nothing remained in the 
path of the advancing armies. It must be remembered, 
however, that Custine was undefeated, ami his army, 
though pushed off the direct road to Paris, still menaced 
the communications of an advancing foe. And on the 
northeast, Coburg had to contend with the ghosts of Louis 
XIV and his famous military engineer, Vauban. For there, 
directly on his road to the French capital, lay Conde, 
Valenciennes, and Maubeuge, masterpieces of Vauban's 
skill, constructed in the days of the fighting Louis, and 
considered well-nigh impregnable. Behind them lay Du- 
mouriez, his army battered but still capable of resistance. 
Should Coburg go on to the destruction of the French army, 
he must leave in his rear the unconquered fortresses from 
which the garrisons would continually harass him. And 
his army, though considered by all the military experts of 
Europe of sufficient strength to crush the makeshift or- 
ganizations of the Republic, was nevertheless not strong 
enough to mask these fortresses and still permit of the 



FOREIGN WAR 115 

continued advance on Paris by a force powerful enough to 
cope with Dumouriez. Coburg, therefore, wisely deter- 
mined to reduce the fortresses, and accordingly, early in 
April, set lied down to the siege of Conde. 

Attention now centers on Dumouriez. A constitutionalist 
at heart, he had long since expressed his regret at the de- 
struction of the monarchy. His dislike of the Republican 
commissioners in Belgium had broken out into open quarrels 
which had aroused the suspicions of the leaders in Paris. 
His defeat at Neerwinden, handled by the skillful orators 
in the Convention, began to lake on the look of treason, and 
Dumouriez saw his life in danger. In the black days of 
late March, 17!).'5, therefore, he opened negotiations with 
Coburg in which he agreed to turn over the border fortresses 
and the army to the Austrian commander, the latter in 
his turn pledging himself to the restoration of the Bourbons, 
with proper compensation, supposedly, for Dumouriez. 
The army proved the stumbling block. It was devoted 
to Dumouriez, but more to the Republic, and when its 
commander attempted the transfer to the Austrian com- 
mand, it revolted. The disgraced leader fled to his country's 
enemies with a mere handful of followers, mostly merce- 
naries. We may condone the defection of Lafayette, who 
maintained his principles and left his army prepared to 
defend his country; but Dumouriez, who repudiated the 
government which he himself had helped construct and 
who bent every effort to steal from France her safeguard, 
we can only condemn. 

Evil times now fell upon the army of the North. Leader 
followed leader through the slough of defeats. Dampierre, 
attempting to relieve Conde, was killed at the head of his 
columns ; Custine, called from the Rhine, and Kilmaine 
fell under the displeasure of the Convention, to whom 
blunders and treason were now equivalent, and the former 
was guillotined. Meanwhile, Coburg had continued his 
sieges. Conde was starved out and surrendered July 10, 



116 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

1793 ; Valenciennes capitulated two weeks later. There 
remained now Maubeuge, and to the commander of the 
beleaguered city the Convention sent the curt information 
that the price of the surrender of the fortress would be its 
commandant's head. 

But the defeats had convinced the French government 
that a greater national effort was necessary, and the victo- 
ries had persuaded the allies that nothing was now left 
but to divide their plunder. These two states of mind 
brought about circumstances which inaugurated brighter 
days for France. The Convention appointed to the Com- 
mittee of Public Safety, with full power over the personnel 
of the army, Carnot, the "Organizer of Victory." The 
allied attitude, manifesting itself in an open declaration 
by Austria that she meant to hold Conde and Valenciennes 
and extend her conquests even further, enabled England 
to make a similar claim which she planned to substantiate 
by seizing and holding Dunkirk. Accordingly the allied 
army was divided, and there was dispatched toward the 
coast the Duke of York's unlucky expedition which was to 
incur the first of that long line of defeats which were not 
to be checked until Leipsic. 

B. THE CONVENTION : MARCH-SEPTEMBER, 1793 

Within the Convention, the factional fight between the 
Robespierre Jacobins (the Mountain, or the enrages) and 
the Gironde Jacobins (the Girondins) was brought to a 
crisis by the successive reverses in the war and the revolts 
within France. News of the advance of Coburg reached 
Paris the same day as a report of a formidable insurrection 
in La Vendee, a district in the west just south of the Loire 
River. Following this came still more alarming news, — 
the French defeat at Neerwinden March 18, the evacuation 
of Brussels March 24, the withdrawal from Belgium March 
30, the treason of Dumouriez April 5, the investment of 
Mainz April 14, and a long series of failures by the repub- 



FOREIGN WAR 117 

lican forces in their attempts to suppress the Vendean up- 
rising in the month of May. Though the Girondin minis- 
ters endeavored to meet the danger, each disaster weakened 
their position and strengthened that of their opponents. 
The Convention again decreed La Patrie en danger (March 8, 
1793) and appointed "Representatives on Mission" to go 
to each of the Departements in France to stimulate recruiting. 
After the bad news from Belgium and the treason of Du- 
mouriez, the ministry, under pressure from the Robespierre 
Jacobins, reestablished the Tribunel Criminel Extraordinaire 
(soon known as the Revolutionary Tribunal) March 29, 
1793, and created a Committee of Public Safety of nine 
members empowered to deliberate in secret and to override 
the ministers. In this Committee, Danton was the most 
prominent and efficient member. Supported by the Robes- 
pierre Jacobins, he was virtually dictator in France for the 
next two months. 

These several measures, however, failed to save the 
Girondin ministry. The Robespierre Jacobins, when in 
May the Vendean peasants continued their successes, began 
to plot actively to overthrow the Girondists. Once more 
the Jacobins called the Paris Commune to their aid. Similar 
procedure to that of August 10, 1792, was adopted. Com- 
missioners from the Sections {i.e., the electoral divisions) 
of Paris deposed the Commune, though for appearances' 
sake afterwards uniting its members to their own number, 
and demanded of the Convention (May 31, 1793) the 
arrest of the Girondin members. Two days later (June 2, 
1793) the Paris proletariat surrounded the Convention, 
placed artillery in readiness, and again demanded the 
immediate arrest of the Girondin deputies. The few mem- 
bers who dared to be in their seats were overawed by the 
mob and helplessly decreed the arrest of nine leading 
Girondin deputies and of the Minister of Finance and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

The coup d'etat of May 31- June 2 was a success in that 



118 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

it overthrew the Girondin government and eliminated the 
important Girondins from the Assembly. The three fac- 
tions which had cooperated in the insurrection, however, 
the Danton and Committee of Public Safety faction, the 
Robespierre faction, and the Commune faction, were not 
united upon their subsequent policy. Danton favored 
moderation and the conciliation of parties. The Robes- 
pierre group wished the utter destruction of the Girondists, 
with the elevation of themselves to power. The Commune, 
led by such unscrupulous men as Marat and Hebert, advo- 
cated the supremacy of the Commune and such socialistic 
measures as the extinction of the bourgeoisie and the dis- 
tribution of property among the proletariat. The de- 
struction of the Girondists served to bring the opposing 
interests of the three factions (which had temporarily acted 
together) in sharp opposition. 

All the advantage lay with the Robespierre group. 
Danton had never gained more than a personal following. 
His counsels of moderation, too commonly interpreted as 
weakness, met with little favor. The Hebertists had, 
and could have, no following outside of the proletariat. 
The Robespierre Jacobins were well organized, and in 
the name of the unity and safety of France rallied to them- 
selves the conservative-revolutionary mass of the people. 

The terrible condition in which the French people found 
themselves in the summer of 1793 demanded a strong 
government. Foreign invasion was combined with acute 
economic distress and civil war. The fortress of Conde 
was captured July 10; Mainz capitulated July 23; Valen- 
ciennes was occupied July 28 ; and Toulon surrendered to 
an English fleet August 23. The assignats had depreciated 
to a small fraction of their value. Domestic industry was 
at a standstill. Foreign commerce was throttled by the 
English navy. The need of the starving urban population 
had led to a Law of the Maximum by which dealers were 
forced to sell their grain at a fixed price. On top of these 



FOREIGN WAR 119 

troubles, important cities of the south and west, Mar- 
seilles, Lyons, Nimes, and Bordeaux, refused to acknowl- 
edge the authority of the Convention, and put anti-republican 
forces in the field. In the face of such conditions the Robes- 
pierre group took over the power. Their main agent was 
to be, not the Convention, but the Committee of Public 
Safety, legally endowed with powers superior even to the 
ministry. Hence when the term of the first Committee 
expired July 10, Danton and his friends were replaced by 
out-and-out Jacobins, and Danton's policy of conciliation 
was discarded for ruthless suppression of domestic revolt 
and energetic prosecution of the foreign war. Robespierre 
and his group were determined to give France a strong 
government in the great national emergency, a government 
which would search out and punish treason at the same 
time that it repulsed the armies of the invader. Their 
measures to meet the domestic and foreign emergency 
resulted in The Terror. 

C. MILITARY OPERATIONS. AUGUST 14, 1793, TO THE END 
OF THE YEAR 

There remain one or two more defeats to be recorded for 
the French. In Flanders, Coburg, preparing for the siege 
of Maubeuge, fell upon the French and pushed them back 
beyond the Scarpe River in order that he might be free 
from interference with his siege operations. The Repub- 
licans, now commanded by Houchard, took up an en- 
trenched position between Arras and Douai. This was the 
moment which England chose to demand that an expedition 
be sent to the Channel to capture and secure for her the 
port of Dunkirk. If we turn for a moment to glance at 
conditions on the Rhine we shall have completed the picture 
of France in her darkest hour. 

Custine's old Army of the Rhine had been reinforced 
by an Army of the Moselle, each army numbering close to 
50,000. These armies were holding the situation near 



120 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

Landau described above, — their left on the Vosges, their 
right on the Rhine, — known as the lines of Weissemburg. 
Opposed to them were superior Prussian and Austrian armies 
under Brunswick, Hohenlohe, and Wurmser. A con- 
certed movement would doubtless have crushed the Armies 
of the Rhine and the Moselle, but the clashing political aims 
of Prussia and Austria prevented cooperation. Austria's 
evident plan to add Alsace to her conquests was not agree- 
able for Prussia to contemplate. Brunswick might at any 
time have annihilated the Army of the Moselle, but such 
an action appeared to the Prussian foreign secretary as a 
play directly into her greedy ally's hands. Consequently, 
il was not until mid-October, 1793, that a combined move- 
ment could be agreed upon. When the advance began, it 
broke the French lines, and completely separated the two 
French armies, but even then the mutual jealousies of the 
allies prevented them from taking the fullest advantage 
of their successes. Here for the moment, we will leave the 
situation — the Army of the Rhine, badly shaken, at Strass- 
burg, the Army of the Moselle in like condition to the west 
of the Saar — - and return to the campaign in Flanders. 

In the north, the lowest ebb of the military tide came a 
little earlier than in the Rhine valley. The retirement 
behind the Scarpe in August was the last of the movements 
dictated by the force of the allied arms. To the govern- 
ments of the coalition, the time seemed ripe to secure their 
individual advantages, and Coburg, since his own govern- 
ment had announced its intention with regard to Conde 
and the surrounding country, could scarcely protest when 
the Duke of York insisted that he lead a force against 
Dunkirk, or when the commander of the Prussian detach- 
ment made a similar demand with regard to the cities of 
Luxemburg. The plan of an expedition to the Channel 
was acquiesced in, and in late August a force of English, 
Austrians, and Hanoverians numbering 35,000 set out for 
Dunkirk. Carnot was fully cognizant of the movement 



FOREIGN WAR 121 

and managed by the first week in September to get to- 
gether an opposing force of 40,000 for the relief of the city. 

Two roads lead out of Dunkirk, one to the east and one 
to the south, with an impassable marsh in the angle be- 
tween them. Along the road from the east, the Duke of 
York marched with the main army, his intention being to 
advance directly to the siege of the town. A portion of his 
force, 10,000 in number, he dispatched to the south of the 
marsh, to seize and hold a point on the south road, cover- 
ing his operations at Dunkirk, at the same time preventing 
the advance of a relieving French force along the southern 
route. The two armies were in position several days before 
Houchard was ready to begin the operations for relieving 
Dunkirk, but the siege had progressed but little owing 
to the fact that the inhabitants of the city had opened 
the dikes and flooded the fields. 

Once again the force of superior numbers rather than the 
skill of the commander brought success to the French. Of 
his 40,000 men, Houchard brought a bare half against the 
Hanoverians, and those were advanced with trepidation. 
Fortunately there was present one of the Convention's 
commissioners who assumed command of the right wing 
and led it forward with such spirit that the remainder 
caught the enthusiasm. They dashed against the allied 
left at Hondschoote and drove out their foe with heavy 
loss (September 8, 170.'}). Houchard proved a most re- 
luctant victor, for at a time when he might have pursued 
vigorously, and cut off the entire expeditionary army, he 
delayed inexcusably until the Duke had retreated east- 
ward, and saved himself. Houchard had won a victory 
and saved Dunkirk, but his actions were not to the liking 
of the pitiless Committee of Public Safety. They wanted 
"audace, toujour* Vaudace" and plainly Houchard was not 
the man to supply it. He was recalled to Paris, and before 
the year was out had been "sent to Heaven through the 
Little Door." 



122 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

Still, the victory was loudly acclaimed in France, and had 
proved the worth of Carnot's idea of concentrating his 
troops for results. He was to demonstrate still more ably 
the correctness of his methods. Immediately after Hond- 
schoote, Coburg had brought his whole strength to bear 
on Maubeuge, the last of the strongholds. If Paris were 
to be saved, the siege of Maubeuge must be raised and the 
Austrians forced to retire. To this end Carnot bent every 
effort. He put in command of the army a young general 
named Jourdan, who had seen service in the American 
revolution. The two working together, planned and exe- 
cuted a speedy concentration near Guise of 00,000 men 
drawn from both ends of their line, and without giving their 
enemy time to surmise their subsequent actions, without 
even giving their own men a much needed rest after their 
marches, they advanced to the attack. 

The allied army numbered about 0.5, 000, but of these 
85,000 were engaged in the siege of the fortress, and the 
remainder spread out in a long covering line, east, south, 
and west — a line so extended that when Jourdan made 
his attack he was able to mass very superior numbers 
against that position which he chose to strike. This was 
an entrenched sector, lying along a low wooded crest, with 
its right resting on the valley of the Sambre, and its left 
on a hill near the village of Wattignies. Against the posi- 
tion, Jourdan feinted on the afternoon of October 14, mean- 
while reconnoitering his ground thoroughly. 

The battle proper began the following day with a general 
attack all along the line. But although the assault was 
sharply pressed, the well-trained Austrian troops again 
asserted their superiority and repulsed their opponents. 
At nightfall, an observer walking among the exhausted 
Republicans would have said that the battle was lost. But 
Jourdan knew better than to spare his men at this juncture, 
exhausted though they were, so under cover of darkness 
he moved reinforcements from the left and center to the 



FOREIGN WAR 123 

extreme right of his line. A heavy mist enabled him to 
mass his artillery and infantry without their positions 
being known. When at noon on October 10, the weather 
cleared, Jourdan hurled his columns full at the plateau of 
Wattignies, and captured it. The little hill was the key to 
Coburg's position, for it enfiladed his lines, and although 
his troops were everywhere else successful, he deemed a 
withdrawal necessary. The siege of Maubeuge was aban- 
doned, and the allies withdrew behind the Sanibre. 

The success was not an isolated one. With the armies 
of the Rhine and the Moselle, the representatives from 
the Convention had employed to the fullest extent their 
arbitrary power. The armies had been reorganized and 
increased, and two new commanders, Hoche and Piehegru, 
had been placed at their heads. In November they began 
a forward movement which by the end of the year had not 
only recaptured the Weissemburg lines but had retaken 
the important fortress of Landau as well. 

In the Pyrenees, in the Maritime Alps, and on the Var, 
France had waged a desultory warfare during these same 
months. There had been no notable successes, but there 
had been only minor defeats which were more than com- 
pensated for by the achievements in Flanders and on the 
Rhine. 

Thus the year closed. France was still hemmed about 
by enemies and vexed by internal disorders, but the period 
of her despondency was past. The end of '93 is notable in 
her military history, not so much for actual battles won, or 
territory taken, as it is for the birth of that great military 
enthusiasm which was to keep the whole world aflame for 
twenty years. Carnot was its father. Under his leader- 
ship the whole country thrilled to the martial spirit. The 
raw levies which he had hurried into the ranks were proving 
themselves excellent soldiers, fit to take the place of the 
regular army which had saved the day in the beginning. 
The cities hummed with the business of preparation for 



124 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

war. Huge foundries wore recasting church bells into 
cannon ; factories were turning out a thousand muskets a 
day ; new methods of steel working produced great quanti- 
ties of swords and bayonets; and a new process of powder 
making was increasing the supply by 30,000 pounds daily. 
France had risen to meet the great issue. The country was 
out of danger. 

]). THE REIGN OF TERROR 

These successes, however, were not sufficient to allay 
the fears and suspicions engendered by the misfortunes of 
the preceding spring and summer. The new Jacobin gov- 
ernment was determined thai never again should France 
be weakened by internal treachery and revolt. The policy 
this government pursued to suppress the existing insur- 
rections, to punish rebels, and to destroy the seeds of future 
uprisings brought about The Reign of Terror. 

The Terror lasted from September, 1793, to July, 1794. 
Its origins were psychological ; its motives, both political 
and patriotic; its agencies, the Revolutionary Tribunal 
and the guillotine; its victims, those who by word or act 
had raised a suspicion of their loyalty to the principles of 
the Revolution. 

Defenders of the policy of terrorism consciously adopted 
by the Jacobin leaders have been few. If we can, however, 
imagine ourselves for a moment in the France of September, 
1793, and regard ourselves as fanatically faithful to the 
democratic principles to which our one-year-old Republic 
has been dedicated, we shall discover, if not a defense, at 
least an explanation of the Terror. At the beginning of 
September we have suffered the shocks of a series of national 
disasters. Our general-in-chief has deserted to the enemy ; 
and a great section of the west has flamed into insurrection. 
City after city, — Lyons, Marseilles, Nimes, Bordeaux, — 
has revolted and in some cases openly advocated restoration 
of the monarchy. Danton has attempted conciliation and 



FOREIGN WAR 125 

failed. Economic life is stagnant. Our friends are in dire 
need. Our nerves are shaken. We have perforce become 
suspicious of everyone, even of our colleagues ; but our 
determination to save the Republic and the Revolution is 
stronger than ever. A weak Girondist government has 
failed. Danton's conciliation has failed. We propose to 
try force. Controlling the new Committee of Public Safety, 
we add to it Carnot, noted for his organizing abilities. We 
leave to him and to his generals the question of repelling 
the invaders. We turn to the task of stamping out the 
fires of disloyalty within the Republic. Such might have 
been our temper in the France of September, 1793 : such 
certainly was the temper of Robespierre and the Jacobins 
at that crisis. 

The signal for the beginning of the Terror was the treason 
of Toulon, which admitted the English fleet August 23, 
1793. As soon as the news reached Paris, the Jacobins 
acted. September 5, 1793, they proposed a decree divid- 
ing the Revolutionary Tribunal into four sections to ex- 
pedite its work. September 17, 1793, they passed the 
terrible Law of the Suspects. This law defined suspects 
as "all who had befriended tyranny, not paid taxes, or 
who were not furnished with cartes de civisme (cards of 
citizenship) from their Sections," and provided that such 
suspects might be accused and haled before the Revolu- 
tionary Tribunal for trial. October 10, 1793, the Con- 
vention put aside for a time its constitutional function 
(for which it had been chosen) and decreed that "the 
government be revolutionary until the peace." December 4, 
1793, the Committee of Public Safety was made supreme 
throughout all France by a law permitting it to send out 
"National Agents" to supervise act of local authorities. 
These several measures of September 5, S ptember 17, 
October 10, and December 4 gave to the Jacobins the 
extraordinary powers they needed. 

Their punishment of the revolted cities showed early the 



[26 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

merciless use they intended to make of their powers. In 
July. Marseilles was captured : the guillotine soon took 
toll to the number oi M)0. September 19, Bordeaux was 
captured: 500 prisoners were summarily shot, and over 
L500 guillotined. December 19 the English fleet was 
forced from Toulon, ami the city captured: SOD prisoners 
were shot, and 1800 guillotined. December 23, the last 
organized hand oi Vendean insurrectionists was cut to 
pieces: an inhuman monster, Carrier by name, took terri- 
ble vengeance upon bis prisoners, having 2000 shot under 
the walls of Nantes, and drowning as many more by scut- 
tling shipfuls in the Loire. Ami in towns which had not 
rebelled the guillotine was busy during these months of 
the Terror. Cambrai, Arras, Orange, Brest, Toulouse — 
each had its long roll of victims. Probably more than 
20)000 suspects were executed in accordance with the 
Jacobins' political policy. 

Paris suffered heavily. Marie Antoinette went bravely 
to the guillotine October 16. Twenty Girondists were 
executed October 31. As factional fights developed, the 
Robespierre group resorted to the guillotine: thus several 
leaders of the Paris Commune, including llehert. were 
executed March 24, 1794; and Danton ami a few of his 
friends April 5, 1794. Persons of less prominence daily 
mounted the guillotine and suffered the extreme penalty. 
Eighty per cent o( the cases tried before the Revolutionary 
Tribunal resulted in sentence o( death. 'The record in Paris 
shows that between September 1. 1793, and July 29, 1794. 
2625 people were guillotined. 

A curious accompaniment oi these excesses was the spirit 
of irreligion. Here the Commune of Paris took the lead. 
November 10. 1793, the great cathedral oi Not re Dame was 
consecrated to the worship of Reason. In the month fol- 
lowing - November -J,') December 25 —some 2500 churches 
in France were converted into 'Temples of Reason. Robes- 
pierre, however, felt the futility of attempting to destroy 



FOREIGN WAR 127 

the evidences of the religious instinct, and, after Hebert's 
fall, procured from the Convention a decree solemnly 
affirming the existence of a Supreme Being and the Im- 
mortality of the Soul. June 8, 17!)4, he officiated in person 
at a great festival to the "Supreme Being" in the garden of 
the Tuileries. 

Yet France was not gloomy and horror-stricken during 
the Terror. The usual run of executions touched the 
interests and emotions of relatively few. The ordinary 
citizen lived without fear of the guillotine. Many of the 
victims were really guilty of disloyalty, in spirit if not in 
act. Twenty thousand executions constitute a very small 
proportion of a population of 25,000,000 less than I out 
of every 1000. Even in Paris, the loss of 2600 was hardly 
noticeable from a population of 500,000. Shops were open, 
fete days celebrated, and I healers crowded as usual. 

In the meanwhile, the continuation of French victories 
brought renewed confidence to the people and rendered 
any further extension of the Reign of Terror unnecessary. 

E. MILITARY OPERATIONS, 1794 

Spring of 1794 found the allied armies, in spite of their 
defeats of the preceding autumn, still ensconced firmly in 
the fortified cities of Flanders, and entrenched along the 
Belgian frontier. From Ypres to Longwy their detachments 
were posted 145,000 strong, their greatest strength centered 
near Tournai. Opposite (hem were ranged under the hand 
of Carnol the armies of the Republic — Pichegru's Army 
of the North and the Army of the Ardennes (combined, 
13,000) were in a position to menace Brussels and Charleroi; 
Jourdan's Army of the Moselle (45,000) was south of Longwy, 
but not actually threatening any portion of the enemy's 
lines. Strategically, neither force could be said to have 
the advantage of the other, but morally the balance inclined 
heavily to the side of the French. The "spirit of '93" was 
everywhere, and the tide of Republican enthusiasm ran full 



128 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

and strong. With the allies, however, the political dif- 
ferences of the governments caused dissensions in their 
armies. For Prussia, in particular, the Oder watered a 
ground more fertile for gain than did the Meuse, and only 
England's monthly subsidy of £150,000 kept Frederick 
William's soldiers in the Netherlands. 

Notwithstanding the moral superiority of the Republicans, 
Coburg struck the first decisive blow of the year by captur- 
ing Landrecies. In May, Souham, commanding a French 
column, retaliated by defeating Clerfayt and thrust his 
division well in between Clerfayt and Coburg's main army. 
His position was an isolated one, and, to Coburg, seemed 
to invite annihilation. Accordingly, he issued orders for 
an attack which would cut off Souham from the remainder 
of Pichegru's army and crush him completely. Three 
columns from the allied center near Tournai were to march 
on Turcoing and gain control of Souham's road to Lille. 
A fourth from farther south was to march due west, unite 
with the Archduke Charles' column arriving from a point 
two days' march south, drive off the nearest supporting 
French troops, and join the first-named columns near 
Turcoing. Finally, Clerfayt from the north was to cross 
the Lys River and inarch upon the same spot, whereupon 
all six detachments were to fall upon Souham's helpless 
division and shatter it. 

It was an excellent plan, — needing only synchrony to 
make it a brilliant success. But from the first the scheme 
went awry. Archduke Charles, marching his tired men 
from the south, fell further and further behind the schedule. 
The fourth column delayed for the Archduke. Clerfayt 
from the north dawdled in a fashion which, had he been 
commanding a Republican army, would have cost him his 
head. The supporting French who were to have been 
beaten off, marched in to assist Souham, together they 
repelled the three assaulting columns from Tournai, and 
then turned and pushed Clerfayt back across the Lys 



FOREIGN WAR 129 

before the battalions of the Archduke Charles could come 
within striking distance. The English and Hanoverians 
in the center fought stubbornly, hoping that the Archduke 
and Clerfayt would retrieve their original blunders and 
save the day. 

The allied losses were inconsiderable, but the defeat told 
heavily none the less. The Duke of York commented 
openly and unfavorably on the Archduke Charles' defection. 
The allied commander, fearing further activities where this 
calamitous beginning had been made, reinforced his right 
wing heavily to forestall a French inarch on Brussels. 

But it was on the Sambre instead of the Scheldt that 
disaster finally overtook the enemies of France. By the 
end of May, Carnot had matured a plan calculated to make 
the most of the conditions resulting from his previous 
successes. Up from the south came 45,000 self-sacrificing 
ragamuffins from the Army of the Moselle, the competent 
Jourdan at their head, to combine them with the Army of 
the Ardennes, and form the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, 
120,000 strong. His orders, sent from Paris, directed him 
against Liege and Namur — unwise orders when it is 
remembered that a strong undefeated enemy lay to the 
northwest on the Sambre. But fortune was fighting for 
the Republic. The Austrians themselves recalled Jourdan 
to his proper task — the destruction of the opposing army 
— by attacking one of the French garrisons on his left 
flank. Immediately, Jourdan changed his plan, and pushed 
back the Austrians by indecisive fighting until his army 
found itself on the left bank of the Meuse. Here new orders 
from Paris awaited it — to move at once on Charleroi and 
essay its capture. Jourdan found his new command, the 
Army of the Ardennes, in a depressed state after its third 
attempt to cross the Sambre in the face of the guns of 
Charleroi. Together the two armies (now to be known as 
the Army of the Sambre and Meuse) ventured the crossing, 
and on the second endeavor extended their jubilant lines 



130 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

around the city. Within a week, the 3000 exhausted Im- 
perialists of the garrison, unacquainted with that buoyant 
spirit impelling the French, gave up the struggle and sur- 
rendered (June 25, 1794). 

Too late, Coburg realized that the disjunctive activities 
in Flanders did not constitute the real danger, and hastened 
to repair the fault which had incapacitated his left. Hur- 
riedly, he assembled about 60,000 men and inarched toward 
the ill-defended stronghold of Charleroi. He found Jour- 
dan's army (now 75,000 strong) near Fleurus, occupying 
the arc of a circle, three miles in radius, with Charleroi as 
its center. Ignorant of the fact that the city had sur- 
rendered, Coburg, on the early morning of June 26, pre- 
cipitated the battle of Fleurus. 

His plan called for a converging attack by five columns, 
impinging on the French lines from the west, northwest, 
north, northeast, and east. Such was the dissemination 
of his troops that Coburg could do no more than give the 
order which initiated the assault. Thereafter his subordi- 
nates did each what he could in his separate field. As a 
result, Fleurus may be considered as made up of five com- 
ponent battles waged with mutual disregard. On the west 
and northwest, the French in the late afternoon gained 
the day and beat off their assailants; on the north and 
northeast, an undetermined struggle raged. But the 
eastern flank was the most hotly contended of all. Here 
the allies came in contact with the old Army of the Ardennes, 
inferior in training and discipline to the other portions of 
Jourdan's army, and worn out by weeks of effort. After 
six hours the defense broke and fled, and the victors pressed 
forward until they were checked by the reserve under 
Lefebvre. Urged on by this fiery commander, and by 
Marceau, another of the same stamp, the Republicans 
withstood four attacks of the foe. Then, just as Coburg 
had ordered the retreat, they launched a counter-attack 
which swept their remaining opponents from before them. 



FOREIGN WAR 131 

The allies were beaten, but the exultant French were too 
exhausted to pursue. Unmolested, the defeated army 
withdrew from the field. 

The battle of Fleurus changed the whole tenor of the war 
and, indeed, of the Revolution. In Paris, men saw that 
the need of The Terror as a form of government had passed. 
Fleurus made possible the overthrow of Robespierre. As 
for the war itself, it ceased to be a war of defense and be- 
came thereafter one of offense. The cities of Conde, 
Valenciennes, and Maubeuge fell to the Republicans, who 
at once began preparations for war on foreign territory. 
With the allies, the disintegration of the First Coalition 
was already in sight. The Imperialists fell back toward 
the Rhine, abandoning the Netherlands, Prussia frankly 
withdrew, and the English and Dutch retreated into Holland. 

F. THE END OF THE TERROR 

The close of The Terror came with the overthrow of 
Robespierre. He had been, even before the death of 
Danton, practical dictator. His consent to the use of the 
guillotine to rid himself of political enemies aroused his 
colleagues in the Convention and on the Committee of 
Public Safety. These men could not conscientiously always 
approve every measure Robespierre introduced ; yet open 
opposition might take them to the steps of the guillotine. 
From their fears, therefore, was born the plot to overthrow 
him. The military successes of the government, culminat- 
ing at Fleurus June 25, 1794, gave the plotters the chance 
to rely for support upon the more moderate elements in 
the Convention. The necessity for a policy of Terrorism 
once removed, these elements would favor the overthrow 
of him who was held responsible for it. 

The plot came to a head July 27, 1794. In a tumultuous 
session, Robespierre was denounced on the floor of the 
Convention. His efforts to procure a hearing were futile. 
After hours of turmoil, the Convention decreed his arrest 



132 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

on the charge of dominating the government. The Jacobin 
mob rose, delivered him from prison, and took him in 
triumph to the Hotel de Ville. The Convention, however, 
saw the necessity, now that it had gone so far, of carrying 
out its full purpose. It declared him an outlaw, rallied 
troops to its aid, and, July 28, attacked the Hotel de Ville. 
Forcing an entry, the soldiers found Robespierre stretched 
out on the floor, his jaw broken by a bullet. The same 
evening he was guillotined. Within the next few days 
103 of his partisans in the Convention and the Jacobin 
Club followed him to the block. The Jacobin power was 
definitely broken. 

Since Robespierre had become the personification of 
The Terror, his execution was hailed with rejoicing by those 
who looked forward to internal peace and conciliation and 
the resumption of normal conditions. Though the leaders 
of the movement for Robespierre's overthrow had them- 
selves been Terrorists, they recognized the political wisdom 
of moderation. In the weeks following July 28, 1794, 
therefore, they made no attempt to combat the various 
measures introduced to stamp out the remains of the Terror- 
ist system. Not until too late did they recognize that 
their power was gone forever and that the moderates were 
establishing themselves firmly in control. 

Since the Committee of Public Safety, the Revolutionary 
Tribunal, and the Paris Commune had been the chief means 
by which The Terror had been maintained, the moderates 
attacked these first in a series of reform measures in August, 
1794. The Paris Commune was abolished, and commis- 
sioners from the Convention designated to govern the 
capital. The Revolutionary Tribunal was reorganized, 
its procedure changed, and ample means of defense allowed 
to prisoners. The Committee of Public Safety was limited 
to the province of War and Foreign affairs, fifteen addi- 
tional committees created to exercise the other powers 
formerly intrusted to it, and provision made that one 



FOREIGN WAR 133 

fourth of its members should retire each month and be re- 
placed by appointees of the Convention. These changes 
were fundamental : they undermined the Jacobin power 
in the government. 

As the moderates became surer of their position, they 
acted with greater force and directness. In November, 
1794, they abolished the Jacobin Club. In the following 
month they decreed amnesty to the remaining bands of 
rebels in the west (Vendee and Bretagne), repealed the Law 
of the Maximum, and ordered the stoppage of the sale of 
confiscated lands. Finally, March 2, 1795, their committee 
recommended that the old Terrorist leaders be arrested and 
sent before the Revolutionary Tribunal for trial. 

The dismay of the Jacobins at these measures, and their 
justified fears for their own safety, led them to have recourse 
to the familiar expedient of insurrection. The misery of 
the proletariat in Paris aided them in their designs. The 
conspiracy came to head April 1, 1795. A disorderly rabble 
broke into the hall of the Convention and for hours inter- 
rupted proceedings. The moderates, however, had learned 
their power. Loyal troops from the National Guard cleared 
the hall. The Convention decreed the deportation of the 
Jacobin prisoners arrested March 2, voted to seize sixteen 
other leaders, to disarm the Terrorists in Paris, and to purge 
the National Guard of members of the proletariat. Not 
only was the insurrection a failure, but the penalties im- 
posed by the moderates in the Convention weakened the 
Jacobins greatly. Six weeks later (May 20, 1795) a second 
Jacobin uprising met a similar fate, and the subsequent 
arrest of 62 Jacobins for complicity wholly destroyed that 
faction. The "Mountain" ceased to exist. 

In the meanwhile the popular reaction had taken a Royalist 
tone. Though these moderates had checked the Terror, they 
had no intention of restoring the monarchy. Economic dis- 
tress, however, had embittered many against the republican 
experiment. The assignats had fallen to less than twenty- 



L34 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

five" per cent of their nominal value, yet the Convention con- 
tinued to issue them at the rate of forty or fifty million 
Ira ncs a day until there were in circulation nineteen billion 
francs of this depreciated currency. Industry was stag- 
nant ; foreign, and even coastwise, trade was choked by 
the English fleets. Though the Law of the Maximum had 
been repealed, grain had not been marketed and the people 
in the cities were starving. The feeling grew that the Re- 
public was a failure, and that a monarchy such as that 
accepted by Louis XVI under the constitution of 1791 would 
again bring prosperity. 

Events of the early summer of 1704, however, blasted 
the hopes of the Royalists. The Dauphin, a boy of ten, 
who had been in prison since the arrest of the King, sickened 
under the hard and unusual conditions, and died (June 10, 
17!) P. At his decease, his uncle, the emigre Comte de 
Provence, younger brother of Louis XVI, issued a proclama- 
tion announcing himself as legitimate King of France with 
the title of Louis XVIII, and declaring his adherence to 
the rights of the ancient Bourbon house, and his contempt 
and hatred for constitutional principles. He thus effec- 
tually removed himself from the field, for few persons who 
desired restoration wished for a return of the old regime. 
A fortnight la tea- a little band of emigres, borne in English 
ships, landed on the peninsula of Quiberon, in Brittany, to 
rally Royalists and tight for the restoration of the monarchy. 
Fatal division of councils ami military incapacity made 
the expedition futile. Republican troops under Hoche 
defeated it July 20. 1794, and 690 of its members were shot 
after a summary court-martial. 

The Convention seized the moment of the collapse of 
the Royalist movement as opportune for the formation of 
the republican constitution — the task for which it had 
originally been chosen. June 23, 1704, its committee 
presented its draft. Debates continued for about seven 
weeks. The constitution was definitely accepted by the 



FOREIGN WAR 135 

Convention in the middle of August, 1794. In accordance 
with precedent, it was submitted to the primary assemblies 
of the people, and ratified. The Convention thereupon 
proclaimed it (September 23, 1795) and set the first meeting 
of the new legislature for November 6, 1795. 

The new constitution was framed in an attempt to avoid 
some of the palpable errors of the old, and was decidedly 
more conservative. Universal suffrage was abolished ; 
residence and taxation were made necessary qualifications 
for the franchise. Further, a property qualification was 
established for membership in the legislature — a provision 
tending to throw the legislature under the control of the 
bourgeois class. The legislature was bi-cameral, consist- 
ing of the Council of the Five Hundred and the Council of 
the Ancients, initiation of legislation being solely in the 
power of the Council of the Five Hundred. The duration 
of the legislature was three years, one third being renewed 
each year. The executive consisted of a commission of 
five members, known as the Directory and chosen by the 
legislature. One member of the Directory retired each 
year. 

Its work done, the Convention prepared to dissolve. 
But it had one more crisis to meet. A decree supple- 
mentary to the constitution had been passed providing that 
two thirds of the members of the Convention should be 
admitted to the new legislature. Its purpose was to insure 
a majority of experienced men in the new legislature, but 
the bourgeoisie, especially in Paris, took great offense, 
believing it intended to prevent the election of members of 
their class. The proletariat was, of course, willing to side 
temporarily with the bourgeoisie to overthrow the Con- 
vention, feeling a grievance in the property qualifications 
for membership in the legislature. Plans were hastily laid 
for insurrection. With the bourgeoisie taking part, such 
an uprising was certain to prove formidable. 

The Convention was informed of the disaffection in Paris 



136 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

and of the intended insurrection. It intrusted measures 
for its own protection to a committee of its members, 
headed by one Barras, who was head of the Army of the 
Interior. Barras called to his aid a young artillery officer 
by the name of Napoleon Bonaparte, who chanced to be 
in Paris at the time seeking reinstatement to the army. 
On the night of October 4, 1795, Bonaparte concentrated 
artillery against the approaches to the Tuileries and dis- 
posed his troops to await attack. The insurgents advanced 
to the attack the afternoon of the 5th. Bonaparte with 
his artillery repulsed them without difficulty. Before 
dark the mob had dispersed, and on the following day loyal 
troops policed the disaffected quarters of the city. Bona- 
parte himself received his reward in the shape of appoint- 
ment as second in command to the Army of the Interior, 
his friend Barras being his immediate superior. A few 
weeks later, when Barras was chosen a member of the 
Directory, Napoleon Bonaparte succeeded to his command. 
Its work now completely finished and all danger of a 
coup d'etat having been removed, the Convention dissolved 
October 26, 1795, and was succeeded by the Directory. 



CHAPTER VI 

CONTEMPORARY EUROPE. 1789-1795 

Since our outline in Chapter I of general conditions in 
Europe, we have concentrated our attention upon events 
in France. We are justified in devoting proportionately 
so much space to these events, not merely because of their 
immediate and lasting importance in French history, but 
because of their ultimate effect upon the destinies of all 
Europe. We must not, however, in stressing the course 
of the Revolution in France neglect the other states of 
Europe, for we thus run the risk of losing that just per- 
spective which is the basis of true comprehension of history. 
Before we go further with our narrative of the Revolution 
in France, therefore, we shall outline conditions in France's 
great neighbors, and indicate briefly the reaction of the 
Revolution upon them. 

A. AUSTRIA 

Joseph II of Austria, Holy Roman Emperor, died Febru- 
ary 20, 1790. His next brother and successor, the Arch- 
duke Leopold, who had already made a reputation for 
wisdom and judgment in his twenty -five years of enlightened 
rule in Tuscany, faced a most difficult situation. Joseph's 
hasty reforms had brought rebellion in the Austrian Nether- 
lands and created strong disaffection in Hungary and 
throughout Austria proper. Further, Joseph's desire for 
territorial aggrandizement had led him to ally himself 
with Catherine the Great of Russia in a war upon the Turks, 
and the Russian-Austrian successes, which by the end of 
1789 had gained the allies all of the frontier Turkish for- 
tresses, had aroused Prussia and England to active measures 

137 



138 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

of hostility. Such, then, was the situation Leopold in- 
herited : internal discontent ; one great province in revolt ; 
a war with Turkey ; and the imminent formation of a great 
hostile alliance against him. 

Leopold II, a man of forty-three at the time of his acces- 
sion to the Austrian and Holy Roman Imperial throne, 
lived only two years thereafter, but accomplished much in 
that short time to reestablish stable conditions in his 
country. As soon as he reached Vienna, he decreed the 
abolition of the new hated land-tax and the return to the 
ancient and familiar taxation system. He restored to each 
section of the monarchy the form of government existing 
under Maria Theresa, thus wiping out the arbitrary terri- 
torial divisions formed by Joseph II. He removed the 
irritating regulations which had fettered foreign commerce. 
These measures were received with joy by the mportant 
and substantial elements in Austria proper, and were re- 
sponsible for a revulsion of extreme loyalty at the ceremony 
of Leopold's coronation. His concessions to the Hun- 
garians, consisting of the restoration of all their ancient 
privileges, were at first less warmly received. His appear- 
ance in person at his inauguration, however, and his gracious 
address finally won from the Hungarian leaders expressions 
of loyalty as warm as those he received in Austria proper. 

In the meantime he had not been idle in his endeavors to 
compose Austria's foreign relations. Realizing the impossi- 
bility of standing against allied Prussia and England — 
especially since his natural ally, France, was becoming more 
and more a prey to revolutionary activity — he at once 
made a direct personal appeal to Frederick William of Prussia 
in a most conciliatory spirit, and also got in touch with the 
English cabinet. By most delicate and adroit diplomacy 
he avoided the imminent war with Prussia. In the Con- 
vention of Reichenbach, August 5, 1790, he agreed to enter 
into an armistice with the Turks, and to open negotiations 
for peace on the basis of the status quo ante helium. He 



CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 139 

then, to be sure, relinquished all the high hopes with which 
Joseph II had inaugurated the war in February, 1788 — 
hopes of gaining Bosnia, Serbia, Moldavia, and Wallachia, 
and expelling the Turks from Europe — - but he secured the 
safety of his dominions and freed his forces for the subjuga- 
tion of the rebels in Flanders. In accordance with the 
terms of the Convention of Reichenbach, the armistice 
with Turkey was concluded in September, 1790, and final 
terms of peace between Austria and Turkey signed at 
Sistova August 4, 1791. 

Leopold was less successful in his treatment of the Aus- 
trian Netherlands. He made a few efforts to conciliate 
the disaffected elements, but when these efforts were un- 
availing, prepared to use force. In September, 1790, his 
armies freed by the Convention of Reichenbach and the 
armistice with the Turks, he began to reinforce his troops 
in Luxemburg. At the same time he issued an ultimatum 
promising the restoration of the government as it existed 
under Maria Theresa and a general amnesty, fixing the 
date for acceptance of these terms at November 21, 1790. 
When no formal acceptance reached him, he ordered his 
troops to advance. The factional fights among the Belgian 
revolutionaries prevented them from making any effective 
resistance. December 3 Brussels was captured; and by 
the end of the year the entire country was again under 
Austrian power. His use of force, however, though out- 
wardly successful, had intensified the bitterness of the 
opposition. It was responsible in succeeding months for 
the constant turmoil, intrigue, petty insurrections, and 
spread of sympathy with the principles of the French 
Revolutionists. Leopold's policy of force actually paved 
the way for the later French successes in winning the Aus- 
trian Netherlands. 

With all these internal and foreign difficulties, Leopold 
kept an anxious eye upon the progress of the Revolution 
in France. Although from general political considerations 



140 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

he could hardly regret the loss of French power and prestige, 
he felt keen sympathy for the predicament of his sister, 
Marie Antoinette, and his fellow sovereign. The obvious 
policy to follow would have been to intervene forcibly and 
restore the sovereign to his former power. Such a policy 
was dictated by his feelings, urged by the body of the 
emigres, headed by the Comte d'Artois, and would have 
received the approval of the other states of Europe and the 
active assistance of Prussia. He was deterred by two factors 
in the situation : 1st, his doubt as to the efficacy of armed 
intervention as a real cure for Louis XVI's difficulties; 
and 2d, his fear of the aggressive designs of Catherine of 
Russia. It required no great political astuteness to see 
that foreign intervention would unite revolutionary France 
against the invader and would actually imperil the position 
of Louis XVI. He hesitated, therefore, to commit his 
country to what might be a long and costly war with no 
assurance that at the end the position of Louis XVI and 
Marie Antoinette would be any better established than 
before. And in the east, Catherine of Russia was obviously 
anxious to have both Prussia and Austria embroiled in a 
war with France in order that she might take advantage of 
their preoccupation to seize Poland. 

Not until the indignities suffered by the French King 
and Queen after their capture at Varennes in June, 1791, 
did Leopold act. He then reluctantly issued a general 
appeal to his fellow sovereigns in Europe to unite in com- 
mon measures in view of events which "immediately com- 
promised the honor of all sovereigns, and the security of all 
governments." A few weeks later, at Pillnitz, near Dresden, 
he met Frederick William of Prussia and issued (August 27, 
1791) the famous Declaration. He still continued to hope 
that intervention would not be required, however, and 
after Louis XVI formally accepted the Constitution of 
September, 1791, professed to believe that a settled govern- 
ment had again been established in France. 



CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 141 

His hope, as we know, proved futile. When he attempted 
to negotiate with the new government concerning the 
grievances of the German princes along the Rhine, whose 
hereditary rights had been infringed by the measures passed 
in the National Assembly, he was sharply rebuffed. He did 
everything possible to avoid war, incurring among his own 
people a reputation for weakness and vacillation, but the 
political leaders in France actually desired hostilities to 
further their own immediate ends. In the face of con- 
tinued insults and provocations, Leopold concluded an 
alliance with Frederick William of Prussia, and moved 
troops toward the west. In the midst of the final negotia- 
tions and preparations, Leopold suddenly died, March 1, 
1792. 

Leopold's eldest son succeeded him on the throne as 
Francis I of Austria. Francis was at this time a young 
man of twenty-four. The negotiations with France had 
at the time of Leopold's death reached a point where war 
was inevitable, so this situation was of course the most 
important one confronting the new Emperor. He straight- 
way issued an ultimatum demanding the restoration of the 
monarchy in accordance with Louis XVI's concessions to 
the Estates General in 1789, and satisfaction for the griev- 
ances of the German states along the Rhine. The French 
leaders answered this by forcing their King to a declara- 
tion of war April 20, 1792. 

The outbreak of the war was the signal for rapid and 
important action in a new quarter, an action which had 
been foreseen by Leopold II. The Polish patriots had 
taken advantage of Russia's preoccupation with the Turkish 
War of 1787 to shake off temporarily the grip which Cath- 
erine had obtained on their country. A Polish Diet, now 
known as The Four Years' Diet, met at Warsaw October 6, 
1787; abolished the Russian Council; demanded the with- 
drawal of Russian troops ; and arranged a defensive treaty 
with Prussia (March 29, 1790). Then for over a year the 



142 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

deputies debated the provisions of the new constitution, 
finally adopting one by acclamation May 3, 1791. Cath- 
erine of Russia had been too busily engaged in the Turkish 
War to interfere. With the coming of peace with Turkey 
January 9, 1792, and the preoccupation of Austria and 
Prussia with war against France April 20, 1792, her hands 
were freed. She ordered her armies across the Polish 
border May 19, 1792. Within six weeks Russian troops 
had overrun all of Poland and the short-lived constitution 
was a memory. 

The negotiations of the following months paralyzed 
Austro-Prussian activities against France. A new partition 
of Poland was known to be imminent, and both Austria 
and Prussia were far more interested in territorial advan- 
tages to be gained therefrom than in barren victories against 
France. In the unedifying bickering of the autumn and 
winter of 1792 Prussia had one great advantage over Aus- 
tria : Prussia could withdraw from the war against France 
without loss, whereas Austria could not withdraw without 
yielding the Austrian Netherlands. By threats, Prussia 
induced Austria to agree to a separate Russian-Prussian 
treaty on Polish affairs. This treaty, signed January 23, 
1793, and known as the Treaty of the Second Partition of 
Poland, secured to Prussia the strongholds of Dantzig and 
Thorn and the district of Posen, with one and one half 
million inhabitants, and secured to Russia a large slice of 
territory in the east with nearly three million people. 

Francis I of Austria and his advisers were amazed at the 
amount of territory Russia and Prussia had taken from 
Poland. Their anger was especially directed against Prussia, 
and the diplomats of the two countries indulged in bitter 
mutual recriminations during the spring and summer of 1793. 
The military campaign against France was neglected while 
Prussia poured troops into her new Polish acquisitions and 
Austria sought in some way to gain satisfaction. So intense 
was the feeling aroused that at the end of September, 1793, 



CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 143 

Frederick William left the Prussian camp in the west, ordered 
his troops to remain inactive, and hurried eastward to be 
sure that none of the Polish booty should be taken away 
from him. 

A Polish uprising the following spring (March 24, 1794), 
led by Kosciuszko, opened up the possibility of a final par- 
tition of the country in which Austria should regain her 
proper allotment. Kosciuszko's cause was hopeless from 
the start. Prussian, Russian, and Austrian armies were 
in motion against him by the end of the summer. His 
army was defeated and he himself wounded and captured 
October 10, 1794. Warsaw fell before the Russian assaults 
November 8, 1794. Russia calmly claimed the country 
up to the Bug River, leaving the remainder to be partitioned 
between Austria and Prussia. Austria, having received no 
territory in the partition of 1793, now sought Russian aid 
for extensive gains in the coming treaty. Catherine under- 
stood well the wisdom of the policy of dividing her favors: 
she had supported Prussia before ; she leaned to the aid of 
Austria now. By secret treaty January 3, 179.5, Russia 
and Austria agreed upon the line of division, Austria being 
assigned the districts of Cracow and Sandomir and a con- 
siderable addition to Galicia. In August, 1795, terms of 
this treaty were divulged to Prussia. With a few slight 
modifications, these terms were accepted in the final agree- 
ment between the three powers, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, 
signed January 26, 1797, and known as the Treaty of the 
Third Partition of Poland. 

Francis I had thus avenged his diplomatic defeat by 
Prussia in the partition of 1793, but the negotiations and 
the bickering had cost him his alliance with Prussia (for 
Prussia signed the Treaty of Basle with France April 5, 
1795), the whole of the Austrian Netherlands (which the 
French had overrun and annexed), and defeat after defeat 
in the campaigns of 1793, 1794, and 1795. During the 
critical years of the French Revolution, years when the 



144 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

raw French levies might have been crushed and the objects 
of the allies gained, Francis and his colleague Frederick 
William II had been deeply interested in plans for selfish 
aggrandizement at the expense of helpless Poland to push 
their advantage. And now, in 1796, it was too late, for 
the French levies were no longer raw and untrained, and 
a new military genius was ready to take the lead in French 
operations. 

B. PRUSSIA 

In the sketch we have given of Austria's course during 
the early years of the French Revolution, we have had 
occasion to refer continually to the diplomacy of Prussia. 
We have seen how Frederick William II vacillated during 
these fateful years between his interests in the east and 
his opposition to the French Revolution in the west and 
how finally he deserted entirely the allied cause against 
France and left Austria to bear the burden of the war alone. 
It is easy now with the fullness of our knowledge of subse- 
quent events to criticize Prussian policy, to point out how 
energetic cooperation by Prussia and Austria would have 
captured Paris, restored the ancient monarchy, and pre- 
vented the vast evils to the European system which ac- 
companied the rise of Napoleon ; but no one at that time, 
least of all Frederick William II with his limited political 
vision, could have foreseen the disasters of the next fifteen 
years. The Prussian King and his advisers were playing 
the game of international politics according to the con- 
ventional standards of their age. They stand condemned 
today by the ultimate results of their policy, results which 
they could not foresee. In their own time, up to the debacle 
at Auerstadt-Jena, they considered themselves — and were 
considered by many of their contemporaries — astute and 
successful. 

From the outbreak of the French Revolution, Frederick 
William II showed the keenest interest in the course of 



CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 145 

events and deep sympathy with his fellow sovereign Louis 
XVI. The Prussian King was among the first to urge 
intervention to save Louis. He was largely responsible 
for inducing Leopold of Austria, in the little town of Pillnitz, 
to issue the famous Declaration August 27, 1791, that the 
two monarchs stood ready to join other European rulers 
in endeavoring to place Louis XVI in a position to establish 
in France a government "that shall once more be in accord 
with the rights of sovereigns, and shall promote the welfare 
of the French Nation." At the same time, he was also 
acutely concerned with affairs in Poland. He had long 
been jealous of Russian influence there. He took advantage 
of Catherine the Great's preoccupation with her war against 
Turkey to encourage the movement for independence in 
Poland in 1789-1790. He viewed with sympathy the acts 
of the Polish Diet in abolishing the Russian Council and in 
demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops. He signed 
an offensive and defensive alliance with Poland May 29, 
1790, and ratified the Polish constitution of May 3, 1791. 
Frederick William's interests, then, were involved in the 
events both upon his eastern border and in France. He 
was probably sincere in what he had done up to this point, 
willing on the one hand to make the sacrifices required by 
intervention in order to save Louis and to restore the posi- 
tion of the French monarchy, and glad to have a strong 
independent Poland as a buffer state between Prussia and 
Russia. The incidents of the next few years, however, 
introduced so strong a temptation to Prussian self-interest 
that Frederick William II was unable to resist. 

The temptation was presented by Catherine the Great 
of Russia. Having made a hasty peace with Turkey 
(January 9, 1792), she prepared her forces to redeem Rus- 
sian power in Poland. She waited until Austria and Prussia 
were both committed to war against France (April 20, 
1792) ; then straightway marched her army across the 
border. Poland, of course, under the terms of her treaty 



;40 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

with Prussia, called upon Frederick William for aid: at 
the same time Catherine offered him the prospect of liberal 
increase of territory in Poland if he gave no aid. Frederick 
William's position was not easy. He had already set his 
army in motion toward the French frontier. He could not 
raise, equip, and put in the field against Russia on his east 
another army with any prospect of success. Yet not to 
aid Poland was to break his pledged word. He chose to 
repudiate the treaty, to denounce the constitution which 
he had rati tied a year before, and to dispatch a small force 
himself to the Polish border to insure the possession of 
the territory he might be assigned in the coming partition. 

As the French War progressed, the chances for glory and 
profit in the west diminished and the opportunities in the 
east increased. His army was cheeked at Valmy in the 
autumn of 179 i 2. His Austrian ally was checked at Jemappes 
in November of the same year. The Anstro-Prussian 
successes of the spring and summer of 1793 were offset by 
the failures in the fall. In the east, on the other hand, 
Catherine had granted him liberal accessions of territory 
with one and one half million inhabitants by what is known 
as the Treaty of the Second Partition of Poland, and the 
Polish Diet was assembled in deliberation upon ratifica- 
tion of the territorial concessions. Fearful lest Austrian 
intrigue or Russian cupidity might rob him of part of his 
Polish spoils, he finally left the Prussian camp, giving his 
generals directions to remain absolutely inactive, and 
hastened eastward. 

An influential body of his counselors, who from the 
beginning had disapproved the alliance with Austria, now 
praised his policy. Self-interest was the guiding principle 
of their doctrine, and self-interest was immediately pro- 
moted, apparently, by the extension of territory in Poland. 
Through the year 1794 the army in the west remained 
practically inactive, while Frederick William, now thoroughly 
committed to and in sympathy with the policy of territorial 



CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 147 

aggrandizement, concentrated all his efforts upon Poland. 
When Kosciuszko led the Polish revolt in the spring of 
1794, Prussian troops were the first to march against him. 
Frederick William now saw the extinction of Poland as an 
immediate probability, and devoted all his energies to 
establishing himself in a position where he could again 
claim a liberal extension of territory. lie defeated Kos- 
eiuszko in I lie battle of Rawka June (J, 1704, oeeupied 
Craeow June 15, and gathered his troops for the siege of 
Warsaw July c 2, 1794. Kosciuszko's cause was hopeless. 
Russian and Austrian armies aided the Prussian. By 
November the unequal contest was decided, and Poland 
was again garrisoned by its enemies. 

Frederick William II had now lost all interest in the French 
War. Knowing I ha I he would have to meet, Austrian 
opposition in his attempt to gain whal he wanted in Poland, 
he decided to make peace as soon as possible with France. 
Hence, in January, 1795, his emissary began negotiations 
in Switzerland with the French representative, and the 
treaty of peace was signed at Basle April 5, 1795. The 
treaty was, of course, an outright betrayal of Austria, 
England, Holland, and other members of the First Coalition 
against France, but Frederick William and his counselors 
justified it by the additional forces it placed at their dis- 
posal to strengthen their demands for Polish territory. 

As we have seen, Austria this time outwitted Prussia 
by means of secret intrigue with Russia. In January, 1795, 
even before Prussia had signed the peace with France, 
Austria and Russia had come to an agreement on the terms 
of partition. All through 1795 and 1796 the unedifying 
squabble over the spoils continued. Before the prospect 
of war against united Russia and Austria, Frederick William 
II was finally obliged to yield his ground, and accept terri- 
tory much less than he had hoped. The Treaty of the 
Third Partition of Poland was signed January 26, 1797. 

Though the Prussian court was disappointed at Prussia's 



H8 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

share in the final partition, it was inclined in 1797 to look 
upon the international situation with pride and confidence. 
The King had, on the whole, fished with good success in 
the troubled waters of European politics. Prussian terri- 
tories had been extensively increased by additions from 
Poland. One of the chief rivals of Prussia — France — 
was so weakened by the Revolution that she ceased to be 
a factor in international considerations. Another — Aus- 
tria — had been continuously since 1792 engaged in war 
with ever-mounting sacrifices in men and wealth. No 
Prussian counselor evinced any remorse for his country's 
broken engagements. The King and his advisers were 
proud of their policy. For the King himself his success 
was the last as well as the crowning glory of his life, for 
he died in this very year (1797) undoubtedly believing that 
he had served his country well. The Prussian awakening 
did not come for a decade. 

C. SPAIN 

Across the Pyrenees the French revolutionary movement 
met with no favor. The Spanish peasantry groaned under 
burdens as excessive as those laid upon the same class in 
France, and the idle nobility inherited a caste prejudice 
against labor or business; but two important factors pre- 
vented the spread of revolutionary doctrines. First, the 
ignorance and the strong racial and religious prejudices of 
the masses of the people prevented them from being inter- 
ested in or aroused by the literature of contemporary 
French political philosophy. The antipathy to French 
literature because it was foreign, and the knowledge that 
Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot and others were condemned 
by the Roman Catholic church, united to bar these en- 
lightening influences from such part of Spanish circles as 
might have profited from them. And second, the bour- 
geoisie class, which as we have seen played so important a 
part in the Revolution in France, was weak, small in iiuin- 



CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 149 

bers, and not energetic or liberal-minded in Spain. The 
keen, aggressive shopkeeper, business or professional man, 
trader, was a type which had not become prominent under 
Spanish conditions. Intensely loyal to the monarchy, 
then, uninfluenced by advanced political doctrines and 
uninspired by the leadership of an active bourgeoisie, the 
Spanish people in 1789 showed no sign of revolutionary 
contamination. 

Charles III, King of Spain, died in December, 1788, and 
his son and successor, Charles IV, was duly proclaimed in 
Madrid in January, 1789. Charles IV was at this time 
a man of forty who, though simple in his habits and honest 
in his principles, lacked conspicuous force or mental gifts. 
His wife, Maria Louisa of Parma, a woman of decided 
character, exercised a strong influence over him. His 
immediate problem was difficult. His father and prede- 
cessor had committed Spain to long and expensive wars 
against England and to costly improvements in naval 
armament, with the result that the Spanish treasury was 
empty. A harvest failure in 1788 and intense cold in the 
winter of 1788-1789 increased the general suffering through- 
out the country. 

Charles IV s efforts to alleviate the misery in Spain 
during 1789 bore witness to the generosity of his temper 
more than to his good judgment. He remitted taxes, 
forcibly cheapened the price of grain, and borrowed large 
sums at exorbitant terms in order to tide over the treasury. 
At the same time, he cut expenses on the navy to the min- 
imum, and reduced the standing army until it numbered 
less than forty thousand men. The temporary relief was 
soon followed by national bankruptcy, for the government 
was wholly unable to pay its new obligations, and the 
weakening of the national armaments proved fatal when 
war came. 

In the midst of these distressing internal conditions, he 
took the keenest interest in the course of events in France. 



150 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

Himself a Bourbon, he looked up to Louis XVI as the head 
of the Bourbon house and sympathized deeply with the 
difficulties of the French King. As the Revolution pro- 
gressed, he took arbitrary and unnecessary measures to 
prevent its spread in Spain. For example: in April, 1791, 
he decreed the suppression of all newspapers in Spain 
except the Official Gazette; he endeavored to keep from 
his country all French news or propaganda; and in July, 
1791, he required every foreigner in Spain, whether resident 
or mere traveler, to swear allegiance to the King of Spain 
and to the Catholic religion, and publicly to renounce all 
claim or right of appeal for protection to his own country. 

With the imprisonment of Louis (August, 1792) Charles 
IV bent all his energies to saving the French King's life. 
Charles was willing, indeed, to accept diplomatic rebuffs 
and even insults from the ministers of the Convention if 
only he might succeed in saving Louis XVI. At the crisis 
of the negotiations he summarily dismissed (November 15, 
1792) his old and tried minister, Floridablanca, and ap- 
pointed to his place General Don Manuel de Godoy, Duke 
of Alcidia. 

All the opprobrium due to the Spanish humiliations of 
the following twenty years has become attached by history 
to the person of Godoy. Godoy had come to the Spanish 
court in 1784 at the age of seventeen to be admitted to the 
King's bodyguard. His handsome figure and his pleasing 
personality captivated the Queen, though she was old enough 
to be his mother By the Queen's influence he was rapidly 
advanced from honor to honor until, as recorded above, he 
was appointed in 1792, at the age of twenty --five, Prime 
Minister. He was not equipped by training or by natural 
genius to cope successfully with the difficult internal and 
foreign problems of the government. 

Godoy's first failure was in his dealings with France. 
It was essential that he should avoid war, for the Spanish 
finances and the Spanish army were, as has been indicated, 



CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 151 

in no condition for war. Yet it was the King's desire that 
Godoy should make every effort to save the head of the 
Bourbon house. The Spanish ministers at Paris at Godoy's 
direction intervened again and again during the course of 
Louis XVI's imprisonment and trial, and used immense 
sums in the attempt to bribe the leaders in the Convention, 
but their efforts were without avail. Indeed, Spanish 
intervention really served to concentrate the hostility of 
the Convention upon Spain. After Louis XVI's death, 
the French leaders declared war upon Spain March 7, 
1793. 

Although the Spanish people accepted the war loyally 
and enthusiastically, the deficiencies in size, organization, 
equipment, training, and leadership of the army prevented 
any success. The series of disasters in 1793 and 1794 aroused 
strong discontent with the government. The initial en- 
thusiasm died down and the people clamored for peace. Both 
the King and Godoy were genuinely anxious to arrange 
terms, so in the spring of 1795 the representatives of the 
two nations got in touch. By the final treaty, signed in 
July, 1795, France agreed to evacuate Spanish territory, 
and Spain ceded the Spanish part of the island of Santo 
Domingo. This peace was generally popular. The Spanish 
court considered that it had come out of the war with honor 
and with its continental boundaries and its national in- 
stitutions unimpaired. The loss of part of Santo Domingo 
was trifling. Godoy, still the object of the Queen's infatua- 
tion, retained his position as Prime Minister and received 
from the King the title of Prince of Peace. 

D. ENGLAND 

The fate of England was intrusted during this dangerous 
period to one of the most remarkable men who has ever 
risen to the fore in English politics. William Pitt, a younger 
son of a former Prime Minister, the Earl of Chatham, was 
called by King George III to the premiership in December, 



152 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

1783. Pitt was at this time a man of twenty-four. He had 
been the favorite of his gifted father and from his youth had 
been trained and designed for political life. His precocity 
gained him an unusual reputation even as a child ; and 
when he came of age, he had the great advantage of his 
father's reputation to give him the necessary start. He 
entered the House of Commons in January, 1781, and at 
once established his position as a great orator and a nat- 
ural leader. A year later, 178 L 2, he accepted the place of 
Chancellor of the Exchequer in a weak cabinet, and be- 
came the acknowledged government leader in the House of 
Commons. And in December of 1783, the King called 
upon him to form a ministry. 

The difficulties before him were very great. His ex- 
treme youth and his relatively limited experience at acces- 
sion to power made it so improbable in the eyes of his con- 
temporaries that his ministry would last that he had the 
utmost difficulty in gaining the consent of men to enter the 
Cabinet. The political opposition in the Commons, a coali- 
tion comprising such men as Burke, Fox, and Sheridan, 
was exceptionally strong. And the prestige of the country 
was at the moment very low, for England had just lost her 
American colonies and had been humiliated by the treaty 
of peace with France and Spain. Indeed, on the continent 
and in some English circles, England was regarded as 
having gone into a decline, as having descended to the 
position of a second or third rate power. At the same time, 
the burden of the great war had greatly embarrassed the 
national treasury, and the Irish were in a defiant mood. 
In the face of such complex problems, it is scarcely to be 
wondered that the English political world hailed the ap- 
pointment of the twenty-four-year-old Prime Minister with 
derision. 

Pitt conceived it to be his first duty to reestablish the 
material prosperity of England. His policy, therefore, 
from 1783 to 1793 was chiefly concerned with fiscal affairs ; 



CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 153 

his chief interest lay in the preparaf ion of the annual budgets. 
Thoroughly familiar will) the doctrines of Adam Smith, 
he brought his enlightened intelligence to bear upon methods 
for reducing the national debt and raising the credit of the 
country. At the same time he advocated, though without 
practical success, parliamentary reform and measures for 
the alleviation of conditions in Ireland. His concent ration 
upon domestic concerns was rewarded by a steady rise in 
public credit and increase in volume of trade. England 
recovered rapidly from the depths into which she had ap- 
parently descended at the time of the conclusion of the 
American-Freneh-Spanish peace. 

This concentration upon domestic concerns did not pre- 
vent the youthful premier from keeping a watchful eye 
upon foreign affairs His purpose was to threaten English 
intervention at any time that the balance of power was 
disturbed and to uphold English rights wherever and when- 
ever threatened. Thus in 1787, when France was on the 
point of interfering in Holland, Pitt's government took a 
firm stand against her, and concluded an alliance (the 
Triple Alliance of that day) with Prussia and Holland to 
uphold Dutch rights. Two years later, 178!), when Spain 
in an endeavor to establish her rights to the northwestern 
coast of North America seized an English merchant vessel 
in Nootka Sound near Vancouver Island, Pitt promptly 
demanded redress and prepared for war. His firm stand 
forced the Spanish government to come to terms (1790) 
and the Nootka Sound incident was concluded with honor 
to England. Again, in 1791, he endeavored with his allies 
Prussia and Holland to check the Russian aggressions 
upon Turkish territory, basing his protest especially upon 
the Russian seizure of the fortress of Ochakoff at the mouth 
of the Dnieper River. In his endeavor, however, he was 
foiled by the unwillingness of his Parliament to offer a threat 
of war over territory so remote from English interests. He 
had, then, as these examples indicate, not neglected inter- 



154 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

national politics in his concentration upon the reSstablish- 
ment of domestic prosperity. 

The outbreak of the French Revolution did not divert 
Pitt from his policy. From international considerations, 
naturally, he could feel no regrel at witnessing (lie apparent 
break-up of England's greatest rival, but he was not tempted 
to take advantage of her weakness. He refused to commit 
England to any action in answer to the Austro-Prussian 
Declaration of Pillnitz, and determined to remain neutral 
after the declaration of war. In England, his course was, 
on the whole, approved. The beginning of the Revolution 
had excited the sincere sympathy of English liberals, but 
the excesses of the Convention and the reports of The 
Terror had quickly alienated the great body of sound and 
conservative public opinion. Even with the general hos- 
tility to the leaders and methods of the Revolution, however, 
the English people were disposed to accept Pitt's view that 
it was not a matter for English concern so long as it did not 
infringe upon English interests. So remote seemed the 
prospect of departure from his peaceful policy that Pitt, 
in surveying the national finances in February, 1792, made 
proposals for repealing certain taxes, adding to the Sinking 
Fund for the reduction of the debt, and reducing the num- 
ber of seamen in the English navy from 18,000 to 10,000; 
and declared that "unquestionably there never was a time 
in the history of the country when from the situation of 
Europe we might more reasonably expect fifteen years of 
peace than at the present moment." And as late as Novem- 
ber 13, 1792, he wrote to a political friend : ''Perhaps some 
opening may arise which will enable us to contribute to the 
termination of the war between different powers in Europe, 
leaving France (which I believe is the best way) to arrange 
its own internal affairs as it can." 

In spite of Pitt's policy and desires, the French leaders 
forced the war. The extreme decrees of November 19, 
and December 15, 1792, the one promising assistance to 



CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 155 

revolutionary peoples in all countries, and the second forc- 
ing French institutions upon territories occupied by the 
French, showed that the revolutionary leaders were not 
only prepared to fomenl rebellion in other countries, but 
thai they had adopted a policy of territorial aggrandize- 
ment in defiance of the rights of their neighbors. At the 
same time, these leaders injected an intensely practical 
issue into the situation by demanding from Holland the 
freedom of navigation of the Scheldt River. This issue, 
taken in conjunction with the revolutionary decrees, broughl 
a sharp protest from England, for by treaty in 17K8 (the 
treaty of the Triple Alliance between England, Holland, 
and Prussia) England had solemnly guaranteed to Holland 
tin- navigation on the Scheldt River. To allow Holland to 
be forced to yield to French demands would be a gross 
violation of good faith. Pill was compelled to stand by 
the provisions of the treaty to assist Holland. War then 
became inevitable. Popular feeling, aroused to a high 
pitch, became even more intense after the execution of 
Louis XVI. The nation went into mourning: crowds 
surrounded the Kin# and demanded an immediate declara- 
tion of war. The French themselves finally put an end to 
the hesitation by a declaration of war February 1, 1793, 
following this by a similar declaration against Spain in 
March. 

This First Coalition of France's enemies comprised, after 
it. additions during 1793, all the chief powers of Europe 
except Russia, Turkey, Switzerland, Denmark, and Sweden. 
In nearly every case, France had been the aggressor and had 
actually issued the declaration of war. We have already 
spoken of England, Austria, Prussia, Holland, and Spain. 
Home, which was the Papacy, had been alienated in the 
early days of the Revolution by the law of the Civil Consti- 
tution of the Clergy, to which the Pope had never agreed. 
In 1701, the French annexed the Papal city of Avignon, by 
this aggression showing that they considered themselves 



156 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

as enemies of Rome. In September, 1792, the Convention 
declared war upon Sardinia and poured troops into the 
provinces of Savoy and Nice. The decree of December 15, 
1792, was the justification for the actual annexation of 
these rich provinces to France. Portugal followed Spain 
into the war in March, 1793, signing an alliance with Spain 
and contributing 5000 troops for an invasion of France. 
When Francis I of Austria became Holy Roman Emperor 
(with the title of Francis II), he naturally committed the 
empire to the war (1793), finding sufficient reasons in the 
infringement of France upon the rights of the German 
princes in Alsace and along the Rhine. Tuscany and 
Naples joined the coalition in the summer of 1793, the 
Grand Duke Ferdinand of Tuscany because of his Haps- 
burg origin, and King Ferdinand IV of Naples because of 
his Bourbon relationship and his antipathy to liberal doc- 
trines. Thus France faced a coalition including England, 
Holland, Prussia, Austria, the Holy Roman Empire, 
Sardinia, Naples, Rome, Tuscany, Portugal, and Spain. 

The coalition, however, was stronger in appearance than 
in reality. Austria and Prussia could not work in harmony 
because of their jealous rivalry in other directions. Holland 
was not prepared to meet an attack in force. The Holy 
Roman Empire was a poorly organized and inefficient con- 
federation whose military strength was negligible. Tus- 
cany, Naples, and Rome added no armies of importance. 
And Spain was on the verge of bankruptcy. Pitt himself 
could contribute nothing but liberal subsidies to help the 
land warfare : the English navy, however, swept the seas 
of French ships. 

The campaign was, as we have already seen in part, a 
series of disasters. By the close of 1795, Austria by land 
and England by sea were the chief remaining members of 
the great coalition. In 1797, Austria retired. The first 
popular enthusiasm for the war in England had long before 
died away. The hardships accruing from the interruption 



CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 157 

of commerce and a series of harvest failures caused general 
misery and depression. The National Debt had increased 
by £135,000,000. Public credit was so undermined thai 
government loan securities, issued below par, in a few months 
were quoted at a loss of fifteen per cent. Ireland was in revolt 
and Scotland apparently on the verge of an outbreak. And 
the navy was paralyzed in the spring of 1797 by general 
mutinies. Pitt was insulted and his life threatened. Cries 
for bread and for peace were raised. Yet there was nothing 
for the prime minister to do but continue the war. He 
endeavored both in 1790 and 1797 to make peace, but the 
French would not meet the English representatives in a 
conciliatory spirit. In the dark days of 1797 and 1798, 
therefore, Pitt struggled to raise a new coalition against 
France. 



CHAPTER VII 
THE RISE OF NAPOLEON 

When the directorate took office October 27, 1795, the 
outlook for the country was brighter than it had been for 
years. In France, the people were weary of the turmoil of 
Revolution. They longed for order and peace, that they 
might enjoy the blessings the Revolution had promised. 
Though it was then generally recognized that reorganiza- 
tion was a most difficult task, Franco accepted the new 
government, hoping that the combined wisdom of its mem- 
bers would find the moans to success. The Directory, then, 
was on trial before a people inclined to be prejudiced in its 
favor. 

Abroad, a series of successful operations for a year previ- 
ous to their assumption of the government seemed to prom- 
ise a speedy general peace. After the victory of Fleurus, 
Jourdan drove the Austrian** from Namur and Liege, forced 
them from their position behind the Roer, and finally (Octo- 
ber, 1794) pursued them across the Rhine and captured 
Cologne and Coblentz. Simultaneously, the Army of the 
Rhine and Moselle advanced from position to position on 
the upper river, occupied Mannheim, and connected on their 
left flank with Jourdan. Austria pretended that the un- 
favorable situation in Poland demanded the withdrawal of 
her armies, but it was believed by the triumphant Republi- 
cans that the retreat was dictated by France's armies. 

Meanwhile, in Holland, Pichegru's Army of the North had 
given the English and Dutch no rest. In October, 1794, 
he began an impetuous advance before which the allies 
evacuated city after city until they had abandoned Old 
Holland. Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and the Hague fell one 



THE RISE OF NAPOLEON 159 

after another; and then, crowning triumph of all, Moreau's 
cavalry charged across the ice of the Zee at Texel Island and 
captured a Dutch fleet ! In disgust, England embarked her 
troops for home. It was a terrible campaign for the French, 
carried on by ill-fed, badly-elothed men in the dead of win- 
ter, but in the end Holland paid for it. Clothing, provisions, 
military stores, and money were requisitioned and the en tin' 
state passed under the military domination of the Republic, 
and became, virtually, a part of France. Early in 1795, 
France began to reap her reward. Prussia had asked for 
peace, and in April signed the treaty of Basic, by which she 
withdrew from the coalition and engaged to exist on friendly 
terms with I h<- Republic, the Rhine being the boundary be- 
tween them. 

By late July, another enemy capitulated. The Spaniards 
who had invaded France from both ends of the Pyrenees, 
had barely been checked at the close of '!).'>. The next year 
brought more success. In a well-conducted campaign, the 
French reconquered what they had lost, cleared the passes 
of the east, and advanced into Spanish territory. The 
fortresses throughout Catalonia were in French hands by 
the end of 1794. In the west they were no less successful. 
The new commander, Moncey, focused his attention on the 
western passes, where he soon outgeneraled the foe. Once 
across the mountains, his troops fought skillfully into pos- 
session of Tolosa, Vittoria, and Bilbao. In July, 1795, the 
treaty of peace ended tin- campaign and necessitated the 
evacuation of the conquests when the French armies were at 

the height of their successes. 

But the work was not yet ended. Austria and Sardinia 
still had armies in the field, and Holland and Belgium 
required an army for garrison purposes. Moreau's Army 
of the North undertook this latter (ask, while Jourdan's 
Army of the Sambre and Meuse and Pichegru's Army of the 
Rhine and Moselle faced two Austrian armies in the Rhine 
valley, one under Clerfayt and the other under Wurmser. 



160 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

The plan of campaign called first for the reduction of 
Luxemburg, and then for an advance across the Rhine, 
which should drive the enemy hack on the Danube. Lux- 
emburg fell June 25, 1795. Within a few weeks, Jourdan's 
army was across (he Rhine at Dtisseldorf, and Clerfayt had 
withdrawn to the line of the Main, l'ichegru had taken 
Mannheim and could assist Jonrdan by pushing his army 
in between Clerfayt and Wurmser and preventing their 
cooperation. The campaign would have been short and 
decisive, but it was destined never to be executed. Pichegru, 
a prey to liis ambitions, thought that the Anstrians and the 
Bourbons would give a more generous recognition of his 
worth than did the Republic. In return for the promise of 
the baton of a Marshal of France, titles, political advance- 
ment, and enormous sums in money, he agreed to use his 
army to overthrow the Directory and establish the Count 
of Provence on the throne of Louis. Instead, therefore, of 
giving Jonrdan his assistance, he sent forward two divisions 
without supports which he knew would be powerless before 
Wurmser, Jonrdan, attempting to save the day from the 
disaster lie could not understand, was defeated, and driven 
back across the Rhine. All France stood incredulous and 
aghast before another great treachery this time one which 
had throttled her at the moment of victory. 

There remains to be outlined the situation in Italy. The 
revolt in the Midi ended, the Committee of Public Safety 
turned in good earnest to the Sardinian problem. Two 
armies — that of the Alps, and that of Italy were in the 
field, the former operating on the frontiers of Savoy, the 
latter, based on Nice, along- the Riviera. The presence of 
the English fleet in the Ligurian gulf made the Corniche 
road, which runs from Nice toward Genoa, an unsafe line 
of communication for the Army of Italy, and made neces- 
sary the establishing of a route free from attack by naval 
raiding parties. In April of 1794, therefore, an attack was 
directed against the Sardinian left which resulted in the 



THE RISE OF NAPOLEON 161 

capture <>f the Col di Tenda, the mosl important pass in 
the Maritime Alps. Simultaneous operations on the part 
of the Army of the Alps secured the Monl Cenis and Sainl 
Bernard passes, I lie principal passes to the west and north 
of Piedmonl . 

Here, however, activities ceased. The fall of Robespierre 
removed for a I ime I lie ad ua1 ing spirit s of I lie Army of Italy, 
and the year L794 ended willi the passes in the hands of 
the French bul willi no advantage accruing from their 
possession. Not until the peace willi Spain in July, 1795, 
did forces become available willi which to conducl a deter- 
mined offensive. 

In June, 1795, the Austro-Sardinian forces conducted a 
series of attacks on I lie coast lowns in I lie hands of the 

French, and on the passes of the Maritime Alps. The 
passes held firm, bul I lie lowns fell, and the whole right 
wing of Kellermann's Army of Italy fell back. The Allies 
failed to take advantage of their success, and Kellermann 
was aboul to reeoup his disaster when he was relieved by an 
order from Paris, and Scherer was appointed in his stead. 

Seherer look up his predecessor's plan in November, 17J)5. 
He proposed to capture the passes of the Apennines, move 
down the valley of the Tanaro, and thus into the Piedmont 
plains. Accordingly, he instituted a surprise attack which 
routed the Ausl ro-S;irdini;i ns from Loano, November 23. 
On the next day, Massena\s forces drove the hostile left off 
the Corniche road, and Augereau pushed through the passes 

of Loano and San Giacomo in the center. These two suc- 
cesses compelled the retreat of I In- allied righl which was 
making a hold stand againsl Serrurier. Scherer was now 
in absolute control of the coast, the Apeninnes crest, and 
the Tanaro valley as far as Ceva. He had inflicted serious 
losses on his enemy and had opened the road to Turin, the 
Piedmontese capital. A conl inued offensive would have car- 
ried him into Turin, bul Scherer was of the old type of gen- 
eral who fought by rule. Winter was upon him and it was 

M 



I: 



162 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

time to go into winter quarters. Piedmont was saved for 
the moment, and the allies were given opportunity to re- 
habilitate their broken armies. But Scherer had played his 
part in making way for a greater general than he. The 
Italian stage was set for the entrance of Napoleon Bona- 
parte. 

Just as the end of 1793 marks a definite period of France's 
military career, so does 1795. The days when the state was 
in danger from her enemies were past. Wattignies and 
Fleurus had ended the menace of invading troops and had 
guaranteed the right of France to choose what form of 
government she would. Nor can the claim be made that 
the wars which follow 1795 were waged to carry the doctrine 
of the Revolution. The greed for conquest, for loot, for 
annexation, had entered into the scheme of things, and 
makes its mark in all the subsequent campaigns. But one 
great step had been made. At the end of 1795, France had 
an army. Her battalions had served as laborious an ap- 
prenticeship as any since the days of Hannibal, and from 
the ruck of indifferent commanders there were emerging 
those names — Vandamme, Lefebvre, Serrurier, Massena, 
Augereau, Kleber, Soult, and many more — which were to 
make France glorious in military history for all time. 

Thus with the favor of France and the auguries of a series 
of military successes, the Directory assumed power in 
November, 1795. 

A. THE DIRECTORY FROM ITS ORGANIZATION TO 

THE COUP D'ETAT OF SEPTEMBER, 1797 

Under the constitution of 1795, the power of the Direc- 
tory was great. Its members appointed the commanding 
officers in the army, foreign ministers, and diplomatic agents. 
They signed treaties and submitted to the legislature decla- 
rations of war. They could by messages propose legisla- 
tion, though they could not initiate laws. Their commis- 
sioners resided in each Departement of France with power to 



THE RISE OF NAPOLEON 163 

approve or disapprove the acts of local authorities. Their 
ministers, instead of forming an advisory council, were sub- 
ordinates or clerks. The Directors thus formed a strongly 
concentrated executive power, controlling directly both 
domestic and foreign policies. 

The peace treaties of the spring and summer of 1795 
had been favorable to France. Moreover, there was 
little prospect of further trouble in these quarters provided 
France herself did not provoke it. Spain was on the verge 
of bankruptcy. A strong liberal party in Holland was will- 
ing to support the French alliance. And Prussia had its 
armies mobilized to guarantee its own share in the third and 
final partition of Poland. 

The first problem of the Directory was, of course, to bring 
the war to a successful conclusion. In offering a solution 
to this problem, Napoleon grasped his second great oppor- 
tunity. He had gained the favor of the political leaders by 
serving the Convention the preceding autumn ; he was at 
the moment in command of the Army of the Interior with 
headquarters in Paris ; and he had a plan to present for 
consideration. His friendship with Barras, a Director, and 
his previous service with the Army of Italy, gained him a 
hearing. His plan so impressed the Directors that they 
adopted it, and made him Commander-in-Chief of the Army 
of Italy (March 2, 1796), and authorized him to carry out 
his part of the campaign along his own lines. 

None could have foreseen that the future of France was 
bound up with the career of this twenty-seven-year-old 
general. Born in Corsica in 1769, Napoleon Bonaparte 
graduated from the French military academy at Brienne at 
fifteen (1784) and entered the artillery. His poverty and 
Corsican birth offered him no chance of advancement under 
the old regime. For nine years he took long leaves of 
absence to mingle in the political intrigues of his native 
island until the failure of an uprising led by him in 1793 
caused a decree of banishment to be issued against him and 



164 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

his family. Upon rejoining his command, he shared in the 
operations against Toulon, his skill exciting the commen- 
dation of the commissioners of the Convention and winning 
for him a commission as General of Brigade in the Army of 
Italy. Early in 1795 he was transferred to the Army of the 
West, then engaged in suppressing the last traces of the 
Vendean revolt. Considering his new assignment undesir- 
able, he went to Paris to protest. His petition was disre- 
garded, and September 15, 1795, his name was officially 
stricken from the list of generals on duty because of his 
failure to report as directed. He waited in Paris, his hope 
of reinstatement lying in the favor of a few prominent men. 
He was still there in October, when Barras summoned him 
to help save the Convention. His success brought its im- 
mediate reward in his appointment to the Army of the 
Interior, from which position he was able to urge his plans. 
Napoleon's plan called for two simultaneous campaigns, 
one in Germany and one in Italy. The one in Germany, 
aimed at the heart of Austria, was expected by the Direc- 
tory to be the more important ; but the one in Italy, led by 
Napoleon himself, proved decisive. 

i. Military Operations, Germany, 1796 

The armies of France gave at Fleurus their very best for 
the Republic and the ideals of the Revolution. In the 1796 
campaign in Italy and from then on they gave their very 
best to a man who was a wonderful leader. But in the 
campaign of 1796 in Germany, the first ideal had died and 
the second had not been born. We find the armies going 
forth in obedience to the Directory, to fight and subsist on 
foreign soil, to plunder and conquer. However acceptable 
to the leaders in France such a war might have been, to her 
people it has always been a business which they set about 
with reluctance. Throughout all that lamentable cam- 
paign of Jourdan and Moreau, there was lacking that en- 
thusiasm, either for a cause or for a man, which makes for 



THE RISE OF NAPOLEON 165 

victory. For once, Carnot's schemes took wings and passed 
beyond his control. He planned a march down the Dan- 
ube valley which should unite the victorious armies before 
the walls of Vienna with those of Napoleon from the plains 
of Italy. The impracticability of such a plan killed it, but 
there was left the possibility of a campaign in the Danube 
valley. 

Facing Jourdan and Moreau on the Rhine, the former 
near Diisseldorf, the latter near Strassburg, were two Aus- 
trian armies under the Archduke Charles and Wurmser. 
From Italy came a cry for help on account of Napoleon's 
successes there, and Wurmser with 20,000 men set out over 
the mountains. Immediately, Jourdan crossed the Rhine 
and advanced southward to the Lahn where he was en- 
gaged by Charles with the bulk of the Austrian armies, and 
forced to retire. His advance was a ruse, however, to 
enable Moreau to cross with ease at Strassburg (April, 
1796). Unfortunately, here cooperation between Moreau 
and Jourdan ceased, and though Charles made the mistake 
of dividing his army perilously to oppose both his adversa- 
ries, the French continued to operate as separate armies and 
came to grief. Charles himself opposed Moreau, leaving 
Wartensleben to confront Jourdan. Both armies were in- 
ferior to the French and before them retreated rapidly, 
Wartensleben up the Main, Charles into the Danube valley, 
unable to unite. 

But at last when Jourdan at Amberg was preparing to 
attack Wartensleben on the Naab River, the Archduke 
marched rapidly across from Neuburg and struck the 
French flank at the moment of Wartensleben's frontal at- 
tack. Jourdan was outnumbered and retired down the 
Main in great haste, nor did his retreat end until with heavy 
loss he had been forced across the Rhine (September 21, 
1796). 

Meanwhile, Moreau had advanced against the small 
Austrian force left in the valley of the Danube as far as the 



166 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

line of the Lech, but there hearing of Jourdan's disaster, 
he turned again to the Rhine. He was none too soon, for 
Charles having finished with Jourdan, marched rapidly up 
the Rhine valley, and but for Moreau's brilliant general- 
ship would have cut him off and destroyed his army. 
Moreau closed the whole disastrous episode by recrossing 
the Rhine October 25, 1796. 

ii. Napoleon's Campaign in Italy, 1706-1797 

The territory in which Napoleon was to operate in 1796 
was not new to him — he had served with the Army of 
Italy in 1794 and had even outlined a plan for the subjection 
of Piedmont. But the army with which he was called to 
carry out his project must have struck dismay to his heart. 
It was one of those bodies of tatterdemalions to which the 
greedy Directory had said, "You must from now on subsist 
on the enemy." Nevertheless, Napoleon knew his material, 
and from the moment when he first addressed them as 
"Soldats" instead of "Citoyens," it became evident that 
the new hand on the reins was a dexterous one. 

He found an army of 38,000 occupying the principal 
passes of the Maritime Alps and towns along the coast as 
far as Voltri. In command of them were men of ability 
and experience — Serrurier, Augereau, Massena, Laharpe. 
Opposed to him was the Austro-Sardinian army occupying 
positions from Coni to Voltaggio — the Sardinians 20,000 
strong under Colli holding the line Coni-Millesimo, the 
Austrians 30,000 strong under Beaulieu strung out from 
Sassello to Voltaggio. 

Napoleon's plan contemplated a thrust at the allied center 
from Savona, an attack which was to fall on the Austrian 
right wing near Sassello. By great good fortune, the Aus- 
trian commander assisted him by moving forward on both 
flanks on the day of Napoleon's contemplated operation. 
The brigade at Voltri resisted Beaulieu's left, while Napo- 
leon opposed the advancing right by Laharpe's forces in the 




' ft HJ 




THE RISE OF NAPOLEON 167 

pass at Savona. Meanwhile he ordered Massena over the 
mountains from Cadibona to fall upon the rear of the Aus- 
trian wing in the Savona pass, and there, as between mill- 
stones, the Austrian battalions were crushed. The remain- 
ing Austrians fell back on both flanks and endeavored to 
collect their shattered forces (April 12, 1796). 

With the wedge thus skillfully inserted between the 
portions of his opponent's army, Napoleon left one division 
to watch the disconcerted Austrians and then turned with 
his remaining force on the Sardinians. In the next few 
days, by repeated attacks near Millesimo, Ceva, and Mon- 
dovi, he drove the demoralized Sardinians back on their 
communications, until on April 23, Colli, in the name of 
the terrified King, asked for an armistice. Bonaparte, while 
treating with the envoys, pushed on, almost to Turin. By 
the armistice of Cherasco (which he signed April 27, 1796) 
the Sardinians definitely withdrew from the war, surren- 
dered the fortresses of Alessandria, Tortona, Mondovi, and 
Ceva, and guaranteed to the French a line of communications 
through the Mont Cenis pass. 

Within a few days, Napoleon renewed his attack on the 
Austrians who had meanwhile accomplished nothing except 
a withdrawal to the Po at Valenza, on the road to Milan. 
The French general feinted against their position, but 
planned his real crossing at Piacenza, fifty miles down- 
stream. His ruse succeeded, but before he could mass his 
troops on his opponent's communications, Beaulieu learned 
of the French stratagem, and retreated precipitately to the 
line of the Adda. By doing so, he definitely gave up Milan, 
and after being forced by the battle of Lodi from the Adda, 
retired on his base, Mantua. Napoleon entered Milan in 
triumph (May 15, 1796). 

The Directory, meanwhile, had confirmed the terms of 
the Armistice of Cherasco, and Bonaparte, his communi- 
cations secure, once more took up the pursuit of the Aus- 
trians. He found them occupying the line of the Mincio 



168 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

River, their left protected by the fortress of Mantua. Here, 
too, Beaulieu was dislodged and withdrew through Vene- 
tian territory, leaving Napoleon to invest Mantua. 

The subsequent episodes of the first Italian campaign all 
center in attempts to relieve the beleaguered fortress. There 
were four of these, all of which were conducted in the vicinity 
of the Italian Quadrilateral (Verona, Peschiera, Mantua, 
Legnano), and all of which came to grief. 

The first was conducted by Wurmser, who with 55,000 
men advanced on both sides of Lake Garda, and down the 
Brenta. Opposed to them with about 45,000 men, of whom 
10,000 were conducting the siege of Mantua, Napoleon 
found himself in a serious predicament. He proved equal 
to the emergency by raising the siege, uniting his troops, 
striking first the western column and defeating it, and then 
repeating the blow against the combined eastern columns at 
Castiglione (August 3, 1796). Wurmser was able in the 
early successes of his advance to re-victual and re-garrison 
Mantua, but Castiglione forced him into the Tyrol, leaving 
the French still in possession of the Quadrilateral and sit- 
ting doggedly before the fortress. 

In early September, 1796, just as Wurmser was beginning 
an advance down the valley of the Brenta, Napoleon pushed 
north as far as Trent, defeated the holding force left there, 
and then turning to the southeast, deliberately pursued 
Wurmser, overtook him near Bassano, and inflicted a sharp 
defeat. He pursued the remnants of the army down the 
Brenta, across the Adige, and finally forced them to take 
refuge in the very fortress they had set out to relieve. 

The third attempt, in November, 1796, nearly succeeded. 
Two columns totaling 47,000 under the command of Alvinzi 
advanced on Verona by way of the Adige and the Brenta 
valleys. Napoleon, near Verona with 30,000, was confronted 
with the problem of meeting attacks from two directions. 
On the north his brigades were pushed in, and he himself 
was roughly handled at Caldiero. Under cover of night, 



THE RISE OF NAPOLEON 169 

he crossed the Adige, moved downstream, recrossed and 
came up on the Austrian flank near the little town of Arcole. 
Here for three days (November 13, 14, and 15, 1796) in the 
marshes and fens raged a most confusing battle. The 
French were outnumbered and in a disadvantageous posi- 
tion, but they fought with a desperation which was re- 
flected from their commander. On the third day, at a 
moment when the battle hung in the balance, Napoleon 
sent a number of cavalry trumpeters around in rear of the 
Austrians with instructions to blow the charge. The ridic- 
ulous trick succeeded, and Alvinzi's warriors fled in con- 
fusion. Meanwhile, the northern Austrian force had re- 
mained unaccountably idle, and as a result both columns 
futilely retreated. 

In January, 1797, the fourth and final relief expedition, 
43,000 strong, again under the command of Alvinzi, started 
in three columns, one down the Adige (28,000), a second 
(6000) from the east on Verona, and a third (9000) on 
Legnano. Napoleon soon learned what the nature of the 
advance was to be, and massed his command to meet the 
main column. At Rivoli the two armies met for what 
proved to be the decisive battle of the campaign. Alvinzi, 
underestimating the troops which were to meet him, under- 
took an enveloping attack on both flanks. That on the 
lake side succeeded in getting behind the French left, but was 
there caught by Massena and annihilated. The general re- 
treat which now began became a rout when the Austrians 
found in their path a French regiment which had crossed the 
lake in boats. Fifteen thousand prisoners remained in the 
hands of the Republicans. 

The remaining operations were short lived. Mantua sur- 
rendered February 2, 1797, and Napoleon turned his atten- 
tion to the Archduke Charles now commanding the Aus- 
trians, forced him through the Carnic Alps, and at Leoben, 
within a hundred miles of Vienna, signed, on April 18, 1797, 
the armistice which ended the campaign. 



170 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

(a) Political reconstruction in Italy 

When the French entered the peninsula, what is now 
Italy was cut up into a dozen or more independent units, 
large and small. The term "Italy" was, as called later, a 
mere geographical expression. The number of separate units 
was greatest in the north, the very section which Napoleon 
invaded. The Kingdom of Sardinia (also called Piedmont), 
the Duchies of Milan, Parma, Modena, Mantua, Lucca, 
the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, and the Republics of Genoa 
and Venice occupied the territory north of the Papal states : 
the Kingdom of Naples stretched south from the Papal 
states to the tip, and included the island of Sicily. Most 
of the sovereigns were foreign in blood to their subjects, 
being princes of the Austrian Hapsburg or of the Spanish 
Bourbon house. The governments were of the old regime. 
Most notable was the absence of any general desire for unity 
or independence. 

The first change came in the little Duchy of Modena. After 
a revolt against their Duke, the people with the approval of 
Napoleon organized (October, 1796) a republic along the 
lines of the French Republic. A few weeks later delegates 
from Reggio, Modena, Bologna, and Ferrara met at Bologna 
and established a federation. In December of the same 
year, 1796, a regular congress met and founded the Cispa- 
dane (this side, south, of the Po River) Republic. In the 
spring of the following year, 1797, delegates encouraged by 
Napoleon met and united territories north of the Po between 
the Kingdom of Sardinia and the Republic of Venice into 
the Cisalpine Republic. At the formal inauguration of this 
new state (July 9, 1797), deputies from the Cispadane 
Republic appeared to request a greater federation. The 
young conqueror approved, and the Cispadane and Cisal- 
pine Republics were united under the name of the latter, 
including territory extending from the Alps beyond Lake 
Como to the Adriatic Sea at Rimini. During the same 



THE RISE OF NAPOLEON 171 

period, Napoleon took advantage of a local disturbance in 
Genoa to force a reorganization of its government along 
French lines. Genoa then became (June, 1797) the Ligu- 
rian Republic. 

The precise boundary lines and the constitutions of these 
new creations are not important, for they were all destroyed 
by Austrian victories a few years later. What was impor- 
tant, however, was the birth of a widespread popular de- 
mand for unity and independence. In the delegations, 
conventions, and congresses, prominent Italian leaders from 
different states for the first time in the modern era became 
convinced of the essential unity of their interests and of 
the desirability of throwing off the yoke of foreign princes. 
Once born, this demand never died, though the ideal was 
not realized for more than half a century. 

iii. Government in France 

The successes of Napoleon's campaign left the members of 
the Directory free to concentrate their attention upon do- 
mestic concerns. The most pressing problem was financial. 
The thousands of millions of assignats had depreciated until 
it took 3400 francs' worth of them to buy one gold louis 
(normally valued at 24 francs). The poor suffered terribly. 
Bread sold at GO francs a pound, and beans for 1400 francs 
a pint. The Directors resorted to a forced loan exacted from 
the more wealthy classes, but this expedient failed, yielding 
barely 20,000,000 francs. The Directors then issued a new 
paper money, a kind of preferred assignat, but the only re- 
sult was to make the original assignats wholly worthless while 
the new money quickly depreciated to thirty-five per cent 
of its face value. The only income which saved the state 
was that received from Napoleon's invasion, and that levied 
upon the conquered territories of the Austrian Netherlands. 
According to instructions, Napoleon went upon the principle 
that the liberated peoples must expect to reimburse their 
liberators. He forwarded great sums to the hard-pressed 



172 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

Directors. Milan was forced to pay 20,000,000 francs ; 
Modena, 10,000,000. The Duke of Parma paid 2,000,000 
and the Duke of Piacenza 10,000,000 for immunity. The 
Pope submitted to the conqueror and gave 20,000,000. 
Murat, one of Napoleon's generals, in a raid upon Leghorn, 
seized English goods which were subsequently sold for 
12,000,000 francs. 

In the field of religion, the Directory faced an anomalous 
condition. The new constitution provided freedom of wor- 
ship, but the Convention had decreed (October 25, 1795) 
that the laws against the non-juring priests should be strictly 
enforced. Priests of the orthodox religion were, therefore, 
liable to arrest and transportation, yet people were permitted 
by the constitution to have freedom of worship. In actual 
fact, the Directory enjoined their commissioners to watch 
the non-juring priests, "never to lose sight of these instru- 
ments of murder, royalism, and anarchy," but it took no 
active measures against them. 

Throughout all its term, the Directory was constantly 
threatened by conspiracy. The uprisings were sternly sup- 
pressed. The only one which deserves special mention here 
was a communistic plot under the leadership of one Babeuf. 
Babeuf was chief of the members of a society known as 
SociStS des Egaux (Society of Equals), whose principles 
were, briefly, that all land should belong to the state, all 
production should be common property, all people should 
contribute their labor to the general good, and all the social 
and economic differences due to relative wealth and poverty 
should be forever destroyed. Curiously enough, this Uto- 
pian scheme gained thousands of followers, including even 
members of the legislature. Attempts were made to under- 
mine the soldiery. On the eve of a revolt, the Directory, 
May 10, 1790, seized the leaders and sent them before a 
special High Court of Justice to be tried for treason. A 
few months later, September 7. 1790, a remnant of the 
"Equals" again tried to foment insurrection, but the army 



THE RISE OF NAPOLEON 173 

remained loyal. The High Court of Justice and a Military 
Commission (for the September cases) acted expeditiously. 
Thirty-four were executed ; thirty-three sentenced to trans- 
portation ; and the remainder acquitted. The last case was 
disposed of by the end of April, 1797. 

The Directory suffered, too, from schism among its own 
members. Three of the five Directors represented the 
Conventionalists, or Revolutionists. Their intention was 
to continue the Revolution by progressive legislation in 
internal affairs, and by aggressive war upon foreign powers. 
Their policy was influenced by self-interest, for any decided 
reaction throughout the country would imperil their posi- 
tions and even their lives. The Constitutionalists, on the 
other hand, comprising two members of the Directory, 
Carnot and Barthelemy, believed that the Revolution 
should be regarded as having ended with the Constitution 
of 1795. Their policy was to establish a well-organized 
government acceptable to the people, to remedy revolu- 
tionary mistakes, and above all to bring the foreign war 
to an honorable close as soon as possible. 

The division in the Directory was reflected in the legis- 
lature. Owing to the decree of the Convention that two 
thirds of its members should be elected to the new legisla- 
ture, the Conventionalist, or Revolutionist, group had a 
strong majority at first. With the successive elections by 
thirds, as provided by the constitution, the Conventionalists 
lost their majority, for the country as a whole was heartily 
in favor of an end of the Revolution and of foreign war. 
The crisis came with the elections of the spring of 1797. 
The 216 Conventionalists due to retire stood for reelection, 
but only 11 gained seats. The legislature, therefore, had a 
majority of Constitutionalists, and the Constitutionalists 
planned to gain control of the Directory. 

The Conventionalist Directors decided to take forcible 
steps to perpetuate the power of their faction. Gathering 
on the night of September 3, 1797, they prepared a proclama- 



174 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

tion announcing that a great Royalist conspiracy had been 
unearthed. Early September 4 they arrested Barthelemy 
and attempted to arrest Carnot, but Carnot escaped to 
Switzerland. Troops under one of Napoleon's generals, 
Augereau, who was released by Napoleon for the purpose, 
marched to the legislature and arrested a number of the 
constitutionalist deputies. The remaining members of the 
legislature passed a decree September 8, 1797, annulling the 
elections of over 150 constitutional deputies and summarily 
punishing by order for transportation 50 more. The coun- 
try at large, surprised and unprepared, made no resistance. 
The trumped-up charge of a Royalist conspiracy deceived 
many, for none desired the restoration of the monarchy. 
The Conventionalist Directors established for themselves a 
dictatorship as absolute as any in history. They quickly 
replaced Carnot and Barthelemy by Conventionalists ; ap- 
pointed new local agents in districts too pronouncedly Consti- 
tutional ; and by wholesale deportations Lessened the number 
of their enemies. September 4-5, 1797, marks the real end 
of the government under the Constitution of 1795, although 
the Directors remained in power for two years longer. 

B. THE DIRECTORY, 1797-1799 

Misgovernment of France during these two years prepared 
the way as nothing else could have done for the overthrow of 
the Directory. With all power in their hands — for the 
legislature became a mere puppet — the Directors failed to 
relieve domestic conditions and brought on a new foreign 
war. We can find few parallels in history to the criminal 
inefficiency and corruption of the Directors during the two 
years from 1797 to 1799. 

Since they failed to extricate the country from its financial 
difficulties, they accepted the odium of repudiation. In 
February, 1797, before the coup d'Stat, they repudiated 
assignats of a nominal value of forty billion francs. Three 
weeks after the coup d'etat they paid off two thirds of the 



THE RISE OF NAPOLEON 175 

huge remaining debt by the issuance of a new paper money, 
called "bons," but the "bons" straightway fell to thirty 
per cent of their face value, and later to I luce per cent. 
The government continued to roll up deficits at the rate of 
twenty-five million francs a month. Metallic currency had 
been forced out of the country by the cheap paper money. 
In many sections, (he poor people had to resort to primitive 
methods of barter and exchange to obtain the necessities of 
life. 

Suspicion was aroused, too, of the honesty of the Direc- 
tors and of their agents — suspicion justified by subsequent 
researches. The Directors, especially Barras and Rewbell, 
were the centers of a dissolute group. Just how much of the 
spoils turned in by Napoleon went into the Directors' pock- 
ets we shall never know, for the agents of corruption kept 
no books. One or two instances, however, indicate that 
the total amount was great. Information leaked out that 
the Portuguese minister had paid to Barras and Rewbell 
$2,000,000 in 1797 to hasten the treaty of peace. Lord 
Malmesbury, negotiating for peace, was invited to pay 
$2,500,000 to assist the negotiations. As rumors of such 
corrupt bargains spread, the Directors, of course, were more 
and more discredited. 

Their incapacity in foreign affairs, however, was more 
directly the cause of their overthrow. After the peace of 
Campo Formio (October 17, 1797) Napoleon returned to 
Paris (December 5, 1797). He was appointed commander- 
in-chief of the army against England, and laid plans secretly 
to strike at the English power in the far east by an expedi- 
tion through Egypt. In May, 1798, he set sail with the 
pick of the French army. The peace he had made, how- 
ever, stopped at once the flow of treasure which had for 
two years maintained the government. Though the Direc- 
tors were glad for political reasons to see him go, they had 
to find a means of replenishing the empty treasury. Their 
sole scheme was to continue the creation of republics in the 



176 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

name of liberty, and then to mulct these republics. Hence, 
through 1798, the Directory used its armies to overthrow 
existing governments, create nominal republics, and extract 
huge sums from these helpless states. In January, 1798, 
they intervened in Holland, established the Batavian Re- 
public, and forced the helpless Dutch to pledge the support 
of 25,000 French troops and the payment of 1/200,000 
guilders (c. $500,000). In the spring of the same year, they 
compelled the Cisalpine Republic to sign a treaty agreeing 
to support a French army of occupation of 25,000 and to 
keep mobilized an Italian army of 22,000. A factional 
quarrel in Switzerland gave excuse for French intervention 
(January-September, 1?!>8), after which the Directors 
formed the Helvetic Republic, forced it to enter an alliance 
with France, seized 5,000,000 francs in specie in the treasury, 
and dispatched a commissioner to levy further contribu- 
tions. A riot in Rome caused the dispatch of a French 
army, the capture of Rome, the imprisonment of the Pope, 
the establishment of a Roman Republic with the payment 
of 15,000,000 francs in specie, large indemnities, and mil- 
lions of francs' worth of supplies. Agents of the Directors 
fomented rebellion in Piedmont and the King was forced to 
flee to Sardinia and abandon Piedmont to the French : 
the booty there reached more than 10,000,000 francs. And 
at the c\\i\ of the year, Naples, opposing the French in the 
Roman territories, was quickly subdued, its King forced to 
flee to Sicily, its name changed to the Parlhenopean Repub- 
lic, its country looted by French soldiers, and its treasury 
assessed sixty million francs. Thus in one short year the 
Directors had used French armies to establish the Batavian, 
Helvetic, Roman, and Parthenopean Republics, with huge 
levies in each case, and to extract great assessments from 
the Cisalpine Republic and from Piedmont. 

Such policy, however, aroused again the resistance of 
Austria and enabled 1km- to gain a powerful ally in Russia. 
The Congress of Rastadt, opened in December, 1707, to 



THE RISE OF NAPOLEON 177 

arrange terms of peace between France and the Holy Roman 
Empire, was making little progress. Austria was disap- 
pointed, for she hoped to use the Congress to revise in her 
favor the terms of the Treaty of Campo Forxnio and to gain 
additional territory in Italy. The determined tone of the 
French delegates, and the aggressions of the French armies, 
balked Austria in her plans. The Austrian government 
made representations to the Russians, already hostile to 
France because of the French seizure of Malta June, 1798, 
by Napoleon on his way to Egypt, and received an immedi- 
ate favorable reply. Russian troops, subsidized by England, 
began to move through Galicia to Austria's aid in July, 
1798. The information of this movement was carried to 
the Directors and brought from them immediate inquiries 
and threats. Negotiations dragged through the fall of 175)8. 
January 31, 1799, the Directors issued an ultimatum to the 
Austrian government, demanding I lie withdrawal of the 
Russian troops. A month later, when no answer was re- 
turned, the French armies were thrown across I lie Rhine 
and I lie War of I lie Second Coalition was begun (March 1, 
1799). April 8, 1799, the Emperor of Austria summarily 
dissolved the Congress of Rastadt and annulled its acts. 

The immediate disasters to French arms following the 
outbreak of war fatally undermined the already tottering 
Directory. The Archduke Charles of Austria defeated 
Jourdan at Slockach (March 25, 1799) and forced I lie with- 
drawal of the French invaders to the Rhine; the Russians 
and Auslrians in Italy quickly cleared Italy in a series of 
battles (April-August, 1799); the Cisalpine, Roman, and 
Parthenopean Republics ceased to exist, and the French 
troops were everywhere on the defensive. 

i. The Campaign in Egypt and Syria, 1798-1799 

In the meanwhile, the one successful French general, 
Napoleon, had been conducting a remarkable campaign in 
Egypt. The purposes of the Egyptian expedition as out- 



178 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

lined in the decrees which Napoleon wrote for the Directory 
to sign are sufficiently startling to satisfy the most romantic. 
To destroy the English power in the Mediterranean, to 
acquire control of the Red Sea, to investigate the antiqui- 
ties, arts, and natural resources of Egypt, to construct a 
Suez canal — here was a list of objectives to fill many 
months of toil. 

The fleet which was to carry Napoleon's army of 35,000 
set sail from Toulon, May 19, 1798. Thirteen ships-of-the- 
line, fourteen frigates, and numerous smaller war craft 
safely convoyed the three hundred transports to Malta, 
the first stopping place. Here, a sham assault completed 
what French gold had begun, and the first of the important 
strongholds in the Mediterranean fell to the Republic (June, 
1798). Two weeks later the fleet came to anchor off Alex- 
andria and disembarkation of the troops began. Napoleon 
must have believed himself favored by fortune, for twice 
his fleet had narrowly escaped the English squadron under 
the redoubtable Nelson, sent into the Mediterranean for the 
very purpose of destroying this menace to England's power. 

Within a few hours of his landing, Napoleon had seized 
Alexandria, and had dispatched Desaix toward Cairo, a 
hundred and twenty-five miles distant. The following day 
(July 3) Bonaparte followed with the main army after hav- 
ing dispatched a flotilla up the Nile. Only once on the 
march did the army encounter the Mamelukes, but the 
sufferings from heat and thirst were terrible to the men 
accustomed to the temperate climate of France. 

Within sight of Cairo, Napoleon encountered the armies 
of Ibrahim and Murad, drawn up on both banks of 
the Nile, the former on the right, the latter on the left. 
Since the French army was entirely on the left bank, it had 
only the army of Murad to contend with. Against this the 
French divisions marched in great squares in echelon, the 
right leading. The Mamelukes launched a furious charge 
against this leading wing but were halted by the devastat- 



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THE RISE OF NAPOLEON 179 

ing fire of the Europeans and were forced back in disorder 
into the waters of the Nile. A little hand-to-hand fighting 
in the streets of the city left Napoleon unquestioned victor 
in this battle of the Pyramids. Murad retreated up the 
Nile; Ibrahim withdrew toward Syria (July 21). 

Desaix immediately began his pursuit of Murad, while 
Napoleon advanced eastward on Ibrahim's track as far as 
Salalieh. These operations were barely begun, however, 
when news came from the coast that Nelson had completely 
destroyed the French fleet in the battle of the Nile (August 
1, 1798). To heighten the gloom came the information that 
Turkey had come to an understanding with England, and 
was preparing two armies to drive the French out of Egypt, 
one at Rhodes, the other in Syria. To the soldiers, the 
army seemed doomed, but their indomitable commander 
was still far from defeat. He saw that he must proceed at 
once to destroy Turkey's armies before they could unite 
against him. Without a fleet, he could do nothing against 
Rhodes, but Syria was open to him. At once he began 
preparations and within a few months started into the desert 
(January 31, 1799). 

His army of Syria numbered only 10,000, but it was ably 
commanded. On February 20, it captured the fortress of 
El Arish, and paroled about 1500 prisoners. On March 7, 
it successfully stormed Jaffa, taking some 2000 prisoners, 
among whom they found many who had been paroled at El 
Arish. Unable to guard them, feed them, or send them 
back to Egypt, Napoleon ordered the entire 2000 to be shot. 
The sentence was carried out, and the imperturbable general 
continued his advance. 

Acre proved the stumbling block of the campaign. Here 
the Turks and English, commanded by Sir Sidney Smith, 
an English naval commodore, had mounted the guns of two 
frigates on the walls of the old mud fort. Bitterly they 
defended it while waiting for the Turkish army in the field to 
come to their rescue. The French, short of artillery, at- 



180 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

tacked with their accustomed fury, but were always at a 
disadvantage. Once Napoleon raised the siege while he 
proceeded against the army of the Pasha of Damascus. At 
Mount Tabor he destroyed the hope of the beleaguered gar- 
rison (April 16, 1799) and turned once more to the siege of 
Acre. Two of the towers fell, and in the assaults which 
followed the French took and held a part of the works. 
The remainder held firm, however, and Napoleon, seeing the 
enormous loss in men and time, gave up the struggle. He 
had had news of the entrance of Naples into the war, and a 
return to Egypt seemed inevitable. 

On May 20 he began the weary 300 mile march back to 
Egypt, and twenty-six days later entered Cairo with per- 
haps half of his army left. He was just in time to learn of 
the landing at Aboukir of the second Turkish army. Desaix 
was ordered to evacuate upper Egypt, and the other troops 
were concentrated before the defenses of Aboukir. In a 
furious assault which lasted two days, the fort was taken 
at enormous cost to the defenders, only 2000 of the original 
10,000 surviving. 

This was Napoleon's last exploit in Egypt. He had long 
since determined to return to Europe, and accordingly, 
early in August, with many of his leading officers, he set sail 
for France. 

C. THE FALL OF THE DIRECTORY 

As a result of the Austrian successes and the proved in- 
competency of the government both in foreign and domestic 
affairs, the political turmoil in Paris was great. May 16, 
1799, the Abbe Sieyes was elected a Director. Sieyes had 
long been one of the most conspicuous men in French public 
life. He had been in the Estates General, had helped to 
draft the Tennis Court oath and the first Revolutionary 
constitution, had voted for the execution of the King, and 
had been a member of the great Committee of Public Safety 
during the Convention. Yet he was vain, self-confident, 



THE RISE OF NAPOLEON 181 

and lacked force, succeeding in concealing his deficiencies by 
an air of reserve and an appearance of wisdom. At the 
moment, however, he was considered by the people as the 
one man capable of saving the situation ; and he assumed 
the leadership at once in the Directory. Largely through 
his influence, the most unpopular Directors were induced 
to resign (June 18, 1799) and their places filled by his 
friends. 

To save France, however, he recognized the need of a 
competent general. He therefore, with the other Directors, 
prepared to negotiate (September 10, 1799) with the Turk- 
ish government for the return of Napoleon and the French 
army, and sent word to Napoleon to this effect. Napoleon, 
however, never received the message, for he had already, 
as we have said, set sail for France. He landed on the south 
coast October 9, 1799. 

Napoleon's appearance in Paris October 16, 1799, was the 
signal for a great popular ovation. Yet people did not 
dream of a dictatorship : they welcomed Napoleon as a 
Republican general returned in time to save the country. 
Napoleon himself prepared to familiarize himself with the 
political situation before taking any decisive step. 

Napoleon could not have had any well-defined plan of 
action when he first reached Paris. His brother, Lucien, 
was therefore of the greatest assistance to him, for Lucien 
was President of the Council of the Five Hundred and in 
touch with the political intrigues. Napoleon's most direct 
course was to ally himself with the leading faction and ride 
with it to success in a coup d'etat. This course he followed. 
He found a colleague in Sieves, who, himself a Director, 
was actually engaged in an intrigue against the Directory 
and the constitution, hoping to replace the existing system 
with one evolved from his own fertile brain. The alliance 
between the two men was cemented in late October. The 
date for the coup d'etat was set for November 9, 1799. The 
position of Lucien Bonaparte as President of the Council of 



182 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

Five Hundred, and the prestige of Sieyes and Napoleon, 
apparently guaranteed success. 

The plan went through with scarcely a hitch. November 
8, 1799, the necessary decrees, proclamations, pamphlets, 
and other literature were ready for distribution. Early 
November 9, the Council of the Ancients, influenced by men 
in the plot, passed a decree that the meeting place of the 
legislature should be transferred to Saint Cloud (a suburb 
of Paris) because of the danger from a popular uprising in 
Paris, and that General Bonaparte should be given com- 
mand of troops in and about Paris to insure the safety of 
the deputies. This decree was read to the Council of the 
Five Hundred, and that Council was immediately adjourned 
by Lucien Bonaparte before any question could be raised. 
Sieyes, Barras, and one other Director resigned, and the 
remaining two were kept under close guard at the Tuileries. 
The following day Napoleon appeared in person before the 
Council of the Ancients and made a confused speech an- 
nouncing the resignation of the Directors and hinting at 
his own purpose to save the country. The Ancients were 
astounded, but did nothing. A few minutes later Napoleon 
entered the hall of the Council of the Five Hundred, but 
met with furious opposition. The deputies rose in a tumult 
and rushed at him, crying "Down with the Dictator! Out- 
law him!" Napoleon was forced to retire in momentary 
discomfiture. Lucien Bonaparte then saved the situation. 
He refused to put to vote motions to outlaw his brother, 
held the floor himself with a long speech to gain time, and 
finally left the chamber and addressed the troops outside in 
ringing tones. His speech and the appearance of Napoleon 
carried the day. The grenadiers advanced and in a few 
minutes cleared the hall. Shortly afterwards the obsequious 
Ancients decreed the appointment of Bonaparte, Sieyes, and 
Ducos as provisional Consuls pending the preparation of a 
new constitution. In the late evening a "rump" council, 
composed of a group of the former Council of the Five 



THE RISE OF NAPOLEON 183 

Hundred, gathered under the leadership of Lucien and in- 
dorsed the decree of the Ancients, thus giving it a certain 
constitutional authority which otherwise it would not have 
had. With this act the coup d'etat was complete. No 
lives had been lost; the plans of the conspirators had suc- 
ceeded. At 3:00 a.m., November 11, Lucien Bonaparte, 
the Abbe Sieves, and Napoleon drove back to Paris, Napo- 
leon "silent and wrapped in thought." 

Unsuspected as the coup d'etat had been, it excited nothing 
but approval in Paris and throughout France. The un- 
popularity of the Directory, the renown of Sieyes and Napo- 
leon, the hope that now indeed the evil days of the Revolu- 
tion were over, inspired everyone to accept the change with 
enthusiasm. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE CONSULATE, NOVEMBER 1799-DECEMBER 1804 

Forty-four days elapsed between the coup d'etat of 
November 9, 1799, and the organization of a new govern- 
ment. During this interval the three provisional consuls, 
Napoleon, Sieves, and Dueos, were intrusted with the 
powers of the defunct Directory, and were theoretically 
assisted by two committees chosen by the former Council 
of the Five Hundred and the Council of the Ancients. In 
pursuance of their proclaimed purpose "to organize order 
in all parts of the administration, to restore tranquillity at 
home, and to procure an enduring and honorable peace," 
these provisional consuls undertook a few urgent adminis- 
trative reforms and hastened their work on the new con- 
stitution. 

Of the three provisional consuls Sieyes was preeminent 
in civil fame, Napoleon in military, and Ducos in political. 
At the beginning of the Provisional Consulate, the reputa- 
tion of Sieyes overshadowed that of his colleagues, for 
Ducos was not considered more than a politician, and the 
administrative genius of Napoleon was as yet unknown. 
Sieyes had good reason to expect that in the new govern- 
ment he would be the logical chief executive, able to rely 
upon the military ability of Napoleon to contribute to the 
success of his government. The few weeks of the Pro- 
visional government's existence, however, changed the 
situation rapidly. By mutual consent, Sieyes took up the 
task of framing the new constitution, and Napoleon of ad- 
ministering the government. Napoleon's duties brought 
him prominently into the public eye. He gained the credit 
for the wise and conciliatory measures decreed by the 

184 



THE CONSULATE 185 

government. His appoint incuts to office of men of recog- 
nized ability, irrespective of previous factional affiliations, 
revealed his broad-minded political views. His suppression 
of the hated Law of Hostages, whereby relatives of persons 
implicated in royalist uprisings had been seized and held 
by the government, raised his reputation for justice. His 
substitution of a fixed war-tax for the obnoxious forced 
loans gained him the confidence of the banking and financial 
interests. His prompt measures for the revision of the 
tax lists and for the collection of arrears gave proof of his 
sound national policy. Rumor magnified his wisdom. In 
the popular mind, he supplanted Sieves as the logical 
candidate for chief executive in the new government. 

Within the Provisional Consulate a similar transformation 
took place. Invited informally at the beginning of its 
meetings to take the chairman's seat, Napoleon soon estab- 
lished his ascendancy over the older and (in civil affairs) 
more experienced Sieves. When it became evident in the 
later stages of the discussion of the proposed constitution 
that he rather than Sieves was to be the chief executive, 
he wielded a determining influence in molding the most 
important part of the document. Sieyes had planned a 
chief executive, to be known as Grand Elector, whose 
actual powers were small, and whose prerogatives were 
carefully limited on every side : Napoleon ridiculed the 
idea, refusing, as he said, to be kept as a "fatted hog." 
Napoleon planned instead a strong executive, who should 
have the power of appointment to the chief legislative 
council, to all offices in the army, navy, and diplomatic 
branch, who should designate ministers responsible indi- 
vidually to him, who should have the right with the advice 
of his picked legislative to conduct foreign affairs. The 
theorist Sieyes was forced to yield before the practical 
Napoleon. In its essential feature, i.e., the nature and 
powers of the chief executive, the new constitution was 
Napoleon's work: in the remaining features, the power of 



180 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

the electorate and the formation of the legislative branch, 
the document was the creation of Sieves. 

Realizing the restlessness in political circles pending the 
production of the new constitution. Napoleon hurried it 
through the final stages, once he had gained his point with 
respect to the chief executive. As finally drafted, the 
document gave universal suffrage, but limited the voters 
in their elective powers. It provided (1) that the 5,000,000 
voters in France should have merely the right to choose 
one tenth of their number (500,000) as candidates for office 
in the communes, final appointment from these .500, 000 
to be made by the chief executive; then (2) that these 
500,000 should in turn elect one tenth of their number 
(50,000) as candidates for office in the DSpartements, final 
appointment likewise to be made by the chief executive; 
and lastly, (3) that these 50,000 should choose one tenth 
of their number (5000) as candidates for the national 
legislative bodies (except the Council of State and the 
Senate), final appointment to the lower houses to be made 
from these 5000 by the Senate. For the formation of the 
legislative branch, the proposed constitution provided four 
houses, or chambers: (1) The Council of State, whose 
members were designated by the Chief Executive, having 
the power to initiate legislation ; (2) The Tribunate*, having 
the power to discuss legislation; (3) The Legislative body, 
having the power to vote upon legislation; and (4) The 
Senate, whose members were appoiided for life by the 
chief executive, having the power to confirm or annul 
legislation. For the executive, the constitution provided 
a First Consul and two Associate Consuls with a ten-year 
term, the First Consul to have the large powers demanded 
by Napoleon as outlined above, and the Associate Consuls 
to have merely advisory functions. It is easy to under- 
stand that from his extensive' powers of appointment as 
well as his independent prerogatives, the First Consul was, 
in the organization outlined above, the actual head and 



THE CONSULATE 187 

soul of the en I ire government. Indeed, he held more 
authority than Louis XVI under the Constitution of 1791. 
He \v;is the legitimate successor of the Committee of Public 

Safety with its autocratic powers of the Reign of Terror. 

The constitution was promulgated December 15, 1791), 
and the people invited to register their approval or disap- 
proval by vole. Popular enthusiasm for Napoleon, who 
was named as First Consul, swept, the country. Over 
3,000,000 votes were recorded in favor of the new constitu- 
tion, and a beggarly 1500 againsl it. By decree Christmas 
Day was set for the inauguration of the new government, 
and Napoleon as First Consul, and Cambaceres and Lebrun 
as Associate Consuls, were then inducted into office. 

A. THE CONSULATE AND ITS PROBLEMS 

Napoleon intended to have the dale of the inauguration 
of the new government, Christmas Day, "Peace on earth, 
good will toward men," accepted as significant. He 
appreciated the fact that the success of his rule over France 
depended upon bringing the war to a speedy and honorable 
conclusion. However favorable the firsl effecl of his 
conciliatory political measures and his wise financial and 
economic reforms, he knew thai the French people desired 
peace. His failure to bring peace would loose all tin- hos- 
tility of opposing factions, and his reforms ami his govern- 
ment would quickly l>e dissolved. He therefore signalized 
his accession to power by addressing personal letters, De- 
cember 20, 1700, to King George III of England and Em- 
peror Francis I of Austria, in which he deplored the miseries 
of war and expressed his own earnest desire to enter upon 
negotiations for peace. These letters constituted an adroit 
political move: if they resulted in a favorable peace, 
France would applaud ; if his enemies rejected his over- 
tures, France would lay the blame for the continuation of 
the war upon England and Austria, and not upon his 
government. 



188 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

Napoleon's letter was not received well by Pitt and his 
ministry. The English government had no assurance of 
tin* enduring power of the newly-instituted consulship 
in France; the military situation, with the French forced 
out of northern Italy, besieged at Malta, ami hopelessly 
isolated in Egypt, promised substantial gains in the near 
future. Hence, though the war had become unpopular 
and a strong group in Parliament favored meeting halfway 
Napoleon's proffer, Pitt and his ministers determined upon 
a resolute refusal to treat. Their reply, however, was need- 
lessly impolitic. After reciting the cause of the war and 
laying all the blame upon France, the note went on to state: 
"His Majesty cannot place his reliance on the mere renewal 
of general professions of pacific dispositions. . . . The 
best and most natural pledge of its reality and permanence 
would be the restoration of that line of princes, which for 
so many centuries maintained the French nation in pros- 
perity at home and in consideration and respect abroad." 
This mention of tin- restoration of the Bourbons deeply 
incensed the French people and enormously strengthened 
the position of Napoleon. lit- could henceforth not only 
blame England for the continuance of the war, hut picture 
her as fighting for a Bourbon restoration. 

The Austrian reply to Napoleon's note was more moderate 
in tone, but still was non-committal in substance. Although 
Francis would bave welcomed peace, his armies had pushed 
through Italy to the very boundaries of France, and he was 
in no mood to make concessions. When, therefore, Napoleon 
definitely offered to discuss peace on the basis of the treaty 
of Campo Formio, the Austrian government refused to 
pursue the subject without agreement with its allies — a 
courteous method of breaking off negotiations. 

Napoleon had at no time deceived himself as to the pros- 
pects of the acceptance of his peace moves. He had. how- 
ever, accomplished his purposes. All the negotiations had 
been conducted on his part with ostentatious publicity, so 



THE CONSULATE L89 

thai France as ;i whole might be convinced of his pacific 
intentions. The blame for the continuance of I In- war he 
could now logically lay upon his enemies. He proceeded, 
therefore, coincident with his reforms in internal adminis- 
tration, to lay lu's plans and make his dispositions Tor a 
decisive campaign againsl Austria. 

li. MARENGO AND HOHENLINDEN 

When the Firsl Consul turned from throwing the diplo- 
matic burden of proof on his enemies to the armies which 
had now to lake up I he discussion, he found in the held 
about 11)0, 000 men. Brune commanded ;in army of occu- 
pation 25,000 strong in the Netherlands; Moreau with 
1^0,000 was arrayed againsl the Austrians along the upper 
Rhine from Schaffhausen to Strassburg; and Massena with 
45,000 confronted a greatly superior Austrian force in 
Piedmont. His opponents, commanded by Melas, num- 
bered 00,000 men distributed at various points throughout 
North Italy, Tuscany, and I he Romagna. On the Rhine, 
Kray opposed equal forces to those of Moreau. 

The Rhenish frontier was the keynote to the Austrian 
situation, for here on the most direct road to Vienna lay 
the bulk of the Emperor's forces. Napoleon's first plan 
contemplated I. he formation of an army of the Reserve 
which he should unite with Moreau's, advance on the Aus- 
trian left wing from Schaffhausen, cul off the army from its 
communications, and end the war by a single campaign. 
Unfortunately, he had in Moreau a genera] whose quality 
differed greatly from his own. Jealousy of Bonaparte and 
caution for his own safety caused the lesser genera] to 
oppose the greater so consistently thai the plan of a decisive 
campaign in Germany had to be abandoned. The resist- 
ance to his plans irked Napoleon, but his position as yet 
was loo insecure to warranl ;i summary dismissal of ;i general 
so influential as Moreau. Accordingly, Italy was chosen 



]!)() THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

as the Held of operations. Here the consul knew he would 
have a free hand. 

Slowly I >u l surely, the situation in Piedmont was becoming 
impossible for the French. Mass6na's army, now divided, had 
Keen forced hack toward the Gulf of Genoa, until on April 
19, L800, Masscna with about 28,000 men was blockaded 
in the city of Genoa, while Suchet, in command of the left 
wing, loooo strong, had been forced hack to the line of the 

\ ar. Superior forces opposed them both, and il became 
apparent to everyone that if they were to be saved, help 
must come, and conic quickly. 

Napoleon's original intention had been to debouch on to 
the plains of Lombardy from the Spltlgen pass north of 
Lake Como and lo cut I he Austrian communications with 
Manlua well to the east, but as Massena's need became 
more and more urgent, he shifted his point of crossing 

westward until he had chosen the great St. Bernard as his 

principal route. Toward this point he began moving his 
Army of the Reserve (40,000 strong) early in May. To 

augment this force he ordered Moncey's corps of 15,000 

to be detached from Moreau, and to join the Army of l In* 
Reserve in Lombardy by a march over the St. Gothard pass. 
The First Consul, forbidden by the constitution from com- 
manding an army in the field, left Paris secretly to lake 
charge of the expedition which he felt could succeed only 
under his personal direction. Under him were Berthier 
as Chief-of-Staff, Lannes as advance guard commander, 
Mural with the cavalry reserve, and Victor and Duhesme 
commanding corps. 

With great toil his advance guard crossed the snow and 
ice of the great Saint Bernard on May 15, and immediately 
began the descent to the plains of Piedmont. Halfway down 
the valley, the little fortress of Bard, perched high on the 
cliffs, threatened to halt the entire army. But at the end 
of the second day, a tortuous path across the mountain had 
been discovered, and over this precipitous route went 



THE CONSULATE 191 

cavalry and infantry alike, leaving a division to reduce the 
troublesome fortress. This latter task was not accom- 
plished for two weeks, and as a consequence only such ar- 
tillery as could be slipped through Bard at night joined 
Napoleon for immediate use. 

Meanwhile, Lannes had arrived at the fork of the way, 
from which led the road to Turin and that to Milan. To 
persuade Melas that an immediate advance on Turin was 
to be looked for, Napoleon ordered Lannes forward on the 
Turin road, while his main army pushed on rapidly to 
Milan. This latter move appears as a direct abandonment 
of the beleaguered garrison in Genoa, but it was not made 
without cogent reasons. At Milan, the Consul knew he 
would capture arms and supplies, he would unite Moncey's 
corps from Germany with his army, and he would secure 
for himself a new line of retreat by way of the St. Got hard 
pass. Moreover, he did not mean only to save Massena ; 
he meant to destroy Melas. On June 2, the French army 
entered Milan, pushed the Austrians in Lombardy across 
the Adda, on the 6th united with Moncey, and at once 
pressed southward to secure the crossings of the Po. 

The Austrian commander awakened but slowly to the 
true situation. He was incredulous when told that an 
entire army had crossed the Saint Bernard, and began a 
rather leisurely concentration of his forces. He was loath 
to withdraw the troops from before Massena and Suchet at 
the moment when success was in sight. His opposition to 
Lannes' feint toward Turin was not spirited, for he felt that 
if the French did come over the Alps, the crossing must 
necessarily be by way of the more accessible Mt. Cenis 
pass. And he was encouraged in this belief by the timely 
arrival at Mt. Cenis of Thurreau whom Napoleon had dis- 
patched with about 4000 men to create that very idea in 
his opponent's mind. 

Even when the true situation was no longer hidden from 
him, Melas might have saved himself by vigorous measures. 



192 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

But his orders for a concentration near Alessandria were 
delayed in arriving at their destinations ; Ott, besieging 
Genoa, delayed two days to receive Massena's surrender ; 
and Elsnitz, retiring from before Suchet, was so harassed 
by that enterprising soldier that less than half of his army 
reached the rendezvous. Only when Massena had been 
allowed to march out with the honors of war en route for 
Nice, did Ott move northward to seize the points of im- 
portance on the Po (June 6, 1800). 

He was too late. Already Lannes and Victor had crossed 
near Stradella to the right bank of the river and were 
marching rapidly toward Alessandria, followed by Murat 
who had crossed at points farther east. At Montebello, 
the two forces came into contact and the Austrians fell 
back in all haste to Alessandria (June 9, 1800). Napoleon's 
generals, reinforced by the arrival of Desaix from Egypt, 
pushed on to Casteggio. On the right bank of the Po, 
Moncey kept Melas from attempting a dash around the 
right flank. In eastern Lombardy, Duhesme was forcing 
the foe toward the Mincio. The Austrian communications 
were completely severed ; they must now either fight or 
retire on Genoa. To prevent this latter contingency, 
Napoleon, who had pushed forward to the Bormida River, 
on June 13, dispatched Desaix with one division towards 
Rivolta in search of information. In Desaix's absence the 
blow fell. 

Melas, made desperate by his situation, had determined 
on battle, and on the morning of June 14 crossed the Bormida 
to meet Bonaparte's leading units on the plains of Marengo. 
The advantage was all with Melas, for he numbered 40,000 
to Napoleon's 21,000. The brunt of the battle was borne 
by Victor and Lannes, whose lines were steadily pushed 
back by the superior numbers attacking them. Napoleon 
was soon convinced that Melas' entire army was opposing 
him and threw in the single division he had held as a reserve. 
Hastily he sent couriers to Desaix, but with little hope of 



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THE CONSULATE 193 

his general's arrival. By mid-afternoon, the Austrians 
conceived of the battle as won. Their solid columns were 
pushing steadily forward against the disordered French, 
and their general returned to Alessandria to write the 
dispatches telling of his victory. 

Then came Desaix. His perfectly formed lines struck 
the head of the hostile columns, and though they lost their 
valiant general, they checked the onslaught. At the same 
moment, Marmont on the right opened a vicious cannonade, 
and the younger Kellermann launched a cavalry charge which 
struck the amazed Austrians midway of their left flank. 
The shock was too great to be sustained. They wavered, 
broke, and streamed away to Alessandria in hopeless 
disarray. 

The next morning, Melas, dazed by a defeat which he 
could not understand, signed a truce by which he agreed to 
retire to the line of the Mincio. The triumphant Napoleon, 
although he had not destroyed his opponent by his splendid 
victory at Marengo, had rendered him impotent, and was 
ready to return to Paris. 

Meanwhile, Moreau had assisted Bonaparte's more 
brilliant maneuvers by well-conducted operations in the 
Rhine country. The battle of Mosskirch in May, 1800, 
and that of Hochstadt in June, had kept Kray fully occupied. 
But the time of Moreau's greatest feat of arms was not yet 
come. A truce was instituted in June which lasted until 
November. During the cessation of hostilities Kray was 
replaced by the Archduke John. When the war was re- 
newed, activities began both in Germany and Italy, but this 
time despite sharp skirmishes on the Mincio, Italy was to 
be the secondary theater of operations. Interest now 
centered in the territory about the Inn River. 

The Archduke John began a bold offensive, hoping to 
take the scattered forces of Moreau by surprise. His 
maneuver of crossing the lower Inn and passing around 
Moreau's left in such fashion as to isolate him, came to a 



1!)4 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

hall in the lace of inclement weather and impassable roads. 
Moreau who was determined to retrieve his mistake of 
having allowed himself to be caughl napping, kepi moving 
in spite of all difficulties and on December 8, encountered 

the foe in the forest of I lohenlinden. 

The blow which I he French general delivered was sudden 
and decisive. While he engaged I he head of the Austrian 
columns in resolute fashion, he dispatched one corps to 

attack their left Hank and rear. This corps, although it 
was itself CUl in two by a chance-met Austrian column, 
nevertheless kept bravely on and accomplished its mission. 

First the baggage and artillery trains were captured, and 
then an attack was begun on the rear of the Anslrians, 
already smartly assailed by Morean's frontal attack. There 
could l>e but one outcome to such an encounter, and night- 
fall of the short winter day saw a confused retreat from ;i 
field where the Anslrians had left ten thousand prisoners 
and as many dead. 

Hohenlinden completed what Marengo began. The 

second coalition was dead. The armistice of Si ever, on 
December 25, L800, terminated the actual fighting and the 
treaty of Lnneville, live weeks later, brought peace. 

C. NAPOLEON IN [NTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY 

With peace negotiations following Marengo and Hohen- 
linden, Napoleon made his appearance upon the stage of 
European politics as an actor of the first importance. When 
he arranged the treaty of Campo Formio (1797), he was 
merely a general of the French Republic acting as his gov- 
ernment's servant ; when he administered northern Italy, 
his work was in a relatively limited theater; when he 
governed Egypt, he ruled an inferior population in a distant 
country; but in the negotiations with Austria in the winter 
of L800-1801, he was head of the French state and was 
negotiating upon affairs affecting the greater part of w r estern 
Europe. International diplomacy had long been, as we 



THE CONSULATE 195 

have said, the game of princes; l>ul from his first appear- 
ance this Corsican interloper played the game as if to the 

purple horn. 

He was greatly aided by his foreign minister, Talleyrand, 
another of the remarkable figures of tlii.s remarkable epoch. 
Talleyrand was horn in Paris in 1754, the scion of an ancienl 
and powerful family. A childhood fall had so crippled him 
thai the usual line of noble advancement, the army, was 
closed to him. His family, therefore, directed his studies 
for the church. At the outbreak of the Revolution he was 
Bishop of Aulim, and was chosen the representative of the 
clergy of his diocese to the Estates General. The world 
of polities proved so much more attractive to him than his 
prospects in the church that two years later (1791) he 
resigned his Bishop's see and sought employment in di- 
plomacy. After five years of vicissitude, at one time on 
special mission to London, at another (\\ i.-, reported) sell- 
ing buttons on the street-, of New York to make a living, 
he was appointed by the influence of Barras — the same 
man who so advanced Napoleon's fortunes minister of 
foreign affairs. There he remained for three years, gaining 
valuable experiences and following the prevailing custom 
of lining his pockets with bribes. When he realized the 
depth of unpopularity into which the Directory had sunk, 
he resigned his post (]7UU) ami associated himself, though 
in a minor capacity, with the conspiracy of Sieyes and 
Napoleon. He was not at onee appointed minister of 
foreign affairs during the provisional consulate, for the taint 
of his reputation for official corruption and private im- 
morality made him undesirable. In December, however, 
the new government, needing badly tin- benefit of his ex- 
perience, reinstated him in his old office, and Napoleon as 
First Consul continued him there. For diplomacy under 
Napoleon, Talleyrand was well suited. lie was unemo- 
tional and cynical, thoroughly familiar with diplomatic 
forms and procedure, unscrupulous, and endowed with a 



196 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

philosophic ability to detach himself from the event of the 
moment and discern the general trend of affairs. He had, 
withal, a genuine love of France and sought according to 
his understanding to advance her interests. The close 
alliance between him and Napoleon, formed in the winter 
of 1799-1800, continued until the ambitions of the con- 
queror passed the bounds of what Talleyrand believed to 
be expediency : then, 1807, Talleyrand left office and with 
calm cynicism watched the successive stages of the Em- 
peror's downfall. 

i. Austria 

Though Austria's army in Italy was shattered at Marengo, 
Francis waited until after the disaster of Hohenlinden (De- 
cember 3, 1800) before agreeing to treat for peace independ- 
ently of England. In the negotiations it was understood 
that the terms of Campo Formio would hold so far as 
territory in Italy was concerned, so that the discussions 
turned mainly on the question of Germany. Austria was 
in no condition to resist Napoleon's demands. She pro- 
tracted negotiations, however, until February, 1801, thus 
living up to the letter of the agreement with England under 
which she had been receiving heavy money subsidies. The 
final terms, signed at Luneville February 9, 1801, provided : 
(1) the boundaries in Italy to be as determined by the treaty 
of Campo Formio ; (2) the cession to France of Belgium, 
Luxemburg, and the German districts on the west bank of 
the Rhine ; (3) the compensation of the dispossessed Ger- 
man princes to be made by the Holy Roman Empire subject 
to the approval of the French government. The Austrian 
diplomat who signed the treaty referred to its conditions 
as "terrible": the French people were elated. Had Na- 
poleon been defeated at Marengo, he and his government 
would have been overthrown : the indisputable triumph 
of the Peace of Luneville secured his hold on power. 



THE CONSULATE 197 

ii. Great Britain 

One important enemy still remained — Great Britain. 
At the moment, however, prospects brightened for Na- 
poleon in this contest also. Pitt had left office in February, 
1801, because of his failure to obtain concessions which he 
had pledged to Ireland, and had been succeeded by the 
acknowledgedly weak Addington Ministry. Furthermore, 
British aggressive measures in seizing contraband in neutral 
bottoms had caused the formation of a Northern Maritime 
League (December 10, 1800), comprising Russia, Sweden, 
and Denmark, pledged to resist by force such seizures. It 
looked, therefore, as though Great Britain, under a weak 
government, would be forced into war against France, Russia, 
Sweden, and Denmark — truly a formidable coalition. 

At the critical time, however, Great Britain was saved 
by two events: the assassination of the Russian Czar; 
and Nelson's naval victory at Copenhagen. The Czar 
Paul, who succeeded Catherine the Great upon her death 
in 1796, quickly alienated by his mad conduct the most 
important elements in his empire. In March, 1801, a group 
of nobles brutally assassinated him, and the throne passed 
to his son Alexander. One of Alexander's first steps was 
to reverse his father's anti-British policy, especially for the 
sake of the much-needed British trade. Russia and Great 
Britain quickly agreed, Great Britain yielding her most 
exorbitant demands ; and Russia thereupon resumed her 
former attitude of neutrality. In April, 1801, the British 
government, treating the declarations of the Northern 
Maritime League as equivalent to war, sent Nelson against 
the Danes. In a most daring and spectacular battle, 
Nelson sailed into the harbor of Copenhagen and destroyed 
the entire Danish fleet (April 2, 1801). The defection of 
Russia and the loss of Denmark's navy broke up the Mari- 
time League. France was again left alone to struggle 
against Great Britain. 



198 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

During the summer the British pushed operations against 
the only French force they could reach — that in Egypt. 
Landing an army of 17,000 in March, the British profited 
by French errors in dispositions, captured the bulk of the 
French army in Cairo June 27, 1801, and the remainder 
in Alexandria August 30, 1801. Inasmuch as Malta had 
surrendered the preceding September, all the French colonies 
and those of France's allies had been captured, French 
commerce had long been swept from the seas, and the people 
of Great Britain were sincerely desirous of peace, the 
Addington government saw no reason for continuing the 
war. 

Preliminaries of peace, providing for the cession of Ceylon 
and Trinidad to Great Britain but not touching upon the 
continental situation, were signed in London October 1, 
1802. After long delay the final peace, the Treaty of Amiens, 
was concluded March 27, 1803. 

iii. Holland, Italy, and Switzerland 

In the meanwhile, during the months following the Treaty 
of Luneville, Napoleon was busy with readjustments in the 
minor republics dependent upon France. He had, it is 
true, guaranteed their independence at Luneville, but he 
did not choose to interpret such a guarantee as preventing 
him from intervention to change their forms of government. 

The Batavian Republic (as Holland was called) had been 
in continual political and financial difficulties since its 
formation. By 1800 its government — a Directory modeled 
on the French system — was thoroughly discredited. Na- 
poleon thereupon framed a new constitution creating an 
Executive Council of twelve members with broad powers, 
and a unicameral legislature whose functions were limited 
to the right to vote "aye" or "no" upon propositions laid 
before it. With callous contempt for the open or sullen 
opposition of the Dutch people, he dissolved the existing 
chambers, disregarded the hostile vote of the plebiscite, 



THE CONSULATE 199 

and imposed the constitution upon the "free" republic 
(October, 1801). 

Plans for the reorganization of the Cisalpine Republic 
were perfected in Paris during the summer and autumn of 
1801. The new constitution provided for a Republic 
headed by a President and Vice-President, with a legislature 
of four chambers, and a very limited electorate. The 
name of the state was changed from Cisalpine Republic 
to the Italian Republic (later the Kingdom of Italy), and the 
presidency was offered on the suggestion of Talleyrand to 
Napoleon himself. By January 2, 1802, these arrange- 
ments were completed. Napoleon accepted the presidency 
and the "independent" state began its career. 

At the same time, Napoleon revised the constitution of 
the Ligurian Republic, changing the name to the Republic 
of Genoa and replacing the Directory and the two legislative 
chambers with a Doge and a single chamber (Senate). 
At the end of June, 1802, this new government took office 
without open opposition. 

One other important part of northern Italy, Piedmont, 
remained. Since Marengo, Piedmont had been occupied 
by French troops. By decree of April 21, 1801, it was con- 
stituted a French military province. In September, 1802, 
French civil administration replaced the military, the 
country was divided into six departments according to the 
French system, and Piedmont became to all intents and 
purposes a part of France. 

In Switzerland, republican agitation following the suc- 
cesses of the French Revolution had resulted in a succession of 
coups d'etat, one faction following another in its few months 
of supremacy. Napoleon was ready to fish to advantage 
in these troubled waters. His secret agents instigated 
political demands, and engineered popular uprisings. In 
the midst of civil war Napoleon directly intervened (Octo- 
ber, 1802). Summoning the leading Swiss representatives 
to Paris, he laid before them an Act of Mediation providing 



200 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

for a Helvetic Republic, a confederation of nineteen sovereign 
cantons, with a chief magistrate known as the Landammann, 
and a Federal Diet of twenty-five members. The differing 

factions accepted this Act of Mediation February 10, 180o, 
and Switzerland (i.e., The Helvetic Republic) forthwith 
began its new regime. 

iv. Germany 

The Treaty of Luneville, it will be remembered, had pro- 
vided for the compensation of the dispossessed German 
princelings by the Holy Roman Empire subject to the ap- 
proval of France. The lands for their compensation were 
gained by the arbitrary secularization of the many church 
territories. A special Imperial Deputation was in session 
from August, 1802, to February, L803, to consider the allot- 
ment of compensations, but as the terms of the treaty be- 
came known, the claimants recognized that the determination 
of boundaries was going to be made at Paris and not at 
the session of the Imperial Commission. Hordes of petty 
nobles moved in person upon Paris, hoping by influence or 
bribes to add a few square miles to their allotment. Ludi- 
crous stories were current of how these supplicants haunted 
Talleyrand's anteroom, tendering gifts o( jeweled snuff 
boxes, fondling his poodle, and playing bliudman's buff and 
drop the handkerchief with his favorite little niece. 

In the end, as usual, the more powerful states absorbed 
the greater amount of the spoils. Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, 
WUrtemberg, Baden increased and consolidated their terri- 
tories. In addition to the 97 separate German states on 
the west bank of the Rhine ceded to France, the final 
distribution extinguished 110 other states of the Empire. 
The Principal Decree of the Imperial Deputation, signed 
February 25, 1803, ami ceremonially ratified by the Diet, 
partitioned some 30.01)1) square miles of territory containing 
o.OOO.OOO people. Though Germany reached the depths 
of humiliation in such readjustments at the virtual dictation 



THE CONSULATE 201 

of a foreign power, the seeds of regeneration were at the 
same time sown in the increase and consolidation of the 
territories of the larger and more important slates. 

D. napoleon's domestic policies 

At the same time that he was winning diplomatic suc- 
cesses, Napoleon was initiating and supervising a series of 
domestic reforms. He found conditions in chaos. The 
decade of disturbance which had preceded him had pro- 
foundly affected matters political, financial, economic, 
religious, legal, and educational. Tl was his problem to 
reestablish order. Complete insurance of his position 
would follow the double triumph of diplomacy abroad and 
wisdom at home. 

From the beginning of his consulate, Napoleon occupied 
a favorable position for conciliating the political factions 
in France. Reputed to belong to no faction himself, he 
was free to draw the ablest men from all parties and to 
compose their differences by employing them in the great 
work of reorganizing and administering the government. 
This policy he followed. His appointments gratified the 
sound elements of French society, for distinguished men 
were drawn from all ranks of life to prominent positions in 
the government. His mercy toward the emigres relieved 
people of the fear of another reign of terror, such as accom- 
panied the previous strong revolutionary government. 
His friendly negotiations with the remaining rebels in 
Brittany and La Vendee {Chouans, as they were called) 
speedily brought an internal peace such as had not been 
known since the days of Louis XVI. With the greatest 
success, Napoleon emphasized in these early days his desire 
to conciliate all the factions in the distracted country. 

With political conciliation came a plan for the reorganiza- 
tion of local government throughout France. The Revolu- 
tion had gone further than the average education of the 
mass of the people warranted in placing the burden of 



202 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

local government in the hands of local authorities. The 
result was inefficiency and confusion. The authorities 
elected in the communes and departements were lax in pur- 
pose and slipshod in method. By a comprehensive law, 
passed February 17, 1800, a centralized system based on 
the new revolutionary divisions of France (i.e., Departements, 
Arrondissements, Communes) was established. At the head 
of each division was an administrative official appointed 
by and responsible to the central government of France — 
the Prefect for the Departement, the Sub-Prefect for the 
Arrondissement, and the Mayor for the Commune. In each 
division was also an elected council with merely advisory 
functions — the General Council for the Departement, the 
District Council for the Arrondissement, and the Municipal 
Council for the Commune. Realizing the urgency of re- 
organization, Napoleon appointed the Prefects under the 
new system March 2, 1800. As was his custom, he chose 
men of ability and reputation, whose energy soon brought 
order from the universal chaos. The people, thankful for 
the resumption of normal conditions, actually welcomed 
the reestablishment of centralized government, though it 
meant the end of their direct elective power over the 
administration. 

Equally urgent was the need for financial measures. 
The decade of civil disorder and foreign war had broken 
down utterly the financial system of the country. At 
Napoleon's accession to power, the government officials 
had not received their salaries for months. The army was 
starving. The administration was trying to pay its debts 
with paper money which had no value except that it was 
legal tender in payment of taxes. The tax-arrears for the 
years 1796, 1797, and 1798 were huge, and so distracted 
was the country that a third of the tax lists for 1798 had 
not been made out, and the lists for 1799 had scarcely been 
considered. For some years the Directory had existed 
merely on the money exacted from the countries dependent 



THE CONSULATE 203 

on France. Napoleon thus faced small cash receipts, great 
difficulty of collection, and abnormal expenditures due to 
war. His finance minister, M. Gaudin, was of the greatest 
assistance to him in reforming the finances. He had been 
a thorough conscientious upper clerk in the Treasury De- 
partment up to the time he was elevated by Napoleon. 
He and Napoleon worked together in the early days of the 
consulate several times a week over their problems. After 
securing an advance of 12,000,000 francs for the immediate 
necessities of the government, they proceeded to formulate 
legislation for a sound financial system. By this legisla- 
tion it was provided that a Director-General of Taxes and 
an Inspector of Taxes should supervise the collection of 
taxes in each Departement, and that 840 Controllers of 
Taxes should be scattered through the Arrondissements to 
see to the details of assessment and payment. At the same 
time (January, 1800) the Bank of France was organized 
with a capital stock of 30,000,000 francs of which the gov- 
ernment and the First Consul subscribed a part, to be the 
central authorized financial agency in France. With in- 
credible energy and ability these measures were carried 
through. The Directors-General, the Inspectors, and the 
Controllers were appointed, the arrears of taxes collected, 
the new tax lists made up. The budget was mercilessly 
cut, economy promised, and order guaranteed. The con- 
fidence of the sound elements of French society rapidly rose. 
In the autumn of 1800, the government began the payment 
of its annuity obligations in specie; in 1802-1803, for the 
first time in a score of years, the financial statement actually 
showed a surplus instead of a deficit. 

The final indication of the success of his financial measures 
led Napoleon to order certain public works of importance, 
works which had been much needed, but which could not 
be forwarded during the civil disorders of the preceding 
decade. Thus the repair of roads, the construction of 
canals, the building of bridges, were financed by the govern- 



204 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

ment. At the same time, M. Chaptal, the broad-minded 
and energetic Minister of the Interior, took steps to improve 
and encourage French industry. Through his foresight, 
French manufacturers were made acquainted with the latest 
improvements in machinery, as in weaving cloth. French 
industries started on a new career of progress and pros- 
perity. The moral effect of this resumption of the normal 
activities of the government and economic life was excellent ; 
men welcomed the end of political agitation and the return 
of regular conditions. 

In his desire to prove himself the conciliator of factions, 
friend of peace, and restorer of order and regularity, Na- 
poleon bent his best efforts toward a settlement of the 
religious problem. From the time when the National 
Assembly had passed the Civil Constitution of the Clergy 
(1790), religious conditions had been in a turmoil. For a 
decade, the French people had not had the opportunity 
to worship after the manner of their innermost desires. 
Napoleon recognized the force and sincerity of the people's 
faith, and therefore sought to make a pact with the Pope 
by which the familiar ceremonies could again be celebrated 
throughout France. Negotiations were extraordinarily dif- 
ficult, for the Pope began by demanding the restitution of 
all rights and properties the church had possessed prior to 
the Revolution. By threats of establishing a new church 
(as Henry VIII did in England), and by making it evident 
after his victory of Marengo how completely the Pope and 
Rome were in his power, Napoleon quickly induced a more 
conciliatory spirit. In the end, Napoleon, realizing the 
complete helplessness of the Pontiff, practically dictated 
his own terms. These terms provided : (1) that the Roman 
Catholic religion should be acknowledged that of the great 
majority of French citizens; (2) that its rites might be 
freely celebrated in France ; (3) that after the division of 
the country into new bishoprics, the First Consul should 
appoint the Bishops, the Bishops should be confirmed by 



THE CONSULATE 205 

the Pope, and the Bishops should choose the priests ; and 
(4) that the government should pay the clergy, provided 
that the clergy should swear to support the constitution 
of the Republic. This Concordat, as it was known, concluded 
September, 1801, gave to Napoleon the power he desired 
over the church in France. At the same time, it satisfied 
the people by permitting them again to enjoy the exercise 
of their religion as sanctified by the Pope. As time passed, 
both the church and the government grew satisfied with 
the provisions of the Concordat. 

It fell to Napoleon, too, to complete the codification of 
the laws of the country. Every government in France 
during the Revolution had recognized the need of such 
codification, but none had been able amid the political 
strife and confusion to carry it through. Napoleon infused 
the committee which had it under consideration with some- 
thing of his own energy and efficiency. Of the 87 general 
sessions of the committee, he personally presided at 35, and 
often assisted in discussion by his insight and his practical 
suggestions. The final code, completed in 1804 and later 
called the Code Napoleon, proved one of the greatest and 
most enduring of the works of the Revolution. In France, 
the Code gave a unity to legal practice which had never 
before been known. In the various countries which at one 
time or another became subject to or merged with France, 
the Code was adopted and became the foundation of later 
systems. 

Thus in these momentous years of his consulate, Na- 
poleon steadily increased his fame and strengthened his 
position. He began with a purely military reputation — 
this he enhanced at Marengo. He pledged himself to a 
policy of peace — he redeemed his pledge at Luneville and 
Amiens. He promised the restoration of order in France — 
he fulfilled his promise by his settlement of factional quarrels, 
by his reforms in the finances, by his stimulation of industry 
and public works, by the Concordat and the Code Napoleon. 



206 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

By each achievement he made himself more indispensable 
to France, for he and he alone was responsible for the 
great and beneficent change which had come over the 
country. 

His successes inspired his ambition. Willi the same clear 
insight with which he solved military, political, and economic 
problems, he perceived the strength of his position in the 
country and the opportunity for a rise to greater heights of 
personal glory. Just after the Peace of Amiens (May, 1802) 
one of the legislative houses proposed to accord to "General 
Bonaparte" a "signal pledge of national gratitude." By 
the clever maneuvers of Napoleon's friends, this "pledge" 
was made to consist of an offer to make Napoleon consul 
for life. With affected modesty. Napoleon replied thai he 
could not consider such a burden unless the people should 
impose the sacrifice. Thereupon the Council of State 
arranged a national referendum upon the question : " Shall 
Napoleon Bonaparte become Consul for life?" The grate- 
ful people recorded their approval of the new government 
by voting 3,577,259 "Yes" to 8374 "No." Shortly after- 
wards, a decree of the Senate bestowed upon him the right 
to name his successor. 

Napoleon's power was at this time imperial, but he de- 
sired the name as well as the substance. He had become 
obsessed with the idea of gaining from a grateful people 
the dignity of Emperor. The title would, he may have 
thought, raise him to equal dignity with the hereditary 
monarchs of Europe, and the establishment of a dynasty 
would assure the continuation of his reforms to France. 
A great plot concocted by his royalist enemies against his 
life so stimulated the enthusiasm of the people that the 
way to the title was made easy. During the late summer 
and autumn of 1803 this conspiracy was ripening. George 
Cadoudal, one of the irreconcilable Breton royalists, crossed 
the channel from England in August with drafts for a million 
francs, and went direct to Paris. General Pichegru fol- 



THE CONSULATE 207 

lowed Cadoudal in January, hoping to win over his comrade 
in arms, General Moreau. In the meanwhile, Fouche, 
Napoleon's Minister of Police, had the strings of the plot in 
his hands and merely wailed to close the net upon all those 
implicated. The firs I arrest was made at the end of Janu- 
ary, 1804; others followed rapidly, including Moreau 
(February 15), Pichegru (February 29), Cadoudal himself 
(March 9), and the remainder within the next few days. 
Still the government was disappointed, for it was under- 
stood that one of the royal princes was implicated and no 
prince had been arrested indeed, the identity of the prince 
was not certain. On the night of March 14, however, 
French troops crossed the boundary of Baden territory 
and arrested the Due d'Enghien, grandson of the Prince de 
Conde, who had been living quietly near Strassburg. A 
week later, after a hasty court-martial, the Duke was con- 
victed of treason and shot (March 21, 1804J. The sensa- 
tion created by the arrest of the conspirators and the execu- 
tion of the Due d'Enghien brought in its wake a wave of 
popular sympathy for Napoleon. People believed that 
Great Britain and the royalists supported the conspiracy 
in order to assassinate Napoleon, ruin France, and restore 
the old regime. Napoleon's friends cleverly worked upon 
the enthusiasm for political ends. April 23, 1804, a mem- 
ber of the Tribunate moved that Napoleon "should be 
declared Emperor" and "that the Imperial dignity should 
be declared hereditary in his family." Carnot was the only 
man to speak and vote against the motion. May 4, 1804, 
the Senate acting upon the Tribunate's resolution, decreed : 
"Glory, gratitude, devotion, reason, the interests of the 
State, all unite to proclaim Napoleon hereditary Emperor." 
A new constitution embodying these changes was approved 
May 18, 1804. A plebiscite, ordered to give national sanc- 
tion to the changes, was held during the summer and autumn, 
the results as announced November 26 being 3,572,239 
"Ayes" against 2569 "Noes." December 4, 1804, the 



208 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

coronation ceremonies were held in the cathedral of Notre 
Dame. At Napoleon's request the Pope was present, but 
Napoleon himself took the crown from the Pope's hands 
and placed it upon his own head, thus symbolizing the fact 
that he owed his crown to no superior power. 



CHAPTER IX 

NAPOLEON VERSUS THE THIRD COALITION 

More than a year before Napoleon assumed the imperial 
dignity, the relations between France and Great Britain 
had been strained and broken. Though both countries had 
welcomed the peace, it proved after all merely a truce. 
To the series of pin pricks, as those caused by attack and 
counter-attack in the public press of the two countries, and 
by British hospitality shown to French royalist emigres and 
conspirators, were added some substantial causes of dispute. 
Napoleon continued to enforce French statutes against the 
importation of British goods, and showed no disposition to 
advance negotiations for a commercial treaty. As French 
control extended in adjacent countries — as by the annexa- 
tion of Piedmont, intervention in Switzerland, and change 
of government in Holland and northern Italy — British ex- 
ports lost more and more markets, until peace seemed as 
costly and ruinous as war. Again, Napoleon sent (Septem- 
ber, 1802) a trusted agent, Colonel Sebastiani, to report 
upon conditions in Egypt. His report, printed in the official 
Moniteur January 13, 1803, stated the number of Turks and 
British garrisoned in Egypt, commented upon the suffering 
and discontent among the natives, and hinted at the pos- 
sibility of a resumption of Napoleon's eastern ambitions in 
the words "6000 French would be sufficient to conquer 
Egypt." Napoleon on his part dwelt particularly upon 
British delay in evacuating Malta according to the terms of 
the treaty. Repeated demands upon Great Britain for the 
fulfillment of the treaty provisions were met by excuses — 
indeed, the Addington Ministry, foreseeing war, had deter- 
mined not to leave Malta. In the formal reception to the 

p 209 



-210 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

diplomatic body March 13, 180.3, at the Tuileries, Napoleon 
created a "scene" by striding in anger to the British am- 
bassador, Lord Whit worth, and indulging in a tirade against 
(Jrcal Britain, using such phrases as: "You want war, do 
you! We have already fought for ten years: do you want 
to fight for another ten? . . . Treaties must be respected ! 
Woe to those who do not respect them!" War was, of 
course, inevitable after such an episode. Though two 
months of futile recriminations passed before the declara- 
tion, Napoleon began preparations at once. He sold the 
vast territory of Louisiana (which he had acquired from 
Spain two years before) to the United States for 7r>,000,000 
francs ($15, 000, 000). lie ordered an inspection and report 
upon the harbors and ships of Flanders and Holland. He 
directed the purchase of vast quantities of timber. He 
caused plans to be drawn of a light draft flat boat suitable 
for the transport of troops. He began the concentration 
of troops at strategic points for initial operations against 
Hanover and Otranto. When Lord Whit worth finally de- 
manded his passports May 11, 1803, Napoleon's plans were 
well advanced. 

Napoleon did not mean to fight his adversary without 
assistance, or to limit his operations to France alone. Han- 
over presented itself as the point demanding most immediate 
attention, for the King of Great Britain was still the elector 
of Hanover, and it seemed to Napoleon that here Great 
Britain was most vulnerable. Within two weeks of the out- 
break of hostilities, an army of 20,000 under General Mortier 
was on the banks of the Weser, summoning the Hanoverians 
to surrender. The British government protested loudly 
against the violation of neutrality of the German states 
which had to be crossed in order that Hanover might be 
invaded. As she was in no position to land an army on the 
continent, however, her protest was unheeded and Hanover 
fell under the sway of the French. The Weser was closed 
to British commerce. 



NAPOLEON VERSUS THE THIRD COALITION L Z\\ 

To offset the naval stronghold, Malta, which the British 
persistently refused to evacuate, Napoleon fell thai he mus1 
occupy adjacenl points of vantage. At the same momenl 
I ha I troops were occupying Hanover, St. Cyr was march- 
ing south wilh 15,000 men to take advantage of the ports 
of Brindisi, Otranto, and Taranto, in the southernmost part 
of Italy. Their occupation was, of course, a violation of the 
neutrality of Naples, but Napoleon was ever distrustful of 
the neutrality of Ferdinand and Caroline, and it is quite 
probable that he reasoned that an army of occupation now 
would make unnecessary an army of invasion later. 

As for assistance, he looked to those states which had 
already fell the weight of his hand. Holland held ready at 
the First Consul's disposal an army of about 15,000; she 
furnished funds to equip a French force of I he same size; 
and she supplied small channel boats in quantity. Swit- 
zerland and the Cisalpine stales both furnished similar con- 
tingents. Hut tin- greatest aid was to come from Spain and 
Portugal. By humiliating treaties in October and Decem- 
ber of ISO.'}, these two count ries opened their ports to French 
goods, and agreed to pay France a yearly contribution of 
nearly a hundred million of francs, the greatest share of the 
burden falling, of course, upon Spain. Such a course was 
bound to provoke Great Britain to retaliatory measures 
retaliations which took the form of attacks on Spanish and 
Portuguese ships from the new world. In a few months, 
Napoleon had the satisfaction of enrolling the Peninsular 
countries not only as financial assistants, but as active 
operating allies. 

However welcome were the gold and men from outsiders, 
the real strength of France was as always in her armies. 
Along the channel, principally in the neighborhood of Bou- 
logne, huge camps sprang up, and to them Napoleon daily 
forwarded new levies to be shaped by his generals info the 
Grand Army of Prance. Long hours of daily training 
taught them the business of the soldier on land, and con- 



212 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

stant drills with the flatboats and ships so familiarized 
them with this form of transportation that they were said 
to be able to embark a hundred thousand in half an hour. 
Nothing was wanting save command of the channel for 
thirty-six hours to place this army on English soil. 

Since the day of the French menace, Englishmen have 
scoffed openly at the idea of the invasion from Boulogne. 
Napoleon, however, was the man in Europe best able to 
judge of the feasibility of any military scheme, and the 
mere fact that he contemplated such an invasion, removes it 
from the category of absurdities. It must be remembered 
that he did not intend to occupy England, but merely to 
destroy her shipyards, arsenals, and manufactures. With 
only such an army as Britain could have put into the 
field at the moment, surely this plan could have been 
possible. 

It was a scheme destined never to be carried into effect, 
however. Great Britain's strength lay on the sea, and she 
guarded the channel jealously. France's navy was inferior 
in ships and personnel and in training. Outside of every 
port where lay the fleets of the First Consul, or of his allies, 
a British squadron hung in the offing, ready to strike. And 
although France had an admirable sailor in Latouche- 
Treville, he was no match for the redoubtable Nelson. 
When upon the death of the former, Villeneuve succeeded 
to the command of the navies of France, the balance in- 
clined still more toward the side of Great Britain. 

Throughout the closing months of 1803 and for the first 
half of 1804, Napoleon tried in vain to concentrate in the 
channel the French and Spanish fleets which lay at Toulon, 
Cadiz, Ferrol, Rochefort, and Brest. A simple plan of 
direct concentration was just about to be executed when 
Latouche-Treville died and left Villeneuve to cope with 
the situation. A new and more intricate plan called for a 
concentration in the West Indies, and thither, in April, 1804, 
sailed the Toulon and Cadiz fleets, hoping to be joined by 



NAPOLEON VERSUS THE THIRD COALITION 213 

the Brest fled. These three, united, were then to make 
for the channel before the British knew of their whereabouts. 

The expedition failed dismally. The Brest fleet never 
left French waters, and Villeneuve, sharply pursued by 
Nelson, returned to Europe only to encounter a second 
British fleet in the Bay of Biscay and be forced again into 
Cadi/. Cornwallis now blockaded Brest, and Nelson, Cadiz 
(August, 1805). 

Thus, the French navy was made useless to Napoleon, 
who now turned toward a new enemy on the Danube. He 
was determined, however, that his fleets should he of some 
value to him, and in consequence gave sharp orders to 
Villeneuve to leave Cadiz and sail to Naples at the first 
opportunity. Villeneuve, stung by the knowledge that he 
was to be relieved of his command, determined to force his 
way out of Cadiz and into the Mediterranean. Accord- 
ingly, on October £0, ISO."), he weighed anchor and left the 
harbor. Off Trafalgar, the blockading squadron attacked 
in two long columns under Collingwood and Nelson, and for 
five hours fought furiously against the allies. Only a rem- 
nant of Villeneuve's fleet was left to take refuge again in 
Cadiz. The Emperor offset this defeat by a brilliant land 
victory at Ulm, but many a time thereafter he longed bit- 
terly for the naval strength which Nelson dissipated at 
Trafalgar. As for Nelson himself, Trafalgar was his last 
battle. The French, in his own words, "had done for him 
at last." Great Britain mourned genuinely the admiral 
who had done more than all the rest to make her mistress of 
the seas. 

A. FORMATION OF THE THIRD COALITION 

In May, 1804, the lingering agonies of the Addington 
Ministry were terminated by its dissolution, and Pitt again 
became Prime Minister. One and only one great task lay 
before him, the defeat of Napoleon, and to that task he bent 
all his strength. Though already broken in health — he 



214 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

died in January of 1806 — he at once set in motion intricate 
negotiations to create a new all-European coalition to oppose 
Napoleon. 

The situation in Europe rendered his task extraordi- 
narily difficult. Alexander I of Russia, who became Czar 
after the assassination of his father, Paul, was a curious 
mixture of the visionary and the practical man. He had 
at first welcomed Napoleon and had actually sought alliance 
with the new France, especially as Napoleon had tempted 
him with the offer of the honorary chief of the Knights of 
St. John of Malta; but the aggressions of the French con- 
queror upon the continent and the execution of the Due 
d'Enghien had turned him to the opposing camp. He 
sounded the British government on the terms of a possible 
alliance, declaring that the new coalition must adopt prin- 
ciples of liberalism to offset the French doctrines, but at 
the same time stipulating that Russia must be given Con- 
stantinople and the grand-duchy of Poland. Austria had 
not yet recovered from the previous wars. She had a huge 
debt and a small income; her army was poorly organized 
and equipped ; the Archduke Charles, then at the head of 
the war office and busy with the problems of reorganization, 
advised peace upon almost any terms, even an alliance with 
France. Prussia's fortunes were guided by a vacillating 
king and his group of short-sighted counselors, all jealous 
of Austria and bent upon the prospect of immediate gain. 
Though Sweden, an implacable enemy of Napoleon, would 
surely join the coalition, her aid could be only trifling. As 
Napoleon frankly told her ambassador at Paris, Sweden 
had descended to the rank of a third-class power. From 
such difficult materials, Pitt sought to build a strong 
coalition. 

Negotiations with Russia dragged from after the death of 
the Due d'Enghien (March, 1804) until April, 1805. In June, 
1804, Alexander signified his willingness to consider an alli- 
ance. In September, 1804, he sent an envoy to London to sug- 



NAPOLEON VERSUS THE THIRD COALITION 21.5 

gest that the declared objects of the proposed coalition should 
be "to deliver from Napoleon's yoke the peoples whom he 
oppressed," and "to free France from the despotism under 
which she groaned, to leave her the free choice of a govern- 
ment," and to bring about "the greatest welfare of their 
subjects." In November of the same year he sent another 
envoy with the more practical proposal that Russia should 
be guaranteed Moldavia, Constantinople, and the island 
of Alalia, with a protectorship over the other Balkan ter- 
ritories and over Poland. In the final convention, signed at 
St. Petersburg April 11, 1805, Alexander was forced to re- 
cede from practically all of his demands. The terms pro- 
vided that a league should be formed for the restoration of 
peace and the balance of power; that Holland, Switzer- 
land, and Italy should be freed from French control, and 
Piedmont returned to the King of Sardinia; that Great 
Britain should furnish an annual subsidy of $0,2.50,000 for 
each 100,000 men under arms against France, provided the 
total forces should be kept at more than 400,000 ; and that 
Russia should furnish an army of 11.5,000 men. AVith this 
convention signed, the diplomats approached Austria, 
Sweden, and Prussia. 

For the reasons previously stated, Austria was at first 
averse to a renewal of the war. "While she was still hesitat- 
ing, however, a new step by Napoleon strongly incensed her 
government. Napoleon changed the Italian Republic (for- 
merly the Cisalpine Republic) into a monarchy and assumed 
the crown himself (at Milan, May 26, 1805) as King of Italy ; 
and a month later he annexed the Republic of Genoa out- 
right to France. Fearing further encroachments against 
Venice, threatened by Russia, and bribed by the offer of four 
months' advance subsidy from Great Britain, the Austrian 
government consented to join the coalition in July, 1805, 
and formally signed the convention at St. Petersburg August 
9, 1805. She agreed to furnish 315,000 troops, though in 
actual fact her armies never reached that number. 



216 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

Sweden joined as a matter of course, promising to furnish 
a contingent of 12,000 men. Later, Queen Caroline of 
Naples, though she had signed a treaty of neutrality with 
France, adhered to the coalition and admitted (November, 
1805) 13,000 Russians and 7000 British troops to her ter- 
ritory. 

The agents of the coalition, however, made little headway 
with the Prussian government. In Frederick William Ill's 
court, the traditional jealousy of Austria, and the belief that 
diplomacy might win Prussia a greater prize than war, in- 
fluenced the councilors to advise neutrality. Napoleon, 
too, had a bait in the shape of Hanover by which at the 
proper moment he might tempt Prussia into an actual 
alliance. Hence, Frederick William III rejected the offers 
of alliance and help from Great Britain, Russia, and Austria, 
acknowledged Napoleon's title as Emperor of the French and 
as King of Italy, and prepared as a neutral to gain all he 
could from the impending war. 

Secret as the negotiations had been, the increase in the 
Austrian armies and the delay of the Austrian government 
in recognizing Napoleon's new dignities gave ample intima- 
tion of what was going on. In June, 1804, he warned the 
Austrian government that he was alive to the continental 
situation. Early in 1805 he demanded from the court at 
Vienna an assurance of peaceful intentions, and received it. 
In August, 1805, he informed his foreign minister, Talley- 
rand, that he must know within two weeks whether Austria 
meant war. At the end of the same month (August, 1805) 
he ordered Talleyrand to prepare an announcement showing 
how Austria had driven him to war, and (on August 26) 
directed the march of his troops from the Boulogne camps 
toward the Danube. The border German states, helpless and 
exposed to the first onset of the French army in its march 
against Austria, declared openly for France. As allies, they 
were at this time useless for Napoleon, however, except as 
they afforded a free highway to the Danube. 



NAPOLEON VERSUS THE THIRD COALITION 217 

September 3, the Austrian government rejected Napo- 
leon's ultimatum, and five days later its armies under 
Genera] Mack crossed the Inn River. 

B. [JLM AND ALSTERLITZ 

It must not be thought that the months spent on the 
channel waiting vainly for the chance to invade England 
were profitless. When the Grand Army turned toward the 
Rhine, it was as tine a fighting unit as the world had ever 
seen. It was composed of thoroughly trained men, a large 
percentage of whom had seen active service, officered by 
generals, young, able, and ambitious, and commanded by 
the greatest soldier of them all a man who had no knowl- 
edge of the word defeat. The quality of the army is shown 
by the fact thai Soult's Corps, 41,000 in number, made 
the march from Boulogne to Spino (over 400 miles) in 
twenty-nine days, without losing a single man either by 
sickness or by desertion. 

The Grand Army numbered 180,000. At its head, the 
Emperor was seconded by Berthier as Chief-ol'-Slaif, 
and under him commanding his several corps were Bes- 
sieres, Bernadotte, Marmont, Davout, Soult, Lannes, Ney, 
Augereau, and Murat — men whose greatest misfortune it 
was that their splendid military achievements were destined 
to take place in the white light which surrounded their 
great leader. Their part was to lead the Grand Army from 
Boulogne and from Hanover into the valley of the Danube 
and there strike at whatever point would prove the key to 
Austria. To second their efforts, Massena commanded an 
army of 50,000 on the Adige, and in Naples, St. Cyr with 
20,000 watched the Bourbons. 

Opposed to them, Austria had about equal numbers of 
her own, and she was relying upon two armies which Russia 
had promised. Twice had Napoleon struck at Austria so 
successfully through Italy, that the Aulic War Council was 
persuaded that the Adige rather than the Danube called 



218 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

for the more steadfast defense. Accordingly, the Archduke 
Charles commanded in Venezia an army of 1 ^(), ()()() wailing 
for a Mow which never fell. Mack, wilh so, (KM), pushed far 
forward to ihc [ller in the vain hope that Bavaria might be 
induced t<> join the allies, and there, with his flank resting 
on the fortress of Ulm, he awaited the arrival of his Russian 
reinforcements. Between Charles and Mack, the Arch- 
duke John held in the Tyrol an army of 40,000, designed as 
a supporting unit for either of the others who might need 
him more. Far to the rear not yet out of Russia 
Buxhowden and ECutusoff each commanded a force of about 
45,000. This, then, was the situation when the Grand 
Army began crossing the Rhine, September 21, ISO.'). 

When his corps moved forward from the Rhine on Sep- 
tember 28, Napoleon's plan of attack was completely 
formed. His advance cavalry under Mural, pushing for- 
ward through the defiles of the Black Forest, gave Mack 
the idea that a frontal attack against his position was con- 
templated. Meanwhile, from Spire, Mannheim, Mayence, 
and Wurtzburg, the divisions moved swiftly forward, cross- 
ing the Danube a1 Donauworth and [ngolstadl on October 
7-8, before Mack was aware of their presence. By the 
time he realized the true situation, Napoleon was already in 
his rear and had cut his communications wilh Vienna. In 
vain he faced his line to the right and then as the French 
pushed on, again lo the right., until now he faced his bases. 
No escape remained but successful battle. 

Napoleon, in possession of his adversary's communica- 
tions, hurried lo secure his own position and to hasten the 
battle which he knew must follow. Two corps marched 
on Munich to guard against the possible arrival of the 
Russians; one corps moved southward to prevent the Arch- 
duke John from sending reinforcements from the Tyrol. 
With the remaining corps, the Emperor moved up the Dan- 
ube from Donauworth, marching on both banks of the river, 
drawing his lines lighter and lighter about, his foe. 



NAPOLEON VERSUS THE THIRD COALITION 219 

On October 12, Mack attempted to cut the not closing on 
him by a march northward from Ulm which would have 
crossed the French communications. A whole-hearted 
attempt might have effected his escape, for an error on the 
part of one of the French generals had left the situation at 
his mercy, had he but known it. Mural, in command of the 
three corps on the right, knowing that the Emperor meant to 
prevent at any cost Mack's possible flight to the Tyrol, had 
ordered Ney to leave the lefl bank of the Danube and join 
Lannes on the right. Ney, fortunately, carried out the 
order in part only, leaving one division on the left bank. 
This division was all that stood Let ween Mack and freedom, 
had he hut brought his entire force against it. Unfortu- 
nately for him, he sent forward less than half his army, and 
against this, Ney's one division fought gallantly until 
Napoleon had retrieved his marshal's error. 

Next day, when his chance had gone, Mack made a second 
attempt, but this time was roughly handled by Ney at 
Elchingen and again withdrew to Ulm. News of a defeat 
to the Archduke John's reinforcements from the Tyrol 
convinced him that his situation was hopeless, and on Octo- 
ber 1!), hemmed in on all sides by his opponents, he capitu- 
lated. He had made vain attempts to get terms, but 
Napoleon was obdurate. The Emperor demanded and 
received the unconditional surrender of Mack's (>(),()()() 
remaining. 

Ulm taken, Napoleon lost no time in marching on Vienna. 
One Russian army was already in the Danube valley, but it 
had turned back upon hearing of the disaster at Ulm. To 
capture and destroy this army before it could unite with the 
second Russian force was now Napoleon's object. In three 
columns he started swiftly down the Danube valley, leaving 
Augereau and Ney to drive the Austrians out of the Tyrol 
and keep them from endangering his communications. He 
received news of a del'ea I which Massena suffered at t he hands 
of the Archduke Charles October 29, but he was not disturbed 



220 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

for he knew that with the road to Vienna wide open, Charles 
must of necessity fall back into Austria if he were to be of 
the slightest use. 

The march to Vienna was accomplished in an incredibly 
short time. What little resistance was encountered at the 
fortified cities or the rivers, was brushed aside, and the 
(J rand Army swept speedily on. At Lin/, the Emperor 
formed a new corps which crossed to and occupied the left 
bank of the river, so that from Linz on the French controlled 
the entire valley. This isolated corps was the one weakness 
of the advance and received the only check suffered in the 
entire campaign. Pushing forward too hastily, it en- 
countered the Russians who had crossed the river without 
Napoleon's knowledge and experienced a severe defeat. The 
reverse was not disastrous, however, and the force on the 
right bank continued its advance. 

The court in Vienna was in consternation. In vain it 
issued orders for its handful of troops to lake up a stand 
before the city. Kutusoff, the Russian commander, was 
unconcerned for the fate of the Austrian capital. lie knew 
that the only hope of a successful outcome of the campaign 
lay in his junction with Buxhowden's army, now in Moravia. 
Accordingly, on November 1), he crossed the river at Krems, 
paused only to administer the defeat to the French on the 
left bank as described above, and then hurried northward 
into Moravia, leaving Vienna to its fate. On the morn- 
ing of November 13, Mural seized the bridge at Vienna 
by a stratagem, and his corps occupied the city without 
opposition. 

The bulk of the (J rand Army crossed at Krems in hot 
pursuit of Kutusoff. The Austrian Emperor had made 
timid overtures for peace, but Napoleon, who saw a great 
victory in sight, offered him terms which seemed impossible. 
In despair, Francis waited for the disaster which he saw pre- 
paring for him. His armies under the Archdukes Charles and 
John, pushed through the mountains by Massena, Augereau, 



NAPOLEON VERSUS THE THIRD COALITION 221 

and Ney, had effected a union at Laibach, only to find Napo- 
leon's armies between themselves and Vienna. The Arch- 
dukes could only begin a long march through Hungary in the 
hope of being able to unite with the Russians in Moravia 
before Napoleon could join battle. 

The two Russian armies united at Wischau on November 
19. Napoleon had been valiantly delayed by Kutusoff's 
rear guard and was in no condition to force immediate issue. 
Before the end of the month, however, he had drawn in his 
various detachments, had several times tested the temper of 
his adversary in small preliminary skirmishes, and was 
ready for the combat which was to make or break his cam- 
paign. His army was inferior in numbers, but in every other 
way seemed more than a match for its opponent. On the 
last of November, he carefully reconnoitered the ground 
which promised to be the battle field. 

The field of Austerlitz slopes to the south, the little Gold- 
bach brook cutting it midway. At the northern end, the 
Brunn-Olmutz road runs east and west ; to the south, the 
Satschan lakes, fed by the Litawa River from the northeast, 
form the boundary. The west bank of the Goldbach is 
rolling, but the east bank rises to the Pratzen plateau, the 
dominating feature of the landscape. For reasons which 
follow, Napoleon avoided the plateau and massed his forces 
on the west bank of the stream. 

The Grand Army having advanced by way of Vienna, its 
communications naturally lay through that city. Napoleon, 
occupying the line of the Goldbach, lay almost parallel to the 
road to Vienna. "Could his right flank be turned," argued 
the allied strategists, "his communications would be lost 
and his army at our mercy." Accordingly, they planned to 
throw their weight against the Emperor's right wing. This 
was quite to Napoleon's liking, for he had arranged a new 
line of retreat westward through Prague, and was, therefore, 
not troubled by an attempt to cut him off from Vienna. On 
the contrary, he had an enormous advantage in knowing 



222 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

where the allies would strike. With this knowledge in mind, 
he concentrated his troops on his left, and held thinly the 
end of the line toward Satschan lake. 

A thick mist hid the field on the morning of December 2. 
Under cover of this the allies moved forward to the line of 
the Pratzen plateau, and when the "sun of Austerlitz" dis- 
pelled the fog, Buxhbwden's masses could be seen marching 
toward the lower ground to attack the weakly held end of 
Napoleon's line. By nine o'clock, Davout's corps and pail 
of Soult's were sharply engaged by the Russian columns 
which crowded together on the lower reaches of the Gold- 
bach. Sure of success, the allied commander had practically 
denuded the Pratzen plateau. Here was the moment for 
which Napoleon waited. Ordering forward his extreme left 
to hold in check the allied right, he launched the great mass 
in his center full on the Pratzen plateau. The troops re- 
maining there were helpless. After an hour of vain resist- 
ance, they were forced back toward Austerlitz, and left the 
plateau in possession of the French. Soult, who com- 
manded this assault, instantly turned to attack the flank and 
rear of the Russians who were engaged with Davout. The 
result was immediate. The Russians caught between the 
two bodies of the French fought braVely but hopelessly. 
Their line was shattered and by nightfall the remnants of 
the allied army were fleeing in so many directions that an 
effective pursuit was impossible. 

But there was no need. The victory was complete and of 
such a nature that Napoleon could dictate what terms he 
would. The Archdukes with all of Austria's remaining 
forces were far away in Hungary, and further resistance was 
out of the question. On December 4, 1805, the two 
Emperors met in Napoleon's tent to discuss the preliminaries 
of the treaty which should end the war. 



NAPOLEON VERSUS THE THIRD COALITION 223 

C. THE TREATY OF PRESSBURG 

The helpless Austrian Sovereign was forced to accept the 
terms at Napoleon's dictation. His army was scattered, his 
ally defeated and retreating, his resources exhausted. By 
the provisions of the final treaty, signed at Pressburg 
December 26, 1805, and duly ratified on New Year's Day, 
1806, Austria ceded to the new Kingdom of Italy all of 
Venetia, including Istria and Dalmatia (but not Trieste) ; 
gave up her territories in the Tyrol and Swabia for the ag- 
grandizement of Napoleon's German allies Bavaria, Baden, 
and Wiirtemburg ; and recognized the elevation of the 
electors of Bavaria and Wiirtemburg to the dignity of Kings. 
In signing and ratifying this treaty, the Austrian ruler and 
his government descended far into the valley of humiliation. 
He lost about 3,000,000 subjects and the source of about one 
sixth of the national revenue. 

One aftermath of Austerlitz and Pressburg deserves men- 
tion at this point. Pitt, Great Britain's great Prime Minis- 
ter, sank under the shock and died January 23, 1806. All 
his plans had gone for naught. One ally had signed a 
disastrous peace ; the shattered remains of the other's army 
were hastily retiring from the conflict. Pitt's last thoughts 
were of his country, from whom he was taken at what 
seemed its darkest hour. 

D. CHANGES IN ITALY AND CENTRAL EUROPE 

Prussian diplomacy during the war had been of the most 
selfish kind. Unable to divine what the result might be, 
Frederick William III had sought to assure the safety of his 
territories by advances to both sides. Thus, even while he 
had assured Napoleon of Prussia's neutrality, he was in 
constant communication with agents of the Czar Alexander, 
and actually signed a convention with him (November 3, 
1805) agreeing to assist in enforcing the terms of the Anglo- 
Russian coalition. His envoy was in Vienna awaiting the 



224 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

issue of Austerlitz to determine whether to go further with 
the Russian relations or to renounce them for an alliance with 
Napoleon. The battle of Austerlitz settled the question. 
Haugwitz (Prussian envoy) sought Napoleon at his head- 
quarters in order to conclude an alliance. 

Napoleon's secret service had kept him informed of Prus- 
sia's duplicity, and the Emperor reproached Haugwitz bit- 
terly for it. The practical advantages of alliance, however, 
were great, so that Napoleon did not let his feeling prevent 
the treaty. Using Hanover as a bait, and his victorious and 
mobilized armies as a menace, he enforced very advantageous 
terms upon Haugwitz. Prussia was to cede the duchies of 
Cleves, Neuchatel, and Anspach, and to guarantee all 
contemplated changes in Italy or in Germany ; and was to 
bind herself in a close offensive and defensive alliance with 
France. In return, Prussia received Hanover. The pre- 
liminary treaty containing these terms was signed December 
15, 1805 — eleven days before the treaty of Pressburg. The 
final treaty, containing a revised provision by which Prussia 
was to annex Hanover at once and to close the ports on the 
Elbe, Weser, and Ems Rivers to British commerce, was 
concluded February 15, 1806, at Paris. 

By his victory at Austerlitz and his treaty with Prussia, 
Napoleon became absolute arbiter of matters affecting Italy 
and Central Europe. Austria was prostrate ; Russia was 
defeated and distant ; Great Britain was impotent on land ; 
and Prussia had become an accomplice. 

His first move was against Naples. Upon the very date 
of the treaty of Pressburg, he announced his intention of 
''hurling that guilty woman" (Queen Caroline of Naples) 
from her throne. The small expeditionary forces of Russians 
and British in Naples were no match for the troops Napoleon 
could direct against them. In the face of Napoleon's threat, 
they embarked about the middle of January, 1806, the 
Russians for Corfu and the British for Messina (Sicily). The 
King and Queen of Naples fled to Palermo (Sicily) and estab- 



NAPOLEON VERSUS THE THIRD COALITION 225 

lished their court there. French troops entered Naples 
February 15, 1806, after slight resistance, and soon occupied 
the remainder of the peninsula. At the end of March, 
Joseph, Napoleon's brother, was proclaimed King of the Two 
Sicilies. 

During the same months, Napoleon was working upon the 
details of another cherished plan — to organize the states of 
western Germany into a new confederation from which the 
influence of Prussia and Austria would be wholly excluded. 
The task was not difficult, for, as has already been indicated, 
the chief great powers concerned were helpless, and the 
Rhine countries were bound to Napoleon by ties of fear and 
self-interest. Talleyrand, who was intrusted with the draw- 
ing up of the necessary articles and treaties worked rapidly 
under Napoleon's dictation. By the final treaty, signed at 
Saint-Cloud July 19, 1806, the Confederation of the Rhine 
was organized to consist of Bavaria, Baden, Wlirtemburg, 
Hesse-Darmstadt, Nassau, and several small states, with a 
central Diet of two chambers, or "Colleges," at Frankfort. 
The new Confederation acknowledged Napoleon as its 
"Protector," and at once signed a close offensive and defen- 
sive alliance with France. August 1, 1806, the representa- 
tives of the several states individually and collectively 
announced to the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire at Ratis- 
bon their withdrawal from the Empire. At the same time, 
Napoleon's envoy announced that Napoleon henceforth 
refused to acknowledge the existence of the Empire. August 
6, 1806, Francis of Austria accepted the inevitable, re- 
linquished his many inherited titles, and assumed the simple 
dignity of Emperor of Austria. Thus the old Germanic 
system, the Holy Roman Empire, came to an unlamented 
end. 

One other change Napoleon made during this same period. 
He again altered the constitution of Holland, making of it a 
kingdom and naming his brother Louis as King (June 5, 
1806). The Hollanders accepted the change with resigna- 



226 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

tion, as they had helplessly accepted previous arbitrary 
changes. Indeed, they had so long suffered from the ex- 
actions of the French that they in general cherished a hope 
that a royal government of their own might make their 
burdens lighter. 

Napoleon's successes and supremacy on the continent led 
him to hope that he might at last gain a favorable peace with 
his remaining enemies — Great Britain and Russia. To that 
end, he encouraged Talleyrand to open negotiations in the 
spring and summer of 1806. 

In Great Britain, Pitt's death had been followed by a 
coalition ministry, the "ministry of all the talents," with 
Grenville as Prime Minister, and Fox as Foreign Secretary. 
The desire for peace was real, but Fox had no intention of 
committing his country to a treaty on unfavorable terms. 
Curiously enough, the discussion turned chiefly upon the 
disposition of the island of Sicily, Napoleon demanding it as 
a part of Joseph's new kingdom, and Fox refusing to yield it. 
Before any compromise could be effected, Fox died (Septem- 
ber, 1806), and war with Prussia interrupted negotiations. 

Alexander of Russia, learning of the Anglo-French negotia- 
tions, feared a separate peace which would leave Russia 
without an ally. He therefore dispatched a special envoy to 
Paris, July 6, 1806, ostensibly to arrange for the transfer of 
prisoners, but really to look after Russian interests. Within 
a fortnight Talleyrand persuaded him of the advisability of 
peace, and packed him back to St. Petersburg with the draft 
of a treaty. Alexander, however, in close communion with 
Prussia and again inclined to rely upon Great Britain, 
repudiated his envoy's treaty, and these negotiations came 
to naught. 

Thus, in spite of his successes, Napoleon could not bring 
peace to his people. The reason lay, not in the obstinacy of 
his enemies, but in his own widening ambitions. This young 
Corsican, whose field had expanded successively from Toulon, 
from northern Italy, from Egypt, to France, now had visions 



NAPOLEON VERSUS THE THIRD COALITION 227 

of vaster projects. He saw all Europe brought to heel, 
himself an Emperor over Kings. His past successes were 
but the preliminary scenes to a far greater drama. He had 
saved France ; he had restored order and advanced prosperity 
in France ; he had increased the territories of France beyond 
the wildest dreams of his Bourbon predecessors ; he had sur- 
rounded France with a barrier of obsequious and independent 
states. Now his ideals passed far beyond the bounds of 
France. He would prove himself, not the mere successor 
of the Bourbon Kings in France, but the inheritor of Charle- 
magne's empire in Europe. Had he been content with 
France, he might have lived and died an Emperor, famous 
and beloved by his people and honored by contemporary 
sovereigns — but such a man would not have been Napoleon. 



CHAPTER X 

NAPOLEON VERSUS PRUSSIA 

The vacillating Frederick William III of Prussia con- 
tinued his policy of double-dealing in the effort to secure 
himself and his territories by diplomacy. His occupation of 
Hanover and closing of the Weser, Elbe, and Ems river-ports 
to British commerce had resulted in the seizure of some 400 
Prussian vessels in British waters and in a declaration of 
war by Great Britain (April, 1806). Furthermore, an in- 
creasingly strong patriotic party in Prussia, led by Prince 
Louis Ferdinand (nephew of Frederick the Great) and the 
beloved Queen Louisa was resenting the policy which 
made Prussia the mere tail to the French kite. Still under 
the influence of Haugwitz and Hardenberg, however, 
Frederick William was more worried about the effect of 
the French treaty upon Alexander of Russia than its effect 
upon Great Britain or the patriots at home. He had a 
wholesome fear of Russia, as he had of Napoleon. 

Shortly after the Paris treaty of February 15, 1806, there- 
fore, Frederick William sent word to Russia that he had no 
idea of attacking her ; that, in fact, he would not interpret 
his French alliance as binding him to offensive measures 
against Alexander. The Prussian overtures fell in with 
the Czar's plans. Alexander needed the assurance of 
Prussian neutrality. He therefore proposed a secret treaty 
to offset the Paris treaty. Frederick William, glad of the 
opportunity thus to secure himself against both his powerful 
neighbors, gladly welcomed negotiations. In the late spring 
of 1806 a convention was signed, pledging Prussia not to 
take part in any attack upon Russia, and to force French 

228 



NAPOLEON VERSUS PRUSSIA 229 

evacuation of Germany within three months, and pledging 
Russia to go to the aid of Prussia if Prussia were attacked. 

With the assurance of Russian support, Frederick William 
III was prepared to lean more to an independent Prussian 
policy and to resist French encroachments. At the same 
time, he hoped that the terms of his treaty with Napoleon 
were such as to prevent any such encroachments. His 
great awakening came suddenly when he learned (August 6, 
1800) that Napoleon in his negotiations with Fox had agreed 
to return Hanover to England. August 9, he appealed 
to the Czar for aid, and a few days later strove even to get 
in touch with the British ministry. At the same time he 
ordered the mobilization of part of the Prussian army. His 
change of attitude aroused the highest enthusiasm among 
the patriotic circles of the country. The thinking men who 
had felt the humiliation of Prussian diplomacy rejoiced 
at the opportunity to take an independent course and to 
revenge themselves for a long series of insults. 

When Napoleon first heard of the popular excitement in 
Berlin, he paid little attention to it. He knew that Austria 
could do nothing to help Prussia ; his agent in Turkey, 
Colonel Sebastiani (the same man who had rendered the 
Egyptian report the preceding year) had adroitly con- 
trived to involve Russia in a dispute with the Porte ; and 
Great Britain was, as always, impotent on land. Early 
in September, however, the gravity of the situation became 
apparent. September 12, 1800, he dispatched a note to 
Berlin concerning Prussian military preparations, implying 
that unless these were at once stopped the French armies 
would be put in motion. Frederick William III answered 
this note with an ultimatum September 20, 1800, demanding 
the immediate withdrawal of French troops from Germany 
and Napoleon's consent to the formation of a Confedera- 
tion of the North comprising the German states outside of the 
Confederation of the Rhine. Napoleon had already slipped 
out of Paris to join his armies, so that the ultimatum did 



230 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

not reach him until October 7. His only .answer was his 
appearance with his troops at the Prussian frontier. 

A. THE CAMPAIGN IN PRUSSIA 

The Prussian officers who fought the Republican armies 
in the wars of the First Coalition against France were 
aware of a change in the spirit of warfare. They knew that 
their adversaries had devised new rules for an old game, but 
they had retired from the war without having learned to 
adjust themselves to those rules. Now, in 180(5, the suc- 
cessor to that Republican army in Flanders, the Grand 
Army of France, hardened by years of campaigning and led 
by adepts at the new warfare was advancing to contend 
with the army of Prussia, grown old in the traditions of 
Frederick the Great. But the methods which under 
Frederick had served to make Prussia's army invincible, 
now served only to make it inflexible. 

Military historians unite in praising the excellence of 
discipline which existed in Frederick William's forces, but 
there commendation ceases. The tactics which prescribed 
the rigid line formations of fifty years before could not but 
spell disaster to troops which marched against the French 
skirmishers with the columns behind. And although the 
French had still to fight Friedland before they learned the 
full value of artillery in masses, they were nevertheless far 
more skillful in the use of this important arm than were the 
Prussians. Napoleon saw fit to warn his marshals es- 
pecially against the Prussian cavalry, for he thought it 
excellent, but at the same time he knew that it considered 
its existence justified if it resisted hostile cavalry charges. 
Its leaders knew nothing of handling it in the face of the new 
infantry tactics. In the matter of supply, the Prussians 
clung to a method, which if more certain in a long campaign, 
nevertheless limited their movements to the speed of the 
ration trains. They were not familiar with Napoleon's 
systems of requisitioning which enabled him to subsist on 



NAPOLEON VERSUS PRUSSIA 231 

the invaded country, but depended entirely upon supply 
magazines. One of their own writers remarks that often 
the Prussian troops went hungry in villages where subse- 
quently the French found food in abundance. Even with 
their magazines, transportation often failed, so thai equip- 
ment and clothing as well as food were often lacking. 

The deficiencies noted above did not exist in the Grand 
Army. The organization had been so perfected through 
experience in war, that Napoleon was able by the simplest 
orders to direct his forces as he wished. Perhaps the 
greatest point of difference in favor of the French lay in 
their superior officers. It was not only that the Prussian 
generals were old: they were often infirm. Opposed to 
them were a dozen or more brilliant young men between 
thirty and forty years of age. No greater contrast can 
appear than in a comparison of the commanders-in-chief. 
Brunswick was seventy-one and exhausted by a life of 
activity; Napoleon was thirty-eight and at the very height 
of his vigor. 

When Frederick William's ultimatum readied Napoleon, 
the French army was being thriftily subsisted at the expense 
of the new ally — the Confederation of the Rhine. The 
various corps were distributed at points along the Main 
River, facing the Thuringian Forest, beyond which lay the 
plains of Prussia. The army numbered about 190,000, 
was in excellent condition, and ready to move at a moment's 
notice. To oppose them, Brunswick could not muster 
more than 145,000, of which 20,000 belonged to Prussia's 
ally, Saxony. His army consisted of two parts, one under 
his own command and one under Prince Hohenlohe, both 
stationed in the country along the upper Saal River, east 
of the Thuringian Forest. The troops promised by the 
Czar had not yet left Russia. Indeed, they did not appear 
until after the campaign was finished. 

The logical line of defense for the "JSussians was the Elbe 
River. Here were their three fortresses of Magdeburg, 



232 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

Torgau, and Wittenberg, and here they might have waited in 
a position of strength the arrival of their allies from across the 
Vistula. But the fact that Dresden, the capital of their 
Saxon ally, would thus have been exposed to the direct 
attacks of Napoleon was a potent factor in determining a 
stand farther to the west. Moreover, the Prussian generals 
cherished the idea thai Napoleon's successes were due to 
the fact that he had always fought an offensive campaign. 
They reasoned that an aggressive enemy who would take 
the initiative would by that act alone bid fair to defeat 
the formidable Napoleon. Accordingly they dispersed their 
troops in the region surrounding Jena, and devised a plan 
which should throw the French at once on the defensive. 
The contemplated scheme proposed an advance through 
the defiles of the northern end of the Thuringian Forest, 
a concentration at a point on its western edge, and thence a 
determined push against the left wing of the French which 
should cut off from Mainz all of the Emperor's troops along 
the Main. This advance was actually begun, and the ad- 
vance guard of Brunswick's army entered the passes of the 
hills October 10, 1806. 

Meanwhile, Napoleon had entered upon the execution 
of a similar attack against the Prussian left, his plan being 
to pass the defiles of the southern end of the forest and if 
possible cut off his enemy from Dresden and the Elbe 
fortresses. His plan stood the better chance of success 
for the distance from the French right to the Prussian left 
was less than that from the Prussian right to the French 
left. In addition, the Emperor's units marched more 
rapidly than did Brunswick's and were consequently enabled 
to strike their blow more quickly. 

On October 9 and 10, 1806, while Brunswick's advance 
guard was entering the northern passes, the bulk of Na- 
poleon's army passed the southern defiles and crossed the 
Saal River. The left and center of his advance encountered 
portions of Hohenlohe's command and drove them back, 



NAPOLEON VERSUS PRUSSIA 233 

while at the same time the right gained control of the road 
to Dresden. In the two or three days following, the French 
lost contact with their enemy, but continued (heir advance 
until on the night of October 13, at which time the Emperor 
gained definite information as to the location of his adversary, 
two corps were close to Jena, three about fifteen miles east 
of that point, and two down I lie river near Naumburg. 
The cavalry had pushed ahead and on October 13, when it 
was called in, its leading elements had entered Leipsic. 

The Prussian commander was slow in arriving at the 
correct estimate of the situation. The defeat of Hohen- 
lohe's men warned him, however, that his own plan of 
attack against the French left was now no longer possible, 
and that he must look to his own communications. By 
the time he had ordered a concentration near Jena on Oc- 
tober 12, a great share of the damage was already done. 
The French controlled the road to Dresden and were closer 
to the routes to Torgau and Wittenberg than were the 
Prussians. There remained the road to Magdeburg, and this 
Brunswick felt he must retain at any cost. He planned, 
therefore, to hold the crossings of the Upper Saal at Jena 
and Naumburg while his army began its march to Magde- 
burg. Such a plan would keep Napoleon on the right bank 
of the Saal until the river was of sufficient size to be a pro- 
tection in itself. Accordingly he ordered Hohenlohe to 
Jena to hold the crossing there while he with the main army 
began the march down the Saal, intending himself to hold 
the crossing at Naumburg until the retreat was well under 
way. 

This, then, was the situation on the evening of October 13. 
Hohenlohe lay west of Jena, the river crossing itself being 
in the hands of the French. Near Jena lay the corps of 
Lannes and Augereau, while en route were the Guard, the 
corps of Soult and Ney, and Murat's cavalry. At Naum- 
burg were Davout and Bernadotte, the former under orders 
to march on Jena on the morning of October 14 by the left 



234 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

bank of the Saal, the latter to march by way of a less im- 
portant crossing at Dornburg, midway between Naumburg 
and Jena. Napoleon, thinking he had before him at Jena 
the entire Prussian army, planned a strong frontal attack 
which should presently be reinforced by Davout and Berna- 
dotte, attacking the flank and rear of the foe. In truth, 
only Hohenlohe lay at Jena, and, meanwhile, Brunswick 
was marching with the bulk of the Prussians on Naumburg 
and Davout, who with one corps was destined to meet the 
onslaught of twice his own numbers. 

In the night of October 13-14, the three corps from the 
east moved westward while Lannes occupied the heights 
of Jena on the left bank. Napoleon expected momentarily 
an attack while this one corps was isolated from the remainder 
of the army, but Hohenlohe lay quiet until morning. The 
French began the attack early, pushing eagerly forward 
to make room on the heights for their approaching reinforce- 
ments. Hohenlohe launched a counter-attack and for 
several hours his lines held. Then the preponderance of 
force on the French side told, and at two o'clock the Prus- 
sians fell back in complete rout. The timely arrival of 
General Riichel with reinforcements, allowed them a breath- 
ing space, but the French did not stop. At four o'clock a 
confused retreat became general. 

Meanwhile, Bernadotte and Davout moved out in the 
early morning, the former on Dornburg, the latter on Jena 
by way of Auerstadt. One division of Davout's corps had 
barely mounted the heights west of the stream, when it 
encountered the leading columns of Brunswick's main army. 
At once it deployed, and under the severest fire, fought 
determinedly until the remaining two divisions should 
come up and extend the line. In the early moments of 
the battle, Brunswick himself was fatally wounded and the 
command passed into incompetent hands. The Prussians 
came blindly on in close columns — a procedure which 
alone allowed Davout to hold his position. By mid-after- 



NAPOLEON VERSUS PRUSSIA 235 

noon, the Prussian situation was hopeless, and Frederick 
William, who was present, ignorant of Hohenlohe's disaster, 
ordered a retreat toward Jena. The fragments of the two 
defeated armies came together midway of the two battle 
fields and streamed away into the darkness with no semblance 
of order or command. 

Swiftly Napoleon followed up the advantage gained by 
Jena and Auerstadt. The two small armies which remained 
after the double disaster were pursued ceaselessly, until 
the one under Hohenlohe was captured at Prentzlau on 
October 26, and the other under Blueher surrendered on 
the Danish frontier, November 7. Meanwhile, Torgau 
and Wittenberg fell, Berlin was captured October 25, and 
Magdeburg capitulated November 8. The victors pushed 
rapidly on to the line of the Oder and before the end of 
November all Prussia lay at the Pmrperor's disposal. 

B. THE WINTER of 1806-1 SOT 

A fortnight after his victory at Auerstadt-Jena, Napoleon 
made his triumphant entry into Berlin (October 27, 1806). 
Within a month after he had entered the Prussian capital, 
every Prussian fortress west of the Oder River, except a 
few strongholds in Silesia, had opened its gates to the 
French. And Napoleon pushed his advantage by extend- 
ing his conquests beyond the territories of Prussia. Novem- 
ber 4, he deposed the Elector of Hesse-Cassel and occupied 
his territories. In the following weeks his soldiers took 
possession of Brunswick, Hanover, and Hamburg. And 
he forced Saxony, Saxe-Gotha, and Saxe- Weimar to pledge 
strict observance of neutrality. 

Immediately after the Auerstadt-Jena battle, Frederick 
William had appealed for peace, but Napoleon, who grasped 
the possibilities of his victory, haughtily replied that he 
hoped "to end the war sooner in Berlin than in Weimar." 
October 18 the Prussian King dispatched Count Lucchesini 
to Napoleon with full powers to enter upon negotiations. 



236 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

The terms submitted by Napoleon, comprising no less than 
the territory west of the Elbe, a guarantee that Prussia 
should not league herself with other German states against 
France, and 100,000,000 francs indemnity, were far more 
severe and humiliating than the Prussians had expected. 
Even these, however, Frederick William and his ministers 
were prepared to accept, but before Lucchesini could reach 
Napoleon, Napoleon had widened his vision of the extent 
of his victory and refused to do more than grant a sus- 
pension of hostilities on condition that the French were to 
occupy all of the country up to the Bug River, the fortress 
of Danzig, Kolberg, Thorn, and Graudenz, and that Fred- 
erick William was to order the Russians out of the country. 
The unhappy Prussian envoys signed terms on these lines 
November 16, 1806, but the King of Prussia, whose hopes 
had risen with the approach of the Russian armies, repudiated 
their act. A few days later at Grodno Frederick William 
and Alexander signed a solemn covenant of alliance and 
began preparations to recoup the Prussian losses. 

The measure of his success against Prussia encouraged 
Napoleon at this moment to try severer measures against 
his arch-enemy, Great Britain. His hatred of Great 
Britain was intense. He used all the manifold agencies at 
his command to arouse and keep at flame-heat indignation 
and hatred among the French for the British. He pro- 
claimed the European coalition against France to have 
been bought and continued by British gold. He described 
how the Russian army was subsidized by British subsidies. 
He pictured Great Britain as the common and eternal enemy 
of the European continent. Nevertheless, however much 
he might threaten vengeance, he was impotent against 
Great Britain. Great Britain had no armies on the conti- 
nent : Napoleon had no navies on the sea. In the realm in 
which he was master, therefore, Napoleon was given no 
opportunity of crushing Great Britain. 

He sought, however, to destroy Great Britain by a 



NAPOLEON VERSUS PRUSSIA 237 

different method, by an extension of his continental blockade. 
Could he ruin British commerce, he plausibly argued, Great 
Britain would soon be forced to sue for peace. He therefore 
promulgated, November 21, 1806, the famous Berlin de- 
cree, in which, after a preamble, asserting the crimes of 
Great Britain, he announced the blockade of his enemy, 
forbidding all commerce or communication with the British 
islands, and ordering the seizure of all British property in 
ports under French control. Great Britain, as was natural, 
retaliated in kind, declaring by Order in Council of Janu- 
ary 7, 1807, all the ports of France and of French colonies 
in a state of blockade and forbidding any ship to trade be- 
tween French ports, French colonial ports, and the ports of 
any of the countries within the French system. The rival 
decrees, of course, bore especially hard upon the neutrals. 
Among others, the merchant marine of the United States 
was practically wiped out. Though serious losses were 
occasioned to Great Britain by Napoleon's decree, these 
losses were in no way vital, and increased rather than 
lessened British determination to continue the war. The 
people of the continent suffered severely, however, from 
the British blockade, for they had long become accustomed 
to luxuries imported from the colonies. The sudden stop- 
page of colonial products was the ground for hardship and 
complaint. 

Napoleon's immediate problem, however, was to meet 
the military menace from Russia and the remains of the 
Prussian army along the Vistula. He did not, therefore, 
remain long in the conquered Prussian cities, but pushed 
forward into Poland. 

i. The Polish Campaign 

His goal was Warsaw, for he saw in the territory controlled 
by the Polish capital men and material in abundance to 
enable him to hold the new enemy on the Prussian frontier, 
and, if successful, to destroy the last remaining enemy on 



238 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

the continent. Accordingly, he dispatched Davout's corps 
to Warsaw by way of Posen. Behind him, all marching 
in a general way on Warsaw, came Augereau, Jerome (Na- 
poleon's brother), and Lannes. These constituted the first 
line and numbered about 80,000 men. Behind them came 
the second line, of about equal numbers, composed of the 
corps of Ney, Soult. Bernadotte, and Murat. Between 
France and the strategic frontier, the country swarmed with 
the new levies, French and allied, which Napoleon was 
hurrying forward. By November 27, the advance guards 
had encountered and driven back Russian detachments 
west of Warsaw, and on the following day entered the city 
without opposition. 

The allied armies consisted of one Prussian corps of 
15,000 under Lestocq — the last remaining fragment of 
Frederick the Great's army — and two Russian columns, 
one 55,000 strong under Bennigsen, the other, 35,000 in 
number, commanded by BuxhSwden. These three bodies 
were not as yet capable of cooperation, for when Davout 
appeared before Warsaw, Lestocq was at Thorn, Bennigsen 
at Warsaw, and Buxhowden on the Russian side of the old 
Polish frontier. Without attempting to dispute the cross- 
ing, Bennigsen withdrew from Warsaw and took up a posi- 
tion near Pultusk to await the second Russian army. 

The withdrawal was ill advised. He was joined by 
Buxhowden in less than three weeks, and, then, as the 
French still did not advance against him, he began to see 
that he had abandoned the river crossings too easily. He, 
therefore, began a forward movement in mid-December 
only to find Napoleon's troops across the river. The latter 
had been hampered by bad roads and inclement weather 
to such an extent that the crossings of the Vistula had 
occupied nearly a month. But when the Russian advance 
began, the French were prepared to resist it. 

On December 23, the Emperor directed an attack which 
involved movements from Thorn to Warsaw. Contact 



NAPOLEON VERSUS PRUSSIA 239 

was gained, but the Russians retired after an indecisive and 
ineffectual struggle. Napoleon was determined that some 
result should be reached and for this reason continued the 
forward movement. December 25, sharp engagements 
occurred at Pultusk and Golymin, but the Russian line with- 
drew without having been dangerously involved. The 
exasperated Kmperor was forced to content himself with 
this unsatisfactory solution, and to look upon the campaign 
as ended. The approach of winter and the exhausted state 
of the armies urged upon him a choice of winter quarters 
along the Vistula. He gave orders for the winter rest early 
in January, 1807. Meanwhile, the Russians remained 
mobilized near Johannisberg south of the Mazurian lakes. 

ii. Diplomacy 

Napoleon had taken measures during this Polish campaign 
to strengthen his position by raising up new enemies for 
his opponents. He found one ally in Turkey, whose Sultan 
had already been strongly influenced by the adroit French 
representative, Sebastiani. November 11, 1806, Napoleon 
wrote a letter to the Sultan, advising him of the French 
victory over the Prussians, stating that a French army of 
300,000 was relentlessly pursuing its enemies, and recom- 
mending that the Turkish army advance to the Dniester 
River while the French operated from the Vistula. Na- 
poleon's object, of course, was to force a division of the 
Russian strength. He was completely successful. The 
first sign of the Turkish advance was met by the dispatch 
of 80,000 Russian troops — troops which were sorely needed 
at Eylau and Friedland. 

Napoleon's other diplomatic opportunity was presented 
by the situation in what had been Poland. As soon as he 
reached Berlin, his secret agents were sent into Prussian 
and Russian Poland to encourage the people with hopes 
of freedom. November 19, 1806, he received in Berlin a 
Polish deputation from Posen and treated the members 



240 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

with marked distinction. After hearing their plea, he dis- 
missed them with the assurance that, as France had never 
recognized the partition of their country, he himself would 
be deeply interested in restoring its independence and re- 
constructing a kingdom along lines which would render it 
permanent. A week later, November 25, he himself went 
to Posen, entering the city under a huge arch inscribed 
''The Liberator of Poland." His arrival awakened the ut- 
most enthusiasm among the Poles, the practical evidence 
of which was the voluntary enlistment of 60,000 men for 
a national guard. 

iii. Campaign in East Prussia 

Alter he had put his troops in winter quarters, Napoleon 
himself, with the Imperial Guard, established his head- 
quarters in Warsaw. Though he unbent in the gayeties of 
the Polish metropolis, he accomplished a prodigious amount 
of work. lit" called upon the obsequious Senate in Paris 
for new French conscripts and provided for their organiza- 
tion, equipment, and drill. He caused the commissary 
and supply departments of his army to be thoroughly over- 
hauled and improved. On account of the barren country 
and poor villages, so different from the rich Italian country 
where his troops could live by pillage, he ordered the estab- 
lishment of immense provision and munition depots in the 
rear of his armies. He made detailed arrangements for 
the organization and training of the Polish contingent. 
He created and put into operation a government for Po- 
land, surmounting all difficulties by the sureness of his 
judgment and the prestige of his power. And with all these 
manifold duties he kept in close touch with affairs in his 
own capital, ordering and advising in every matter of 
policy. He was, indeed, at this period at the height of 
his mental and physical powers, and his capacity for work 
seemed boundless. 

His troops, however, war-weary though they were, could 




SKETCH MAP TO ILLUSTRATE 
CAMPAIGNS IN 

POLAND AND EAST PRUSSIA 
180« AND 1807 

SCALE OF MILES 



NArOLEON VERSUS PRUSSIA 241 

not be allowed their needed rest in their winter quarters. 
January 27, 1807, Napoleon was compelled to issue orders 
for a concentration. The Emperor was unwilling to renew 
the war so soon, but circumstances forced him to remold 
his plans. Marshal Ney, who was subsisting his troops 
in the sector northeast of Thorn, found the country barren 
of supplies. Pushing farther and farther toward the Alle 
River without encountering resistance, he conceived the 
idea of making a flying attack on the temporary Prussian 
capital, Konigsberg. At Bartenstein, he was cheeked by 
Lestocq, January 15. Apprised by couriers that the Em- 
peror was infuriated by this unwarranted activity, Ney 
withdrew to his original station. He was just in time, 
for Bennigsen, having learned of Ney's isolated position, 
had started his entire army to the northwest, intending 
to cut off the intrepid marshal and destroy him. In this 
immediate object he failed, since Ney had withdrawn as 
we have seen, but he continued his advance, encountered 
Bernadotte in the sector just north of Ney, and forced him 
to fall back nearly to the Vistula. 

It was this last circumstance which had determined 
Napoleon to renew the campaign in the dead of winter. 
His marshals formed their corps hastily, and began the 
laborious march northward. The Emperor hoped to en- 
counter his enemy near Joukendorf, where he knew Bennig- 
sen had concentrated; but when his forces arrived, it was 
only to find that the Russians had retired northward. He 
did, however, succeed in forcing Ney's corps between 
Bennigsen and Lestocq, and prevented their union until 
the battle of Eylau. The remainder of his army pursued 
Bennigsen, always hoping to overtake the foe, arriving at 
a place only to find that the Russians had vacated it. The 
pursuit, begun February 4, was short but exhausting. The 
cold was intense, and I lie troops suffered incredibly. Only 
the ingrained Russian discipline kept Bennigsen's army on 
the march; only the Emperor's iron will kept up the pur- 



242 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

suit. The losses from cold, exhaustion, and disease in 
that terrible five days' march have never been accurately 
determined, so that it is not known what numbers faced 
each other when the Russians turned on their pursuers. 

Napoleon's army was not all present when the action 
began. Bernadotte was far to the rear — so far that he 
took no part in the battle ; Davout was several miles away 
on the right, having followed a different route ; and Ney 
was well to the left, pursuing Lestocq. The Emperor in- 
formed the two latter marshals of his plans, and ordered 
their support, but at the moment when the engagement 
was precipitated by the Russians, Davout had only begun 
his march toward the field, and Ney had not been heard 
from. 

A heavy cannonade in the early morning of February 8 
opened the battle. Napoleon planned to advance by his 
center corps — that of Augereau — which should be sus- 
tained by a holding attack on the left, and supported by 
an envelopment of the enemy's left flank by Davout. The 
movement was begun in a blinding snowstorm, and Auge- 
reau, advancing through the confusion, lost his direction 
and came full on the massed artillery in the hostile center. 
The enemy's batteries opened on the battalions at less 
than a hundred yards, and practically annihilated the whole 
corps. Indeed, it ceased to exist as a separate unit from 
that time. The Russian counter-attack was repulsed by 
Bessieres in command of the Imperial Guard, in time to 
drive the attacking Russians back into Davout's enveloping 
maneuver which now began to manifest itself. With 
skillful strokes, Davout advanced from position to position 
until by four o'clock he was behind the center of the Russian 
line. 

Help was to come to Bennigsen from his other flank. 
Lestocq, in command of the Prussian corps, had successfully 
evaded Ney by a brilliant flank march and in the late after- 
noon appeared in time to check the victorious Davout. 



NAPOLEON VERSUS PRUSSIA 243 

Night fell with the battle undetermined, with the French 
holding advanced positions, but with the allies complete 
masters of their lines of retreat. The Emperor had lost 
heavily, and he contemplated his situation with misgivings. 
In the night, however, Bennigsen's courage failed him, and 
he slipped away, leaving the French in possession of the 
field. Napoleon, greatly relieved, ordered a pursuit, but 
the weather was such that he soon abandoned it. 

iv. Diplomatic Maneuvers 

After the bloody and indecisive battle of Eylau Febru- 
ary 8, 1807, Napoleon made direct advances to Frederick 
William of Prussia for peace. Frederick William's spirits 
had risen, however, at the amount of resistance the Russians 
had been able to offer, and he rejected Napoleon's overture's. 
A few weeks later the Prussian and Russian sovereigns 
renewed their pledges in the Treaty of Bartenstein (April 26, 
1807), and bound themselves also to request the adhesion 
of Great Britain, Sweden, Austria, and Denmark to a great 
Coalition of Liberation, whose object should be to drive 
Napoleon out of Germany and Italy. 

At the same time Napoleon again approached Austria 
in the endeavor to involve her with the French in an alliance 
against Russia and Prussia. In the Austrian court at the 
same time were envoys from both Russia and Prussia 
trying to influence Francis for their cause. Though Silesia, 
the bait offered by Napoleon, was most tempting, and 
though the reward of success in case an Austro-Prussian- 
Russian alliance should overthrow Napoleon would be great, 
the Austrian government had suffered too heavily to take 
up arms again at once. Francis resisted the appeals from 
both belligerents. As a matter of fact, this neutrality was 
of immense value to Napoleon, for an attack by Austria 
upon his communications and his flank would at this time 
have been disastrous. lie obtained, therefore, all that 
he had any reason to expect. 



244 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

In a more distant quarter he had still further success. 
The Turkish campaign against Russia had languished be- 
cause of the inefficiency and treacherous intrigues of the 
Turkish commanders. And still farther east, his negotia- 
tions with the Shah of Persia had not been brought to a 
satisfactory conclusion. With t he beginning of the new year, 
however, conditions look a turn for the better. Napoleon's 
emissaries infused new life into the Turkish campaign, 
causing the Czar to send reinforcements to his armies in 
the Danube region. And the French Emperor concluded 
a treaty with the Shah by which Napoleon guaranteed to 
compel the Russians to evacuate the province of Georgia 
and the Shah pledged himself to take the offensive against 
the British in India. 

v. The Campaign in East Prussia {continued). Friedland 

In the few days following the battle of Eylau Napoleon 
withdrew to the general line of the Passarge River and set 
about his preparations for the activities which he knew 
would come with spring. The chief of these was the siege 
of Dantzig — an operation undertaken in order that a new 
and shorter line of supply might be established through 
the productive province's of north Prussia to replace that 
through Poland. The siege was brought to a successful 
conclusion by the surrender of the fortress on May 26, 
1807, and the Emperor was left free to turn his attention 
to his enemy in the field. He had recruited his forces until 
he was ready to oppose the allied 02,000 men with an army 
of nearly 150,000. He had behind him 30,000 more in 
the north German lowlands, and Massena with 25,000 
opposing a single Russian corps in Poland. 

Bennigsen forestalled any possible French advance by 
an attack along the Passarge begun in the early days of 
June, 1807. A few minor successes speedily faded from 
view, for Napoleon concentrated for a counter-attack, and 
the Russian advance became a precipitous retreat. The 



BATTLE OF 

FRIEDLAND 




NAPOLEON VERSUS PRUSSIA 245 

allied commander had committed the error of dividing his 
forces. 20,000 of his scanty numbers under Lestocq were 
on the lower Passarge where they could be opposed by a 
single corps under Victor. They began their retirement 
simultaneously with Bennigsen, but Napoleon's advance 
was such that he pushed the two forces farther and farther 
apart. In this advance, the French encountered one severe 
check at Heilsberg where Bennigsen had constructed an 
entrenched camp. A full 10,000 was the price they paid 
for the Russian evacuation, but in the end they saw their 
foe in full retreat down the right bank of the Alle. 

Napoleon's plan contemplated an attack on the allied 
right wing which would cut off his opponent from Kbnigs- 
berg and force him across the Niemen. Accordingly, when 
he learned of Bennigsen's retreat from Heilsberg, he hurried 
across country through Eylau to prevent the allied armies 
from entering the Prussian capital. He was too late to 
prevent Lestocq's corps from entering the city, but he put 
his army across Bennigsen's shortest route to Konigsberg. 
The latter, who had meanwhile lost touch with the French, 
determined to cross the Alle at Friedland, and make at 
once for Lestocq and the city. Napoleon, learning of this 
on the night of June 13, was enabled so to move his troops 
that the following day they won for him the great victory 
of Friedland. 

In the early morning of June 14, Bennigsen was opposed 
at Friedland by a single French corps, but his crossing was 
slow, and before he was prepared to advance, other French 
divisions had arrived, and he was forced to take up a de- 
fensive line. A scattering fight was waged all day, during 
which the French were continually being enforced, until 
by late afternoon the Emperor was able to put into execu- 
tion his real attack. This provided for an assault on the 
Russian left wing by Ney, while the remainder of the line 
engaged in a strong holding attack. The Russians rallied 
bravely to the shock of Ney's assault, repulsed it sharply, 



246 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

and caused the Emperor to send heavy reinforcements. 
The second attempt forced the Russian left into the very 
streets of Friedland where the havoc wrought by the French 
massed artillery was frightful. The bridges, crowded by 
the Russian infantry, were set afire and became impassable. 
Meanwhile, the Russian right had become demoralized 
before the sturdy French holding attack and was being 
sharply pressed back to the river bank. The French cavalry 
under Grouchy, which might have made the victory com- 
plete, was inexcusably inactive, and the Russian artillery 
gallantly held the stream's edge while great masses of the 
infantry swam and forded the Alle below Friedland. 

But though a large portion of the Russians escaped, it 
was not as organized units, for the right bank of the Alle 
was crowded with fugitives fleeing to cross the Niemen. 
Lestocq, when he learned of the disaster, abandoned Konigs- 
berg and did his best to rally the fragments of Bennigsen's 
command, but the attempt was vain. The Russian army 
had been too roughly handled, and Lestocq was forced, 
when Napoleon appeared on the Niemen, to give up the 
struggle, and with it, Prussia's last hope of freedom. 

C. THE TREATY OF TILSIT 

The victory of the French at Friedland disheartened the 
Czar. The Russian generals urged him to treat with the 
French conqueror. Alexander was forced to yield to their 
entreaties. June 22, 1807, he arranged an armistice, ad- 
vising the Prussians to follow his example. The next day 
Frederick William acted in accordance with this advice. 
June 25, 1807, a personal interview between Napoleon and 
Alexander was held on a huge raft, moored in the middle of 
the Niemen River. 

What took place in this first meeting of the sovereigns 
is unknown. Alexander, however, was in a mood to come 
to terms of peace. He had been bitterly disappointed by 
the lack of assistance from Great Britain. He was face to 



NAPOLEON VERSUS PRUSSIA 247 

face with a strong mutinous element among the officers 
of the Russian army, who condemned this war "for foreign 
interests." It has been said that Alexander's first remark 
was: "I hate the English as much as you do, and I will 
second you in all your actions against them;" and that 
Napoleon at once responded: "In that case all can be 
arranged and peace is made." Certain it is that Napoleon's 
personal fascination was exercised to good effect upon the 
young Russian Czar. "I never had more prejudices against 
any one than against him," said Alexander afterwards, "but 
after three quarters of an hour of conversation, they all 
disappeared like a dream." 

After two meetings on the raft, the monarchs met there- 
after in the town of Tilsit, a section of which had been 
temporarily neutralized for the purpose. Frederick William 
met them, but Napoleon treated him coldly and discourte- 
ously, accusing him of being responsible for the war and 
paying little attention to his interests. Indeed, Napoleon 
accepted his presence, not in the character of sovereign, 
but in that of a protege of the Czar. In the midst of the 
negotiations, word came that the Sultan of Turkey, with 
whom Napoleon had been allied, had been deposed. No 
event could have suited Napoleon's purposes better. He 
realized well the ambitions of Alexander for Constantinople. 
He had no scruples against arranging for a partition of the 
country which had been his ally. He is said to have ex- 
claimed to Alexander upon receipt of the news: "It is a 
decree of Providence which tells me that the Turkish Em- 
pire can no longer exist." Certainly, Napoleon now had 
something definite to offer the Czar in return for what he 
desired for France and his own ends. 

In the negotiations that followed, Prussia suffered severely. 
Neither the arguments of the Czar nor the entreaties of 
the beautiful Prussian Queen Louisa could move Napoleon 
to spare Prussia. In the final treaty, the Treaty of Tilsit, 
signed July 7, 1807, Prussia was given back Silesia out of 



248 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

deference to the wishes of the Czar, but her territories were 
restricted to those former territories between the Elbe and 
the Niemen Rivers. The Polish lands seized by Prussia in 
the second and third partitions were constituted into a 
new state, the Duchy of Warsaw, of which the King of 
Saxony was made sovereign. Dantzig was made a free 
city under the joint protection of the King of Prussia and 
the Czar of Russia. Prussia was thus dismembered and 
weakened. 

By the terms of the treaty, Alexander recognized the 
changes made in Naples, Holland, and Germany, including 
the creation of the Kingdom of Westphalia for Napoleon's 
brother, Jerome, out of the Prussian territories west of the 
Rhine. He further agreed to accept Napoleon's mediation 
between Russia and Turkey, and to withdraw Russian troops 
from the Danubian provinces as soon as a Russo-Turkish 
peace was reached. 

Added to the above public terms of treaty was provision 
for a close offensive and defensive alliance in a convention 
signed the same day. By the terms of this alliance, both 
sovereigns pledged themselves to make common cause in 
any war either might undertake against any European 
power. The Czar agreed to make war upon Great Britain 
if she did not accept his mediation between France and 
Great Britain. Napoleon agreed to help Russia drive the 
Turks from Europe, if the Porte did not accept his mediation 
between Russia and Turkey. 

Two days later, July 9, 1807, a treaty of peace was signed 
with Prussia, its terms being the same as those outlined in 
the treaty with Russia. In addition, Prussia was forced 
to join the continental blockade against Great Britain and, 
in case Great Britain failed to come to terms, to join France 
and Russia in war. 

Shortly after the Peace of Tilsit was signed, Napoleon 
returned to Paris, stopping en route at Dresden to visit 
his ally the King of Saxony. He arrived in Paris, July 27, 



NAPOLEON VERSUS PRUSSIA 249 

1807, after an absence from his capital of ten months. His 
troops were gradually withdrawn from Prussia and dis- 
posed among (he stales of the Confederation of the Rhine. 
His diplomacy was now directed solely to injuring his one 
implacable enemy, Great Britain. 



CHAPTER XI 

THE DUEL WITH GREAT BRITAIN 

Afteb his successive victories over Austria, Prussia, and 
Russia, Napoleon was encouraged to believe thai he could 
subdue his last important enemy, Greal Britain. He was 
unable, it is true, to meet the British naval power or to 
break the strict blockade it maintained on French ports: 
but, on the other hand, Greal Britain was equally unable to 
meet his troops on land, and accurate reports represented her 
industry and commerce as suffering intensely from his 
limitation of her continental markets. Indeed, as he esti- 
mated the situation, France was, after the Treaty of Tilsit, 
in the more favorable position. Greal Britain had put forth 
her full effort in the blockade: she could injure France no 
further. The conquest of Prussia and the alliance with 
Russia gave to France new weapons. Napoleon could look 
forward with confidence to barring the British from access 
to any part of the continent. His plans, then, from this 
moment onward depended wholly upon the single end of the 
defeat of Greal Britain. His decrees, his annexations, his 
wars and campaigns were all executed with the single object 
of stopping up every gap on the continent. Success in his 
duel with Great Britain became the key to all his policies. 

A. THE CONTINENTAL BLOCKADE 

The first measure in his plan for a continental blockade 
against British commerce was taken in the issuance of the 
Berlin Decree (November 21, L806). By this, as we have 
mentioned, he forbade all commerce or communication with 
the British islands, and ordered the seizure of British goods 
in ports under French control. He forwarded this Decree 

250 



I HE DUEL WITH GREAT BRITAIN 251 

to the governments of Spain, Naples, Holland, and Etruria 
(Tuscany), and expected them in loyalty to the Hose bonds 
be1 ween them :ni<l France to comply with its provisions. II< 
looked forward to forcing the observance of this decree upon 
every state with which lie preserved amicable rein I ions. 

Greal Britain, of course, could not supinely disregard 
such ;i sweeping decree as thai Napoleon issued from Berlin. 
Her answer was in an Order in Council of January 7, 1S07, 
proclaiming thai any ship trading between two ports from 
which British ships were excluded should after due warning 
be regarded as lawful prize. This stroke was intended to 
prevent neutral commerce from reaching France. The 
British governmenl followed this measure a1 the end of the 
year by another Order in Council (November 11, 1807) pro- 
claiming that ports whence British ships and goods were 

excluded should be subject to all the restrictions of actual 
blockade; that all trade in articles produced by countries 
excluding British ships and goods was to l>e prohibited; and 
thai all ships indulging in such trade were to l»e regarded 
as lawful prize. These Orders in Council were intended to 
do two things: (1) to prevent trade with France; and ( L l) lo 
prevent other slates from observing Napoleon's decrees. 
The deadly efficiency of the British navy made the Orders in 
Council a frightful menace to neutral shipping. 

Napoleon's response to the British measures was by the 
Warsaw Decree (January 25, 1 SOT) in which he directed the 
confiscation of all British merchandise in the Hanseatic 
cities; and by the greal Milan Decree December 17, 1807, in 
which he proclaimed that all ships submitting to the British 
Orders, and any ship sailing from a British harbor or from a 
country occupied by British troops, would he regarded ;i-> 
lawful prize subject to capture by the French. Thus, the 
British navy tried to catch neutral ships at sea, and the 
French officials seized them when they came lo port. 
Neutral commerce was paralyzed by such sweeping acts of 
the belligerents. 



252 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

Napoleon's decrees were by no means the mere "paper 
blockade" they might seem, for he accompanied them with 
an extension of his power until he had actually stopped access 
to the continent for British goods. His Treaty of Tilsit had 
secured Russia and Prussia ; his alliances guaranteed Holland, 
Spain, Etruria (Tuscany), and northern Italy. There 
remained only Denmark, Portugal, Austria, and Sweden. 
Beginning immediately after the Treaty of Tilsit, he put 
pressure upon these states until he brought them one by one 
into his system. 

In July, 1807, Napoleon invited the Danish government to 
make its choice between friendship with Great Britain and 
friendship with France. Denmark's position was difficult. 
War against Great Britain would expose her thriving com- 
merce to destruction : war with France would probably result 
in her extinction : and neither France nor Great Britain was 
disposed longer to tolerate her neutrality. The Danish gov- 
ernment's final decision was determined by Great Britain's 
action. The British government, learning of Napoleon's 
intentions toward Denmark, decided to forestall him. It 
therefore ordered a fleet and expeditionary force to Copen- 
hagen to offer alliance, and in the event of refusal to cripple 
the Danish offensive power. This fleet arrived off Copen- 
hagen August 3, 1807. As was expected, its offer of alliance 
was refused. The expeditionary force was landed and guns 
placed for the bombardment of the city. September 2, 1807, 
the bombardment began. Five days later the Danes yielded, 
surrendering their fleet, and the British seized eighteen ships 
of the line, ten frigates, and forty-two smaller vessels. Den- 
mark, of course, formally declared war upon Great Britain, 
and joined whole-heartedly Napoleon's alliance. Napoleon 
thus gained his purpose, but keenly regretted the loss of a 
navy which would have strengthened him offensively. 

At the same time he was pressing Denmark, Napoleon 
was acting against Portugal, another gap in his continental 
blockade. July 19, 1807, he instructed Talleyrand to warn 



THE DUEL WITH GREAT BRITAIN 253 

the Portuguese ambassador that Portugal must close its har- 
bors to British trade and seize British goods by September 1 
on penalty of war. Like Denmark, Portugal, not allowed to 
maintain neutrality, was sure to lose with whichever bel- 
ligerent she cast her fortunes. Napoleon expected her 
refusal and consequently signed a secret convention with 
Spain at Fontainebleau October 27, 1807, providing for 
military cooperation and the ultimate partition of Portugal. 
Even before this convention was signed, a flying column un- 
der Junot entered Spain (October 19, 1807) and marched rap- 
idly toward Lisbon. The Portuguese government, recogniz- 
ing the futility of resistance, prepared to flee. November 29, 
1807, the entire court, with the national archives and the 
state treasure, set sail for Brazil under protection of the Brit- 
ish fleet. The following day Junot's advance guard came in 
sight of Lisbon, almost in time to see the retiring ships. 
Lisbon fell, and Portugal was closed to British commerce ; 
but Napoleon felt again that one of the chief advantages of 
his policy had been lost by the escape of the court and the 
treasure. 

Though Austria, with her single port of Trieste, could 
hardly be called one of the important trading countries, the 
moral advantage of her adhesion to the continental system 
was great. Napoleon sought, therefore, to bring his influence 
to bear upon her government. By a convention signed at 
Fontainebleau October 11, 1807, all outstanding issues, 
especially those concerning boundaries in Illyria and Dal- 
matia, were settled, and Austria undertook to offer her 
mediation to the British government with a view to Anglo- 
French peace. When the British refused firmly such media- 
tion, the Austrian ambassador withdrew from London. 
February 28, 1808, Austria accepted the principles of the 
continental blockade. This triumph for Napoleon was 
marred by no disaster. Indeed, he had hopes at the time 
of a close alliance with Austria to further French ambitions. 

The pressure upon Sweden was exerted by Russia. Febru- 



254 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

ary 10, 1808, Alexander demanded that Sweden withdraw 
from her alliance with Great Britain. Upon Sweden's 
refusal, Russian troops poured into Finland and in a quick 
campaign subjugated the country. June 17, 1808, Alexander 
endeavored to make his conquest agreeable to the Finns by 
promising them the enjoyment of their ancient rights and the 
convocation of their Diet. In November, 1808, Sweden 
accepted a truce, acknowledging I lie Russian occupation of 
Finland. Not until over a year later, however, after the 
abdication of the irreconcilable Swedish King Gustavus IV, 
did Sweden enter the continental system (January G, 1810). 
Two other small possible gaps in the coast line Napoleon 
closed by outright annexation. The small Kingdom of 
Etruria (Tuscany, chief city Florence) had not been governed 
with the efficiency Napoleon expected. lie therefore 
annexed it by decree May 30, 1808. To the south, the Pope 
had been sullenly hostile to Napoleon, even after the con- 
clusion of the Concordat of 1801. Napoleon dealt with him 
arbitrarily. After detaching the northeastern papal prov- 
inces, known as the Marches, and adding them to the 
Kingdom of Italy (April, 1808) he annexed Rome and the 
adjoining provinces, May 17, 1809. 

B. EFFECT OF NAPOLEON'S POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC MEASURES 

Upon Great Britain, the closing of commercial op- 
portunities in country after country naturally produced the 
keenest effect. Gold went to a premium. The price of 
necessities, especially grain, rose to unprecedented heights. 
Great merchant houses went into bankruptcy. The poor 
people suffered intensely. So far as the government was 
concerned, however, the determination to carry the war 
through to a successful conclusion remained unshaken. Fox 
had died in September, 1800, and his "Ministry of all the 
Talents" had been succeeded in March, 1807, by a Tory 
ministry under the Duke of Portland. It was this ministry 



THE DUEL WITH GREAT BRITAIN 255 

which projected the attack upon neutral Denmark (August- 
September, 1807), which refused Austrian mediation lot- 
peace (October, 1807-February, 1808), which first saw the 
light of possible ultimate success in the Spanish uprising and 
the fighting of British expeditionary troops in Portugal and 
Spain in 1808 and 1809. The Portland government showed 
little energy or capacity in domestic affairs, but it remained 
firm against Napoleon's system. 

Upon the continent, Napoleon's exactions were at this 
time rapidly arousing new enemies and putting fresh life into 
old ones. In his efforts to ruin Great Britain, he over- 
reached himself and awakened national forces whose strength 
he utterly failed to appreciate. In dealing with the princes 
and princedoms, he ceased to take into account the inherent 
patriotism of peoples. 

It was in Spain that his arbitrary policies met their first 
decidedly popular check. The Spanish government had 
been his ally from the beginning of the war. It had actually 
in October, 1807, by the Convention of Fontainebleau bound 
itself more rigidly to alliance in the hope of sharing in the 
partition of Portugal. The Spanish people had welcomed 
Junot's soldiers in their march to Lisbon, and. though sur- 
prised, had not at first resisted the later French detachments 
which established themselves at strategic points throughout 
northern Spain. Resentment at the presence of these 
foreign troops on Spanish soil suddenly blazed forth in a 
demonstration against the King and the Prime Minister, 
Godoy, March 19, 1808 The King, Charles IV, resigned in 
fright and his son Ferdinand assumed t he crown . A few weeks 
later the French Emperor induced the whole royal family 
to meet him at Bayonne (in French territory), and there 
extracted from Ferdinand the restoration of the crown to his 
father, and from Charles IV a resignation of all his rights into 
the hands of Napoleon, as the only person able to restore 
order (May 6, 1808). Napoleon thereupon designated his 
brother Joseph as King of Spain, sending Murat to take the 



256 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

throne of Naples. Joseph went to Spain in June, 1808, to 
assume his new but dangerous honors. 

When information of these political changes was given out 
in Spain, the country broke into spontaneous revolution. 
However inefficient their sovereigns had been, they were still 
of Spanish blood and traditions. The people were en- 
thusiastically loyal. Though they were without organiza- 
tion, without capable leaders, and without adequate equip- 
ment, they prepared by guerrilla warfare to harass the French 
armies. They gave to the world the first example of what 
could be effected against the French conqueror by a truly 
national uprising. 

To the east, the humiliation of Prussia by Napoleon had 
engendered a new patriotism which revealed itself, not in a 
spectacular uprising, but in the laborious reorganization of 
the country's institutions. Prussia, under the lead of Stein, 
Scharnhorst, and their colleagues, began to fit herself to put 
forward her utmost strength when the time came for her to 
strike. The disasters of the war had shown the need of 
general reformation. Stein, who entered office as Minister 
of War October 5, 1807, had the energy and ability to carry 
through this reformation. The initial measure was the 
abolition of serfdom in Prussia by edict of October 9, 1807. 
By thus abolishing all personal servitude and permitting all 
persons to engage in any calling, Stein at a stroke brought the 
social structure of Prussia into a line legally with that of her 
progressive neighbors, and won for the government a new 
kind of allegiance from the mass of the people. Stein 
accompanied this social reform by his support of the plan for 
a reorganization of the army suggested by Scharnhorst. 
According to this plan, the principle of universal service was 
to be adopted, a short term of service with the colors required, 
and a term in the Reserve when a man would be called upon 
only in the event of war. The standing army of Prussia would 
be only 40,000, but by means of assigning trained men to the 
Reserve and continually calling new levies to the colors, a 



THE DUEL WITH GREAT BRITAIN 257 

large number of soldiers were kepi ready for military duty at 
short notice. The system thus suggested l>y Scharnhorst 
and adopted remained the practice of Prussia and of modern 
Germany. A third great reform projected by Stein, but 
never fully carried out, was I he establishment of I lie founda- 
tions of representative liberal government, including a 
parliament and local elected bodies. The opposition on 1 1m- 
part of the old nobility drove Stein from power (December, 
1808) before lie had been able to do more than introduce the 
rudiments of local self-government. Such measures as these 
mentioned encouraged a new spirit among the Prussian 
people. Once the instinct of patriotism was aroused, its 
development was fostered under the new institutions. 

In Austria, too, the government prepared to rely upon an 
awakened patriot ism to withstand Napoleon. As in the 
case of Prussia, the severity of Napoleon in his hour of victory 
actually gave birth to a new spirit in the defeated nation. 
The Austrian humiliation at the terms of the Treaty of Press- 
burg and at the enforced entry of the government into the 
continental system early in 1808 inspired the people to re- 
deem themselves. The Emperor Francis gave them their 
opportunity by ordering (June 0, 1808) the establishment of 
a national Landwehr, an army to include all able-bodied men 
from eighteen to twenty-five years old. 'the people re- 
sponded to this law with the greatest enthusiasm, enrolling 
themselves eagerly in the new Landwehr and looking forward 
with confidence to the struggle. 

The persistence of Great Britain, the signs of awakening 
national life in Prussia, the formation of the new Landwehr in 
Austria, and the very embarrassing revolt in Spain led Napo- 
leon to desire a new conference with Alexander of Russia, his 
one great ally. The shifting political situation made a full 
understanding between the two sovereigns advisable. The 
conference was arranged for the end of September, 1808, in 
the little Thuringian town of Erfurt. There the Czar and 
the Emperor met September 27 and remained together until 



258 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

October 12, 1808. The conditions, however, were much 
changed since Tilsit. At Tilsit Napoleon was supreme. At 

Erfurt, the Czar held the advantage of position, for Napo- 
leon sorely needed the Czar's guarantee to keep in check the 
threatening Austria and Prussia while the French armies 
were engaged in Spain. Of the discussions we know little. 
Much time was taken up with the eastern question, where 
the Czar wanted a free hand even so far as the seizure of 
Constantinople, and by Napoleon's desire to make a joint 
Franco-Russian demand upon Austria to disarm. The final 
convention, signed October 12, 1S0S, was a compromise. 
Napoleon consented reluctantly to Russian acquisition of the 
Turkish provinces of Moldavia ami Wallachia, acknowledged 
the Russian control over Finland, and received the Czar's 
pledge to come to his assistance in case Austria attacked 
France. Napoleon had to be content with these terms, and 
hurried from Erfurt to direct his campaign in Spain. 

C. THE PENINSULAR WAR 

The Peninsular War does not admit of a casual survey as 
readily as do Napoleon's other campaigns. The definite 
shock of army against army ending in decisive victory or 
defeat is missing here. This is partly because the Emperor 
himself was unable to give his whole attention to Spain, 
and partly because the war dragged out its unsatisfactory 
course for five years. There were sharp conflicts between the 
opponents, but they were not decisive lor the reason that the 
contestants, British and French, were fighting over the 
territory of a third nation, the Spanish, and there could never 
be added to the strategic value of any operation that political 
gravity which so influences the scale when one belligerent is 
defending its own domain. Nevertheless, the war can be 
divided into phases sufficiently definite to give an under- 
standing of the military situations. The two phases which 
concern us now are that of Junot in Portugal and that of the 
Emperor in Spain. 



THE DUEL WITH GREAT HKITAIN 25!) 

The situation in Spain was a confused one. To meet the 
growing national rising the French troops wen- scattered 
throughout the Peninsula. In the beginning they were every- 
where successful againsl the ragged nationalists, arid by 
July, 1808, they were occupying the provinces of Navarre, 
Aragon, Catalonia, and the Castiles, holding, among others, 
the cities of Madrid and Toledo. Then disaster fell sud- 
denly upon them. Dupont, marching into Andalusia, was 
defeated after he had captured Cordova, and was Forced to 
surrender at Baylen his entire force of 20,000. A little 
earlier, Moncey had been repulsed in an attempt to storm 
Valencia. The Spanish general, Palafox, had held the 
French helpless before SaragOSSa, and on the Mediterranean 
another force had blockaded 14,000 French in Barcelona. 
All this the Spanish had accomplished acting alone, and now, 
early in August, came news of 25,000 English landing at 
various points in Spain and Portugal. King Joseph, with 
Marshal Jourdan of Revolutionary army fame as his 
military adviser, proved incapable of handling so vexed a 
question, and it became apparent to the Emperor that then- 
were needed in Spain more men and the Imperial presence. 

The landing of the British troops calls attention for the 
moment to Portugal. August 1, 1808, 15,000 men under 
Sir Arthur Wellesley (later Duke of Wellington) landed on 
the coast a hundred miles north of Lisbon and a I once began 
an advance on the Portuguese capital. On their march 
southward they were joined by two brigades which brought 
their strength up to 20,000. With this force, Wellesley 
hoped to drive out Junot's weaker army of less than 15,000. 
The French general, however, determined to make up in 
activity what he lacked in strength, and accordingly took the 
offensive before the little town of Vimiera. A failure to 
reconnoiter properly his enemy's position led to his army's 
being pushed off the Lisbon road into a most unfavorable 
situation (August 21, 1808). Learning of the approach of 
British reinforcements, Junot on the following day asked for 



260 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

an armistice. By the convention of Cintra, signed on 
August 30, the French agreed to withdraw from Portugal and 
in turn the English undertook to transport Junot's army to 
France. 

Affairs in Spain were no more satisfactory. The French 
forces had retired to the line of the Ebro River, where they 
held a weak position near Logrono. The Spaniards were 
confronting them boldly but unintelligently. Their line was 
divided into three principal parts, stationed from Valmaseda 
to Saragossa, and between the commanders of these divisions 
there was little desire for cooperation. Their forces were 
disposed as follows : Blake (32,000) held the left of the line 
at Valmaseda; Castafios (25,000) formed the center at 
Tudela; Palafox (17,000) stood before Saragossa; and a 
reserve of 13,000 occupied Burgos. Far to the right, another 
force of 20,000 was blockading the French in Barcelona. 
This was the situation which Napoleon found when he ar- 
rived in Vittoria on November 5, 1808. 

The Emperor had prepared for his campaign by greatly 
augmenting the corps with which he proposed to operate. 
At the moment of taking command, his army, divided into 
seven corps, numbered 190,000. Of these, all except one corps 
of 30,000 under St. Cyr (who was designated to relieve Barce- 
lona) occupied the line of the Ebro. The army was divided 
into three units : the right composed of Soult and Lefebvre ; a 
center made up of Victor, Bessieres, and the Guard ; and the 
left constituted by Ney and Moncey. The plan of campaign 
was outlined as soon as the situation became apparent. The 
Emperor decided upon a swift thrust at the hostile center 
which should completely penetrate the Spanish line, and then 
a series of blows aimed at the greatly inferior portions of his 
dissevered foe. It was familiar strategy, for the young 
General Bonaparte had used it with great effect against the 
Austrians and Sardinians in that renowned first campaign in 
Italy. 

It was to succeed as markedly in the present campaign. 



THE DUEL WITH GREAT BRITAIN 261 

The initial irruption of the Spanish line brought Soult and 
Bessieres face to face with their opponent's reserve, near 
Burgos. In the engagement which followed, the irregular 
Spanish forces were beaten and entirely dispersed. Thus, in 
a single day the first part of the plan was completed. The 
line was bisected; it remained only to crush each portion 
separately. The left half under Blake featured ever so 
slightly in the operations which followed, and may be dealt 
with in a few words. Soult, to whom was given the task of 
pursuit, pressed it back through the mountains of northern 
Spain. Though it subsequently united with Sir John Moore's 
army, it did not affect the outcome of the campaign. 

The right wing lay at the mercy of Ney and Moncey. A 
coordinate movement would have crushed it utterly between 
the two corps, but for no apparent reason Ney lay quiet while 
Moncey attacked, with the result that though this wing of 
the foe was again divided, it was not crushed. Palafox's 
command made for Saragossa, while Castafios retreated to 
Guadalajara. 

Meanwhile, the center with the Emperor in command had 
marched briskly forward, seized the passes of the Guadar- 
rama Mountains, and on December 2 appeared before 
Madrid. A few hours of artillery fire so convinced the armed 
inhabitants of the futility of resistance that on December 4 
the city capitulated. Napoleon did not pause in the city but 
moved south to the Tagus River to meet the British attack 
which he knew was approaching. 

He had miscalculated the direction of this approach, 
however. Sir John Moore, commanding a British force of 
20,000, was marching from Lisbon to the assistance of the 
Spaniards. He expected to join at Valladolid or Burgos a 
smaller British force which had landed at Corunna, and from 
the point of union go on to the assistance of their allies. 
But by the time his advance guard had entered Salamanca, 
the French were in sight of Madrid, and his original plan had 
become impossible. He formulated a second which con- 



262 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

templated a thrust at Napoleon's communications, but gave 
it up for a purely defensive union at Valderas with the force 
from Corunna, and then began his famous retreat to the 
coast. 

For Napoleon had learned of his advance, and had left 
Madrid on December 20 with a force of 50,000 in the hope 
of cutting Moore off from Corunna. In twelve days he 
inarched 214 miles through ice and snow to reach a position 
in the rear of Moore, while at the same time, in obedience to 
the Emperor's orders, Soult moved forward from his position 
in north Spain. At Astorga, on January 1, 1809, Napoleon 
saw that Moore could not be cut off from his port ; so leaving 
Soult's corps to carry on the pursuit, he led his own command 
to Valladolid. A few days later he was in Paris. Meanwhile, 
Soult kept at the heels of the retreating British. At Corunna, 
within sight of the transports, he forced a battle which cost 
the British their commander, but he was unable to prevent 
a safe embarkation. The first phase had ended successfully 
for France, but the British still held Lisbon, and dishearten- 
ing times were in store for the Emperor in the Peninsula. 

D. THE WAR WITH AUSTRIA 

Believing that the final stages of the campaign in Spain 
could be carried through by his lieutenants, Napoleon hurried 
back to Paris in January, 180!). Rumors had reached him of 
political intrigues in the French capital, and direct informa- 
tion of the extent and progress of Austria's preparations for 
war. His presence in Paris quickly ended the intrigues and 
he began to make his dispositions to meet the Austrian 
attack. 

For her excuse for war, Austria need merely point to the 
terms of the Treaty of Pressburg. Such terms could never be 
considered permanent by a proud and self-respecting nation. 
Furthermore, the Emperor Francis had been deeply moved 
by Napoleon's treatment of the Spanish royal family, and by 
the changes in Italy. If the French conqueror could by a 



THE DUEL WITH GREAT BRITAIN 263 

word unseat the ancient Bourbon house in Spain, why should 
not the whim seize him to demand the abdication of the 
Hapsburg house in Austria ? And if by mere imperial decree 
Napoleon chose to annex nominally independent states in 
tlie Italian peninsula, like Tuscany, and arbitrarily assign 
parts of the Papal dominions to his Kingdom of Italy, where 
need this process end? Considerations of self-interest and 
fear both pointed to a war to destroy this constant menace. 
The time seemed opportune, for the mass of French troops 
were engaged in Spain, and the new Austrian levies were 
inspired with enthusiasm. 

By December, 1808, the Austrian court had secretly 
determined upon war. The final decision was made by the 
Imperial Council under the presidency of the Emperor 
Francis February 8, 1809. The concentration of Austrian 
troops began February 25, 1801); the advance over the 
Bavarian boundary without a formal declaration of war on 
April 10, 1809. 

In the spring of 1809, for the first time in his career, 
Napoleon was unable to anticipate his adversary's prepara- 
tions for war. His own activities in Spain had kept him out 
of France until January, and though he immediately set 
about the task of concentrating an army for the coming war, 
Austria's commander, the Archduke Charles, was able to 
make the initial move. The Emperor Francis was making 
every effort to avenge Pressburg, and accordingly put into 
the field an army of 190,000. In the second week of April, 
1809, this great army was set in motion. Bellegarde with 
50,000 men was in Bohemia, marching toward Ratisbon, 
while the Archduke Charles with the remainder crossed the 
River Inn. His objective was, of course, Napoleon's troops 
on the upper Danube, and in order to compass their destruc- 
tion he planned a union with Bellegarde at Ratisbon, from 
which point he would march to destroy the French. He had 
behind him, on both sides of the Danube, lines of communica- 
tion with Vienna, which were guarded by militia. 



264 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

Napoleon's plan contemplated the destruction of the 
Austrian army combined with an occupation of Vienna. 
This plan, however, was dependent upon the movements of 
his enemy, because, as we have said, Charles rather than 
Napoleon was in a position to direct the opening movements 
of the campaign. By the end of March, the Emperor had 
east of the Rhine 167,000 troops, which he planned to con- 
centrate in the vicinity of Ratisbon. In command of them 
he had his two ablest lieutenants, Davout and Massena, and 
before the campaign was well under way, he was able to 
employ the other marshal who is worthy to be ranked with 
these two — Lannes. In addition, he had Lefebvre, Oudi- 
not, Vandamme, Bessieres, and as chief-of-staff, Berthier. 
In early April the six corps into which the army was divided 
were stationed along the Danube in the vicinity of Ulm, 
extending as far east as Ratisbon, and as far south as Augs- 
burg. One corps — the Bavarian — was holding the Isar 
River at Landshut. The army was based on the Rhine from 
Mainz to Strassburg. 

When Charles crossed the Inn, about April 12, 1809, he 
made impossible a French concentration at Ratisbon. 
Berthier, who was in command until the Emperor should 
arrive, failing to grasp the significance of his advance, 
instead of concentrating, as Napoleon had directed for this 
contingency, ordered the Bavarians to retake Landshut, 
from which they had retired at the approach of the Austrians. 
In the face of greatly superior forces they were unable to 
hold the river crossing, and fell back, thus opening a great 
hole in Berthier's Augsburg-Ratisbon line, into which the 
Archduke began pouring his forces. The French position 
was not unlike that of the allies in the first Italian campaign 
after Montenotte, or of the Spaniards after Napoleon had 
made his thrust on Burgos. Fortunately, the Emperor was 
at hand to repair the damage which Berthier's blunder had 
caused. Upon his arrival he ordered Massena with the right 
wing to march from Augsburg on Pfaffenhofen, and Davout 



THE DUEL WITH GREAT BRITAIN 265 

with the left wing to march from Ratisbon on Augsburg. 
Both flanks were thus brought in to support the Bavarians 
who had fallen back to I he Abens River, just east of Neustadt. 

But the Archduke failed |<> lake advantage of his fortunate 
situation. Instead of marching with his whole force against 
either wing of Napoleon's army, he made the mistake of 
marching north from Landshut in four columns — one each 
on Mainburg, Abensburg, llohr, and Langquaid. The next 
day (April 19, 1809) he made his situation still worse by 
turning his center and right toward Ratisbon, where he still 
hoped to unite with Bellegarde. In the march toward 
Ratisbon his westernmost columns brushed against the 
col iimns of Davout marching south to the support of the 
Bavarians. There was an encounter, but it was limited to the 
hinderniost divisions and did not deter Davout from complet- 
ing his mission. A half of his corps remained to watch the 
Archduke himself while the remainder hurried on to carry out 
an attack against the Archduke's left wing. 

This wing, commanded by Hiller, had been left, when 
Charles turned toward Ratisbon with his center and right, in 
an isolated position of which Napoleon was quick to take 
advantage. Against it he brought the whole force of Mas- 
sena, the Bavarians, and half of Davout's corps under 
Lannes. With their overwhelming numbers, they had soon 
defeated it (April 20, 1809) and forced it to retreat across the 
Isar at Landshut. Sending two cavalry divisions under 
Bessieres in pursuit of this shattered wing, the Emperor 
turned his attention toward the Archduke's main force. 

Bellegarde, meanwhile, had arrived at Ratisbon after his 
march through Bohemia, and had quickly overpowered the 
garrison left there. He had then pushed southward and had 
soon joined Charles near Eckmuhl (April 22, 1809). He had 
barely arrived when Massena and Lannes, who had just 
finished defeating Hiller, attacked at Eckmuhl. The Arch- 
duke's right was being engaged at the time by Davout, so the 
attack on Eckmuhl came as a disagreeable surprise ; and as a 



266 THE HISTORY OP EUROPE 

result of it he was forced to fall hack upon Ratisbon. lie was 
pursued thither by Napoleon in the hope of destroying the 
Austrian army, hut Charles' rear guard held the city until his 
army had safely crossed the river. Nevertheless, Charles 
was now limited to a line of retreat north of the Danube, 
while on the south a way lay clear for the French to the 
Austrian capital. 

The march to Vienna was made speedily, the Archduke 
Charles paralleling it on the north hank of the Danube. On 
the 9th of May, the French were before the walls, and on the 
evening of the 12th, Massena entered the city. The capital 
surrendered on the following day. But the neatest task was 
still ahead, for the Archduke's army was still in the field. 
The two portioTis had united near Wagram and were expect- 
ing to he reinforced by the Archduke John who had been 
endeavoring to prevent Prince Eugene's advance with an 
army from Italy. To reach and attack this army Napoleon 
planned to cross the Danube at the island of Lobau. Such 
a crossing required the construction of two bridges, one 
across the wider southern channel and another across the 
narrow northern one. They were completed within a week, 
and on the morning of May 21 Massena crossed and oc- 
cupied the villages of Aspern and Essling. Charles waited 
until such numbers had crossed as he thought could he 
readily handled, and then fell upon them at the two villages. 
For two days a bloody battle raged, in which the Austrians, 
perhaps, had the advantage. The villages were taken and 
retaken, while Napoleon waited for Davout's corps to cross. 
But the great southern bridge had been destroyed by a sud- 
den rise in the river, and nothing remained hut to retire to the 
island of Lobau. This retreat was carried out in safety but 
it cost the Emperor the life of Lannes, one of his ablesl 
marshals and closest friends. 

The marshals, when consulted, advised a retreat after the 
defeat at Aspern, but Napoleon determined to try once more. 
By July 4, on which day he completed his new bridges, he 



SKETCH MAP 
TO ILLUSTRATE THE BATTLE OF 

WAGRAM 

SCALE OF MILES 




Van Bni,Co..W.T 



THE DUEL WITH GREAT BRITAIN 267 

had raised his army to 150,000, and was ready to attempt 
again the defeat of Charles. The next morning, his army 
crossed the Danube in safety and filed out on the level field 
of Wagram. He found the Archduke, with equal numbers, 
occupying;) great semicircle, his lefl a1 Neusiedel, his right at 
Aspern. He was momentarily expecting the arrival of the 
Archduke John on his left. 

The Emperor's attack consisted of a simultaneous attack 
on the Austrian left and center. This was repulsed with 
such vigor, that Charles himself seized the offensive and 
massed his forces on the river bank hoping to cut Napoleon 
off from his bridges. Massena rushed to the threatened 
spot, and the Emperor look command in the center. Order- 
ing his right again forward, lie massed his artillery in the 
center, supporting it with the cavalry of the Guard and two 
infantry divisions under MacDonald. The guns pushed for- 
ward almost to the Austrian lines and opened a devastating 
fire against which nothing could stand. The Austrian center 
broke, the left fell back, sharply pressed by Davout, and 
diaries, realizing that the Archduke John was nowhere in 
sight and that his heavily reinforced right at the river was 
too far away to assist, gave up the struggle. A well-ordered 
retreat was conducted, but the French were too exhausted 
for pursuit. 

The battle of Wagram was not decisive in the same way as 
Austerlitz. Charles had been defeated, but he had handled 
the situation so skillfully that Napoleon's gain had been a 
minimum. However, Austria's losses had been heavy 
throughout the campaign, and the week's desultory righting 
which followed Wagram proved that there was no possibility 
of retrieving the situation. On July 12, 1809, Francis reluc- 
tantly agreed to an armistice. 

E. THE PEACE OF SCHONBRUNN 

The armistice concluded on July 12, 1809, and ratified 
reluctantly by Francis five days later put an end to hostili- 



268 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

ties. Peace negotiations dragged, for a strong party among 
the councilors of the Emperor and in the court actually 
favored the resumption of hostilities. Indeed, Napoleon's 
terms in the beginning, comprising the cession of much 
territory and the abdication of the Emperor, were such as to 
inspire further resistance. Prussia, too, offered prospects of 
immediate aid in case the war were continued. The dis- 
organization of the army, the difficulty in finding money and 
supplies, and the certainty that Napoleon would strike long 
before the Prussian contingent could aid, finally turned the 
scales toward peace. Napoleon receded from his most 
extreme demands, and the treaty of Schonbrunn was signed 
October 15, 1809. 

The terms of the treaty marked the extent of Austria's 
failure. Austria ceded territory in the west to Bavaria; 
agreed to the division of the greater part of Galicia between 
Russia and the grand-duchy of Warsaw; and surrendered 
Trieste, Croatia, and adjoining districts to form Napoleon's 
new Illyrian provinces. These terms were hard enough, re- 
ducing Austrian territories by 50,000 square miles and nearly 
4,000,000 souls ; but in addition Napoleon was to receive an 
indemnity of 85,000,000 francs, and Austria was to pledge 
herself to reduce her active army to 150,000 men. Thus cut 
off from the sea, weakened and humiliated, Austria descended 
to the rank of a second class power. 

For Napoleon's future plans, the victory at Wagram was 
of the utmost importance. He looked forward to a general 
tightening of the continental blockade and a sure victory 
over Great Britain. His policy in this respect became more 
determined than ever before. 



CHAPTER XII 
NAPOLEON AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 

A. CONSOLIDATION OF POWER 

The crushing of Austria at Wagram left Napoleon abso- 
lute master of the continent. No state therein dared to 
oppose his will. His territories, including his Kingdom of 
Italy, extended from the boundaries of Holland on the north 
to Naples and to Turkey on the Adriatic. Russia and 
Denmark were his allies. Holland, Spain, and Westphalia 
were ruled by his brothers. Naples was in the hands of 
one of his marshals (Murat). The Grand Duchy of Warsaw 
(Poland) and the Confederation of the Rhine were his 
protectorates. And Switzerland acknowledged him as 
mediator. He had indeed proved himself a worthy suc- 
cessor of Charlemagne. He now took advantage of his 
position to consolidate his power by bringing within his 
influence the few remaining independent units of western 
Europe. 

i. Portugal and Spain 

The hold which the little British force maintained upon 
Portugal broke the blockade at that point, but in the vast 
extent of his influence Napoleon was inclined to disregard 
this break and to underestimate the importance of the 
British operations and the coincident Spanish revolt. As 
his general policy was dictated by the necessity of main- 
taining the continental blockade, he was content to keep a 
cordon of French troops around the British force and sat- 
isfied that no British commerce could penetrate the continent 
through these lines. 



270 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

But this conclusion had not been reached without serious 
efforts to dislodge the British. When Napoleon left Spain, 
to give his attention to the Austrian War, he turned over 
the command to Marshal Soult, who, as we have seen, was 
pursuing Sir John Moore in Galicia (January, 1809). Within 
a few weeks, opposition on the part of Spanish mobile forces 
had practically ceased, although resistance was still kepi 
up in a few besieged towns. Immediately, the French began 
a campaign against the most formidable remaining enemy 
— the British in Portugal. Accordingly, they advanced 
in two main columns under Soult and Victor in the general 
direction of Lisbon, the former marching south from the 
neighborhood o( Corunna, the latter advancing down the 
Tagus valley. 

This was the situation which confronted General Wellesley 
when he arrived in Lisbon in April, ISO!). With com- 
mendable energy, he determined upon attacking the two 
armies before they could unite By a swift march, early 
in May, he surprised the French before their newly captured 
town o{ Oporto, and after sharp fighting drove them out, 
nor did his activities cease until, with the help of the Portu- 
guese, he had forced Soull over the mountains into Galicia. 
Without delay, he turned on Victor. The latter had halted 
at the news of Soult 's reverse, and when, a few days later, 
he learned of Napoleon's cheek at Aspern, had withdrawn 
to Talavera. Here, Wellesley encountered him on July 27, 
ISO!), ami for two days there raged a battle which ended in 
Victor's retirement on Madrid. The defeat would have 
been more serious hut that Wellesley \s Spanish allies failed 
him completely at the decisive moment. 

In the meantime, the hand of Napoleon had reached out 
to direct Spanish affairs. Divining what Wellesley would 
do after he had defeated Soult, he ordered the latter's 
forces south to strike the British rear and (lank. Hardly 
were the guns of Talavera silenced when Wellesley learned 
of this new menace to his army. Soult pressed his ad- 



NAPOLEON AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 271 

vantage, and by late Augusl the British were in a position 
of greal danger. The British commander proved himself 
equal t<> the situation, however, and by a skillful retreat 
to the south of the Tagus he made good his escape from 
Soult, and was soon in his old position before Lisbon. Here 
he began the construction of the Torres Vedras lines which 
were to maintain the British in the Peninsula and ultimately 
insure their success. 

In a hall' do/en places the Spanish armies had been de- 
feated by the French, until only in Andalusia did resistance 
continue. Wellesley had learned the true worth of his 
Spanish allies, however, and had determined Tor the future 
to conduct his campaigns by himself. 

Hence, the Portuguese break in the continental blockade 
did not seriously worry Napoleon. Though naturally 
desirous of defeating the British and driving them from 
Portugal, and chagrined at the failure of his lieutenants, 
he still considered that his main object was being achieved 
by I lie exclusion of British goods. lie was, indeed, justified 
under the conditions in considering the Iberian peninsula 
as included in his continental system. 

ii. Sweden 

In the far north, Sweden, one of Napoleon's most im- 
placable enemies, was finally induced by expediency to 
join his system. Her continued opposition had brought 
her nothing but disaster. The Russian invasion of Finland 
was the last blow to a discouraged people. When the 
King, Gustavus TV, planned still further hopeless resistance, 
an army corps forced his abdication, March 29, 1809. The 
Estates of Sweden, in sympathy with the popular desire for 
peace, confirmed this act, and called to the throne a descend- 
ant of Adolphus Frederick (King from 1751-1771) as Charles 
XIII. The new sovereign's policy was dictated by the cir- 
cumstances of his accession. He straightway made peace 
with Russia (September 17, 1809), ceding the remains of 



272 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

Finland ; and followed this with a treaty of peace with 
France (January 6, 1810) by which he accepted the terms 
of the continental blockade. Shortly afterwards, when a 
fatal accident removed the heir apparent, Charles desig- 
nated, with the general approval of the nation and the 
consent of a special Diet, one of Napoleon's marshals, 
Bernadotte, as his successor (August 18, 1810). For 
Charles XIII, this designation seemed to guarantee perma- 
nent peace with the French conqueror : for Napoleon, of 
course, it meant the adherence of Sweden — for the time 
at least — to his system. 

iii. Holland 

In Holland, King Louis was trying to solve a difficult 
problem in the best way for his people. Naturally a mari- 
time nation and normally trading largely with Great Britain, 
Holland suffered severely from the restrictions imposed 
by the continental blockade. The people, who had no 
individual quarrel with, or hatred for, Great Britain, re- 
sorted to smuggling on a large scale, and the King failed 
to take strict measures to suppress the practice. His 
brother, Napoleon, showed no inclination to help Holland, 
but rather blamed the King for his laxness in enforcing the 
blockade system. 

In the summer of 1809, the British attempt to open the 
Scheldt River to commerce intensified Napoleon's an- 
tagonism to his brother's government. Antwerp, the key 
not only to the river but to all the rich lowland country 
which the river waters, had been seized upon by Napoleon 
as the site of proposed enormous docks, arsenals, and ship- 
yards, and already some of his construction was under way. 
The Emperor was not alone in his appreciation of the im- 
portance of Antwerp. Already the British had gone to 
war at least three times to maintain the neutrality of this 
city so close to their own shores, and now that the strong- 
hold was in possession of their greatest enemy, they planned 



NAPOLEON AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 273 

an expedition to capture it. 40,000 men, the largest force 
ever sent from England until this time, set sail in July, 
1809, for the mouth of the Scheldt. The attack was orig- 
inally planned as a diversion for the Austrians contending 
with Napoleon along the Danube, but it was so late in being 
executed that by the time a landing was made on Wal- 
cheren Island the Austrians had been defeated and peace 
was in sight. Troops under Bernadotte were hurried to 
the defense of Antwerp, and though the British had some 
successes near the mouth of the river, they never seriously 
menaced the city. Malaria broke out alarmingly amongst 
the troops, and the shattered army was recalled in Decem- 
ber, 1809, with a lengthy death roll, and with nothing 
permanent accomplished. 

By the autumn of 1809, Napoleon had decided to annex 
Holland and thus introduce French agents to enforce the 
provisions of his blockade. In November, 1809, he advised 
King Louis of his intentions, but gave him the chance to 
retain his crown by the enforcement of strict measures 
against British commerce, by the creation of a strong naval 
force for use against England, and by the maintenance of 
a standing army of 25,000 men. King Louis struggled on 
for a few months longer, trying to conciliate Napoleon and 
at the same time to spare his people. Napoleon's aggres- 
sions continued. January 3, 1810, he annexed the Island 
of Walcheren and his troops forcibly occupied two towns 
near the mouth of the Scheldt In May and June, he seized 
several American trading ships in Holland's harbors and 
demanded the cession of the territory south of the Rhine 
River. 

Under such continued humiliations King Louis was 
finally moved to abdicate. On the night of July 1, 1810, 
after signing his abdication and writing to his counselors, 
he fled from his Kingdom and took refuge in a little town 
in Bohemia. Eight days later (July 9, 1810) Napoleon by 
decree annexed Holland, and straightway dispatched his 



274 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

agents to confiscate forbidden goods and to enforce the 
French decrees. 

iv. Annexations 

Two important annexations during this year 1810 com- 
pleted Napoleon's territorial extension and consolidation. 
In the north, he feared a leakage of British goods through 
the ports of the northwest German states including the 
duchy of Oldenburg, the Hanseatic towns (Hamburg, 
Bremen, and Liibeck), and the northern part of Hanover. 
In the south, he desired full control of the great Simplon 
Pass, the highway to Italy. With simple audacity, he de- 
creed the annexation, December 10, 1810, to the Empire of 
all the lands between the lower reaches of the Rhine and 
the free city of Liibeck ; and a fortnight later the annexation 
to the Empire of the Republic of Valais. There was no 
one who dared oppose him. 

Thus by the middle of December, 1810, Napoleon had 
completed his system. It would be scarcely inaccurate to 
state that he had brought the whole of the continent of 
Europe within the sphere of his direct influence. France 
itself stretched from the Baltic to the Adriatic, and from 
the Rhine River to the Atlantic Ocean. France's close 
allies included Russia, Sweden, Denmark, the Grand Duchy 
of Warsaw, the Kingdom of Westphalia, the Confederation 
of the Rhine, Switzerland, and the Kingdom of Italy, 
Naples, and Spain. Prussia and Austria were impotent. 
French emissaries were upon a cordial footing in distant 
Turkey. It cannot be surprising that Napoleon expected 
confidently that Great Britain would be brought to terms 
by so formidable a power. 

B. CONDITIONS IN FRANCE 

At the beginning of 1810 Napoleon had been in power, 
reckoning the consulate, for a full decade. For France, 
it was a period of order and prosperity in sharp contrast 



NAPOLEON AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 275 

to the ten years of chaos which had preceded it. The in- 
stitutions of the Empire seemed on a firmer foundation in 
1810 than they had been at any previous time. 

Yet Napoleon realized how slender was the thread which 
bound the various parts of his wide administration together. 
He in his own life alone controlled the government ; he 
was both executive and administrative authority throughout 
all parts of France. His energy, his insight, his memory, 
his capacity for work were the marvel of his contemporaries. 
He kept in touch simultaneously with all branches of ad- 
ministration, and infused something of his own energy and 
ability into his servants. He constantly scrutinized the 
details of the departments, seeking blunders and suggesting 
improvements. He had presented to him each fortnight 
full reports of the various activities of the government, so 
classified that he could at an instant locate any desired bit 
of information. He kept in touch with the affairs of foreign 
states through the messages of his secret agents, and often 
surprised diplomats by the fullness and accuracy of his 
knowledge. He watched closely the condition of the 
finances, the price of foodstuffs, the development of public 
improvements, the system of education, the practice of 
religion. Above all, he knew intimately his armies down 
to details of organization, equipment, discipline, and train- 
ing. Though often absent from his capital for long cam- 
paigns in distant countries, he never allowed his vigilance 
to relax : relays of couriers kept him in constant communica- 
tion with Paris. He was confident of the loyalty of his 
people so long as he lived, but he was troubled by his fears 
of what would happen to the Empire after his death. He 
longed for some assurance that his system would be per- 
petuated, for some person after him around whom the 
people would rally loyally and preserve the existing in- 
stitutions. 

This desire to guarantee the continuation of the Empire 
led him in 1809-1810 to seek a marriage alliance with one 



276 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

of the ancient royal houses of the continent, whereby his 
dynasty might find sure support in Europe, and from 
which an heir might come who would give a new cohesion 
to his empire. He first approached the Czar of Russia, 
asking for the hand of his sister, the Archduchess Anna. 
When the Czar pleaded her extreme youth — she was but 
fifteen at the time — Napoleon turned to the Emperor 
Francis of Austria and negotiated for the hand of his daugh- 
ter, the Archduchess Maria Louisa. Though the marriage 
was repugnant to Francis' ideas and at first thought hateful 
to the young archduchess, the prime minister, Metternich, 
urged it for reasons of state. Francis yielded and the 
archduchess assented to the sacrifice. Napoleon divorced 
Josephine, settled her with a comfortable pension at the 
chateau of Malmaison, and married Maria Louisa (April 2, 
1810). The following year Napoleon's hopes were ful- 
filled by the birth of a son (March 20, 1811). Upon the 
child he conferred the title of the King of Rome. He 
looked forward confidently to a new loyalty from France 
which should center about the child. 

With the birth of his son, Napoleon's happiness seemed 
complete and the future of France assured. He had ex- 
panded the boundaries of the Empire until they contained 
45,000,000 people. He had brought order and security 
out of chaos and danger. He had seen industry flourish. 
He had carried through vast public improvements. Now 
he saw the prospect of his work being continued by his 
son amid the enthusiastic loyalty of a devoted people. 

Indeed, the France which had revolted against a monarchy 
and had established a Republic in the decade from 1789 to 
1799 had once more under Napoleon seen the introduction 
of monarchical forms. The power of the legislative body 
(the Corps Legislatif) was severely restricted. One of its 
chambers, the Tribunate, had been abolished after its 
debating functions had been taken over (decree of August 
19, 1807) by commissions empowered to discuss legislative 



NAPOLEON AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 277 

proposals before the full session of the Corps Legislatif. 
The Senate and the Council of State were the chief bodies 
in the government, and their members, appointed by Na- 
poleon, were subservient to his wishes. The Council of 
State considered legislation and formulated decrees for 
Napoleon : Napoleon sent these decrees to the Senate for 
ratification. Napoleon thus kept autocratic control over 
all legislation of major importance. 

Again, the Emperor had reintroduced the ceremonies, 
dignities, and titles that go with monarchical government, 
At his elevation in 1804 he created the Legion of Honor, 
membership in which he awarded to soldiers or civilians 
who had deserved well of their country. As he conquered 
foreign territories, he raised his brothers and sisters to 
sovereign rank, and bound his ministers and marshals to 
his interests by bestowing upon them principalities and 
dukedoms. He established a court of the usual conti- 
nental splendor, with its hierarchy of officials about the 
throne, from the Grand Imperial Dignities down to the 
Grand Master of Ceremonies, and with its customary retinue 
of chamberlains, equerries, ladies-in-waiting, aides-de-camp, 
pages, etc. He created a new nobility by decree (March 1, 
1808), with its ranks of Prince, Duke, Count, Baron, and 
Chevalier (Knight). 

He assumed the royal right, too, to restrict the freedom 
of the press and of speech. Newspapers were carefully 
censored or were suppressed. The official Moniteur was 
the only favored sheet. Political discussion was dis- 
couraged : political literature did not exist. The schools 
were obliged to teach loyalty to the Emperor as the first 
duty of a French citizen. Spies abounded, listening, 
sounding opinion, opening mail, and reporting to Paris 
the first signs of trouble. 

Yet France forgave the restoration of monarchical forms, 
the autocratic power, the social distinctions, the loss of 
freedom, in the general satisfaction at the return of order 



278 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

and prosperity. For France under the Empire was pros- 
perous. Though she had been continually at war, the cam- 
paigns had been fought on foreign soil and had largely 
been paid for by the indemnities wrung from the conquered 
nations. Her national finances, honestly and wisely ad- 
ministered, had borne the strain. Her industries had found 
new continental markets to replace those lost to them by 
the British blockade. Her improved methods of agricul- 
ture, brought about by a campaign of education among the 
peasants, yielded her more bountiful crops. Her scientists 
solved some of the difficulties due to the blockade by per- 
fecting the process of extracting sugar from beets, dyes 
from native roots, and by teaching the substitution of 
chicory for coffee. Her government began and carried 
through vast public improvements, such as canals, roads, 
bridges, and the draining of marsh lands. Under the 
autocratic and paternalistic government, the people of 
France were industrious, prosperous, and contented. Gov- 
ernment securities reflected the general confidence and 
prosperity, rising in 1807 to ninety-three per cent and re- 
maining firm thereafter around eighty. 

Bright as this broad picture of France under the Empire 
may be painted, it had its dark sides too. The prosperity 
of France was not shared in equal degree by newly annexed 
territories or by France's allies in the continental system. 
Ominous indications proved that beyond the limits of 
France proper the French method of administration, even 
when accompanied by much-desired legal and social re- 
forms, was seriously resented. French dependencies were 
too often required to be governed in the interests of France 
rather than for the best good of their own people. 

Again, Napoleon had brought on a conflict with the Pope 
which stirred the religious feeling of his people. Pius VII 
had resisted Napoleon's attempts at an alliance after the 
treaty of Tilsit (1807), and had insisted upon his right to 
maintain his neutrality and his independence of action. 



NAPOLEON AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 279 

In 1808 Napoleon annexed the northern and eastern Papal 
states to the Kingdom of Italy; in May, 1809, he seized 
Rome and removed the Pope, a prisoner, to Savona. Pius 
VTI's only means of protest was a bull of excommunication, 
and a refusal to confirm bishops to vacant sees in France. 
The spectacle of this self-styled successor to Charlemagne 
imprisoning the head of the Roman Catholic church 
awakened serious criticism in France, and, indeed, through- 
out Christendom. 

But most serious of all was the ever-present war or 
shadow of war. The annual drain of conscripts, usually 
a year or more in advance of their legal time, kept the 
people aware of the cost of empire. Napoleon's wars 
after 1800-1807 were waged in accordance with his general 
policy of maintaining the continental blockade against 
British commerce ami not for his personal glory or for 
French aggrandizement. The French peasant, however, 
had no such comprehensive conception of imperial strategy. 
He understood merely that war followed war, and that he 
w r as now called upon to fight in distant lands where France 
had no direct interest. The patriotic ardor with which 
he had defended France against invasion gave place to a 
sullen dissatisfaction with these campaigns in distant fields. 
And the people at home felt intuitively that their happiness 
and prosperity were being imperiled by the never-ending 
series of wars. 

C. INTERNATIONAL SITUATION 

In the last days of 1810 Napoleon was confident that his 
continental blockade policy was at the point of success. 
The extension of his influence over the entire continent 
blocked the free entry of British goods at every point. His 
agents brought him true reports of the depression in Great 
Britain, of the successive crop failures and the resulting 
misery and suffering of the British people, of the warehouses 
stuffed with goods for which no market could be found, of 



280 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

the commercial failures, and of the depreciation of British 
credit. He pictured Great Britain as choked with her own 
manufactured wealth, ready to plead for peace to gain a 
market for her products. His agents were busily tighten- 
ing every joint in his vast European system that not a bale 
of British goods might find access to the continent. 

The hardships entailed upon his allies, however, were 
rapidly causing a suffering as intense in many cases as that 
in Great Britain, and were breeding a general discontent 
which was bound in the end — if Great Britain held out 
long enough — to react against Napoleon. His continental 
blockade was a two-edged sword : it cut his friends as well 
as his enemies. The once busy and prosperous Hanseatic 
towns were idle and the people driven to despair by the 
cessation of trade and the imposition of heavy taxes. Russia, 
which had long exported its grain, timber, and furs, and 
had imported British manufactured goods, especially cloths, 
found herself facing huge annual deficits with no prospect 
of relief. Swedish and Danish ships rotted at their idle 
wharves. In every state of Europe, except in a few isolated 
cases where smuggling proved profitable or where the 
blockade operated as a kind of protective wall for special 
native industries, the continental system was choking all 
economic life and causing intense distress and dissatisfaction. 

One breach in his great system existed, and had existed 
since 1808, in Portugal, but, as has been explained, this 
was not regarded as vital. To this was added, however, 
at the very end of 1810 a second breach which, if permitted, 
meant the ruin of his whole vast system. On December 31, 
1810, the Czar of Russia signalized a change in policy by an 
ukase permitting colonial trade in neutral bottoms and 
imposing a prohibitive tariff upon the importation of cer- 
tain luxuries, as wines and silks. The admission of colonial 
trade threw Russia's great markets open to Great Britain : 
the tariff upon imports of wines and silks was a direct 
blow at France. 



NAPOLEON AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS I'OWER 281 

i. Russia 

Since his convention with the French Emperor at Erfurt, 
October 12, 1808, the Czar Alexander had gradually been 
alienated from Napoleon by the course of events. His 
alliance had not yielded him the results he expected. He 
had gained Finland, it is true, but he had learned that 
Napoleon, instead of aiding him to acquire Moldavia and 
Wallachia and an open way to Constantinople, was secretly 
encouraging Turkish resistance. Again, at the conclusion 
of the Peace of Schonbrunn, Napoleon had added large 
parts of Galicia to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and had 
yielded less than one third as much territory to Russia. 
Alexander could not but be hostile to the growth of the 
grand duchy, for its strength was a continual threat against 
his own Polish provinces. Further, a strong party among 
his counselors emphasized the financial ruin his pro-Na- 
poleonic policy was bringing upon his country in the loss 
of trade. He fell keenly the imputation that he was but a 
tool in Napoleon's hands, and that his country's policy 
was being subordinated to the ambitions of Napoleon. 
Two other incidents added a tinge of personal bitterness 
to Alexander's change of attitude. When Napoleon had 
first planned a divorce and remarriage, he had asked the 
hand of Alexander's sister, the Archduchess Anna; and 
before the alliance had been definitely refused, lie had be- 
trothed himself to Maria Louisa of Austria. The indecent 
haste with which Napoleon had transferred his negotiations 
— we can scarcely speak of affections -deeply offended 
the Czar. Then again, when the French Emperor annexed 
the states of northwesl Germany, he absorbed the duchy 
of Oldenburg, whose sovereign was the Tzar's uncle. Alex- 
ander took offense at this wanton disregard of the rights of 
a member of his family. 

Napoleon regarded the ukase of December 31, 1810, as 
a direct challenge to France. He bitterly reproached the 



282 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

Czar for his rupture of the alliance, but his words were 
without effect other than to reveal to the world that a new 
war was impending. Through the summer of 1811 and the 
early months of 1812 both states hastened their preparations. 

ii. Portugal and Spain 

With a Russian war in sight, the continuation of opera- 
tions in Portugal and Spain proved most embarrassing. 
Wellesley, now Viscount Wellington, was determined to 
fight the war not for his personal glory but for victory. 
When, therefore, in the early summer of 1810, he first en- 
countered the forces of Massena, he began the long months 
of defensive warfare which broke down the French with 
the minimum of loss for his own command. 

Napoleon had returned victorious from Wagram resolved 
to throw into Spain forces sufficient to subdue once and for 
all this troublesome peninsula. Because of the press of 
affairs in France he was unable to take charge in person, 
but in command of troops numbering over 300,000 he 
dispatched his lieutenants, among whom were the lustrous 
names of Massena, Soult, Victor, Bessieres, Ney, Reynier, 
Junot, and Mortier. Unfortunately, because the warfare 
was partly guerrilla in character, these vast numbers could 
not operate as one powerful unit, and to this disadvantage 
Napoleon himself added a second by leaving Soult (70,000) 
independent of Massena. It was planned that the latter 
should have 120,000, but it is doubtful if the number 
under his immediate command was ever more than 
80,000. 

Of these huge armies, many thousands were necessary 
to reduce the fortified cities and to overcome the resistance 
of the hordes of Spanish nationalists. But two enterprises 
of some magnitude were projected. Soult was ordered 
south to undertake the subjugation of Andalusia, and 
Massena was directed against the British in Portugal. 
This last operation was considered the most important, 



NAPOLEON AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 283 

and so that it might be completely successful, Massena 
was cautioned to spare no effort in preparation. 

From Burgos two roads lead into Portugal, one by way 
of Salamanca, the other through Madrid and Talavera. 
The first crosses the mountain barrier at the frontier by a 
pass protected by the cities of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, 
the second by a pass guarded in the same way by Badajoz 
and Elvas. This latter route is circuitous and arrives, 
finally, not at Lisbon itself, but at the ferry on the east 
bank of the Tagus. This point was, of course, in 1810, 
menaced by the British fleet. There is no practicable road 
down the Tagus valley, so Wellington felt sure that he 
might expect Massena by the northern route. He knew 
that Soult was in Andalusia, and might menace him through 
Badajoz, but he felt certain that the strongholds of southern 
Spain, particularly Cadiz, would keep the French marshal 
fully occupied. Accordingly, he placed his 50,000 men, 
English and Portuguese, in position on the Salamanca road. 

Massena began his advance in early June, 1810. His 
supplies were scanty and reached him so irregularly that 
it was not until mid-August that the mountain pass was in 
his possession. He was not alarmed at this, for the Emperor 
had told him that he might take all summer reducing 
Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida. The towns taken, however, 
he pushed rapidly in pursuit of Wellington's army. The 
British general occupied a position at Busaco with the idea 
of damaging his opponent's forces, and did succeed in 
checking him with heavy loss. Massena, however, out- 
flanked him to the north, and Wellington was obliged to 
fall back. 

The victor of Rivoli now felt that the worst of the cam- 
paign was over, for he was assured that Wellington was 
withdrawing to his transports. In hot haste, then, he 
followed closely behind the retiring allies. But on the 
evening of October 10 his advance cavalry came upon 
fortifications, and Massena riding forward the next morn- 



284 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

ing to investigate, found himself facing the famous lines 
of Torres Vedras. It is said that in response to a shot from 
a British battery, he lifted his hat and bowed in acknowl- 
edgment of his defeat. 

For defeat it was. Two sturdy lines of fortifications, 
five miles apart, prepared with all the skill which the British 
Engineers could bring to bear upon them, stretched across 
the Lisbon peninsula from the Atlantic to the Tagus. 
Thousands of Portuguese laborers had worked on them for 
months, and now when Massena appeared before them, 
they were complete, thirty miles long and manned by 
thirty thousand Portuguese militia under British officers, 
while behind, Wellington with his regular army stood ready 
to receive whatever attacks the French might make. There 
the British fleet supported his troops in comfort while 
outside the French were starving in an impoverished country. 

Massena, hoping for the reinforcements which alone 
could enable him to force the Tagus below the Torres Vedras 
lines, remained on the river for four months and then in 
March, 1811, began the retreat to (he mountain passes. 
Soult meanwhile had taken Badajoz, but this of itself could 
bring no relief to Massena's starved and frozen army. There 
is no room here for the details of that wretched retreat to 
Ciudad Rodrigo. The brave Ney in command of the rear 
guard performed the most brilliant exploits of his career, 
but a bare half of the army crossed the mountain passes. 
Cold, sickness, hunger, and the implacable hatred of the 
inhabitants had cost Massena 25,000 men. 

The remaining months of the year mark the beginning 
of Wellington's offensive. He directed his attacks first 
on the northern pass, then against the southern, now 
against Marmont (who had succeeded Massena), now 
against Soult. The battles of Fuente d'Onoro and of 
Albuera in July took a heavy toll of the French, but they 
held doggedly to the strongholds of Ciudad Rodrigo and 
Badajoz. They had, however, by the close of 1811, lost 



NAPOLEON AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 285 

every fool of ground in Portugal, whereas, on the western 
side of the mountains, Wellington was each day becoming 
stronger and more active. 

I). PREPARATIONS FOR THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA 

Embarrassing as these Portuguese and Spanish opera- 
tions were, Napoleon naturally concentrated his main 
attention during ISM and the early months of 181 i upon his 
preparations for his campaign againsl Russia. 

He had already begun to feel in France a slackening in 
thai military fervor which had supplied him his earlier 
armies, but he turned to the task with vigor. The armies 
thai foughl al Wagram had been maintained in the form 
of so-called "corps of observation" on the Elbe, the Rhine, 
and in Italy, and in their augmented form numbered 200,000. 
These consl ituted the backbone of the greal army of Russia, 
and about them Napoleon gathered the legions from his 
allies, willing and coerced alike. Austrian, Prussian, fllyr- 
ian, Polish, Rhenish, Saxon, and [talian contingents swelled 
his army to ;i strength thai has been variously estimated 
al from 150,000 to 000,000 men. Tlie variations lie in 
the uncertainty of determining whal troops protected his 
frontiers and lines of communications, Out it is probable 
thai lie crossed to Russian 3oil with a full 400,000. 

To the formation of this enormous army, the Emperor 
had paid the closesl personal al tention. Dei nil-, of ordnance, 
transportation, uniform, commissariat, route-, of march, 
everything had passed under his eye. Indeed, it may fairly 
be said thai Napoleon commenced this campaign as Emperor, 
Commander-in-Chief, Minister-of-War, and Chief-of Staff 
— a burden vvliieli mi^lit well bow even In'-, capable shoulders. 

Coincidenl with these strictly military preparations were 
diplomatic attempts to secure the greatesl possible ■ 
ance from In'-, allies. His marriage alliance with Austria, 
the overwhelming force be could bring at -Jiorf. notice againsl 
her, and In'-, knowledge of her weak financial condition made 



286 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

him certain that she would not accept the Czar's overtures. 
He knew, too, that Austria did not desire to see Russia 
established upon the lower reaches of the Danube in Mol- 
davia and Wallachia. He did not feel so sure of Prussia. 
His agents kept him informed of the progress of the national 
movement in that state. He had, however, great forces 
cantoned in fortresses within easy reach of the Prussian 
border, and determined to use those as a threat to force 
Prussia into active alliance with him. He realized that 
he could not leave a possible enemy in force upon his line 
of communications. Frederick William, in view of his 
probable annihilation if he made common cause with the 
Czar, yielded to Napoleon's terms, agreed to furnish a 
Prussian contingent to the Grand Army, and so to dis- 
tribute the troops remaining in Prussia that they would be 
under the constant surveillance of French officers. In 
Poland, too, Napoleon's diplomacy was successful. Though 
the Czar offered the Poles an independent Kingdom with 
himself as King, the Poles remained faithful to Napoleon, 
who had created their Grand Duchy of Warsaw and had so 
liberally enlarged their territory by the Peace of Schonbrunn 
(1809). Napoleon, however, was disappointed in his deal- 
ings with Turkey and Sweden. Though his agents tried 
to put new life into the Turkish campaign against Russia, 
the Sultan, obtaining liberal terms from the Czar, made 
peace with Russia in the Treaty of Bucharest (May 28, 
1812). The Czar gave up his immediate hope of gaining 
Moldavia and Wallachia, but acquired Bessarabia and freed 
his army on the Danube for the defense of the Ukraine 
region. Napoleon's overtures to his former marshal, Berna- 
dotte, prince regent of Sweden during the dotage of Charles 
XIII, were met by the demand that France should agree 
to the Swedish acquisition of Norway. Since Norway 
belonged to France's loyal ally, Denmark, Napoleon re- 
fused to yield. Bernadotte thereupon threw in his fortunes 
with Russia, and signed a treaty of alliance with the Czar 



NAPOLEON AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 287 

March 24, 1812. Great Britain, of course, welcomed 
friendship with any country willing to oppose Napoleon. 
Russia and Sweden, therefore, quickly composed their 
differences with Great Britain and signed an alliance July, 
1812, after the French invasion had already begun. 

France and Russia had for so long actively and openly 
prepared lor hostilities that a declaration of war was hardly 
necessary; and, in fact, none was issued. The last week of 
.June, 1812, Napoleon's Grand Army crossed the Niemen 
River. Without other notification, the war began. 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 
LEIPZIG 

Just as in the latter days of the Revolution the military 
exigencies strike the dominant note in the government, so, 
beginning with 1812, we find the thunder of guns, con- 
stantly increasing, drowning out matters of domestic im- 
port which had hitherto engaged the Emperor. From 
1812 to 1815 history was made only on hat tie fields. The 
periods of quid were mere armistices and lulls during which 
the opponents were preparing themselves for further struggle. 
Four great campaigns the Russian in 1812, the Leipzig 
in 1813, the defense of France in 1814, and the Waterloo 
in 1815 — hurried the Napoleonic drama on to its tragic 
close. 

A. THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN, 1812 

The disastrous campaign which opened in June, 1812, 
was conducted on so vast a scale that a brief sketch can 
provide only the slightest conception of the magnitude of 
the operations. The Emperor's forces were divided into 
three armies. The first, 220, 000 strong, which he himself 
commanded, with Berthier as his Chief -of-Staff, was com- 
posed of the Guards, three infantry corps under Davout, 
Oudinot, and Ney, and two cavalry divisions. The second 
army, 80,000 strong, was commanded by Prince Eugene, 
and was composed of Eugene's own corps, that of St. Cyr, 
and one cavalry division. The third army, numbering 
80,000 also, was under the command of the Emperor's 
brother, Jerome, and was made up of three infantry corps 
under Poniatowski, Vandamme, and Reynier, and one 



THE CAMPAIGNS IN RUSSIA ANT) LEIPZIG 289 

cavalry division. On the extreme left was MacDonald 
in command of 38,000 men of which the Prussian Auxiliary 
Corps was a part, and on the extreme right, Schwarzenberg 
led the Austrian Auxiliary Corps, 30,000 strong. On 
June 28, 1812, the Emperor's army crossed the Niemen at 
Kovno and set out for Yilna. One week later, Jerdme 
crossed the river at Grodno, and on the following day 
Eugene crossed al a point between the other two armies, 
and followed the Emperor toward Vilna. 

To oppose the French, the Czar Alexander had in his first 
line two armies ready for service, one under Barclay de 
Tolly numbering aboul 120,000, with its headquarters at 
Yilna, the other .00,000 strong under Bagration, stationed 
near Volkovisk. A third army, some 40,000 in number, 
was in process of formation, while on the frontier of Turkey, 
a fourth of 50,000 waiterl the cessation of Turkish hostili- 
ties. Th<- Czar had placed his forces in the belief that, 
Napoleon would proceed againsl him in one large column, 
directed probably toward Yilna. This would be me1 by 
his larger force under Barclay, while Bagration's army com- 
ing from the south harassed its Hank and rear. Th<- ex- 
istence of Napoleon's second and third columns, of course, 
made such a procedure impossible, and the Tzar from the 
very beginning found himself acting on the defensive. In 
addition to his ignorance as to Napoleon'- method of ad- 
vance, Alexander was still working on the supposition that 
Austria and Prussia would remain neutral. 

On June 28, the Emperor's forces captured Vilna. His 
plan of campaign contemplated a piercing of his enemy's 
right wing, and then a continuation of operations againsl 
the communications of the hostile center and left. The 
advance to Vilna practically completed the firsl step of the 
scheme, for Barclay fell back, in accordance with ;i previ- 
ously arranged plan, to tie- entrenched town of Drissa, 
there to wait his reinforcement by Bagration. Such a 
junction was, of course, impossible, and within a few days 
v 



290 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

the absurdity of the position at Drissa, while the left wing 
was all but surrounded, became apparent, and Barclay 
began a withdrawal to Vitebsk. Unfortunately, the Em- 
peror had delayed at Vilna until he should hear of success 
against the army of Bagration, and did not, therefore, begin 
further activities until July 10, the very day on which 
Barclay set out for Vitebsk. 

And meanwhile, the operations against Bagration had 
gone sadly awry. Davout had been sent from Vilna in 
the direction of Minsk, there to crush Bagration's army 
when Jerome should have driven it against him. But the 
latter had been most dilatory, and had remained unaccount- 
ably immobile for four days in spite of Napoleon's urgent 
commands to move forward. As a result, Bagration was 
enabled by a detour through Bobruisk to avoid serious en- 
counter with Davout and to reach Smolensk on August 1, 
where on the following day, his army was united with that 
of Barclay. 

After a two weeks' rest, Napoleon on August 14, 1812, 
continued his operations. The indecisiveness of the cam- 
paign thus far was most vexatious to him at a time when 
he considered some conspicuous achievement essential, 
and urged him to advance farther into Russia, at a season 
when prudence advised taking a defensive position (though, 
perhaps, strategically, an undesirable one), and preparing 
for the winter. His initial move involved an attack against 
Smolensk, on the left bank of the Dnieper, which should 
cut off the Russian retreat to Moscow ; but before the 
operation could be completed, the Russians learned of his 
plan. Accordingly, they held the city only until they were 
sure of their communications, and then retired. 

The Emperor pushed hotly forward on the three hundred 
mile pursuit to Moscow. One great battle broke the con- 
tinuity of the march. Barclay, unwilling to risk his army 
in a pitched battle, was summarily removed and his place 
filled by Kutusov. The latter, knowing that his appoint- 



THE CAMPAIGNS IN RUSSIA AND LEIPZIG 2!)l 

ment had been made that he might fighl a bailie in defense 
of "holy Moscow," turned at Borodino, on September 4, 
IH1 C 2, to meel Mi«' army of the Emperor. The French forces 
were so strung on! along the Smolensk road that it was 
not until September 7, after he had made a careful recon- 
naissance of I Ik- field, that Napoleon was ready to attack. 

Kutusov's army of I 1 0,000 occupied an excellent position, 
increased in value by the addition of redoubts and other 
works. At 6 a.m. the action began an attack lull on 
the center supported by ;i turning movement against the 
hostile left flank by Poniatowski's corps. The great center 
redoubl was taken again and ;i ^» : i i 1 1 , but ECutusov handled 
his Forces skillfully and brought troops where they were 
most needed. Eugene, Ney, and Davout, late in Hie after- 
noon, united their commands and launched a greal blow at 
the Russian left center. The attack was a success and 
shattered the hostile line, but exhausted the assailants. 
Hurriedly, the marshals sent a requesl to the Emperor to 
throw in the Guard and complete with fresh troops what 
had been so ably begun. Bui the Emperor, 1500 miles From 
Paris and in a hostile country, in an unusual mood of pru- 
dence refused the request, and Kutusov made his way Lin- 
pursued From the bloody field. He had lost 40,000 men 
and lie had caused the French a loss of 30,000. The battle 
had served Napoleon only to open the road to Moscow. 

The occupation of the city, which look place September 
14, was a short-lived triumph. On the morning following, 
fires broke oul all over I Ik- city, probably set by I In- bands 
oF Russian patriots, and For two days Moscow was a sea ol" 
flames. Napoleon's position was a serious one. His army 
was in the liearl oF a hostile country, the supplies he had 
expected to find in the vicinity of Moscow were insufficient to 
support him, and he had of necessity lefl portions of his com- 
mand behind on his communications, so that now, Mac 
Donald (left), Schwarzenberg (right), and himself Formed 
the apices of a huge triangle, five hundred miles to a side. 



292 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

On October 4, he attempted to open negotiations for peace, 
but Alexander was keenly alive to the situation and de- 
clined resolutely to treat. Winter in Moscow was im- 
possible, and after three precious weeks of further delay 
in the hope of a possible peace, Napoleon moved out for 
Smolensk. He planned to go by a southern route which 
had not been touched by the advance, but a rough handling 
at Maloyaroslavetz forced him back to the main road to 
Smolensk. 

News had already come that both to the north at Polotsk 
and to the south near Minsk, the enemy were approaching 
his communications. But now came the advance guards 
of a sterner and more powerful foe — winter. By the time 
the Emperor reached Smolensk, the Russians all the time 
at his heels, the thermometer was registering zero weather, 
and his loss in horses and men had been frightful. Not 
over 50,000 actives of the 110,000 who had left Moscow 
remained to him at Smolensk. The weather had ruined 
discipline, and a whole army of stragglers followed as best 
they could. 

November 14, 1812, the French left Smolensk in four 
bodies, the Guard first, followed in turn by Eugene, Davout, 
and Ney. At Krasnoi the Emperor and his stepson were 
attacked by a superior force, but fought valiantly until 
they were reinforced by Davout. Ney had been lost sight 
of, and Napoleon was reluctantly obliged to leave him. 
But at Orcha, Ney rejoined the main army with less than 
half his corps, after a series of exploits that more than 
justified his sobriquet of "bravest of the brave." The 
shattered army pushed on with what speed it could to 
Borisov. 

Then came the terrible crossing of the Beresina. At 
Borisov, the corps of Oudinot and Victor joined, bringing 
the army up to 40,000 effectives. Fully as many stragglers 
were in the vicinity. Oudinot's men with great difficulty 
constructed bridges over the Beresina on November 26, 



THE CAMPAIGNS IN RUSSIA AND LEIPZIG 293 

and late in the afternoon, the infantry of that corps crossed. 
The foe had troops close at hand which attempted to impede 
the crossing, but Victor's corps by gallant efforts protected 
the miserable army. The military crossing was completed 
November 27, although great numbers of stragglers still 
remained on the east bank. Napoleon, sacrificing the 
chances of his army, allowed the bridges to remain a day 
longer, to permit these stragglers to cross, but on Novem- 
ber 29 he burned the bridges and left the remaining wretches 
on the other bank to their fate at the hands of the enemy. 

From the Beresina the retreat became a confused flight. 
Napoleon, seeing new and greater labors ahead, left for 
Paris on December 5. Ney with a valiant rear guard 
protected the dwindling army. Finally, on December 8, 
the wreck of the Grand Army crossed the Niemen at Vilna 
and the exhausted Russians were forced to let the pursuit 
drop. To the south, Schwarzenberg's Austrians were 
withdrawing to their own frontiers, and to the north, Yorck 
was already negotiating with the Russians for the treason- 
able surrender of the Prussian corps. Huge numbers of 
sick and stragglers had filtered back into Germany during 
the previous months, but of the Grand Army which had 
crossed the Niemen in the heat of June, a single organized 
body of less than 40,000 recrossed its ice-bound surface in 
December. 

B. THE AFTERMATH OF THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 

Napoleon left his retreating army at Smorgon December 5, 
1812, and traveled at top speed via Vilna, Warsaw, Dresden, 
and Mainz to Paris, reaching his capital at midnight De- 
cember 18-19. He knew that his presence was sorely needed 
in France. Vague rumors of disaster had alarmed the 
people. A conspiracy at the end of October, 1812, after 
Napoleon had not been heard from for a fortnight, had 
nearly succeeded in overthrowing his government by 
announcing his death. He in person had to reassert his 



294 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

authority, calm the fears of his people, and above all initiate 
measures to recoup his losses and defend his empire. 

To his councilors he painted his situation in the most 
favorable light possible. He had been defeated, he said, 
not by the Russians, but by the exceptionally early and 
severe winter weather. He had beaten the Russians in 
every battle. He had not lost a gun until he was forced 
to abandon artillery because of the lack of horses. His 
army, when he turned it over to Murat at Smorgon, was, 
he said, still in good condition, and could serve as a nucleus 
for a new force to save the empire. By such statements 
and by the force of his personality he reassured his ad- 
visers and, in some measure at least, allayed the excited 
fears of the people. 

Indeed, his position was by no means desperate so long 
as he could maintain his empire and its alliances intact. 
He had the resources of all western Europe, except Spain 
and Portugal, at his disposal. He could levy for troops 
and supplies upon all the countries from the Baltic to the 
Mediterranean. He could, by withdrawing his armies in 
Spain to the natural defensive line of the Pyrenees, divert 
a great force of trained and seasoned troops to meet the 
Russians. He still had the promise of alliance of Denmark, 
the Confederation of the Rhine, Saxony and Poland, Prussia, 
Austria, the Kingdom of Italy, and Naples. And above 
all, France itself was loyal to him. The Russian Czar, 
Alexander, would be bold if he attempted to defy the power 
of such a league. 

Napoleon, however, realized that his league had fatally 
weak links in Prussia and Austria. These states had so 
suffered at his hands that they could hardly be expected 
to maintain their loyalty to the French alliance when once 
the Emperor's power was broken. All depended upon 
their attitude. 

In Prussia, the news of the French disaster was as the 
dawn of a new day. When the ragged, starving remains of 



THE CAMPAIGNS IN RUSSIA AND LEIPZIG 20.5 

Napoleon's Grand Army streamed across the Prussian border, 
they sent a thrill of hope throughout the Prussian people. 
The tale of the extent of the di>trev> of the French spread 
rapidly from mouth to mouth. A few days later, news of 
the convention of Tauroggen (December 30, 1812), by which 
the Prussian general Yorck had betrayed Napoleon and saved 
the Prussian contingent by agreement with the Russians, 
increased the popular excitement. Yorek. by his treachery 
to the French, raised himself to the position of a national 
hero in the thoughts of the Prussians. The secret leagues^ 
like the Tugendbund (League of Virtue), which had flourished 
in Prussia and throughout Germany since the debacle of 
1806 with the desire of inspiring the people to work for the 
regeneration of the German fatherland, now openly pro- 
claimed that the moment for an uprising against the tyrant 
was at hand. In only one quarter was there hesitation — 
in the government. Frederick William III was still in fear 
of the power of Napoleon. He vacillated when the whole 
nation was aroused. In Berlin, where the French garrison 
was still in control, he disavowed the act of Yorck in sign- 
ing the convention of Tauroggen and sent repeated messages 
of assurance to Napoleon. All through the month of 
January, 1813, he was subject to the greatest of pressure, 
on the one hand from his fears that a fatal war would end 
in the extinction of his Kingdom, and on the other hand 
from the loyal enthusiasm of his aroused people. In Febru- 
ary he moved from his capital to Breslau, where he was less 
subject to the watch of the French. 

In Austria, the disaster to the French army failed to arouse 
any such national enthusiasm as in Prussia, but resulted 
in a marked independence of policy by the government. 
The chancellor, Metternich, had been responsible for the 
original alliance with Napoleon after Wagram, and had 
persuaded his Emperor, Francis, to cement this alliance 
by permitting the marriage of the Archduchess Maria 
Louisa to Napoleon. The advantages of the alliance so 



296 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

long as Napoleon remained powerful were obvious : ;i new 
condition was created, however, by the prospect of Napo- 
leon's fall. Metternich exerted himself, therefore, to pursue 
a policy which should guarantee the safety of Austria, 
maintain the dignity ot Francis, and insure his own reputa- 
tion. He first concluded a secret agreement with Russia 
(January. 1818) to cease hostilities, lie did not, however, 
venture at first It) repudiate t lie French alliance, but he 
initiated a policy of independence by putting Austria tor- 
ward as a mediator for a general peace. He was, indeed, 
feeling his way. By proposing mediation, he was taking 
no step inconsistent with his alliance with France, and yet 
he was moving definitely toward the independent position 
he desired Austria to assume in European affairs. 

In the meanwhile, Napoleon was exerting himself to 
prepare his country and his armies to resist whatever forces 
should he brought against them. At no time in his career 
were his energy and his genius more conspicuously dis- 
played than during the early months of 1813. lie pro- 
vided for the drafting of new levies of soldiers, and for their 
equipment and training. He raised funds by taking over 
the communal lands and disposing of them. He framed a 
new concordat with the Pope, induced him to sign it (Janu- 
ary 25, 1813), and reaped the advantage of it, even though 
two months later the Pope repudiated it. He kept in con- 
stant touch with the courts of Prussia and Austria, endeavor- 
ing to keep them within his alliance. He was working under 
high pressure, hut was accomplishing wonders. 

The danger-spot was Prussia. When Frederick William 
III removed to Breslau, he went outside the direct range 
of French influence as typified by the French garrison in 
Berlin. The unanimity of public opinion in favor of a war 
of liberation became evident to him. He recalled Scharn- 
horst and Gneisenau to assist in the organization, equip- 
ment, and training of the masses of enthusiastic volunteers, 
and Hardenberg as chancellor to be his chief councilor in 



THE CAMPAIGNS IN RUSSIA AND LEIPZIG 297 

conducting the governmenl at the crisis. He approached 
the government of Austria, seeking alliance, bul received 
no encouragement from Metternich. He al last, upon 
the advice of Hardenberg, turned to Alexander of Russia. 

When Alexander of Russia had reached the Prussian 
border, he had been temporarily halted by ;i division among 
his councilors. Kutusov, his commanding general, favored 
the abandonmenl of the pursuit ;il that point. Stein ur#ed 
the grander plan of advancing to liberate Europe from the 
oppression of Napoleonic tyranny, and prophesied the up- 
rising of l lie Prussian people. Alexander's hatred of Na 
poleon, his desire to play a great part in the history of Ins 
lime, and his belief thai his success would win him Poland, 
inclined him to follow I lie counsel of St<in. He moved his 
troops across the Niemen River, and (February, 1813) 
welcomed negotiations with Frederick William III. 

With both sovereigns agreed upon the main object, the 
negotiations proceeded rapidly. By I lie Treaty of Kalisch, 
signed February 26, L813, Russia and Prussia bound them- 
selves to an offensive and defensive' alliance. Prussia 
agreed to furnish 80,000 troops; Russia, 150,000. Alex- 
ander pledged himself to continue the war until Prussia 
was restored to her boundaries of 1805. Russia was to 
receive extensive acquisitions in Poland. Prussia was to 
receive compensation for lier Polish losses by annexations 
in noil hern Germany. A fortnighl later, Prussia made 
public the treaty and declared war on France (March 13, 
1813). 

At the same lime that this declaration was made, a new 
country in the north turned actively againsl Napoleon. 

Bernadotte, the crown prince of Sweden, when the news 
of the French disaster reached him, demanded the cession 
of Norway as the [nice of Swedish support. To accede to 
this demand would have been a base betrayal of Denmark, 
which had remained consistently faithful to the French 
alliance. Napoleon therefore refused. Bernadotte there- 



208 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

upon further cemented his alliance of 1812 with Great 
Britain by a new treaty of March 13, 1813, and landed 
12,000 troops in Swedish Pomerania, ready to operate 
against the French when the opportunity offered. 

Thus in the spring of 1813, Napoleon faced a coalition 
in the east of Russia and Prussia, had a Swedish force in 
the north prepared to strike at his communications, and 
was heavily engaged against the Spanish, Portuguese', and 
British in Spain. Though Austria was not at the moment 
against him, she had made evident her new independent 
policy. April 16, 1813, Napoleon left Paris to join his 
armies in the east. 

C. THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN TO THE ARMISTICE 

Although the Grand Army had retreated into Poland 
little better than a band of fugitives, there were troops in 
the Polish and Prussian fortresses which had not felt the 
burden of war. To Napoleon it seemed imperative that 
the line of the Vistula should be held. Accordingly he 
admonished Eugene, whom he had placed in supreme com- 
mand, of the necessity of presenting a bold front to the 
Russians. But the defection of Yorck, and the hike warm 
attitude of the Austrians in withdrawing to their own 
frontiers, combined with evidences of such strong antipathy 
to the French as threatened actual uprising, persuaded 
Eugene to withdraw from Posen, and ultimately to take 
up a position at Magdeburg on the Elbe. Here reinforce- 
ments were gradually collected about him until he had an 
army of 00,000 guarding the line of the river. To his right 
rear, the Emperor had collected another force of 105,000 
on the lower Main ; a third force of 40,000 was hurrying 
from Italy 

The allied army at the opening of the campaign num- 
bered about 130,000. The right wing, 50,000 strong, under 
Wittgenstein, was marching on Magdeburg; the left wing, 
a force of 40,000 under Bliicher, was directed on Dresden ; 



THE CAMPAIGNS IN RUSSIA AND LEIPZIG 299 

while the center reserve of 40,000, under Kutusov, was 
following a center route but was still far to the rear when 
activities commenced. More units were being formed, 
and great hope was placed in the prospect of reinforcement 
by Austria. The allied commanders feared an attack on 
Berlin, but they nevertheless determined to assume the 
offensive, devising a plan which involved a march down the 
Elbe, rolling up the French line as they went. 

The Emperor had hoped that his foe would march so 
far south that he would be able to cut him off from Prussia 
by an advance from Magdeburg, but when on April 25, 
1813, he joined the army at Erfurt, he found that the enemy 
was in two main bodies, one to the south and one to the 
north of Leipzig. lie therefore abandoned his first plan 
and determined on a concentration near Merseburg, fol- 
lowed by a frontal advance which should push the allies 
across the Elbe. Eugene's army, composed of the corps of 
MacDonald, Lauriston, and Reynier, was ordered on Merse- 
burg, while the main army — the Guard, Ney, Marmont, 
Oudinot, and Bertrand — were advanced from near Erfurt. 
His advance guard arrived before Leipzig May 1, 1813, 
and there gained contact with the enemy. The main body 
was at this time some distance to the rear, and, since the 
Elbe protected them on the left, well to the right of the 
advance guard. 

The allied armies, meanwhile, had united, and learning 
of the arrival of troops before Leipzig, determined to strike. 
Mistaking Napoleon's strong advance guard for his main 
army, they devised the plan of attacking fiercely at Liitzen 
(to the west of Leipzig) with about 5000, while with their 
main body they endeavored to turn his right flank. The 
effect of this was, of course, to bring their main body full 
front to the Emperor's army marching to the right and rear 
of his advance guard. The attack at Liitzen began about 
9 a.m., May 2, and was proceeding spiritedly under the 
Emperor's personal direction, when suddenly there was 



300 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

heard the roar of cannon to the rear. Comprehending 
instantly its full import, Napoleon set out for the scene of 
action, where he at once prepared a battle-reserve. When 
the allies' attack began to slacken from exhaustion, he rushed 
forward a hundred guns which tore the hostile line to shreds, 
and through the holes he marched his reserve. The victory 
was complete, and had the Emperor possessed an adequate 
cavalry, annihilation of the beaten army would have fol- 
lowed. As it was, the allies retreated under cover of night 
from a field which should have been as decisive as Austerlitz. 

The retreat lay through Dresden, and thither Napoleon 
followed with five corps, while Ney with his own corps, 
Reynier's, Lauriston's, and a new corps under Victor, was 
sent to cross at Torgau in the hope of turning the enemy's 
position in the Saxon capital. At first the allies seemed 
disposed to dispute the crossing, for they established artil- 
lery on the bank in the vicinity of the bridges. A superior 
massing of artillery drove them out, however, and under 
cover of its fire, the bridges were built, and the army was 
pushed across. There was no further attempt to defend 
the city, and a reconnaissance to the east showed that the 
foe was rapidly retiring. Contact was not again effected 
until the line of the Spree was reached. 

Here, near the little village of Bautzen, the allies had 
decided once more to risk an encounter. Their first line 
of defense was that of the river itself, but behind that on 
the heights was a second line of considerable strength to 
which they proposed to fall back. The Emperor's army 
as we have seen was marching in two bodies, one from 
Dresden (Napoleon), and one from Torgau (Ney), the second 
one about a day's march behind the first. When Napoleon 
had reconnoitered the hostile line, he determined upon a 
frontal attack which should drive it back from the river, 
whereupon he would strike it in the right flank with Ney's 
army and crush it. His plan worked almost mechanically. 
On May 20, the river line was everywhere pushed back, 



THE CAMPAIGNS IN RUSSIA AND LEIPZIG 301 

after hot fighting, and the French advanced to the right 
bank of the stream. Early next morning the attack began 
again, and in some places the French were repulsed. But 
Napoleon was not alarmed, for he had assured himself of 
the presence of Ney and was only waiting for the latter to 
attack in flank. When the assault came, the allied line 
was crumpled, and Napoleon, hastily throwing in his 
frontal reserve, was able within a few hours to congratu- 
late himself on the second great victory of the campaign. 

Again the lack of cavalry had left him powerless to pre- 
vent the enemy from making an orderly retreat, and again 
the pursuit had to begin, this time directed toward Silesia. 
But by the middle of May, the behavior of Austria alarmed 
the Emperor, and he opened negotiations with a view to 
peace. On June 1, 1813, a thirty-six-hour armistice was 
agreed to, a lull in operations which was gradually lengthened 
to a six weeks' suspension of war. 

D. THE ARMISTICE 

Historians, knowing the disorganization and weakness 
of the allied armies following their successive defeats, have 
marveled at Napoleon's short-sighted policy in concluding 
the armistice of Plaswitz, June 1, 1813. Napoleon's own 
losses, however, had been exceptionally heavy, and he sorely 
needed time to procure the additional cavalry to drive his 
victories home. Also, he feared the policy of Austria, and 
hoped by bringing up troops from Italy to overawe her 
government and force it to remain neutral. Possibly had 
he realized the extent of demoralization among his enemies, 
he would have waived these advantages of an armistice 
and continued the campaign to a decision. 

During the armistice both belligerents worked furiously 
to strengthen their position for the ensuing struggle. Fresh 
troops were brought up ; supply lines established and 
improved ; and all possible done to equip the armies for 
the reopening of the war after the armistice. 



302 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

Austria was recognized as the critical state now, however, 
as Prussia had been in the first months of the year. Prussia, 
Russia, and Sweden, after some preliminary difficulties 
over the question of Hanover, reached an agreement with 
Great Britain by which British subsidies were allowed, but 
they found Metternich of Austria hard to deal with. Met- 
ternich had, indeed, now fully resumed for Austria full 
independence of policy. He was guided by a purely Aus- 
trian policy. He purposed to reestablish the old continental 
equilibrium of power between Austria, Prussia, Russia, 
and France. He was unwilling to encourage Russia's 
aggrandizement. He distrusted the popular movement 
in Prussia. He did not desire to weaken unduly the French 
Empire. He saw the opportunity of advancing Austrian 
interests by dictating to Napoleon the terms of peace. 
Metternich's proposals as mediator were laid before Na- 
poleon June 7, 1813, and involved the abolition of the Grand 
Duchy of Warsaw and the Confederation of the Rhine; 
the restoration of the Illyrian provinces to Austria ; the 
surrender of the Hanseatic towns and of the northern Ger- 
man states ; and the re establishment of Prussia in her 
boundaries of 1805. Shortly afterwards, while Napoleon 
was deliberating on these terms, Metternich signed the 
Treaty of Reichenbach with the Russian-Prussian allies 
(June 27, 1813), agreeing to join them in the war if the 
terms were not accepted. 

Napoleon might well have agreed to these terms. They 
left him a huge empire, far greater than the France of the 
Bourbon Kings. It was, however, galling to his pride 
to think of returning to Paris with diminished empire. He 
consented to a congress to discuss the terms and dispatched 
a representative thereto, but continued to push feverishly 
his preparations for a renewal of the campaign. 

The Congress of Prague was in session from July 15 to 
August 10, 1813. After agreeing upon an extension of the 
armistice from July 20 to August 20, the delegates entered 



THE CAMPAIGNS IN RUSSIA AND LEIPZIG 303 

upon a discussion of possible terms of peace along the lines 
laid down by Metternich. The French representative, 
Caulaincourt, could not, however, obtain from Napoleon 
the authority to accept these terms. Finally, as negotia- 
tions continued to drag, Metternich put forth Austria as 
armed mediator and delivered to Napoleon an ultimatum 
that the terms must be accepted by August 10 or Austria 
would enter the war on the side of the allies. When August 
10th arrived and Napoleon had failed to answer the ulti- 
matum to the satisfaction of Austria, the Congress declared 
itself dissolved. Two days later, August 12, 1813, Austria 
declared war against France. 

E. THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN TO THE BATTLE OF LEIPZIG 

The Emperor had during the armistice greatly increased 
his armies by the addition of levies from France so that at 
the resumption of hostilities his army numbered nearly 
420,000 effectives. The allies had augmented their forces 
by recruiting as well as by the addition of the Austrian 
contingent, and must have had in the field 435,000 men. 
These figures had been placed as high as 700,000 and 860,000 
respectively, but the lesser figures are certainly more ac- 
curate as a comparison of the power of the two combatants. 
Of the Emperor's enemies, Bernadotte with the Swedes 
and Prussians (135,000) lay near Berlin; Blucher, 95,000 
Russians and Prussians, about Breslau ; and Schwarzenberg, 
180,000 Austrians and Russians, in Bohemia. 

The Emperor's position called for the exercise of all his 
talents, but was far from being an unsatisfactory one at 
the opening of this phase of the campaign. He was deter- 
mined to strike a blow at his old lieutenant, Bernadotte, 
while waiting to see what the main body of his enemy should 
propose. With the Austrians on the move behind the 
Bohemian mountains, he knew that his position in Silesia 
was too advanced, and accordingly withdrew the bulk of his 
army to Bautzen. From here he directed Oudinot against 



304 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

Berlin, supporting him by troops from the lower Elbe. 
Such an advance if successful would not only capture the 
Prussian capital, but could continue and relieve the French 
garrisons in Danzig and the Oder fortresses. 

While waiting for the consummation of this scheme, 
Napoleon made an experimental move toward Blucher, 
hoping to draw him into an exposure of his real intentions, 
but the wily old Prussian simply retreated before the ad- 
vancing French, drawing them farther and farther into 
Silesia. At this juncture, the Emperor learned that the 
Austrians were advancing in force down the Elbe, threaten- 
ing to take Dresden and to cut his communications with 
France. Leaving MacDonald to watch Blucher, Napoleon 
hurried his army to Bautzen, planning meanwhile a inarch 
across the mountains to Konigstein which should result 
in a battle bound to be decisive. But at Bautzen he re- 
ceived word from St. Cyr, garrisoning Dresden, that Schwar- 
zenberg was already through the defiles, and that if the 
fortress were to be saved, help must come at once. Re- 
fusing to give up entirely his proposed march into Bohemia, 
the Emperor ordered Vandamme's corps to effect the cross- 
ing to Konigstein, while with the main army he himself 
set out for Dresden. He was only just in time, for Schwar- 
zenberg's six columns were close to the city, and the battle 
was already under way when the French from Bautzen 
began to arrive. 

The battle began late in the afternoon of August 26, 
1813. The superior numbers of the Austrians soon told 
on the defenders, and St. Cyr had begun a slow withdrawal 
when the Emperor arrived. Night gave an opportunity 
to put the new arrivals in position, and to formulate a 
plan. A severe rain storm which occurred during the night 
placed the Austrians with their heavy artillery at a disad- 
vantage, of which the French were soon aware. In the 
morning, the Emperor began an operation unusual for him 
— an attack on both flanks of his opponent. The cannon 



THE CAMPAIGNS IN RUSSIA AND LEIPZIG 305 

of the Dresden redoubts were, he thought, able to hold off 
the attacks from the Austrian center while a spirited assault 
on the hostile right would leave him free to carry out the 
portion of his scheme to which he looked to bring success — 
the assault on the hostile left. A ravine just to the south 
of the city ran between the allied center and left, and upon 
the wing thus isolated, the blow was launched. So effective 
was this that the isolated portion of Schwarzenberg's line 
was completely crushed, less than one fourth of it escaping. 
The success of Ney's assaults on the other flank made 
necessary a withdrawal of the center and by late afternoon 
the allies were in full flight. For the third time, the lack 
of cavalry rendered sterile what was the last great victory 
of the Empire. 

Success did not lie wholly with the French, however. 
When Napoleon withdrew to Bautzen, preparatory to 
Dresden, Bliicher seized his opportunity and administered 
a telling defeat to MacDonald. The Austrians, retreat- 
ing into Bohemia, came upon Vandamme at Kulm, his 
corps across their road, and by sheer force of numbers 
overpowered him. Within a few days came word that 
Oudinot had been repulsed at Grossbeeren, south of Berlin, 
and Ney at Dennewitz. 

But when the Emperor hastened eastward to repair the 
damage done to MacDonald, Bliicher retreated before him, 
and Schwarzenberg again advanced down the Elbe. Back 
came the Emperor to overwhelm the Austrians only to find 
that the latter had retired. Time was working for the allies, 
and they did not mean to risk another defeat. Napoleon's 
activities of this period of the campaign do not show him 
at his best. Indeed, his numerous marches back and forth 
from Bautzen earned from the sneering peasants the title 
of "The Bautzen Messenger." When, finally, he reviewed 
his situation, he decided upon a stand somewhere behind 
the Elbe which would enable him to start anew in the spring. 

The determination to execute this plan brought him on 



306 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

October 13 to Diiben. His enemies lay as follows : Berna- 
dotte at Halle, Bliicher at Wittenberg, Schwarzenberg to 
the south of Leipzig. Plainly the only way to overcome 
them was to turn first on one, and then on the other. Bliicher 
was the first objective. But by now the Prussian had 
moved westward from Wittenberg and at the moment of 
Napoleon's operation, Bernadotte was between the Prus- 
sians and the French. The attack, therefore, came upon 
the timid Bernadotte who at once withdrew, leaving Na- 
poleon, as he thought, free to deal with Schwarzenberg. 
But though the Emperor was acting on interior lines, he 
had not left himself room to operate to advantage, and he 
had lost sight of Bliicher — the real danger to his success. 
When, therefore, he turned to meet the Austrians, although 
he was in no danger from Bernadotte, Bliicher was within 
a day's march. 

On October 16 began the Battle of the Nations. Na- 
poleon had massed his troops to the east of Leipzig, prepared 
to meet Schwarzenberg's Austrians who were approaching 
in converging columns down the valleys of the Elster and 
Pleisse, with the heaviest column on the right hand of the 
latter. Farther to the west, a third column under Ginlay 
was pressing northward in the double hope of destroying 
the bridge on the road to Erfurt, and of uniting with Bliicher 
when the latter should arrive from the north. The French 
positions were undisturbed by the Austrian onslaughts, 
and Ginlay 's column completely failed in its mission. In 
the afternoon, however, there came disturbing news from 
northwest of the city, that Bliicher was closing in on the 
city and had already reached the suburb of Mockern. 
Detachments of French troops were sent to oppose him, 
and in the early evening, before the little village, there 
occurred some of the most furious fighting of the Napoleonic 
wars. Nightfall brought success to the Prussians, and left 
Napoleon occupying a space far too restricted for success- 
ful handling of his forces. 



THE CAMPAIGNS IN RUSSIA AND LEIPZIG 307 

He had hoped, as we have seen, to defeat Schwarzenberg 
before Bliicher could arrive, but he had allowed himself 
licit her time nor space in which to complete such a plan. 
On the second day of the battle, therefore, he could only 
resist the attacks of his enemies, directed against him from 
the same quarters, and in much the same fashion as on the 
day previous. Again Ginlay's column was driven in upon 
the main Austrian column, a success which enabled Napoleon 
to make sure of the bridge across the Elster on the Erfurt 
road. 

It was a fortunate gain for the French, for on the third 
day, Bernadotte's army came in on the northeast and filled 
the gap between Bliicher and Schwarzenberg. The Em- 
peror's situation was now hopeless. Pressed on three sides 
by the savage attacks of his enemies, he gave the orders 
to retreat from the disastrous field. Bravely the French kept 
open their single line of retreat to the west, and by daybreak 
a full half of the army was across the Elster. Defeat was 
certain, but the Emperor's troops were well handled, the 
enemy was in the utmost confusion, and the sturdy French 
battalions still on the right bank of the Elster were cover- 
ing the crossing skillfully. 

The Emperor had ordered that bridges be constructed 
across the Elster at Lindenau, but for some reason his 
commands were not carried out, and the whole army found 
itself struggling to cross by a single bridge. When morn- 
ing dawned, the allies, seeing the battle field abandoned, 
pressed rapidly into the city and beat against the defenders 
of the bridge. Already the Russians were close upon it 
when a sudden explosion (accidental, it has always been 
supposed) blew the bridge into bits. Immediately the 
Italian and Rhine troops, still on the Leipzig side, sur- 
rendered, or turned against their French allies, who after 
maintaining the attack against overwhelming odds, plunged 
into the river, where many were drowned. 

Napoleon's retreat lay across the front part of Schwar- 



308 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

zenberg's army, and it would seem that energetic measures 
would have completed the ruin begun at Leipzig. Nothing 
was done, however, and the beaten army, now reformed, 
began its march to the Rhine by way of Erfurt, without 
serious interference. Near Hanau, 50,000 men under Wrede, 
marching north from Bavaria, placed themselves across the 
way and attempted to halt the retreating army. For three 
days they contested the French retreat obstinately, but were 
at last forced aside. Two days later (November 2), the 
fleeing army crossed the Rhine at Mainz, its numbers now 
reduced to about 70,000. 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE FIRST ABDICATION 

A. THE FRANKFORT NEGOTIATIONS 

With the advance of his army after the shattered French, 
Alexander of Russia reached Frankfort November 7, 1813. 
The question then arose : Should the allies push their forces 
across the Rhine for the invasion of France proper ? 

At the beginning of the discussion, only the Prussian 
generals Blucher and Gneisenau favored invasion. The 
Prussian people, burning with resentment at their past 
humiliations, looked forward to the joy of revenge. The 
representatives of the other powers, however, paused before 
the probable difficulties of invasion and the problems which 
would result. Alexander's generals had wished to stop at 
the Niemen : all the more did they urge the cessation of 
hostilities at the Rhine. The allied armies had suffered 
severely in the defeats at Lutzen, Bautzen, and Dresden, and 
even in the victories at Katzbach, Grossbeeren, Kulm, 
Dennewitz, and Leipzig. The Russian advisers could see 
no advantage which would accrue to Russia from further 
operations. The risk of defeat at the hands of a martial 
French people, aroused by the disgrace of invasion and led 
by the genius of Napoleon, was too great. Political con- 
siderations influenced Metternich of Austria to be of the 
same opinion. The allied successes had avenged Marengo, 
Austerlitz, and Wagram, had freed Austrian territories, and 
cleared the French from Germany. The Austrian purposes 
were thus achieved. Further successes would merely 
strengthen Russia and Prussia, who under normal conditions 
were Austria's traditional foes. Even England hesitated 



310 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

momentarily at the prospect of invading France. Welling- 
ton had taken no significant forward movement after his 
victory at Vittoria, and the British representatives at Frank- 
fort were willing to negotiate. 

Hence from Frankfort the allies sent a message to Napo- 
leon, November 9, 1813, offering peace on the condition that 
the French surrender all the conquests and claims of France 
beyond the Pyrenees, the Alps, and the Rhine. France was 
thus to be confined within what were regarded as her natural 
boundaries. The allies insisted upon the acceptance of these 
terms before further negotiations, and announced that they 
expected an answer before December 1. Their messenger 
reached Paris with the proposals November 14, 1813. 

Napoleon had arrived at his capital upon his return from 
his retreating army November 4, 1813. He understood his 
position thoroughly, and again bent his energies toward 
raising the men and supplies necessary to defend France. 
He had not had time to make great progress before the allied 
offer reached him. 

Napoleon realized that the terms proposed from Frank- 
fort were liberal under the circumstances, yet he could not 
bring himself to an outright and definite acceptance of them. 
His memory of the extent of his empire, his dreams of pan- 
European dominion, his claim to be inheritor from Charle- 
magne, his sense of humiliation at the prospect of acknowl- 
edging before France that he had grasped for more than he 
could hold — these very human influences led him to tempor- 
ize. He did not reject the offer ; but he did not accept the 
terms as the bases of negotiation : he answered (November 
16, 1813) by suggesting that a congress be held at Mannheim 
for the consideration of peace. 

If Napoleon really desired peace on the terms offered by 
the allies, his answer was ill considered, for by neglecting to 
accept the provisions named it gave his enemies the op- 
portunity to withdraw them. And in the few days which 
elapsed between the dispatch of the allies' offer and the 



THE FIRST ABDICATION 311 

receipt of Napoleon's answer, the attitude of the representa- 
tives of the great powers changed radically. Information 
reached them of the pitiable condition of the wreck of 
Napoleon's army, of the universal war-weariness in France, 
of the great difficulty Napoleon was meeting in his attempts 
to raise men and supplies. In addition, the official British 
attitude changed as a result of a burst of popular indignation 
when it became known that the terms offered Napoleon had 
not comprised the surrender of Holland and the Netherlands. 
The feeling that no strong continental power could be suffered 
to maintain a foothold across the English Channel had long 
inspired the popular conception of what should be British 
policy. Thus when Napoleon's answer reached the repre- 
sentatives of the great powers, they united in regarding it as 
unsatisfactory, and proceeded to draw up their plans for 
crossing the Rhine for the invasion of France. A few more 
futile notes followed, Napoleon even going so far as to accept 
the terms as a basis of negotiation, but the allies were no 
longer disposed to treat with him. When November closed, 
the allies considered that their ultimatum had not been met. 
On the last day of December, 1813, they began to move 
troops across the Rhine. 

B. THE PENINSULAR WAR 

Before proceeding to this campaign in France, however, we 
may well outline the military operations in the Spanish 
peninsula and bring them into such perspective that the 
general military situation in the last few fatal months will 
be clear. 

The account of the campaign in the Peninsula was dropped 
at the moment when Wellington had been repulsed before the 
fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz in the autumn of 
1811. The French still held the gates on the Portuguese 
frontier while Wellington was master in Portugal; and 
though, if the French wished to complete the subjugation 
of Andalusia, they would have Wellington on their flank, the 



312 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

latter in his turn would be harassed in precisely the same way 
should he attempt to operate in the valley of the Douro. 
When operations began in the spring of 1812, the pocketbook 
of Britain began to assert its superiority, for Wellington 
subsisted his armies from well-filled magazines supplied by 
British transports, whereas the French were obliged to 
scatter in order that they might forage in a reluctant country. 

The guerrillas were becoming each day more powerful, and 
were a constant menace to the French communications. 
The French armies, some 175,000 strong, still greatly out- 
numbered Wellington's forces, but for the reasons just given 
this superiority was more apparent than real. 

The campaign of 1812 began with two swift attacks by 
Wellington on the border fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and 
Badajoz (January and March, 1812). The element of sur- 
prise contributed largely to Wellington's success, but there 
were days of very bloody fighting at both places before that 
success was complete. With the gates to Portugal in his 
hands, he no longer feared an attack in his rear when he 
moved into the Douro valley. Accordingly, in June, he 
moved on Marmont's forces there. An attempt on the part 
of the latter to interpose his army between that of Wellington 
and the fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo brought on the battle of 
Salamanca, where the British won a decisive victory (July 
22, 1812). Marmont fell back on Burgos, and Wellington, 
after routing Joseph, occupied Madrid. Soult now raised 
the siege of Cadiz and, abandoning Andalusia, hurried over 
the mountains into Valencia, where he joined Suchet. 

In September, Wellington marched against the French 
army of the north now concentrated at Burgos. For over a 
month he laid siege to the citadel without effect. Then, 
learning that Soult was approaching from Valencia, he 
directed the evacuation of Madrid and withdrew his army 
to Ciudad Rodrigo. The French pressed the pursuit warmly. 
The close of the campaign had, it was true, been unfavorable 
to the British, but they had won a notable victory at Sala- 



THE FIRST ABDICATION 313 

manca, they had occupied the Spanish capital, and their 
operations had forced the French to abandon Andalusia. 

In the spring of IS 1 : > , Wellington, now commander-in- 
chief of the British, Spanish, and Portuguese forces, found 
himself in command of troops totaling 200,000, of which 
75,000 were his own British regulars and seasoned Portuguese. 
These were massed near Ciudad Rodrigo, and the Spanish 
nationalists were scattered about Spain, there being one 
army of 40,000 in Leon, on Wellington's lefl flank. To 
oppose them, the French had 165,000, of which number 
Suchet's 55,000 were in Valencia and Catalonia, and the 
remainder in the Tagus and Douro valleys on the Burgos 
line of invasion under the command of King Joseph. Mar- 
niont and Sonll had both been recalled to France, leaving 
Joseph with only second-rate generals under his command. 

When Wellington began his advance in May, 1S1:>, there 
was no one on the opposing side skillful enough to divine his 
purpose. A divided attack was proposed, a junction on the 
battle field being part of the scheme. It was very daring, 
for at one time the two portions of the army (under Graham 
and the Duke) were fifty miles apart. But Wellington knew 
his junior, and the scheme worked. The French, their right 
flank on the Douro turned, fell back in haste. The Spaniards 
on Graham's left joined the allies and the advance continued, 
through Burgos, to the Ebro, to Vittoria. Santander on the 
north coast was taken and a new base established, the long 
lines to Lisbon being abandoned. At Vittoria, Joseph made 
his last stand in Spain. Another converging attack by the 
allies met on the battle field from which the weak King fled 
in dismay, leaving his troops, his treasure, and his kingdom 
behind (June 21, 181S). 

Vittoria is the high tide of British success in the Peninsula. 
There was severe fighting in the Pyrenees following that 
battle, but before winter stopped the campaign, the British 
held the line of the Nive, and the French had withdrawn 
from Catalonia on the east flank of the mountains. 



514 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

in F 1814, SouH was ed from his spk 

achievements in the 1 - mpaigi pair the damage 

^ ria Bui his army of recruits was helpless 
before the Duke's veterans. Though Souh never displayed 
more ably his qualities - g ueral, he was driven i 

one ami forced back to roulouse. Her v.vil 10. 

1814, he attempted to stem the British advance ami m; 
brave stand, but again the superiority of the seasoned soldier 
displayed itself. In the night he retreated, leaving 
Dnke in possession of the city. Before hostilities could be 
renewed, the new- oi Pontainebleau ami of Napoleon's 
abdication reached the opposing forces 1". w thereupon 
terminated operations by a convention. 

The five J rs varying fortunes had been compl 
favorably to Britain. Her success there had by no means 
been the smallest contribution to the downfall of Napoleon. 

C. THE DEFENSE OF FRANCE 

Wo turn now back to Napoleon's defense of France. The 
Emperor hoped to be left in peace until the spring, by which 
time his new levies might have been whipped partly into 
shape for the campaign. Long before then, however, the 
allies were agreed as to the urgency for an invasion of France. 
Consequently. Napoleon was forced to tight with an army 
never greater than 90,000. These figures do not represent 
France's total strength in the held : Eugene with 50,000 was 
in Italy ; Soult and Suchet had fully 100.000 in the Pyrenees 
and southern France; and the German fortresses, which 
Napoleon was determined to hold, absorbed 50,000 more. 
These last were entirely lost to him. because the fortresses 
were at once invested. Such, then, were the armies, pitifully 
small by comparison, which were to endeavor in vain to stem 
the great tide of allied invasion — five armies advancing 
through Belgium, on the upper and lower Rhine, in Italy, 
and from Spain. 

The tirst of the allied armies was that of Bernadotte. which 



THE FIRST ABDICATION 315 

for the moment consumed a great part of its strength in be- 
sieging the Netherlands and the German fortresses, but 
which, nevertheless, was able to detach two corps yto.000) 
under Billow for service in the field. The second army was 
Blticher's Army oi Silesia, 70.000. advancing through Cob- 
lenz and Main.-. The third was Schwarzenberg*s Army of 
Bohemia, 200,000, which planned to enter France near Basle. 
The fourth was Bellegarde's Army o( Northern Italy. 50,000. 
And the fifth was Wellington's combined British, Spanish, 
and Portuguese army. 100.000. operating at the moment in 
the Pyrenees and southern France. It will be seen at a 
glance that Bliicher and Schwarzenberg were the most 
immediate and dangerous of the enemies Napoleon had to 
face. It was by them that the issue was decided. 

At the very outset o( the campaign, difficulties developed 
between Blticher and Schwarzenberg as to the proper method 
of procedure. Blticher, a courageous officer and a thorough 
tighter, wished to push straight through the Rhine fortresses, 
take them, or, failing that, mask them, and march on Paris ; 
Schwarzenberg, timid and awed by the prospect of fighting 
the terrible Emperor in his own country, wished to turn the 
line of fortresses by entering from Switzerland. As a result 
of the difference of opinion, the invasion was made in two 
columns, each general following his own plan, so that Napo- 
leon was able to make the very most out of the situation, ami 
with an army much weaker than the combination of his 
enemies would have presented, to hold up their advance 
for many weeks. 

The theater of operations was east of Paris, in the valleys of 
the continent rivers, the Aisne, the Ourcq, the Marne, the 
Aube. the Seine, and the Yonne. but chiefly in that portion 
between the Marne ami the Seine. The main roads to Paris 
which the allies were obliged to use follow these rivers, so 
that it was necessary for the allies to force these streams at 
the points of crossing. None of them is very wide, but all are 
so deep that the bridges are points of supreme importance. 



816 l'HK HISTORY OF EUROPE 

The country about them is all open cultivated land, suitable 
for the passage of armies : but in the winter and early spring 
much of the country next to the rivers becomes impassable 
and movements of troops are therefore confined to the 
highways. 

It was a field admirably adapted for a defensive campaign. 
In it. the Emperor disposed his meager forces to oppose his 
advancing foes. He divided his army into three parts: a 
main body, and a right and left wing. By holding the 
bridges on either side with one wing, he could move his center 
freely to the support of the other wing, thus striking one 
opponent with the bulk of his forces while the other was 
being contained at the river crossings by the smaller part of 
his command. 

Bliicher crossed the Rhine January 1. 1814, and within a 
few days Schwarzenberg pushed through the Belfort gap. 
Napoleon's army, composed of the corps of MaeDonald. 
Ney. and Victor, and the Imperial Guard under Mortier and 
Oudinot. was disposed to meet the foe and delay him as much 
as possible until the Emperor should arrive in person. 
Bliicher pushed back Marmont from Met/. Victor and Ney. 
falling back through the \ sg 5, oined Marmont at Nancy 
and together retired, first upon St. Dizier, and then upon 
Vitry-le-Francais. Simultaneously, Mortier had retreated 
before Schwarzenberg through Rar-sur-Aube to Troyes, 
M.u Donald, marching south through Belgium, was ap- 
proaching Chalons. This was the situation when Napoleon 
arrived in Chalons January 25, 1814. 

He pictured Bliicher as marching through >t. Diner to 
join Schwarzenberg, and decided to strike him in flank. 
January 00. he began the first of those swings from river to 
river which were to be so disastrous to his foe. Leaving 
MacDonald as his left wing to hold the Marne. he attacked 
the Prussian detachment at St. Dizier, drove it out. and 
turned southward on the rear oi Bliicher's troops. At the 
same time he ordered Mortier (his right wing in from Troves 



THE FIRST ABDICATION 317 

to cooperate with him. The Prussian general was pursued 
until he came into touch with Schwarzenberg's army, when, 
strongly reinforced, he turned and faced the Emperor at La 
Rothiere. Napoleon would gladly have retired in the face 
of such superior numbers, but conditions were such that he 
could not cross the Aube without an encounter. In the 
battle of La Rothiere, which followed February 1, 1814, his 
lines were so badly broken that in the night he slipped away 
and fell back on Troyes. 

Meanwhile, the rear of Blucher's column, which had not 
arrived at St. Dizier when Napoleon's first blow fell, was forc- 
ing MacDonald rapidly westward on the Chalons-Chateau- 
Thierry road. Bliicher who, impatient with Schwarzen- 
berg's caution, had decided to operate separately in the valley 
of the Marne, moved northward (February 3) through La 
Fere-Champenoise to join his two corps who were pursuing 
MacDonald, now at Meaux. Here was Napoleon's second 
chance. Leaving Victor and Oudinot (one half the Guard) 
as his right wing to hold the crossings of the Seine, he hurried 
across the valley through Sezanne and struck the flank of 
the Army of Silesia strung out along the road from Vertus to 
La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. His blow cut Blucher's army in 
half. Leaving Marmont to face Bliicher himself at Etoges, 
the Emperor turned full on the two corps to the west, beat 
them badly at Montmirail (February 11), and finally drove 
them across the Marne. There, pursued by Mortier, they 
could rejoin Bliicher only by a roundabout march through 
Reims. Before they could arrive, Napoleon faced squarely 
about, inflicted with Marmont's help another defeat on 
Bliicher at Vauchamps (February 14), and drove him well 
toward Chalons, leaving Marmont to continue the pursuit. 
Marmont and Mortier thus formed his left wing on the 
Marne. 

In between the battles of La Rothiere and Montmirail 
the allies had again offered peace to the French Emperor, 
The kaleidoscopic changes in the military situation, hard 



320 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

Chaumont (February 23, 1814). Bliicher attempted to 
help his colleague in this reverse, and to that end moved 
south to the Seine at Mery. Oudinot's Guards, however, 
were able to hold him there and to nullify his attempt at 
assistance. 

The allies now determined to call in two corps from 
Bernadotte's Army of the North and unite them with 
Bliicher, a union which they planned to take place in the 
vicinity of Laon. Bliicher, therefore, moved north from 
Mery, and, as he advanced, drove the French left wing, 
Marmont and Mortier, across the Marne at La Ferte-sous- 
Jouarre, and later forced them into a position near Meaux 
where they held the bridges of the Marne and the Ourcq. 
Here was the Emperor's opportunity for the fourth great 
swing across the theater of war. Forming MacDonald and 
Oudinot into a right wing as a containing force against 
Schwarzenberg, Napoleon marched swiftly on La Ferte-sous- 
Jouarre, forced a crossing, and made his way to Chateau- 
Thierry in the hope of destroying Bliicher before the 
latter could unite with the corps from the north (March 3, 
1814). 

This gain the Emperor was forced to forego, but his act 
freed Marmont and Mortier who now joined him near 
Craonne. The junction was too late, however, to prevent 
Bliicher's reinforcement by Biilow near Soissons. The 
Prussian was now far distant from his Austrian colleague, 
and Napoleon might have contained him on the Aisne as he 
had formerly contained him on the Marne. Unfortunately, 
he chose to attempt Bliicher's destruction. With this in 
view, he crossed the Aisne and drove his opponent out of 
Craonne. At Laon, however, Bliicher made a stand in 
a position against which the French could accomplish 
nothing and from which they were repulsed with heavy 
loss. 

Again the scene shifts to the Seine and shows the fifth and 
last of those swift blows from side to side of the theater of 



THE FIRST ABDICATION 321 

war. Schwarzenberg had taken advantage of Napoleon's 
absenee in the north to push down the valley at Nogent and 
Bray. Napoleon, leaving Marmont to contain Blucher 
on the Aisne, hurried southward to cope with the new danger. 
At Reims he encountered and destroyed St. Priest's Prus- 
sian corps ; and here, also, he detached Mortier to support 
Marmont. Thence he pushed on to Arcis-sur-Aube. As soon 
as the news of his movements came to Schwarzenberg, the 
Austrian began a retreat up the Seine, the French right wing 
(MacDonald and Oudinot) close behind. Schwarzenberg's 
courage this time did not fail. Turning northward when he 
reached Troyes, he marched with greatly superior numbers 
upon the Emperor's army at Arcis-sur-Aube. The odds 
were so great that after a day's hard fighting Napoleon with- 
drew across the river (March 20, 1814). 

The Emperor next determined on a blow against his ad- 
versary's communications at a point far enough east to 
force them to retreat and to enable him himself to call in 
much needed troops from the Rhine fortresses. From Arcis, 
therefore, he moved on Vitry, drove out the Prussian gar- 
rison, and sent orders for Marmont and Mortier to join him. 
But the marshals were no longer in a position to obey. The 
allies, too, had determined on a new plan which made the 
occupation of Paris their first concern. They paid no at- 
tention to Napoleon's attack on their communications, but 
pushed straight on to the city, Schwarzenberg by the Seine, 
and Blucher by the Marne, driving Marmont and Mortier 
before him. The two armies established communications 
between the rivers and left one corps between them to hold 
off Napoleon until the city should fall. The steady advance 
of the allies brought them to the capital, where on the heights 
of Montmartre Mortier and Marmont were making a last 
attempt to save the city. In the last fight in the hills 
adjacent to Paris, the overpowering numbers of the allies 
forced the two marshals to surrender. The city itself 
capitulated March 31, 1814. 



322 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

D. THE FIRST ABDICATION 

Napoleon would fain have treated the fall of his capital as 
an event of no military importance, but political conditions 
in France determined otherwise. The capitulation of Paris 
marked in the minds of Frenchmen the definite end of 
effective resistance. The war was over. 

The Emperor himself, as he concentrated his army around 
Fontainebleau with the expectation of maneuvering to strike 
the enemy on the flank, was made aware of the hopelessness 
of further resistance. The news of the Senate's act in decree- 
ing the deposition of the Emperor, thus absolving the French 
people from their allegiance to him, strengthened the general 
feeling of desperation. Napoleon endeavored in vain to 
combat this depression. April 4, 1814, he addressed his 
Guard in an inspiring harangue : 

Soldiers ! The enemy, by making three days' march from 
our neighborhood, has made himself master of Paris. We 
must chase him thence. Certain men, emigres, unworthy of 
the name of Frenchmen, whom we had the weakness to for- 
give formerly, have made common cause with the foreigner, 
and have donned the white cockade. The cowards ! They 
shall receive the reward of this new attempt. Let us swear 
to conquer or die, to avenge the outrage offered to our native 
country and the honor of our arms ! 

Fanatically devoted to Napoleon, the rank and file re- 
sponded with enthusiastic cheers and cries of "We Swear." 
But Napoleon's marshals, no less loyal but much clearer of 
vision, recognized that the end had come. Though they 
dreaded the task of informing the Emperor that they could 
carry on no further, they felt this was necessary. They 
therefore confronted him with the facts and urged the 
impossibility of further action. Lefebvre, Oudinot, Ney, 
and MacDonald, marshals whose courage and loyalty had 
been so many times tested and found true, presented the 
situation to the Emperor. 



THE FIRST ABDICATION 323 

Before such facts thus presented Napoleon could no longer 
stand. He might, it is true, have appealed directly to his 
troops, but he could not discard the marshals who had been 
his lieutenants in so many campaigns. After a few hours of 
thought, therefore, he announced his willingness to abdicate 
in favor of his wife as regent for his young son. He then 
designated Marshals Ney and MacDonald to accompany 
Caulaincourt to Paris with the following communication : 

The Allied Powers having proclaimed that the Emperor 
Napoleon is the sole obstacle to the reestablishment of peace 
in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, 
declares his readiness to descend from the throne, to quit 
France, to lay down his life even for his country's good, 
which is inseparable from the rights of his son, from the 
regency in the person of the Empress, and from the mainte- 
nance of the laws of the Empire. Given at our palace of 
Fontainebleau, 4th April, 1814. 

A week later, after realizing that only an unconditional 
abdication would be acceptable to the victors, he drew up 
and sent by the same messengers the necessary words : 

The Allied Powers having proclaimed that the Emperor 
Napoleon is the sole obstacle to the reestablishment of peace 
in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oaths, 
declares that he renounces for himself and his heirs the 
thrones of France and Italy, because there is no personal 
sacrifice, not even of life itself, which he is not prepared to 
make in the interests of France. 

April 13th he agreed to the conditions of his exile at Elba, 
and April 26th, after an affecting farewell to his Guard, he 
was on his way south. 



CHAPTER XV 

THE LAST PHASE 

When Alexander of Russia and Frederick William of 
Prussia rode into Paris on the morning of March 31, 1814, 
their triumph signalized the solution of one problem and at 
the same time brought into the foreground two others. They 
had vanquished Napoleon : it remained for them to decide 
the future government of France, and to determine the read- 
justment of Europe. The second of these, the readjustment 
of Europe, in view of the vast and complicated interests at 
stake, had necessarily to be postponed for the deliberations 
of a general congress of the powers ; but decision with regard 
to the government of France had to be made at once. 

A. THE FIRST RESTORATION 

The immediate future of France lay admittedly in the will 
of Alexander of Russia, for it was generally conceded that his 
defense against Napoleon's invasion of Russia, his aid in 1813 
and 1814, and his policy of a direct drive upon Paris had been 
the principal factors in bringing about a final victory for the 
allies. He was nonplussed by his problem. He no longer 
considered Napoleon possible. He thought of a regency 
under Maria Louisa for Napoleon's son, the King of Rome ; 
of Prince Eugene ; of Bernadotte ; of a carefully organized 
conservative republic ; and especially of the Bourbons. 
Against each plan, however, serious objections existed. The 
shouts of Vivent les Bourbons raised by a little knot of royal- 
ists when he rode through Paris had not impressed him as 
much as the sullen apathy of the crowds. 

One man of political importance remained in Paris when 
all officialdom had fled by order to Blois. Prince Talley- 

324 



THE LAST PHASE 325 

rand had had a vision of the end of the Napoleonic regime, had 
contrived to get himself left behind in Paris, and now frankly 
offered his services to the Czar in dealing with the French 
situation. Alexander took up his quarters in Talleyrand's 
palace and expressed his confidence in Talleyrand's judg- 
ment: "You know France, its needs and its desires: say 
what we ought to do and we will do it." Thus given his 
opportunity, Talleyrand asserted the principle of legitimacy 
and pleaded the cause of the Bourbon house. To the Czar's 
objections, the astute diplomat answered that, once it was 
certain that no terms were to be made with Napoleon or with 
any member of his family, the legislative councils would of 
their own volition recall the Bourbons. It would thus 
appear that the legal representatives of the people had sum- 
moned the ancient monarchy back to France. 

Talleyrand's arguments convinced the vacillating Alex- 
ander. The Czar proclaimed that the powers would not 
treat with Napoleon or with any member of his family. 
Talleyrand hastily gathered together what remained of the 
Senate, created a provisional government with himself at its 
head, and published the Senate's decree of the deposition of 
Napoleon from the throne (April 3, 1814). Two days later 
the Senate at the instigation of the provisional government 
adopted a constitution, the second clause of which contained 
the words : "The French people freely calls to the throne of 
France Louis Stanislas Xavier, brother of the late King." 
A week afterwards the Comte d'Artois entered Paris and 
assumed the position of Lieutenant-General of the kingdom 
until his older brother, the Comte de Provence, should 
return. 

With the Comte d'Artois the allies discussed the terms of 
peace. Alexander counseled clemency to France as the 
surest guarantee of the permanence of Bourbon power, and 
his fellow sovereigns yielded. By the provisions of the 
Treaty of Paris (negotiated in April and finally signed and 
ratified May 30, 1814) the French boundaries were approx- 



326 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

imately those of 1792. France surrendered Belgium, the 
provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, the conquered 
territory in Holland, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, and 
a few small colonies. Actually, however, she emerged from 
her long series of wars with boundaries greater than those 
at the beginning. The European powers were astounded at 
their own generosity. 

In the meanwhile, as we have outlined at the close of the 
previous chapter, the Emperor Napoleon bowed to the 
inevitable and accepted the terms offered to him by his 
conquerors. He was allowed to retain his imperial title, was 
given the island of Elba in the Mediterranean Sea off the 
coast of Italy for his residence, and was allotted from the 
revenues of France an annual income of two million francs 
with adequate additional provision for members of his family. 
He reached his new home in Elba May 4, 1814. 

Just one day earlier, the Comte de Provence had entered 
Paris and assumed the crown as Louis XVIII. 

B. THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE 

Louis XVIII was bound by his brother's promise and by his 
own pledge^to give France a constitution. He redeemed his 
word by the issue June 4, 1814, of a Constitutional Charter. 
Although after the Revolution many patriots felt that a 
constitution should be an instrument, not granted by a 
sovereign, but drawn up by the representatives of the people 
and subscribed to by the sovereign, the Charter was liberal 
in its provisions and the desire for peace was overwhelming. 
The Charter, therefore, was peacefully accepted as the funda- 
mental law of France, and as such continued, except during 
the Hundred Days, until the Revolution of 1848. 

The Constitutional Charter was an attempt to graft the 
English constitutional system on the French body politic. 
It introduced into France the chief recognized English 
principles, the inviolate King as executive, the upper chamber 
composed of nobles, and the lower chamber chosen by an 



THE LAST PHASE 327 

electorate restricted by high property qualifications. The 
Chamber of Peers was to be appointed by the King either for 
life or for hereditary transmission, as he judged best. The 
Chamber of Deputies was elected for five years, one fifth 
retiring each year, by an electorate composed of men not less 
than thirty years old and paying not less than three hundred 
francs of direct taxes. Candidates for the lower chamber 
had to be men not less than forty years old paying not less 
than one thousand francs of direct taxes. By these restric- 
tions the Chamber of Deputies naturally became the repre- 
sentative of the wealthy interests in France. Out of a popu- 
lation of nearly 30,000,000, only 100,000 were eligible for the 
suffrage and only 12,000 for the election. The two Chambers 
were given full power over taxation in accordance with the 
English system, but the King had the sole power of initiating 
legislation. In the statement that all citizens were equal 
before the law, and in the guarantees of liberty of worship, 
liberty of the press, and trial by jury, the Charter revealed 
how far the restored Bourbon King was willing to accept the 
lessons of the Revolution. 

Louis XVIII himself was not badly qualified by temper 
and experience to meet he difficulties of the situation. He 
was wise enough to recognize that he inherited, not the 
France of Louis XIV but the France of the Revolution and 
of Napoleon. He had long been an exile and had no desire 
to "resume his travels." He had no passion for revenge 
for his suffering and the suffering of his class. He was skep- 
tical, good-natured, witty, and indolent beyond the general- 
ity of men. His personal attitude toward the problems of 
government was that of an opportunist who met each 
situation with the sole object of retaining his throne with the 
least labor and inconvenience to himself. 

The restoration, however, brought back to France a host 
of emigres inspired with feelings very different from those of 
the King. These men desired revenge and clamored for the 
restitution of their lost privileges. They looked confidently 



328 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

forward to the reestablishment of the old regime. They had 
been long in exile, usually passing their time amid courts and 
environments of the old familiar kind, and had learned 
nothing of the spirit of the new France. Many of them had 
fought in the allied armies against their own country, 
and all were completely estranged in sympathy from those 
who had accomplished and lived through the glories and 
dangers of the revolutionary and Napoleonic years. 

In little ways as well as big the new government quickly 
alienated the people. Its first act was to establish the white 
cockade as the badge of loyalty and to adopt the white flag 
of the Bourbon house as the national standard. The tricolor 
which had been carried to victory on a hundred battle fields 
was discarded as being a revolutionary symbol. Honors and 
high appointments n the army were distributed to the 
returning nobles. Thousands of the Napoleonic officers 
were summarily discharged to make room for these nobles. 
Ribbons of the glorious Legion of Honor were distributed to 
civilians of little merit. The Order of St. Louis was consti- 
tuted the sole military order in the kingdom. The influence 
of the Roman Catholic church at the restored court aroused 
a suspicion that it might be given back all of its former vast 
holdings in France. 

Thus big things and little combined to make the new 
regime unpopular. Tens of thousands of Napoleonic 
soldiers, too, released from the prison camps of the allies and 
from the fortresses on the Oder and on the Vistula, returned 
to spread discontent. The whole country became sullenly 
embittered against the restored regime. 

C. THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 

The second of the two problems confronting the victorious 
allies, the readjustment of Europe, had by common consent 
been postponed for the consideration of a general congress of 
the powers. In the Treaty of Paris, that treaty which had 
settled the boundaries of France, it was definitely provided 



THE LAST PHASE 329 

that "within the space of two months all the powers that have 
been engaged on either side in the present war shall send 
plenipotentiaries to Vienna to regulate in a general congress 
the arrangements that are necessary to complete the present 
treaty." 

After the nine days' wonder over the fall of Napoleon and 
his exile to Elba, all popular interest turned to Vienna. The 
Congress, originally set for August 1, 1814, was delayed for 
various reasons until about November 1. By that date most 
of the powers concerned had their representatives in the 
Austrian capital. Many monarchs, feeling that the issues 
at stake were too great to intrust to any plenipotentiary, 
established themselves in person at Vienna where they might 
be in immediate touch with the situation. Alexander I of 
Russia, Frederick William III of Prussia, Frederick VI of 
Denmark, and of course Francis I of Austria were among 
the most prominent monarchs present at Vienna during this 
time. Not only governmental interests, however, but 
interests of commercial bodies, racial societies, and religious 
organizations had their representatives at the congress. 
The publishers and authors had a representative. The Jews 
of Frankfort, Bremen, and Liibeck had representatives. 
The Roman Catholic interests of Germany contributed more 
than thirty representatives. And various districts, towns, 
corporations, and commissions added their delegates to the 
throng. Europe was to be reapportioned ; political, com- 
mercial, racial, and religious interests of great magnitude 
were at stake. In the matter of mere territories, it was 
estimated that the congress had at its disposal lands in- 
habited by thirty-two millions of souls, and each power was 
determined to use every conceivable resource of diplomatic 
strategy to secure what advantage it could. 

Francis I of Austria was host to the assembled royalties 
and diplomats. The possibility of vital differences was early 
foreseen, so Metternich, the Austrian chancellor, with the 
idea of easing so far as possible the personal relations between 



330 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

the diplomats, appointed a committee on entertainment 
whose duty it was to organize and carry on a continual 
round of social diversion. Military reviews and maneuvers, 
grand fancy dress balls, formal and informal banquets, excur- 
sions, and huge fetes followed one another with bewildering 
rapidity. The impoverished Austrian treasury is reported 
to have spent nearly thirty million florins ($15,000,000) in 
entertainment. 

Naturally enough, the four great powers (Russia, Prussia, 
Austria, and Great Britain) who had accomplished Napo- 
leon's overthrow expected to have the deciding influence in 
all matters brought before the congress. As early as the 
middle of September, before the representatives of the other 
states had assembled in Vienna, the plenipotentiaries of these 
four powers were meeting, formulating procedure for the 
coining congress, and agreeing to arrange among them- 
selves the disposition of the Polish, German, and Italian 
territories. 

As a matter of fact, the congress did not "open" Novem- 
ber 1, 1814, or at any subsequent date. The work for which 
it had been summoned was accomplished by a number of 
special committees. It was a popular fiction that the 
assembled rulers met daily and discussed familiarly before 
the social relaxations of the late afternoon and evening the 
complex problems of international politics with which they 
were confronted. The truth was that the practical work of 
the congress was done in these special committees by trained 
diplomats — men whose names are scarcely remembered 
today, as Wessenberg, Clancarty, Dalberg, Gentz, and La 
Besnardiere — who considered proposals, weighed claims, 
and drew up articles in accord with diplomatic precedent. 
The only authoritative act of the congress as a whole was its 
so-called Final Act, which embodied in its various articles 
the decisions of the separate special committees on the 
political and territorial questions at issue — and even this 
Final Act was but the act of the representatives of the great 



THE LAST PHASE 331 

powers submitted to the rest of the states of Europe for their 
acceptance. 

The problem of first importance before the congress was 
the redistribution of European territory. Most important 
among the lands on the continent of Europe which were at the 
disposition of the congress were Italy, the Netherlands, the 
left bank of the Rhine, Saxony (whose King had forfeited his 
rights, it was thought, by adhering so long to his alliance 
with Napoleon), and Poland. Each of the great powers 
had at the beginning of the deliberations in the committees 
certain well-defined desires. France was excepted, of course, 
for her boundaries had been fixed at the Treaty of Paris. 
Great Britain was expected to find her compensation in the 
retention of many of her colonial conquests. Russia, Austria, 
and Prussia were to divide Poland. In addition, Russia was 
to receive Finland, Bessarabia, and distant territories on the 
Persian border ; Austria was to control Italy ; and Prussia 
was to expand in Germany. 

No doubt the allied powers, had they been free from out- 
side interferences, could have come to an arrangement 
satisfactory to themselves along the above general lines with- 
out undue friction, but the French representative, Talley- 
rand, had determined to use the potential international 
jealousies to break the coalition against France. For 
Talleyrand realized that, even though the war had ended 
and his nation was technically again one of the family of 
European nations, a tacit understanding existed among the 
allied powers Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain 
whereby France was outlawed and French influence was 
minimized. 

Talleyrand's opportunity came with the discussion of the 
territories to be awarded to Russia and Prussia. Russia 
desired the greater part of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, 
Alexander wishing to restore the ancient kingdom of Poland 
under Russian supremacy. The Czar could yield to Austria 
her coveted share of Poland without seriously endangering 



332 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

his scheme, but he needed that part which in a division 
would naturally fall to Prussia. The issue resolved itself, 
then, into an endeavor to persuade Prussia to relinquish her 
claim on Warsaw in return for compensation elsewhere. 
Such compensation was offered by Russia in Saxony, whose 
King had forfeited his rights to his kingdom by remaining 
faithful to his alliance with Napoleon. 

As soon as the disposition of Saxony was injected into the 
situation, Talleyrand seized his opportunity. The King of 
Saxony, though an ally of Napoleon, had long been connected 
with the Bourbon house, and his cause was the cause of legiti- 
macy. The people of Saxony had much loyal sentiment for 
their King and no enthusiasm for Prussia. Other smaller 
German states feared that the constrictor swallowing up of 
Saxony might augur a like process for them upon some 
future occasion. Talleyrand, therefore, put France forward 
as the upholder of the rights of the principle of legitimacy 
and of the rights of the small states. From the beginning he 
had the support of Austria, who had no wish to see Russia's 
power so greatly extended. Later he won the support of 
Great Britain, whose representatives were influenced by 
popular opinion at home and by the traditional jealousy of 
Russia. Prussia, attracted by the rich bait of Saxony 
offered by Russia, had agreed to the exchange and had even 
taken preliminary measures for the occupation and govern- 
ment of the Saxon kingdom. 

At this juncture, Talleyrand on behalf of France offered 
armed aid to Austria to resist the Russian-Prussian plan, 
and a close alliance was formed by a secret treaty (Jan- 
uary 3, 1815), signed by Talleyrand (France), Metternich 
(Austria), and Castlereagh (Great Britain), binding these 
three nations to mutual support if any one of them were 
attacked because of the proposals upon which they had 
agreed. The alliance could count confidently upon the aid 
of the Saxons, Bavarians, Hanoverians, and others of the 
smaller German states. Talleyrand had succeeded up to his 



THE LAST PHASE 333 

highest expectations and could well boast to his master, 
Louis XVIII, that the coalition against France was forever 
dissolved. In but a few short months after the humiliation 
of France, Talleyrand by adroit albeit conscienceless diplo- 
macy had secured for his nation alliance with two of the 
greatest European states and had thus raised France back 
to her rightful position among the arbiters of European 
destinies. 

Actual war, however, did not result. The gravity of the 
situation made the nations pause. Europe had exhausted its 
war spirit, its men, and its money. Alexander of Russia 
became more conciliatory, and Frederick William III abated 
part of his ambitions. Austria, too, receded from her most 
extreme demands, and France, who had no inherent ter- 
ritorial interest involved, was disposed to agree to a compro- 
mise as soon as the dignity of her position in international 
politics had been redeemed. The delegates began to bargain, 
and by the end of the first week in February, 1815, after some 
very stormy sessions, an agreement was reached. 

By this agreement Austria recovered her Polish ter- 
ritories ; Prussia retained a part of her former Polish posses- 
sions, gained about two fifths of Saxony, and some territory 
along the left bank of the Rhine ; and Russia received the 
greater part of Poland in addition to Finland, Bessarabia, 
and the Persian frontier provinces. The remainder of 
Saxony was returned to its King, but it was not until the mid- 
dle of May that Frederick Augustus, the King, accepted 
definitely the cession of a part of his land to Prussia. 

Other committees of the congress had been busily engaged 
with other problems during these months occupied by the 
Polish-Saxon wrangle. The Swiss committee struggled with 
the difficulties raised by the traditional animosities among 
the several cantons, each of which had its representative at 
Vienna. Since no individual interests of any of the great 
states were involved, the committee was actuated solely by 
considerations affecting the future of Switzerland. An 



334 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

unusual degree of success was thereby assured. The per- 
petual neutrality of Switzerland was guaranteed (November 
20, 1815) and the cantons of Switzerland, including three 
new cantons, Valais, Geneva, and Neufchatel, were bound 
together in a loose federal union. 

In the settlement of questions affecting the Italian 
peninsula, Austrian influence predominated. Italian unity 
was not considered. Lombardy and Venetia went direct to 
Austria, in addition to Illyria and Dalmatia on the other 
shore of the Adriatic. Tuscany, Modena, and Parma went 
to individual members of the Hapsburg house. Naples, 
including Sicily, was after the defeat of Murat in 1815 
restored to Ferdinand. The Papal states were given back 
to the Pope. 

In the northwest of Europe, the Netherlands and the 
southern provinces (formerly the Austrian Netherlands) 
were joined into one state. Great Britain favored this plan, 
for it partially compensated The Netherlands for its great 
colonial losses, and it placed a "buffer" state north of France. 
The racial, religious, and economic differences between the 
two districts were, it was theoretically argued, no objection 
to their union. Racial mixture was a common phenomenon 
in European states ; religious privileges might be securely 
guarded by the fundamental law ; and the union between the 
mercantile and maritime Netherlands and the industrial 
and agricultural southern provinces might actually prove a 
source of strength. 

In the extreme north, Russia was the arbiter of territorial 
division much as Austria was in the Italian peninsula. 
Sweden received Norway as a compensation for her part in 
the coalition against Napoleon, but she was forced to sacrifice 
Finland and all prospect of an important part in the political 
life of central Europe. 

Although no desire to revive the defunct Holy Roman 
Empire existed among the diplomats, it was generally 
acknowledged that some kind of federal system should be 



THE LAST PHASE 335 

inaugurated among the German states. The difficulties, 
however, were very great. Austria would not allow Prussia 
to take leadership in the new federation ; Prussia would not 
submit to Austrian dominion ; and neither state would con- 
sent to the formation of a new combination of states which 
might threaten its own position. Of the important matters 
before the congress, this of the German constitutional 
system was the chief one undecided when the news of 
Napoleon's return from Elba was brought to Vienna (March 
4, 1815). Quick action was then taken. One of the many 
schemes which had been suggested was, with slight modifica- 
tions, adopted, and a Federal Act adopted. This Federal 
Act provided for a Federal Diet of seventeen votes, an 
assembly of sixty-nine votes proportionately distributed 
among the constituent states, for the prohibition of any 
alliance on the part of any state with foreign governments 
against the confederation or against any of its members, for a 
constitution of estates in each of the German states, and for 
the placing of the Federal Act itself under the protection of 
the European powers. This Act was signed and sealed June 
8, 1815, by the accredited representatives of thirty-six of the 
German states, Wurtemburg and Baden not accepting it 
until months later. 

Thus before Napoleon had landed in France the congress 
was practically through with its labors, and Gentz (Austria), 
the secretary, was engaged in incorporating into a Final Act 
the decisions of the separate committees. Before the battle 
of Waterloo this Final Act was signed (June 9, 1815) by seven 
out of eight representatives of the great powers, Spain's 
representative alone withholding his signature. An effectual 
seal was put upon the work of the congress by the troops 
which defeated Napoleon at Waterloo, so that the decisions 
incorporated in the Final Act were destined to stand for good 
or for ill. 



336 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 



D. THE HUNDRED DAYS 



Napoleon, in exile at Elba, had been kept informed by his 
agents of events both in the Congress of Vienna and in 
France. He knew, probably with exaggerated details, of 
the dissension among the allies aroused by the Polish-Saxon 
question, and he knew the dissatisfaction and unrest preva- 
lent in France as a result of the ill-considered measures of the 
new government. 

Inspired by reports from these sources, Napoleon laid his 
plans for an attempt to regain his throne. February c 26, 1815, 
he set sail with his guard of eleven hundred men on seven 
ships and bent his course directly for the French coast. 
From a military view, his force was of course insignificant, 
but it sufficed to guard against any interference from local 
authorities and would have protected him against a small 
band under an unsympathetic leader. March 1, 1815, he 
disembarked in a little bay near Nice, and, instead of striking 
for Marseilles whose population was royalist in sympathy, at 
once marched northward through the mountains. He knew 
his people thoroughly. In these mountain districts the 
peasants worshiped Napoleon, and so aided him with carts 
and horses that he was able with his little force to advance 
from thirty to forty miles a day. The first threat of op- 
position came at a little village near Grenoble, where a 
regiment of infantry was drawn up to defend the road. At 
the sight of Napoleon, however, the soldiers broke ranks and 
crowded enthusiastically around their former idol with the 
old cry of " Vive VEmpereur." Similar scenes greeted him all 
the way. Cities opened their gates to him ; troops refused to 
oppose him ; even the commanding officers sent against him, 
as Colonel Labedoyere and Marshal Ney, went over to him 
with all of their detachments. 

And Napoleon chose his messages to the nation skillfully. 
He came, he said, to bring to France peace without and liberty 
within. He sought to govern as a constitutional sovereign. 



THE LAST PHASE 337 

He wished to redeem France from the nobles and from the 
priests. He sought to assure to the people the reforms that 
had been won in the great Revolution of 1789. Such ut- 
terances as these were certain to arouse the most enthusiastic 
response both from the peasantry and from the bourgeoisie, 
for the peasantry feared a restoration of the feudal privileges 
of the nobles and of the power and property of the priesthood, 
and the bourgeoisie longed for civil liberty and wider suffrage. 
The Napoleonic success was not a mere military restoration : 
it was a popular revolution. 

In the meanwhile, Louis XVIII in Paris had failed to real- 
ize the alienation of his people and the feeling in favor of 
Napoleon. Only after the fall of Grenoble and Lyons did he 
begin to understand the extent of the popular movement 
with which he had to contend. Then by a series of conces- 
sions to liberal demands he attempted to rally the nation 
around him. He recalled many of the discharged officers to 
active service with full pay. He reconstituted the old 
Imperial Guard. He professed loyalty to constitutional 
principles. He summoned the chambers in session March 
13th, and three days later appeared before them wearing 
conspicuously the rosette of the Legion of Honor. With 
information of the desertion of Marshal Ney to Napoleon, 
however, he realized at last that his measures had come too 
late and he made preparations to leave Paris. March 19 he 
slipped out of the city, and the following day Napoleon 
drove up to the palace of the Tuileries amid the enthusiastic 
welcome of thousands. The government of Louis XVIII 
was temporarily at an end. 

With prodigious energy Napoleon labored to construct a 
government, to issue guarantees which would assure France 
of his democratic principles and good intentions, and to take 
the necessary steps to keep France at peace with Europe. 
Within two days he had the machinery of government in 
operation and, after a slight resistance in the south of France, 
had secured its recognition by the French people. To assure 



338 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

the cordial support of the great liberal element in the French 
nation, he issued an Acte Additionel, an additional act to the 
former imperial constitution, by which provision was made 
for a bicameral parliament, for responsibility of ministers 
to the parliament, and for freedom of the press. The Acte 
Additionel was submitted by plebiscite to France, was duly 
adopted, and was at once put into effect. Outwardly 
Napoleon seemed to have succeeded in the first of his two 
problems. 

Napoleon's fate was decided, however, not by his good 
intentions for internal government or by constitutional 
guarantees within France, but by the diplomats assembled at 
Vienna. In the first week of March news reached the 
congress that the exile had sailed from Elba, and a few days 
later that he had landed in France. To Metternich (Austria) 
is due the rapidity of action of the allies. On March 12, 
1815, the representatives of the great powers issued the 
famous proclamation denouncing Napoleon Bonaparte as 
the common enemy of mankind and declaring him an outlaw. 
March 25, the plenipotentiaries of the four great powers, 
Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain, signed a solemn 
treaty of alliance and invited the adherence of all the powers 
of Europe. Napoleon seems to have made genuine efforts to 
maintain peace — as indeed he well might, knowing the 
number and disposition of the military forces against him — 
but his messengers were turned back without being able to 
deliver their messages and his letter to the Prince Regent 
of Great Britain was returned unopened. By the middle 
of April, it was evident that France was to stand again 
against all Europe. Civil reforms became of subordinate 
importance and Napoleon was forced to bend every energy to 
raising and equipping an army for the defense of his throne. 

1. THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN 

The British and Prussians were still in Belgium, and to 
their forces the allied powers looked to bear the brunt of the 



THE LAST PHASE 339 

initial activities while Austria and Russia were getting their 
armies ready to strike. So far as Napoleon was concerned, 
there was but one question to decide : whether the coining war 
was to be for him offensive or defensive — whether he should 
fight it on French soil or beyond the frontier. There were 
plenty of reasons on both sides, but two finally decided the 
Emperor in favor of the latter course. The first was the 
fact that his political situation in France was far from secure 
and needed the bolstering effect of a military victory ; the 
second was the strategical advantage to be gained by expel- 
ling the enemy from the Netherlands and occupying the 
Rhine from Switzerland to its mouth as the line of defense. 

Early in June the Emperor had formed his army. He was 
to command in person, and had selected Soult as his chief-of- 
staff . The army was composed of the Guards ; five infantry 
corps under d'Erlon, Reille, Vandamme, Gerard, and Laban ; 
and four small cavalry corps under Pajal, Excelmans, Kel- 
lermann, and Milhaud, the whole cavalry command being 
under Grouchy. Ney joined the army just before operations 
began, and was given command of the left wing. It will 
be seen at a glance that many of the lustrous names of the 
earlier campaigns are absent. Davout was in command of 
Paris ; Suchet was in the Alps ; Mortier was ill - — but the 
others who had made their names under Napoleon were not 
numbered among the Emperor's adherents. The army 
as composed numbered about 125,000. 

The immediate opponents were the Anglo-Dutch army and 
the Prussian, stationed in two groups in the country between 
Brussels and the Scheldt and Sambre rivers, the former 
based on Ostend and Antwerp, the latter through Liege on 
the Rhine cities. Wellington was in command of the Anglo- 
Dutch force, 90,000 strong ; Bliicher led the Prussian con- 
tingent of 115,000. Wellington's forces lay to the west and 
south of the Belgian capital; Blucher's corps occupied the 
chief points along the Sambre. Both armies were widely 
distributed, and not in the best position to cover Brussels, 



340 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

since the main line of attack from the south, the Charleroi- 
Brussels road, ran between the two commands. 

Napoleon had the option of operating against either army's 
line of operations, or of attacking between the two forces and 
separating them. The preponderance of numbers decided 
for him the last-named course. A successful attack, such as 
he had made in his first Italian campaign and again in his 
Spanish campaign, would mean that he could deal singly 
with armies not much larger than his own. Having decided 
upon the point of attack, the Emperor was restricted to the 
Charleroi-Brussels road as being the line leading to the 
junction point of the two adversaries. Nothing could have 
suited him better. The road was an excellent one ; it was 
undefended ; and it led him to the very point of assault. On 
the night of June 14, 1815, he had his corps in position at 
Philippeville, Beaumont, and Leers, all three points within a 
few miles of his projected crossing of the Sambre. 

Before daylight of June 15, the three columns began their 
march to the Sambre ; a few hours later they had crossed the 
river on a front of six miles in the face of only nominal re- 
sistance by one of Blucher's corps. When night came the 
head of the French left on the main road had arrived at 
Frasne; the right was approaching Fleurus. On the allied 
side, Bliicher had prepared to check the French advance by 
ordering a concentration near Ligny, where he proposed to 
give battle if necessary ; Wellington began concentrating at 
various points west of Brussels turnpike. The British 
general was still afraid of an attack against his communica- 
tions, and consequently left the main road but lightly de- 
fended. The situation was most favorable for the success of 
Napoleon's plan. 

The condition of that success was that the Emperor should 
seize the Quatre Bras-Namur road, the main avenue of 
communications for the allied commanders. Once in pos- 
session of that, he knew that his opponents could reestablish 
contact only through Wavre, or even by the Brussels-Lou- 



THE LAST PHASE 341 

vain road. Accordingly, therefore, he issued orders for a 
simultaneous attack on June 16 on the crossroads at Quatre 
Bras and on those near Ligny. 

Let us turn first to the attack against Blucher at Ligny. 
Three of the Prussian commander's corps (about 90,000) had 
taken up a strong position at Saint Amand and Ligny. 
Grouchy was in general charge of the attack by Vandamme, 
Gerard, and three of the cavalry corps. Blucher, with his 
usual impetuosity, pushed forward over the hotly contested 
ground in front of the villages with the evident intention 
of turning the French left, and in so doing greatly weakened 
his center in order to give strength to the attacking wing. 
The Emperor, seeing the denuded line, prepared the Guard 
for an assault on the weakened center, but before carrying 
out the projected movement waited the arrival of d'Erlon 
whom he had ordered from Ney's command. The head of 
d'Erlon's column was seen approaching, but suddenly, with 
no apparent cause, it countermarched and disappeared. 
Without further delay, Napoleon ordered his assault, broke 
the hostile line, and forced the discomfited Prussians from the 
field. Both armies bivouacked near the scene of the battle. 

Meanwhile, on the left, Ney in command of the remainder 
of the army had been fighting skillfully near Quatre Bras. 
Opposed in the beginning of the fray by forces considerably 
inferior to his own, he found himself confronted by a con- 
stantly increasing army as the battle wore on. At the 
last, he called in d'Erlon's corps as his final reinforcement. 
But just as this corps was marching to the field, an aide from 
the Emperor without consulting or informing Ney ordered it 
to Grouchy's assistance at Ligny. Ney, upon learning of its 
deflected route, peremptorily ordered its return, but the 
damage had already been done. D'Erlon had been of use to 
neither wing. Night fell upon an evenly contested tactical 
battle, but strategically Ney had won. He had prevented 
Wellington from reinforcing Blucher. 

On the night of the 16th, Wellington retired and took up a 



342 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

position at Mt. St. Jean, where he felt assured that Blucher 
would join him. The latter, after his defeat at Ligny, had 
resolutely abandoned his communications with Liege, and on 
the morning of June 17th set out to rejoin his ally by way of 
Wavre. Napoleon, who seems to have been convinced that 
the Prussians were retiring on Liege, nevertheless left 
Grouchy with Vandamme, Gerard, and one cavalry corps to 
pursue. That pursuit was tardily begun at 2 p.m. on the 
17th, ten hours after Blucher had marched. It did not 
determine until late that night what direction the Prussians 
had taken. And when the information was in Grouchy 's 
hands, instead of maneuvering to prevent Blucher 's uniting 
with Wellington, the French marshal stupidly followed the 
Prussian army to Wavre. The advantage gained by the 
seizure of the Quatre Bras road was lost. 

The Emperor meanwhile had joined Ney, followed the 
retiring British, and by evening was in sight of their position 
near Waterloo. He was determined to attack at once, and 
with this attack in mind carefully reconnoitered the field. A 
heavy rain on the night of June 17 prevented his moving his 
artillery early the next morning, so it was not until about 
11.30 a.m. that the action commenced. 

The British occupied a strong position at the crest of the 
hill, and, in front, on their right and opposite their left center, 
they had prepared two stone farmhouses which became 
centers of resistance — Hougomont and La Haye Sainte. 
Opposite the allies, on another crest, with a shallow dip be- 
tween, were the French. Napoleon's plan was to attack and 
turn the allied left flank, his idea being always to force the 
Anglo-Dutch army away from any possible union with 
Blucher. 

The attack was begun with an advance by d'Erlon on the 
French right, down the hill against the British lines. Murder- 
ous infantry volleys checked the forward movement, and 
while the corps halted a spirited cavalry charge forced them 
back, broken and disordered, to their original position. No 



THE LAST PHASE 343 

sooner were their lines reformed than a new danger appeared 
to their right front in the form of Billow's Prussian corps 
which Grouchy \s inactivity had allowed to cross from Wavre. 
The Emperor placed a part of one corps at Planchenait to 
meet this menace and turned again to the main issue. The 
battle now took the form of a series of gallant cavalry 
charges under the command of Ney. Again and again the 
horsemen assaulted the British lines, but without effect. 
Ney, instead of directing his charges against the wing 
weakened by d'Erlon's advance, was hurling his squadrons 
against the unshaken British center. It is true that the 
British line was weakened by these furious shocks, but the 
French cavalry was well-nigh exterminated. 

By four o'clock in the afternoon, the French had possessed 
themselves of Hougomont and La Haye Sainte, but the 
Prussians had become a very grave danger on their flank. 
Fully 30,000 men were engaged, and Laban's divisions were 
hard pressed to hold their own. Another Prussian corps 
had joined the British left, so that the French were out- 
numbered by 50,000. As a last resort Napoleon ordered the 
Guards to assault the plateau and break the British lines. 
Bravely, the veterans advanced across the valley under a 
galling fire and pushed their charge halfway up the opposite 
rise. There, taken in front and flank, the Guards staggered, 
halted — and broke ! The effect was electric. The news 
spread instantly, and morale vanished. Nothing remained 
but flight. The Prussians overcame their immediate op- 
ponents and pushed their lines across the Brussels road. In 
the greatest disorder Napoleon's army was routed from its 
last battle field. 

On the following day, Grouchy fell upon the remaining 
Prussian corps at Wavre and defeated it badly, but nothing 
could retrieve the disaster of Waterloo. Although Grouchy 
managed to get his divisions safely across the frontier, the 
mass of the main army filtered over the border, fleeing in as 
abject terror as had ever the Prussians or the Austrians be- 



S44 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

fore the relentless Napoleon. The Emperor himself, after a 
few desperate attempts to restore order, succumbed to the 
general despair and hastened dejectedly to Paris. There 
was with him none of the feeling that followed Leipzig or 
Fontainebleau. He could not but feel now that his last 
campaign was completed in defeat and disaster. 

E. THE FINAL SURRENDER 

Napoleon arrived in Paris, utterly exhausted, June 21, 
1815. He had no time for rest, for measures had to be taken 
at once to defend the capital. He hastily gathered his 
brothers and ministers about him to consider ways and 
means. He suggested a temporary dictatorship. 

But even while he was in conference with his advisers, the 
Chamber of Deputies had assumed control of the situation. 
It passed a motion to continue in permanent session, and to 
consider any attempt to dissolve it as an act of high treason. 
This measure was a final blow to Napoleon's hopes. He 
might, it is true, have collected some loyal forces and moved 
against the Deputies, but he shrank with good reason from 
the civil war which would inevitably follow. The blow at 
Waterloo had, indeed, temporarily paralyzed his will. For 
a precious day he allowed matters to drift. When news 
came that Grouchy had escaped, his chance of again as- 
suming leadership appealed to him, but the Deputies had 
steeled their minds against further sacrifices and demanded 
his immediate abdication. He yielded on June 22, 1815 ; 
and reached the depths of humiliation a few weeks later 
when he received orders to leave France. 

July 8, a fugitive, he embarked on board the French ship 
Saale. After a week of agonizing delay, he saw the impos- 
sibility of eluding the British ships hovering outside the bay. 
Hence, July 15, he surrendered to the commander of the 
British ship Bellerophon, throwing himself on the mercy of 
the British government. July 31, Napoleon was presented 
with the decision of that government that his liberty was to 



THE LAST PHASE 345 

be restricted in the interests of the peace of Europe, and that 
he would be taken to the isolated island of St. Helena to live. 
He was landed at St. Helena on the evening of October 
17, 1815. 

The remaining years of his life were passed as a prisoner on 
this island. He was assigned residence at a country estate 
called Longwood near the center of the island. He was 
allowed to have with him the small group of those who had 
chosen to share his exile. He was subject, however, to 
constant surveillance and to a number of restrictions irritat- 
ing to a man of his energy and previous position. For 
example : his title was never recognized — he was always 
addressed as General Bonaparte; beyond certain prescribed 
limits he was not allowed to go without the company of a 
British officer ; all his mail was intercepted and censored ; in- 
terviews with him were possible only upon special permit 
from the British governor — and this permit was seldom 
issued. In his constant protests against the injustice of 
these restrictions, and his displays of temper against Sir 
Hudson Lowe, the British governor, we have an unedifying 
picture of the nervous irritability of Napoleon and his utter 
failure to adapt himself to his fall in fortune. Perhaps 
it would be too much to expect that the greatest military 
genius of his age should be also a practical philosopher. 

Outside of the bickerings with Sir Hudson Lowe and the 
management of the small court formed by his companions 
in exile, Napoleon spent his time in dictating his memoirs. 
He had at hand a fair library (more than 2500 volumes) and 
took an interest in creating for the imagination of the future 
a favorable interpretation of his own career. From what 
he dictated on St. Helena grew the Napoleonic tradition that 
played an important part in later French history. 

Late in 1820 the first serious symptoms of the disease 
which had carried off his father — cancer of the stomach — 
manifested themselves in sharp stabbing pains. By the end 
of the year the disease had so undermined his constitution 



346 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

that he had lost his energy and become weary and apathetic. 
He no longer cared for the outdoor exercise he had been- 
taking so vigorously ; he lost weight rapidly ; his digestion 
was impaired. May 3, 18 c 21, his mind, which up to that 
time had remained clear, began to wander. Two days later, 
May 5, 1821, at 5.50 p.m., he died. 

Napoleon's body, after an autopsy according to his own 
desire, was interred at Longwood with full military honors. 
Twenty years later, 1840, when the passions excited by his 
career seemed to have subsided, the British government 
allowed the removal of the body to Paris. There it received 
the honors that were its due and gained its final resting place 
on the banks of the Seine under the magnificent mausoleum 
of Les Invalides. 

F. THE SECOND RESTORATION 

When the extent of the allied victory was recognized, 
Wellington sent word to Louis XVIII that he had better 
follow the armies into France. So the dethroned Bourbon 
King again entered French soil June 25, 1815, publishing a 
proclamation that he had returned to resume his rights and 
that he would abide by the Constitutional Charter of 1814. 
The whole north of France speedily accepted him as King, so 
that debate by the assembled chambers or by the diplomats 
of the allies was useless. 

The situation at the French capital was still, naturally, 
confused. The chambers continued in session; the wreck 
of the imperial army retreated within the city; and on June 
29 the Prussians took up positions on the heights to the 
north. Wellington and Bliicher refused to grant an armistice 
and pushed the attack. Confronted with the alternative 
of fighting or capitulating, the Chambers, in view of the 
hopelessness of the former course, accepted the latter, at the 
same time admitting Louis XVIII as the rightful King. 
On July 7 the allies entered Paris, and the following day 
Louis XVIII returned to the Tuileries. 



THE LAST PHASE 347 

Victory had been won so quickly by the allies that the diplo- 
mats had not had the opportunity to discuss terms. The res- 
toration of Louis XVIII had to be treated as an accomplished 
fact, but certain of the diplomats, especially Hardenberg 
(Prussia) and Metternich (Austria), believed that France 
should suffer territorially for having again supported Napo- 
leon. Prussia's object was to gain the border provinces of 
Alsace and Lorraine. Alexander of Russia strongly opposed 
any reduction of French territory, recalling the declaration 
of the allies that they warred, not against France, but 
against Napoleon. Wellington added to the arguments of 
Alexander the statement that the position of Louis XVIII in 
the eyes of the French people would be untenable if his 
restoration were accompanied by material loss of territory. 
Hardenberg (Prussia) was forced to abate his demands until 
Prussia obtained only a few small border strips. The punish- 
ment which, all agreed, France deserved was imposed in the 
shape of a money indemnity amounting to about $200,000,- 
000 and by the location of allied troops to the number of 
150,000 in the northern provinces of France for a period not 
to exceed five years. The Treaty of Paris, embodying the 
above provisions, was signed November 20, 1815. 

With the success of the allies at Waterloo, the Second 
Restoration of the Bourbon monarchy, and the abdication 
and imprisonment of Napoleon, Europe settled down to the 
task of readjustment. The terms and conditions under 
which this readjustment was to begin, and the territorial 
reapportionments, had been set forth in full by the Final Act 
of the Congress of Vienna. The governments in general 
looked forward to a speedy return to the old familiar condi- 
tions. In France alone the restored monarch yielded in the 
Constitutional Charter something to the forces of the 
Revolution. Elsewhere, the Revolution was regarded as a 
great earthquake which had for a time convulsed Europe, 
torn society from its natural bases, hurled sovereigns from 
their thrones, and left a wake of general destruction. This 



348 THE HISTORY OF EUROPE 

earthquake once stilled, it remained for the old monarchs 
to restore the former order of existence. To their restricted 
vision, the period from ITS*) to 1815 was no sign of the end 
of one era and the beginning o( a new, of death agonies and 
birth throes, but merely a temporary and unfortunate dis- 
turbance in routine conditions. Hence, their idea of read- 
justment was to make every effort to forget, and to force 
their subjects to forget, the causes, nature, and results of the 
Revolution and its Napoleonic aftermath. 

The reactionary elements obtained a temporary ami de- 
ceptive success. Under the domination of Metternieh of 
Austria, true diplomat of the old regime as he was. the great 
states of the continent were frozen into an ultra-conserva- 
tive mold. The dreams of political and social equality 
which had been inspired during the great Revolution were 
forcibly dissipated. For a full generation, Metternieh and 
his colleagues in the chancellories of continental Europe 
strove to stitle the new life which had been born in France and 
spread far and wide by the French armies. 

A generation is. however, but a minute time in history. 
With the passage of the years the living influences created by 
the Revolution gained explosive force. By spontaneous up- 
risings from one end of Europe to the other in the middle 
of the century, men testified to the vitality of these influences. 
And in contemporary Europe, we recognize that the liberal 
institutions and popular governments are the direct heritage 
of the convulsion in France. The political power of the 
masses of the people; the ideals of civil and social equality 
and justice; the extinction of absolute monarchy, feudal 
privileges, and a host of other abuses: — on the continent 
of Europe these reforms date from the Revolution. Severe 
as was the suffering caused to individuals by the shock of the 
Revolution, it is doubtful whether the intrenched system of 
the old regime could have been carried otherwise. 



INDEX 



Ahoukir, battle of, 180. 

"Abuses," in France, 55, 76, 80. 

Acre, siege (if, 179 lso. 

Acte Additional, France, 338. 

Addington, British minister, 197, 209, 
213. 

Adolphus Frederick, Sweden, 271. 

Albuera, battle of, 2SI. 

Alexander I, Czar of Russia, accession 
to throne, 197; policy, 214; and 
Prussia, 223, 226, 228, 229, 231 ; 
Treaty of Tilsit, 246-249; and Fin- 
land, 254; Conference of Erfurt, 
257-25S; and Napoleon, 276, 280 
282; and Turkey, 286; and Great 
Britain, 287 ; and Russian campaign, 
289-293 ; and Prussia, 297 ; Frank- 
fort negotiations, 309 ; the 1st 
Restoration, 324 325; Congress of 
Vienna, 329, 331, 333; and 2d 
Restoration, 347. 

Alexandria, seized by Napoleon, 178. 

Alvinzi, Austrian commander, 168, 169. 

Amiens, Treaty of, 198. 

Anna, Archduchess, Russia, 276, 281. 
• Arcis-sur-Aube, battle of, 321. 

Arcole, battle of, 169. 

Arouet, Francois, see Voltaire. 

Arrondissement, 202. 

Artois, Comte d\ led the Emigres, 76, 
140 ; at Restoration, 325. 

Aspern, battle of, 266. 

Assignats,81, 92, 104, 118, 133, 171, 174. 

Associate Consuls, 186, 187. 

Auerstadt, battle of, 234-235. 

Augereau, French commander, 161, 
162, 166, 174, 217, 219, 220. 233, 238, 
242. 

Austerlitz, battle of, 221-222. 

Austria (inch Hungary), territory L8th 
century, 19; relations with Russia, 
24 ; and 1st partition of Poland, 25 ; 
history, 1780-1789, 26-29; and Sile- 
sian wars, 30; interests 1788-1791, 
89 ; war with France, 94-95 ; armies, 
97-98; in 1st coalition, 111; war 
with France, 119-124, 127-131, 158- 



162, conditions in, 1789-1795, 137 
144; at Congress of Rastadt, 176 
177; and Napoleon, 1KN-194, 200 
in 3d coalition, 215; war against 
France, 217 22:? ; and Prussia (1806) 
229, 243; and continental blockade 
252, 253, 257 ; war against France 
262-268, 274 ; and Russian campaign 
285-2S(i, 291 ; agreement with Russia 
(1813), 296; and Napoleon (1813) 
301-303; in Leipzig campaign, 303- 
308; campaign in France, 314-323 
Congress of Vienna, 328-335 ; alliance 
against Napoleon, 33S, 339. 

Austrian Netherlands, 18th cent., 19 
revolt (1787-1789), 28; invasion of 
by French, 1792, 98, 108; policy of 
Leopold II toward, 139; congress of 
Vienna, 334. 

Avignon, papal city, annexed by French 
1791, 155. 



Babeuf, French conspirator, 172. 

Badajoz, capture of, 311-312. 

Baden, 200, 207, 223 ; in Confederation 

of the Rhine, 225, 335. 
Bagration, Russian commander, 289, 

290. 
Bank of France, established, 203. 
Barclay de Tolly, Russian commander, 

289, 290. 
Bard, fortress of, 190-191. 
Barras, French politician, 136, 164, 175, 

182. 
Bartenstein, Treaty of, 243. 
Barthelemy, Director, 173-174. 
Basle, Treaty of, 159. 
Bastille, fall of, 72 73. 
Batavian Republic, 176, 198. See also 

Holland. 
Bautzen, battle of, 300-301. 
Bavaria, part of Holy Roman Empire, 

19, 200, 218, 223 ; in Confederation of 

the Rhine, 225 ; received cession from 

Austria, 268. 
Baylen, capitulation at, 259. 
Beaulieu, Austrian commander, 116, 

167, 168. 



350 



INDEX 



Beccaria, 49. 

Bellegarde, Austrian commander, 263, 

265, 315. 
Bennigsen, Russian commander, 238, 

241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246. 
Beresina, crossing of, 292-293. 
Berlin decree, 250-251. 
Bernadotte, French commander and 

King of Sweden, 217, 233, 234, 238, 

241, 242, 272, 273, 286, 297, 303, 

306, 307, 314, 320, 324. 
Berthier, French general, 190, 217, 264, 

288. 
Bertrand, French commander, 299. 
Bessarabia, ceded to Russia, 286, 331, 

333. 
Bessieres, French commander, 217, 242, 

260, 261, 264. 265, 282. 
Blake, British commander, 260, 261. 
blockade, Napoleon's Continental, see 

Continental blockade. 
Blilcher, Prussian commander, 235, 

298, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 309, 

315, 316, 317, 319, 320, 321, 339, 

340, 341, 342, 346. 
Bonaparte, Jerome, 238, 248, 288, 289, 

290. 
Bonaparte, Joseph, 225, 226; King of 

Spain, 255, 256, 259, 312, 313. 
Bonaparte, Louis, 225 ; in Holland, 

272-274. 
Bonaparte, Lucien, 181, 182, ls:>. 
Bonaparte, Napoleon, see Napoleon. 
Bons, paper money, 175. 
Borodino, battle of, 291. 
Boulogne camp, 211-212. 
Bourgeoisie, 10, 15; in France, 42-43 ; 

organize local government in Paris, 

74; embittered by massacre of the 

Champ de Mars, 85 ; in Jacobin club, 

91 ; revolt against Convention, 135- 

136; in Spain, 148-149; in France, 

favored Napoleon. 337. 
Bremen, annexed by Napoleon, 274, 

329. 
Brissot, a Girondin leader, 110. 
Brittany, revolt in, 133, 201. 
Brune, French commander, 189. 
Brunswick, duchy of, occupied by 

Napoleon, 235. 
Brunswick, Duke of, 98, 99-100, 105, 

106, 113, 120, 231, 232, 233, 234. 
Bucharest, Treaty of, 286. 
Biilow, Prussian commander, 315, 320, 

343. 
Burgundy, detached from Holy Roman 

Empire, 34. 
Burke, British statesman, 152 



Buxhowden, Russian commander, 218, 
220, 222, 238. 



Cadoudal, Breton conspirator, 206, 207. 

Cahiers, France, 63. 

Caldiero, battle of, 168. 

Calonne, Controller-general of Finance, 

France, 56-58 ; dismissed, 58 ; and 

Brunswick manifesto, 100. 
Cambaceres, Associate Consul, France, 

187. 
Campo Formio, Peace of, 175, 177, 188, 

194, 196. 
Capitation tax, France, 40. 
Carnot, 116, 120, 122, 123, 129, 165, 

173-174. 
Caroline, Naples, 211, 216, 224-225. 
Carrier, 126. 

Castafios, Spanish commander, 260, 261. 
Castiglione, battle of, 168. 
Castlereagh, British statesman, 318, 332. 
Catherine II, The Great, Russia, benev- 
olent despot, 16 ; empress of Russia, 

20-25, 137, 140, 143. 
Catholic Church, France, National 

Assembly and, 80-83, 88; condemned 

French liberal writers, 148; Pope 

imprisoned, 279 ; at Restoration, 328 ; 

interests :it congress of Vienna, 329. 
Caulaincourt, French diplomat, 303, 318. 
Ceva, battle of, 167. 
Ceylon, ceded to Great Britain, 198. 
Cham! i de Mars, massacre of, 84-85. 
Chaptal, French minister, 204. 
Charles, Archduke, Austrian commander, 

128, 129, 165, 166, 169, 177, 214, 218, 

219, 220, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267. 
Charles III, Spain, benevolent despot, 

17, 149. 
Charles IV, Spain, 149-151, 255. 
Charles XIII, Sweden, 271-272, 286. 
Charter, Constitutional, in France, see 

Constitutional Charter. 
Chatillon, Conference of, 318-319. 
Chaumont, Treaty of, 319. 
Cherasco, armistice of, 167. 
Cintra, Convention of, 260. 
Cisalpine Republic, 170-171, 176, 177, 

199, 211, 215. 
Cispadane Republic, 170-171. 
Ciudad Rodrigo, capture of, 311-312. 
Civil Constitution of the Clergy, 82-83, 

88, 155, 204. 
Clancarty, 330. 
Clerfayt, 128, 129, 159, 160. 
Clergy, in 18th century Europe central 

and eastern, 5 ; in western Europe, 10 ; 



INDEX 



351 



and don gratuit, 41 ; in France, 46 
47; in Estates General, France, 61 
66, 81 ; law of Civil Constitution of 
the, 82 83; non-juring, 83, 93, 104. 

Clubs, political, France, 90 92. 

Coburg, Austrian commander, 113, 114, 
I 15, L19, 120, 122, 123, 128, 130. 

t 'odt NapolSon, 205. 

Colli, Sardinian commander, 166, 167. 

Collingwood, British admiral, 213. 

Commerce, 18th century Europe, 11. 

Committee of Public Safety, 116, 117, 
118, 119, 121, 131, 132, 160. 

Commune, France, 53, 79, 117, 126, 132, 
202. 

Concordat, 201 205, 254, 296. 

Conde, French city, besieged, 114-116; 
lis. 

Confederation of the Rhine, 225, 220, 
231, 219, 269, 271, 291, 302. 

Constitution, National Assembly at 
work on, 71 76, 78 83, 85 88; Con- 
vention, 134 Hi."); consulate, 185 
lsii; imperial, 207. See also Con- 
stitutional Charter. 

Constitutional Charter, France, 326- 
328, 346, 317. 

Constitutionalist, party during Direc- 
tory, 173-171. 

Consulate, France, 184 208. 

Continental blockade, Napoleon, 237, 
250-258, 26S, 269, 271, 279 -280. 

Convention, decreed by Legislative 
Assembly, 102; meeting, 108-112, 
116-119, 124-127, 131-136; dissolved, 
136. 

Conventionalist, party during Directory, 
173-174. 

Copenhagen, British naval victory, 197, 
252. 

Cordelier Club, France, 91. 

Corps Legislatif, see Legislative Body. 

( lorvee, S, 40 ; suppression proposed, 57 ; 
approved by Parlement of Paris, 58. 

Council of Notables, France, proposed, 
56; meeting, 57-58; dissolved, 58. 

Council of the Ancients. 135, 182 L83. 

Council of State, France, 186, 206, 277. 

Council of The Five Hundred, 135, 181- 
183. 

Craonne, battle of, 320. 

Crimea, annexed to Russia (1783), 24. 

Custine, French general, 107, 108, 113, 
114, 119. 

D 

Dal berg. 3: in. 

Dalmatia, to France, 223 ; to Austria, 334. 

Dampierre, French commander, 115. 



Danton, 102 103, 104, 105, 108-109, 

117, US, 119, 124 126, 131. 
Davout, French commander, 217, 222. 

233, 234, 23S, 212, 261, 265, 266, 267, 

2SS, 290, 291, 292. 339. 
Declaration of Pillnitz, 93-95, 140. 
Declaration of Rights, 75 76. 
Denmark, 19, 197, 243, 252, 255, 269, 

27 1, 286, 29 1, 297. 
Dennewitz, battle of, 305. 
Departement, 79, 82, 162, L86, 202, 203. 
Desaix, French commander, 178, 179. 

192, 193. 
Desmoulins, C, 72. 
Diderot, Denis, is 19. US. 
Diet, of Holy Roman Empire, organi- 
zation, 3 1. 
Directory, 135, 136, 158, 160, 162-163, 

167, 171 177, ISO 1S3. 
ilon gratuit, France, 41, 46. 
Dresden, battle of, 304 305. 
Ducos, consul, 1S2, 184. 
Duhesme, French commander, 190, 192. 
Dumouriez, Minister of War, 98 99 , 

general, 99, 105, 106, 107, 113, 114, 

115, 116. 
Dupont, French commander, 259. 



E 

Eckmiihl, battle of, 265 266. 

Egypt, Napoleon in, 175, 177-180; 
British victorious in, 198. 

El Arish, captured by Napoleon, 179. 

Elba, Napoleon at, 323, 326, 329; 
return from, 335, 336, 338. 

Elsnitz, Austrian commander, 192. 

Emigres, desert France, 74 ; Legislative 
Assembly ads toward. 92-93; Dec- 
laration of Pillnitz, 93 ; lands con- 
fiscated, 104 ; Quiberon expedition, 
134, 140; and Napoleon, 201, 209, 
322; at Restoration, 327-328. 

Enghien, Due d', 207, 214. 

England, sec Great Britain. 

Enrages, the Jacobins (which see). 

Erfurt, Conference of, 257-258, 281. 

Erlon, d', French commander, 339, 341, 
342. 343. 

Essling, battle of, 266. 

Estates General, France, demand for, 
58-59; summoned by decree (1788), 
60. session, 61-67, 111. 

Etruria (Tuscany), 251, 252, 254. 

Eugene, Prince, French commander, 266, 
288, 291, 292, 298, 299, 314, 324. 

Excelmans, French commander, 339, 

Eylau, battle of, 2 12. 



352 



INDEX 



Farmers-General, tax collectors in 
France, 41. 

Federes, camp of near Paris, 98. 

Ferdinand, Naples, 211, 334. 

Ferdinand, Spain, 255. 

Festival to the Supreme Being, 127. 

Feuillant, Club, France, 91 ; Ministry 
replaced, 1792, 94, 110. 

Finland, part of Sweden 1Mb century, 
19 ; occupied by Russia, 254, 258, 
271-272, 281 ; Congress of Vienna, 
331, 333, 334. 

First Coalition, war against France, 
111-116, 119-124, 127-131, 147, 155- 
156, 158-162. 

First Consul, 186 ff. ; Napoleon consul 
for life, 206. 

Fleurus, battle of, 130-131, 158, 164. 

Floridablanca, Spanish minister, 150. 

Fontainebleau, Convention of, 253, 
255. 

Fouche, French minister of police, 207. 

Fox, British statesman, 152, 226, 229, 
254. 

France, 19 ; organization of government 
under Louis XVI, 50-55 ; financial 
crisis, 55-58 ; summoning of Estates 
General, 60-67; revolt of July, 1789, 
72-74; National Assembly, 74-88; 
Legislative Assembly, 90-95 ; armies, 
95-97 ; war with Austria and Prussia, 
99-100, 105-108; The Convention, 
108-111; war against The First- 
Coalition, 111 ff. ; The Convention, 
116-119; The Terror, 124-127, 131- 
136 ; war against First Coalition, 158- 
162; Directory, 162-163, 167, 171- 
177, 180-183; Consulate, 184-196. 
201-207; Empire, 207-208; vs. 3d 
Coalition, 209-227 ; vs. Prussia and 
Russia, 228-249; Peninsular war, 
258-262; war against Austria (1809), 
262-269; and Sweden, 272; and 
Holland, 272-274; conditions in, 
under Napoleon, 274-279 ; Peninsular 
war (1810-1811), 282-285; war 
against Russia, 287-293 ; between 
Russian campaign and Leipzig, 293- 
298; Leipzig campaign, 298-308; 
Peninsular war, 311-314; defense 
(1814), 314-321; 1st Restoration, 
324-328; Congress of Vienna, 331- 
333; return of Napoleon, 335-338; 
Waterloo campaign, 338-344; 2d 
Restoration, 346-347. 

France, bank of, established, 203. 



Francis I, Austria, succeeded to throne, 
141 ; and partitions of Poland, 142- 
143 ; dissolved Congress of Rastadt, 
177 ; and Napoleon, 187 ; and end 
of Holy Roman Empire, 225 ; neu- 
trality after Eylau, 243 ; and national 
awakening in Austria, 257 ; and war 
of 1809, 262-263; Peace of Schon- 
brunn, 267-268; marriage of Maria 
Louisa, 276 ; Austrian policy before 
Leipzig, 295-296 ; Congress of Vienna, 
329. 

Frankfort, represented at Congress of 
Vienna, 329. 

Frederick Augustus, Saxony, 333. 

Frederick the Great, Prussia, political 
theory, 16; 1st partition of Poland, 
24-25 ; King of Prussia, 29-32, 230. 

Frederick VI, Denmark, 329. 

Frederick William II, Prussia, accession 
to the throne, 32 ; personality and 
policies, 32-33 ; Declaration of Pill- 
nitz, 93 ; war with France, 95 ; 
policies, 144—148. 

Frederick William III, 216, 223; and 
Napoleon, war of 1806-1807, 228-249 ; 
and alliance with Alexander, 295- 
297 ; at Restoration, 324 ; Congress of 
Vienna, 329, 333. 

Friedland, battle of, 245-246. 

Fuente d'Ofioro, battle of, 284. 



Gaudin, French finance minister, 203. 

Generalite, France, 52-53, 79. 

Geneva, canton of Switzerland, 334. 

Genoa, 170-171 ; Republic of, 199, 215. 

Gentz, 330, 335. 

George, Duke of Hanover, George I of 
England, 36. 

George III, England, 37, 151-157, 187. 

Gerard, French commander, 339, 341,342. 

Ginlay, Prussian commander, 306, 307. 

Girondins, formed ministry, 94 ; minis- 
try dismissed, 98 ; and Jacobins in Con- 
vention, 109-111, 116-119, 125-126. 

Gneisenau, Prussia, 296, 309. 

Godoy, Spanish minister, 150-151, 255. 

Golymin, engagement at, 239. 

Graham, British commander, 313. 

Great Britain, 19, 35-37, 89; in 1st 
Coalition, 111 ; conditions in, 1789- 
1795, 151-157; after Marengo, 197- 
198; and 3d coalition, 208-227; 
and continental blockade, 236-237, 
243, 248-249, 250-258; and Penin- 
sular War, 258-262, 269-271 ; effects 



INDEX 



353 



of continental blockade upon, 279- 
280; alliance against Napoleon, 287, 
298, 302, 310-311; Congress of 
Vienna, 328-335 ; alliance against 
Napoleon, 338; Waterloo, 339-344. 

Grenville, British minister, 226. 

Grossbeeren, battle of, 305. 

Grouchy, French commander, 246, 339, 
341, 342, 343, 344. 

Guilds, 18th century Europe, 6, 12. 

Gustavus III, Sweden, benevolent 
despot, 17. 

Gustavus IV, Sweden, 254, 271. 



H 

Hamburg, occupied by Napoleon, 235 ; 
annexed, 274. 

Hanau, battle of, 308. 

Hanover, 210, 224, 235, 302. 

Hanseatic towns, annexed by Napoleon, 
274 ; hardships in, 280 ; surrender 
demanded, 302. See also Hamburg, 
Bremen, and Lubeck. 

Hardenberg, Prussian statesman, 228, 
296-297, 347. 

Haugwitz, Prussian envoy, 224, 228. 

Hebert, 118, 126. 

Heilsberg, combat at, 245. 

Helvetic Republic, 176, 200. 

Hesse-Cassel, Elector deposed, 235. 

Hesse-Darmstadt, in Confederation of 
the Rhine, 225. 

Hiller, Austrian commander, 265. 

Hoche, French commander, 123, 134. 

Hochstadt, battle of, 193. 

Hohenlinden, battle of, 194. 

Hohenlohe, 120, 231, 232, 233, 234. 

Holland, 18th century, 19; British 
alliance, 111; Batavian Republic, 
176, 198-199, 209, 211, 215; King- 
dom, 225-226, 251, 252, 269; 
annexed to France, 272-274, 311; 
surrendered by France, 326; Con- 
gress of Vienna (Netherlands), 334. 

Holy Roman Empire, territory 18th 

century, 19 ; history to 1789, 33-35 ; 

.89; in 1st coalition, 111, 156; and 

Treaty of Luneville, 196, 200; end 

of, 225, 334-335. 

Hondschoote, battle of, 121, 122. 

Houchard, French commander, 119, 120. 

Hougomont, engagement at, 342, 343. 



Ibrahim, Mameluke commander, 178, 
179 



Illyrian Provinces, 268, 302, 334. 

Insurrection, of August 10, 1792, 101- 
102; of June 2, 1793, 117-118. 

Intendants, France, 52-53. 

Ireland, revolt, 157, 197. 

Italy, 18th century, 19 ; detached from 
Holy Roman Empire, 34 ; Napoleon's 
1st campaign in, 166-170 ; political 
reconstruction in, 170-171 ; Napo- 
leon's 2d campaign in, 189-193 ; 
Napoleon's policies in, 196, 199 ; and 
plans of 3d coalition, 215 ; Napoleon 
King of, 215, 223, 224, 254, 263, 269, 
274, 294 ; surrendered by France, 
326; Congress of Vienna, 330, 331, 
334. 



Jacobin, Club, 90-91, 92, 100, 101 ; and 

factional quarrels, 109-111, 116-119, 

124-127, 131-133. 
Jaffa, captured by Napoleon, 179. 
Jemappes, battle of, 107, 108. 
Jena, battle of, 234-235. 
Jerome Bonaparte, see Bonaparte, 

Jerome. 
John, Archduke, Austrian commander, 

193, 218, 219, 220, 266, 267. 
John XII, pope, and Holy Roman 

Empire, 34. 
Joseph (Bonaparte), King of the Two 

Sicilies, King of Spain, see Bonaparte, 

Joseph. 
Joseph II, Holy Roman Emperor, 

benevolent despot, 16 ; ruler of 

Austria, 26-29, 138. 
Josephine Beauharnais, Empress of 

France, divorced, 276. 
Jourdan, French commander, 122, 123, 

127, 129, 130, 158, 159, 160, 164, 

165, 166, 177, 259. 
Junot, French commander, 253, 255, 

258, 259, 260, 282. 



K 



Kalisch, Treaty of, 297. 

Kellerman, French commander, 105, 106, 

161, 193, 339. 
Kilmaine, French commander, 115. 
Kleber, French commander, 162. 
Kosciuszko, Polish patriot, 143, 147. 
Kray, Austrian commander, 189, 193. 
Kulm, combat at, 305. 
Kutusoff, Russian commander, 218, 

220, 221, 290, 291, 297, 299. 



2 a 



354 



INDEX 



Laban, French commander, 339, 343. 

Labedoyere, French officer, 336. 

La Besnardiere, 330. 

Lafayette, Marquis de, appointed head 
of National Guard, 74, 77-78 ; gen- 
eral, 98, 99, 104, 105, 115. 

La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, battle of, 317, 
318. 

Laharpe, French commander, 166. 

La Haye Sainte, engagement at, 342, 343. 

Landshut, combat at, 265. 

Land tax, France, proposed, 57 ; ordered 
by edict, 58 ; opposed by Parlement 
of Paris, 59. 

Lannes, French commander, 190, 191, 
192, 217, 219, 233, 234, 238, 264, 265, 
266. 

Laon, battle of, 320. 

La Rothiere, battle of, 317. 

Latouche Treville, French admiral, 212. 

Lauriston, French commander, 299, 300. 

Law of Hostages, is">. 

Law of the Maximum, 118; repealed, 
133, 134. 

Law of the Suspects, 125. 

Lebrun, Associate Consul, France, 187. 

Lefebvre, French commander, 130, 162, 
260, 264, 322. 

Legion of Honor, 277, 328, 337. 

Legislative Assembly, constitution pro- 
viding for, 86-87 ; character and 
session, 90-95 ; and Revolutionary 
Commune, 101-105. 

Legislative body, French consulate, 186 ; 
and empire, 276-277. 

Leipzig, battle of, 306-308. 

Leipzig campaign, 29S-301, 303-308. 

Leoben, armistice of, 169. 

Leopold, archduke Tuscany, benevolent 
despot, 17 ; succeeded to Austrian 
throne (1790), 29; Declaration of 
Pillnitz, 83; death, 94; policies, 
138-141. 

Lestocq, Prussian commander, 238, 241, 
242, 245, 246. 

Lettre de cachet, France, 55. 

Ligny, engagement at, 341, 342. 

Ligurian Republic, 171, 199. 

Lisle, Rouget de, La Marseillaise, 100. 

Lit de justice, France, 59. 

Lobau, fight at, 266. 

Lodi, battle of, 167. 

Lombardy, 19, 334. 

Lomenie de Brienne, Chief of the Com- 
mittee of Finance, France, 58; dis- 
missed, 60. 



Longwy, capture of, 104, 105. 

Louis (Bonaparte), King of Holland, see 
Bonaparte, Louis. 

Louis Capet = Louis XVI. 

Louis Ferdinand, Prince, head of pa- 
triotic party in Prussia, 228. 

Louis XIV, France, 50-51. 

Louis XVI, France, organization of 
government, 50-55 ; and financial 
crisis, 56-58; summoning of estates 
general, 60; and Estates General, 
61-66 ; and National Assembly ; 
character, 68-69; and nobility vs. 
people, July, 1789, 71-74; position 
after July revolt, 76 ; from Versailles 
to Paris, 77-78 ; and Civil Constitution 
of the Clergy, 82-83; flight to Va- 
rennes, 83-84 ; took oath to support 
the constitution, Sept. 1791, 86; and 
Legislative Assembly, 93-95, 100- 
102 ; tried for treason and executed, 
111, 141, 150. 

Louis XVIII (Comte de Provence), 134, 
160, 325, 326-328, 333, 337; Second 
Restoration, 346-347. 

Louisa, Queen, Prussia, 228, 247. 

Louisiana, sold to U. S., 210. 

Lowe, Sir Hudson, British governor of 
St. Helena, 345-346. 

Li'ibeck, annexed by Napoleon, 274, 329. 

Lucca, 170. 

Lucchesini, Prussian diplomat, 235, 236. 

Luneville, Treaty of, 194, 196, 198. 

Lutzen, battle of, 299-300. 



M 

MacDonald, French commander, 267, 

288, 291, 299, 304, 305, 316, 317, 319, 

320, 321, 322, .323. 
Mack, Austrian commander, 217, 218, 

219. 
Malmesbury, British diplomat, 175. 
Maloyaroslavetz, combat at, 292. 
Malta, 178, 209, 211, 214 251. 
Manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick, 

99-100. 
Mantua, siege of, 168-169, 170. 
Marat, 102-103, 105, 118. 
Marceau, French commander, 130. 
Marches, The, detached from papal 

territories, 254. 
Marengo, battle of, 192-193, 196. 
Maria Louisa, Archduchess, Austria, 

Empress of France, 276, 281, 295, 324. 
Maria Theresa, Austria, 1st partition of 

Poland, 25 ; and war with Frederick 

the Great, 30. 



INDEX 



355 



Marie Antoinette, Queen of France, 58, 

69-70, 78, 100, 126, 140. 
Marmont, French commander, 193, 217, 

284, 299, 312, 313, 316, 317, 320, 321. 
Marseillaise, La, 100. 
Massacre of the prisons, 1792, 104-105. 
Massena, French commander, 161, 162, 

166, 167, 169, 189, 190, 191, 192, 217, 

219, 220, 244, 264, 265, 266, 267, 

282, 283, 284. 
Mazarin, 50. 

Mediation, Act of, Switzerland, 199-200. 
Melas, Austrian commander, 189, 191, 

192, 193. 
Metternich, Austrian chancellor, 295, 

296, 297, 302, 303, 309-311, 329, 332, 

338, 347, 348. 
Midi, revolt in, 160. 
Milan, 18th century, 19, 167, 170, 172. 
Milhaud, French commander, 339. 
Millesimo, battle of, 167. 
Mirabeau, 66, 70-71, 80, 83. 
Mockern, fighting at, 306. 
Modena, 170, 172, 334. 
Moncey, French commander, 159, 190, 

191, 192, 259, 260, 261. 
Mondovi, battle of, 167. 
Montesquieu, 50. 
Montmirail, battle of, 317. 
Moore, Sir John, British commander, 

261, 262, 270. 
Moreau, French commander, 159, 164, 

165, 166, 189, 190, 193, 194, 207. 
Mortier, French commander, 210, 282, 

316, 317, 320, 321, 339. 
Moscow, Napoleon at, 291-292. 
Mosskirch, battle of, 193. 
Mountain, see Jacobin. 
Mount Tabor, battle of, 180. 
Murad, Mameluke commander, 178, 179. 
Murat, French commander, 172, 192, 

217, 218, 219, 220, 233, 238, 255, 269, 

294, 334. 

N 

Naples, 18th century, 19 ; in 1st coali- 
tion, 111, 156, 170, 176; Napoleon 
and, 211, 224-225, 251, 269, 274, 
284 ; restored to Ferdinand, 334. 

Napoleon Bonaparte, defense of Con- 
vention, 136 ; life, 162-164 ; general, 
164; 1st Italian campaign, 166-169; 
and political reconstruction in Italy, 
170 ; and Directory, 174, 175 ; Egyp- 
tian campaign, 177-180 ; overthrow 
of Directory, 181-183; consul, 184- 
189; 2d Italian campaign (Marengo), 
189-193 ; international diplomacy, 



194-196, 198-201 ; domestic policies. 
201-206; Consul for life, 206; Em- 
peror, 207-208; vs. 3d Coalition, 
209-227; vs. Prussia and Russia, 
228-249; continental blockade, 250- 
258; Peninsular war, 258-262; vs. 
Austria, 262-268; continental bloek- 
ade, 269-287; vs. Russia, 288-293; 
Leipzig campaign, 293-308; defense 
of France, 309-321 ; 1st Abdication, 
322-323 ; Elba, 320, 335, 336 ; return 
and Waterloo, 336-344; final sur- 
render, 344; St. Helena, 345-346. 

Nassau, in Confederation of the Rhine, 
225. 

National Assembly, France, organized, 
64 ; joined by other Orders, 66 ; its 
work, 74-86 ; its close, 87-88. 

National Guard, organized, 74 ; cockade, 
77 ; at Versailles, 77-78 ; arrested 
Louis XVI at Varennes, 84 ; and 
massacre of the Champ de Mars, 85, 
133. 

Nations, Battle of the, see Leipzig, 
battle of. 

Necker, Jacques, France, Minister of 
Finance, 60 ; before the Estates 
General, 64; dismissed July 11, 1789, 
72; recalled, July 21, 74. 

Neerwinden, battle of, 114, 116. 

Nelson, 178, 179, 197, 213-214. 

Netherlands, Austrian, see Austrian 
Netherlands. 

Neufchatel, canton of Switzerland, 334. 

Ney, French commander, 217, 219, 220, 
233, 238, 241, 242, 245, 260, 261, 282, 
284, 288, 292, 293, 299, 300, 301, 305, 
316, 322, 323, 336, 337, 339, 341, 342, 
343. 

Nice, occupied by French, 108, 318. 

Nile, battle of the, 179. 

Nobility, in 18th century Europe central 
and eastern, 4 ; in western Europe, 9 ; 
in politics, 15-16; in Russia, 21-22; 
in Great Britain, 35 ; hunting priv- 
ileges in France, 40, 44-46 ; in 
Estates General, France, 61-66 ; and 
King vs. People, July, 1789, 71-74; 
desert France, 74 ; give up privileges, 
75 ; in Prussia, opposition to Stein, 
257. See also Emigres. 

Non-juring clergy, 83, 93, 98, 104. 

Nootka Sound incident, 153. 

North, Lord, Prime Minister in England, 
37. 

Northern Maritime League, 197. 

Norway, 19 ; Sweden demands, 286, 
297-298 ; Congress of Vienna, 334. 



356 



INDEX 



Ochakoff, Russian victory over Turks 
(1788), 24; British interest in, 153. 

Oldenburg, duchy of, annexed by Napo- 
leon, 274 ; effect on Alexander of 
Russia, 281. 

Oporto, battle of, 270. 

Order in Council, British, 237, 251. 

Orleans, Due d', 72. 

Ott, Austrian commander, 192. 

Otto I, Holy Roman Emperor, 34. 

Oudinot, French commander, 264, 288, 
292, 299, 303, 305, 316, 317, 319, 320, 
321, 322, 



Pajal, French commander, 339. 
Palafox, Spanish commander, 259, 260, 

261. 
Palais-Royal, 72, 77. 
Papal States, 19, 279, 334. 
Paris, revolt in, July, 1789, 72-74; 

October, 1789, 77 ; capitulation of 

(1814), 321. 
Paris, Treaty of, 1st, 325, 328, 331; 

(2d), 347. 
Parlement, France, 54, 58. 
Parlement of Paris, and taxes, 58-59; 

banished and returned, 59. 
Parma, 170, 172, 334. 
Parthenopean Republic, 176, 177. 
Patent of Tolerance, Austria (1781), 26. 
Paul, Russia, 197. 
Peasantry, 18th century Europe central 

and eastern, 3-4 ; in western Europe, 

7-8 ; political conditions, 16 ; in 

France, 38-42 ; in Spain, 14S ; in 

France, favored Napoleon, 337. 
Persia, and Napoleon, 244. 
Peter III, Russia, married to Catherine, 

Czar, assassinated, 20. 
Petion, mayor of Paris, 92. 
Pichegru, French commander, 123, 127, 

128, 15S, 159, 160, 206. 
Piedmont, 18th century, 19, 176; 

Napoleon in, 190, 199, 209, 215. 

See also Sardinia. 
Pitt, Earl of Chatham, Prime Minister 

in England, 36, 151. 
Pitt, William (Pitt, The younger). Prime 

Minister in England, 37, 151-157, 

188, 197, 213-217, 223, 226. 
Pius VII, Pope, and Napoleon, 278-279. 

See also Pope. 
Plaswitz, Armistice of, 301-303. 
Poland, division, 17 ; territory 18th 

century, 18-19; 1st partition, 24-25, 



89; 2d partition, 112, 141-142; 3d 
partition, 143, 145-148; Russian 
claims, 214 ; and Napoleon, 239- 
240, 248, 268, 269, 281, 286, 294, 
297, 298, 318; Congress of Vienna, 
330, 331, 333. 

Political conditions, 18th century 
Europe, 15, 18. 

Political Theories, 18th century, 16, 17, 
47-50. 

Poniatowski, King of Poland, 25, 288, 
291. 

Pope, visited Vienna to protest Joseph 
II's reforms, 27 ; National Assembly 
in France acts against, 82, 155, 176; 
and Napoleon, 204-205, 208, 254, 
278-279, 296; Congress of Vienna, 
334. 

Portland, Duke of, British minister, 
254-255. 

Portugal, 19, 111, 156, 211, 252, 253, 
255, 269-271, 280, 282-285, 294, 298, 
311-314. 

Prague, Congress of, 302-303. 

Prefect, French administrative official, 
202. 

Pressburg, Treaty of, 223, 257, 262. 

Proletariat, in France, 43^14, 78, 85, 
91, 103, 110, 117, 133, 135. 

Provence, Comte de, Louis XVIII, 134, 
160. See also Louis XVIII, France. 

Provisional Commune, Paris, 1792, 101- 
105, 110. 

Prussia, territory 18th century, 19; 
relations with Russia, 24; history 
(1740-1789), 29-33, 89; war with 
France, 95 ; in 1st coalition. 111 ; war 
with France, 119-124, 127-131, 158- 
162; and Poland, 141-143; history, 
1789-1795, 144-148; and Napoleon, 
200, 214, 216, 223-224, 228-249, 
256-257, 274, 286, 294; treaty with 
Russia, 297; vs. Napoleon, 298, 299- 
308; campaign in France, 314-323; 
Congress of Vienna, 328-335 ; Alliance 
against Napoleon, 338; Waterloo, 
339-344. 

Pultusk, engagement at, 239. 

Pyramids, battle of the, 178-179. 

Q 
Quatre Bras, engagement at, 341. 
Quiberon expedition, 134. 



Rastadt, Congress of, 176-177. 
Reichenbach, Treaty of, 302. 



INDEX 



357 



Reichenbach, Convention of, 1790, 138- 
139. 

Reille, French commander, 339. 

Representatives on Mission, appointed 
by Convention, 117. 

Revolutionary Commune, Paris, 1792, 
101-105. 

Revolutionary Tribunal, 104, 117, 124- 
127, 132. 

Rewbell, Director, 175. 

Reynier, French commander, 282, 288, 
299, 300. 

Richelieu, 50. 

Rivoli, battle of, 169. 

Robespierre, 102, 105, 110, 116-119, 
124-127, 131-132, 161. 

Rochambeau, French commander, 98. 

Roland, Mme., Gironde leader, 110. 

Roman Republic, 176, 177. 

Rome, see Pope. 

Rome, King of, son of Napoleon, 276, 
324. 

Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 49, 148. 

Riichel, Prussian commander, 234. 

Russia, territory 18th century, 18; 
history, 1762-1789, 20-25 ; interests, 
1788-1791,88; in Northern Maritime 
League, 197 ; in 3d coalition, 214-215 ; 
and Napoleon (1806-1807), 228-249; 
seized Finland, 254 ; and Napoleon, 
269; and Sweden, 271-272; and 
Napoleon, 284, 280 ; agreement with 
Austria (1813), 296; treaty with 
Prussia, 297 ; vs. Napoleon, 298, 
299-308, 318-319; Congress of 
Vienna, 328-335 ; alliance against 
Napoleon, 338, 339. 

Russian campaign, 288-293. 

Russo-Turkish war, 1768-1774, 24; 
1787-1788, 24. 



Salamanca, battle of, 312. 

Sardinia, 18th century, 19 ; war with 

France, 108, 111, 156, 160-162, 166- 

167, 170, 176, 215. 
Savoy, and France, 109, 318. 
Saxe-Gotha, occupied by Napoleon, 

235. 
Saxe-Weimar, and Napoleon, 235. 
Saxony, part of Holy Roman Empire, 

19 ; neutrality forced by Napoleon, 

235 ; King of, made sovereign of 

Poland, 248; ally of Napoleon, 294; 

Congress of Vienna, 331, 332, 333. 
Scharnhorst, Prussian statesman, 256- 

257, 296. 
Scherer, French commander, 161. 



Schonbrunn, Peace of, 267-268, 281, 

286. 
Schwarzenberg, Austrian commander, 

289, 291, 293, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 

308, 315, 316, 317, 319, 320, 321. 
Sebastiani, French agent, 209, 239. 
Seigniorial charges, 7, 39 ; destruction of 

records of, 73. 
Senate, French consulate, 186, 206 ; 

empire, 240, 277, 325. 
Serfdom, Russia, Catherine II's policy 

toward, 21-22, 23; Austria, Joseph 

Il's policy toward, 27-28 ; remnant 

in France, 38 ; abolished in Prussia, 

256. 
Serrurier, French commander, 161, 162, 

166. 
Seven Years' War (1756-1763), 30. 
Sheridan, British statesman, 152. 
Sieyes, French statesman, 180, 181, 182, 

183, 184, 185, 186. 
Silesia, Frederick the Great's wars for, 

30. 
Smith, Adam, 50. 
Smith, Sir Sidney, British commander, 

179. 
Social conditions 18th century, Central 

and Eastern Europe, 2-6 ; Western 

Europe, 6-11. 
Societe des Egaux, 172. 
Souham, French commander, 128. 
Soult, French commander, 162, 217, 222, 

233, 238, 260, 261, 262, 270, 271, 282, 

283, 284, 312, 313, 314, 339. 
Spain, 19; in 1st coalition, 111; con- 
ditions in, 1789-1795, 148-151 ; and 

Napoleon, 211, 251, 252, 255-262, 

269, 270, 282-285, 294, 298, 311-314. 
Stamp Tax, France, proposed, 57 ; 

opposed by Parlement of Paris, 58. 
States of Europe, 18th century, 18-20; 

1789-1795, 137-157. 
St. Cyr, French commander, 211, 217, 

260, 288, 304. 
St. Dizier, fight at, 316. 
Stein, Prussian statesman, 256-257, 297. 
Steyer, armistice of, 194. 
St. Helena, Napoleon at, 345-346. 
St. Louis, Order of, 328. 
Stockach, battle of, 177. 
St. Priest, Prussian commander, 321. 
Suchet, French commander, 190, 191, 

312, 313, 314, 339. 
Sweden, 19, 89, 197, 214, 243, 252, 253- 

254, 271-272, 274, 286, 287, 297-298, 

302 334. 
Switzerland, 19, 176, 199-200, 209, 211, 

215, 274, 326, 333-334. 



358 



INDEX 



Taille, 8, 39, 52 ; reduction proposed, 57. 

Talavera, battle of, 270. 

Talleyrand, French statesman, 195-196, 

199, 200, 216, 225, 226, 324, 325, 331, 

332, 333. 
Tauroggen, Convention of, 295. 
Temples of Reason, conversion of French 

churches into, 126. 
"Tennis-Court Oath," France, 65. 
Terror, The, France, 119, 124-127, 131- 

133. 
Third Coalition, war of, 208-227. 
Third Estate, in Estates General, 61- 

66 ; in National Assembly, 80. 
Thurreau, French commander, 191. 
Tilsit, Treaty of, 246-248, 252. 
Tithes, 8. 

Torres Vedras lines, 271, 284. 
Toulon, French port, surrendered to 

British, 118, 125; recaptured, 126, 

164, 178. 
Towns, conditions in central and eastern 

Europe 18th century, 5-6 ; in western 

Europe, 10-11 ; France, 53. 
Trafalgar, battle of, 213. 
Treaty of the Second Partition of 

Poland, 142. 
Treaty of the Third Partition of Poland, 

143. 
Treves, Elector of, 94. 
Tribunate, 186, 207; abolished, 276. 
Trinidad, ceded to Great Britain, 19S. 
Turkey, territory 18th century, 19; 

relations with Russia, 24, 88; defense 

of Egypt, 178-180; and Napoleon, 

239, 244, 247-248, 258, 269, 281, 286. 
Tuscany, 111, 156, 170, 251, 252, 254, 

263, 334. 

U 

Ulm, Austrian surrender at, 219. 
United States, purchased Louisiana, 
210; merchant marine suffers, 237. 



Valais, Republic of, annexed by Napo- 
leon, 274 ; joined to Switzerland, 334. 

Valenciennes, French city, captured, 
116, 118. 



Valmy, battle of, 106, 108. 

Vandamme, French commander, 162, 

264, 288, 304, 305, 339, 341, 342. 
Varennes, flight to, 83-84, 140. 
Vauban, French engineer, 114. 
Vauchamps, battle of, 317. 
Vendee, La, revolt in, 116-119, 126, 133, 

164, 201. 
Venice, 19, 170, 223, 334. 
Verdun, 104, 105. 
Vergniaud, a Girondin leader, 110. 
Victor, French commander, 190, 192, 

245, 260, 270, 282, 292, 293, 300, 316, 

317, 319. 
Vienna, Congress of, 328-335, 347. 
Villeneuve, French admiral, 212, 213. 
Vingtieme, 8, 52 ; suppression proposed, 

57. 
Vitry, combat at, 321. 
Vittoria, battle of, 310, 313. 
Voltaire (Francois Arouet), 48-49, 80, 

148. 

W 

Wagram, battle of, 266-267. 
Walcheren Island, British expedition, 

273. 
Warsaw decree, 251. 
Warsaw, Grand duchy of, 248, 268, 274, 

281, 286, 302, 331. 
Waterloo, battle of, 335. 
Wattignies, battle of, 122-123. 
Wellesley, Sir Arthur, see Wellington, 

Duke of. 
Wellington, Duke of, 259, 270, 271, 282, 

283, 284, 310, 311, 312, 313, 315, 339, 

340, 341, 342, 346, 347. 
Wessemberg, 330. 
Westphalia, Kingdom of, 248, 274. 
Whitworth, British ambassador, 210. 
Wittgenstein, Russian commander, 298. 
Wrede, Austrian commander, 308. 
Wurmser, Austrian commander, 120, 

159, 165, 168. 
Wiirtemberg, 200, 223 ; in Confederation 

of the Rhine, 225, 335. 



Yorck, Prussian commander, 293, 295, 

298. 
York, Duke of, British commander, 116, 

120, 121, 129. 



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